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Hi, how are you?  It has been suggested to me that a few pages of 
prefatory remarks of the form “dear reader” would help “prepare the reader 
to be disoriented” in the essays I’ve written.  I’m very happy to do so, insofar 
as corresponding with you in this way somewhat lessens the natural readerly 
tendency to demand—intentionally or not—that I correspond “to” you.  This 
distinction might be the most important cord running through the essays, 
which all in some way discuss coping strategies for how to deal with 
irrevocable, incommunicable difference.  The maps by which we tend to 
conceptualize “diverse” people in familiar or categorical terms are 
inadequate.  Disorienting?  Yes, insofar as the reader holds to a protocol that 
does want some of its categories to remain unquestionable.  Common sense 
tells us that one has to stand on solid ground to swing a hammer effectively; 
whereas my project has turned out to have more in common with Derrida’s, 
in that one can’t write about what underwrites meaning without either 
violating one’s own thesis or else finding some other technique for swinging 
the hammer—or wielding the scalpel, or unwinding the threads of a 
fabrication, or any metaphor you choose, so long as it means fundamental 
anti-foundationalist critique.   
I’m not interested in linguistic foundations as a philosophical matter, 
however.  Deconstruction of meaning goes hand in hand with my rather 
urgent need to break apart the naturalized idea of experience.  No matter 
how astutely we observe the cultural construction of experience from a 
critical distance, there remains an uncritical fall-back operational 
presumption that a report on one’s embodied experience (as an 
ethnographer, for instance) is concrete; as if there were a simple sentence 
(see how we’re back to language again) that could accurately communicate 
basic shared elements of sense data, as if there weren’t learned and arbitrary 
iv 
forces behind what one is primed to notice, to ignore, to recall, to interpret, 
to infer as causality—and as if what one sees can be assumed to be all there 
is, merely because one doesn’t see anything else.  Awareness of the learned 
and arbitrary character of experience has, during the past thirty years, 
attached more readily to the Balinese than to the anthropologist.  I’ve 
needed to understand and circumvent this level of presupposition.  The 
differences between my experience and yours—differences which shared 
practices of common language gloss over—matter more than is generally 
supposed.  Neither are the products of these fallen-through differences small 
matters: their products are things like trauma, disability, and the tipping 
point between an argument and a fight.  My target is the cultural force of 
presupposition, then, which is a classically anthropological subject matter I 
approach through an emergent set of techniques and widely divergent 
literatures.  My aim has not been to “disorient the reader,” and in fact I think 
such a reaction marks a certain kind of resistance to the ways my text 
explicitly asks to be read—namely, my assertion that all texts, including 
anthropological ones, and particularly this one, ought to be approached 
anthropologically.  Every text is a cultural document, even if it disguises itself 
as a report.  Orientation itself, then, is very much the topic to keep in mind.  
Its outlines re-appear in various guises again and again.   
It occurs to me, too, that what some readers find disorienting may be 
the fact that my text is not primarily organized according to the principle of 
linear development.  It is organized according to the principle of repetition, 
which is native to human socialization.  I was able to recognize somewhere 
along the way that this was going on in my writing, and I was able to 
recognize the usefulness of refining it as an intentional technique.  What 
linguists call “parallelism” is basic to the voice and consciousness constructed 
here.  Similarly, I don’t believe the present work can be read properly if read 
once and/or from a single perspective.  I say this not as a conceit, but simply 
because of the way books are written and how my own work has inevitably 
reflected on and multiplied that process.  For one thing, I began and 
completed all the essays at roughly the same time and wrote them 
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concurrently during 2006.  Most passages migrated very freely from one 
chapter to another before the thing took shape from the connections these 
passages left behind as the residue of their being sewn into new contexts and 
then ripped out again to be tried someplace else.  Gradually, I found myself 
learning to use a peculiar lexicon and set of images, such that the reader 
now has to be socialized to their meaning rather than being taught them 
formally.  This wasn’t on purpose, but it does faithfully produce the document 
of an in-vivo thought process, thus providing the texture I am asking you to 
work through.  Second, bear in mind that the few minutes required to read 
from one paragraph to the next very often maps onto a year of intensive 
writerly work, including my digesting hundreds of texts in the meantime.  
This holds true from front to back.  Thus, it was written from multiple 
perspectives and in multiple layers.  It’s a text that wants to be lived with for 
a while and/or understood within a conversation among several readers.  
This multiplicity is itself the technique for encountering individual differences, 
those unshared qualia that culture fails to present.  They aren’t presentable 
without a mechanism for bringing out contrasts within seemingly unified 
entities like mono-graphs or narratives about an individual’s field 
experiences.  By these means, one’s own presuppositions can be 
foregrounded and one is prompted to formulate the idea that one has an 
orientation, and isn’t at the origin of a simple vector between sense and 
sense data.  “Dialogue” is of course the well-rehearsed but still-elusive 
philosophical term for this dynamic. 
Another binding agent within the collection became evident to me only 
after letting the whole manuscript sit for a while, during which time passages 
and images revisited me.  “The theory” that gradually constructs itself here 
deals with the anthropological study of the present, perhaps as opposed to 
the cultural Other; as such, it keeps company with Brian Massumi (1995) and 
recent work by Kathleen Stewart (2005, in press), neither of which I quite 
appreciated until I had derived my own approach based on many of the same 
texts they cite.  Here is my version.  Individual difference exists solely in the 
present.  Once it is recognized and schematized as an experience of 
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something or of some kind, the particularity of the present has been 
abducted into practical categories steeped in past and absent contexts.  
Husserl concluded at the outset of the last century that what we experience 
as the present is already past—a re-cognition—while vision science made 
similar observations at the beginning of this century, as I note in Chapter 2.  
Put another way, individual difference always constitutes the present, which 
cannot be conventionally experienced (I suspect that affect, which we tend to 
think of as a phenomenon floating somewhere near emotion, is instead our 
unqualified registration of the present).  I’m not especially concerned here 
with that aspect of the present concerned with time, however.  The other 
constituent of the present is, quite simply, the fact that one is in it; it isn’t 
happening any place else.  Reflexivity is the avenue for sensing this field, 
insofar as direct observation instead apprehends a field that is confined to 
the space in front of the observer.  The way to encounter the present, and 
especially presences, is through a reflexive interrogation of one’s own 
presupposing knowledges and values that leaves one less certain of what one 
knows.  Things become contingent and questionable. I will refer to this 
practice as ethics.  Reflexivity, the present, and individual difference have 
therefore turned out to comprise a system.  The result is a critical theory of 
how radical difference enters into or becomes dissociated from awareness. 
All these entirely too meta-reflexive comments about a text—itself a 
text that tries to account fundamentally for its own production and the 
textual production of authorial consciousness—are only made necessary by 
the fact that readers are apparently likely to encounter this work as 
something at once more internally connected than a simple stack of seven 
essays but less obviously cohesive than an ethnography.  You are free to 
read any assortment of the essays in any order without reference to any of 
what I have mentioned; every essay has a topic sentence and sports a more 
or less conventional structure.  I summarize the essays as separate texts in 
the next section (I recommend chapters 3, 5, and 6).  If you feel prompted 
to understand the collection as a single work, on the other hand, then I 
recommend that you encounter it as the artifact of a thought process being 
vii 
carried out on the page, where it can be studied.  More or less every page 
records a process of heuristic thinking, one bent on transcending socialized 
categories in search of new ideas about how experience and selfhood 
function and, just as importantly, how they break down.  The text is always 
on its way someplace else.  It is also talking about this process as it goes.   
Because ethnographies provide legible records of very smart, creative 
people coping with difference, I treat ethnography as an intrinsically 
interesting body of literature with which I have tried to think about 
difference.  My task ultimately required a historical remediation of three 
advents in post-1960s ethnographic practices: the repulsion of the study of 
mind by the study of interpretation, a flirtation with and rapid domestication 
of the self within the representation of the other, and the divorce between 
the critical study of texts and the empirical study of language.  Reflexive 
anthropology, if that turns out to be a useful label, re-engineers 
anthropological study without these schisms.  You might well object to these 
discussions of ethnographic practices, because they are keyed to an early 
moment of interpretive anthropology.  First, my experience has been that a 
great many anthropologists still fall back on venerable understandings of 
ethnography, because senior ethnographers belong to that moment and their 
students have reached their majority.  Interpretive dynamics are discussed 
less and less, however, and I am afraid that an important philosophical 
understanding will be lost to institutional memory in the next decade.  I 
argue that there is unfinished business from the Interpretive Turn.  Second, 
most ethnographies do not occupy the cutting edge, while the fact that many 
of the attempts to write in non-objectivizing ways will be labeled 
“experimental” highlights the fact that ethnography still has an ideological 
center based on realist interpretive science.  So if I’m not writing about your 
work, I’m nevertheless reflecting on and learning from a body of work being 
produced today on the social science side of anthropology.  More 
fundamentally, however, I argue that anything going by the name 
ethnography, experimental or realist, concerns itself with exploring collective 
life, either as process or product.  I ask for a distinction to be made between, 
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on the one hand, techniques of writing and research that produce the 
ethnographer as an experiencing subject; versus the institutionalized impulse 
that these advents ultimately serve.  Much of what I do here, for example, 
partakes of the heuristic moment of ethnography, but I am not writing about 
a people, place, or practice.  Finally, I argue that the objectifying tendencies 
we can so easily spot in 1960s ethnography are still with us, alive and well, 
within the fabric of anthropological discourse, just outside the focus of critical 
awareness.  Hopefully, the essays tease out some examples of this.  
Ethnographic texts and people talking about “ethnography,” then, both 
provide surfaces on which I can track the dissociation of individual difference 
within the documentation of cultural difference. 
An anthropology that remains programmatically reflexive as to its own 
construction of objective data will stress the much-prized—but also much 
romanticized and undertheorized—moment when the ethnographer is able to 
think “outside the box,” such as when a striking encounter overturns the 
research agenda brought by the anthropologist into the field.  This moment 
takes place outside the context of research, either as a critical perspective on 
one’s ethnographic practices or as a mode of anthropological thinking beyond 
ethnography.  In particular, we already know that our training informs our 
everyday lives and our dialogues with students, despite the absence of 
recording devices or opportunities for systematic data collection.  The 
dissertation helps formalize our understanding of this heuristic and abductive 
process, which is at play both in the pedagogical encounter with students and 
the encounter with individual suffering (hopefully these remain separate for 
you).  As a critical process for the production of self knowledge, moreover, 
reflexive anthropology is the way to find one’s voice without being given one 
by an observer or the society in which one lives.   
Thanks for reading, and I’d be happy to hear your response if you 
write me at neill@txstate.edu. 
 
RNH 




Chapter 1, “Presentiments,” introduces basic theoretical concepts that 
occupy the other essays, starting with the understanding of my blindness as 
an ongoing manifestation of socially unincorporated difference.  The 
pragmatics of individual difference and of text seem like two separate topics, 
but I attempt to articulate a vital relationship between them.  Given that 
culture precludes and in fact dissociates the encounter with present 
particularity, owing to the tendency of interpretation to press the present 
context into the mold of past and absent ones, a critical distance is required 
to apprehend new and different qualities of the hermeneutic circle in which 
experience forms.  It seems one has somehow to already be primed to 
expect the unknown.  Writing permits this kind of reinterpretation, while an 
ethical attentiveness, discussed in Chapter 4, may be the closest thing 
attainable to real-time apprehension of presence.  Sometimes phenomena 
needing to be understood are so complex that only writing can provide a 
reflexive surface adequate for attaining critical distance. Read as a completed 
product rather than as process, of course, the writing has a pre-fated quality: 
the events that the text has worked to formulate are present as 
presentiments in already-articulated forms.  But we can approach the text 
from the position that the formulation of experience has been carried out 
through writing, and not as a completed, insular mental process preceding it.  
This is a pragmatic or rhetorical protocol of reading.  The reading, writing, 
and circulation of texts, furthermore, continues to be an active, legible force 
of experience-making within social space.  To interpret a text in isolation 
solely as a matter of its meaning, either as personal experience or as a 
cultural field of interpretive potentials, does not track what a text observably 
does pragmatically in the world.  I use the example of Helen Keller’s 
rhetorical style and her account of her introduction to language to describe 
textuality as an ongoing work of experience and to argue that individual 
x
difference as what one must invariably discover through reading between the 
lines.  
In Chapter 2, “A Crack in the Ground,” I begin by rereading texts and 
fieldnotes from my prior short-term ethnographic projects.  I had written 
ethnographic narratives that hinged on visual details I could not have 
experienced originally, and which implied a mobility in the field (collecting 
data) that I hadn’t possessed.  But a corrected form of ethnographic 
narrative proved beyond my reach, because my memories were already 
inherently visual and otherwise impossible.  I tried for years to reread my 
memory as a palimpsest, but it wasn’t one.  There would be no experience of 
blindness or experience from a blind perspective unless I laboriously and 
theoretically constructed one.  The institutional discourse of New 
Ethnography was complicit in addressing me with an injunction to present 
myself in the way of an immersed ethnographer, while my becoming trained 
to do so averted the possibility, much less the professional responsibility, to 
apprehend the radicality of my own situation and its methodological 
implications.  At the same time, immersive ethnography’s standardized 
negation of me provided the fulcrum by which I could begin to formulate a 
productive experience of blindness: ethnography and I became one another’s 
dialectical Other.  I present a critical reading of anthropology’s “Interpretive 
Turn” by discussing reflexivity as it was developed in ethnography, 
ethnomethodology, and reflexive sociology, then argue for a composite 
approach.  What I term “Self-analytics” is what psychoanalytics would have 
been if built upon the premise that “The reality of the inner psyche is the 
same reality as that of the sign” (Voloshinov 1973 [1930]: 26). 
Chapter 3, “Making a Scene,” examines the interpretive work disclosed 
in everyday scenes of my blindness.  I focus on various forms of logistical 
and intercorporeal awareness (or lack thereof) that blind and sighted people 
display within public encounters.  The chapter takes the concept of disability 
out of the category of physical impairment and places it onto the field of 
social relations.  The “scenes” of my disability help complete the discussion of 
reflexivity begun in the previous chapter by providing occasions to discuss 
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intersubjective attunement (Rommetveit 1998, Wilce 2004) and 
communicative competence.  I define disability as the negative of agency and 
describe this product in terms of a triadic system of differences: it is a 
function of the magnitude of difference between oneself and the actor 
anticipated by the social field (including the built environment), as 
compounded by emergent conditions created during the interaction, and 
mitigated by prosthetic mechanisms (technologies, humans, animals, 
routines, and reliable environments).  Disability, in turn, is defined by the 
formula “individual difference is disabling.” 
Chapter 4, “The Interpretation of Difference,” polemicizes the 
production and circulation of anthropological knowledge, identifying 
classroom pedagogy as a major site of anthropology’s real-world circulation. 
This essay joins what the dissertation learns about blindness as a social 
process to how anthropology students are asked to become aware of their 
social contexts, largely outside the practice of organized research.  The 
central figure of this essay is the dialectical relationship between empirical 
research, as an ocular production of new knowledge; and anthropological 
heuristics, the self-critical inquiry into the conditions of knowledge production 
that I practice in these essays.  The discussion is framed by the three basic 
philosophical components of what I am identifying as cultural critique: the 
pre- and post-Hegelian dialectical form of interpretation, with special 
attention to Ricoeur and Gadamer; the ethical remediation of one’s own 
ethos, defined as a value horizon; and, finally, the pedagogical discipline—
ultimately always a self-discipline—that compels ethical engagement.  I 
argue that postmodern theorists have often reproduced models of 
philosophical ethics uncritically, neglecting the fact that philosophical texts 
are addressed to a professional public already disciplinarily bound to pursue 
self-knowledge.  Postmodern social theorists adopt the same form of address 
without addressing the framework of their actual publics who, as students 
and social scientists, tend to “apply” poststructural concepts within a narrow 
field.  There is no disciplinary compulsion for social scientists to rethink 
personal and professional practices outside that specialized field.  As a result, 
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the claims fieldwork tends to recognize as “interesting” are organized within 
the institution of professional anthropology, while the coveted scene in which 
the fieldworker’s itinerary is overturned by a different claim on her attention 
coming from an agent in the field is mystified.  Pedagogy urges 
programmatic attention to the present communicative interaction, such as 
the classroom, so that anthropological knowledge can be produced within the 
dialogue in which it is exchanged.  Significantly, only processes of repetition 
and synthesis with one’s own situation can teach the body how to practice an 
ethics learned in the sequestered context of reading “about” culture and 
society.  I do not attack the idea of field research, but emphasize that ethics 
warrants equal critical understanding as part of anthropological practice. 
Chapter 5, “Self Knowledge, from Circulation to Production,” contrasts 
the deconstructive uses of blindness from Chapter 3 with analysis of 
“constructive” examples of similarly-structured scenes in disability 
performance and practices of disabled identity formation within discourse.  
Michael Warner’s discussion of publics and counterpublics (Warner 2002) 
provides a framework for examining these processes in terms of who is being 
addressed and what public is being constituted by the discourse.  This issue 
is complex in the setting of published autobiographical accounts which, in 
important respects, are addressed to the author as a reflexive project to 
produce self knowledge.  By focusing on the pragmatics of particular 
observable speech events, the essay problematizes the reliance cultural 
studies places on the projection of an ideal reader or the reader normal to a 
defined culture group.  For autobiographical performances, including memoir, 
pragmatics analyzes the text in terms of what it does—the conceptual 
relationships the text constructs—rather than what it means as a 
representation of an extra-textual reality (the works of Faulkner and Joyce, 
for example, demand a discourse-pragmatics protocol of reading).  I 
conclude with an examination of several strategies of analytical reflexivity 
found in the AIDS diary of anthropologist Eric Michaels, who textually 
reformulates his changing relationship to his body, sexuality, professional 
identity, friends, family, and social institutions.   
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Chapter 6, “Clinical Inferences,” examines three widely divergent 
points on the map of what, for the sake of argument, we can call cognitive 
science.  Cognitive anthropology, neuroimaging, and psychosurgery all 
operate according to a foundational claim to make grounded inferences about 
the mind.  Working from three specific texts, I identify the conceptual hinges 
that the scientists have taken as given, then I imagine contrary possibilities.  
The result is not a scientific critique, but a rhetorical one.  For absolutely all 
practical purposes, the foundations of empirical science reside within history 
and culture.  Scientific practice crosses into the realm of a regime at the 
point where its foundationalisms are taken as an objective reality withdrawn 
from any contact with falsification procedures.  Without a reflexive function 
(i.e., a self-analytics or cultural critique), reality is trapped in a circuit 
comprising the scientist, the subject, and an array of instruments calibrated 
to keep this circuit humming.  Anything qualitatively at odds with established 
reality will remain dissociated by virtue of its ready interpretability according 
to quantitative instruments. 
Chapter 7, “Argonauts of the Western Tradition,” takes discourse 
pragmatics very far afield in order to rekindle critical dialogue between the 
empirical study of communicative practice and poststructural philosophy, 
both of which historically stem from the same critiques of structure.  The 
essay performatively revisits the fundamental theoretical orientation of the 
other essays: a reflexively-involved form of cultural critique that 
comprehends difference through attending to the pragmatics of the social 
field as a communicative interaction.  “What is going on” is understood by 
suspending the “aboutness” of discourse, apprehended as the expression of a 
system, to be understood instead according to the local production of agency 
and the wider circulation of value indexed in local exchanges.   
Page by page, then, the essays deal with the philosophy of science and 
the sociology of ethnographic knowledge as much as fields of action.  Each 
essay addresses itself to a somewhat different but related disciplinary 
literature, ranging from linguistic anthropology to cognitive science, the sum 
of which make up the scope of the problematic as I have encountered it.  The 
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overall organization into an essay collection has resulted from these topics 
and discourses gradually differentiating themselves as I wrote.  I have had to 
struggle against the pull of scholarly writing conventions that present 
“objects of study” as special topics contained by the disciplined scholarly 
work as representation.  When disability appears within such a discourse, as 
I will argue, it is immediately severed from the contextual processes that 
produce it.  Accordingly, the idea of a collection also contributed the solution 
to a problem: how to impede the readerly tendency to build up a final, 
unified vision of the subject so as to instead promote a coming to terms with 
the irreducible differences among the essays (and sites of disablement), 
along with a sense of the generative process that nevertheless crops up 
repeatedly from one essay to the next.  That’s the protocol for remediating 
the socially averted encounter with difference.   
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When the author sets out to use anthropology to understand his 
physical blindness, he discovers a dialectical tension between empirical 
observation versus heuristics that is held in common by both ethnography 
and disability.  Ensuing discussions synthesize personal experience with the 
history of anthropology and the philosophy of science in order to construct a 
critical dialogue in which blindness can be understood anthropologically, 
while the individuality of the experience of blindness ultimately pushes 
ethnography past its generic limits.  The essays argue that the study of 
cultural differences cannot apprehend disability processually.  Disability is 
instead properly understood as an unshared individual difference dissociated 
from communicative practice and learned practices of embodiment, 
dissociated as well by ethnographic accounts of collective practices.  
Individual difference is disabling; meanwhile, ideologically, the visible 
products of disability are driven into the individual body, qualifying it as 
disabled, without reference to the generative process.  This exploration 
becomes an application of “reflexive anthropology,” which departs 
qualitatively from the conventional project of ethnography by centering 
critical attention on the interlocutory field that includes the anthropologist as 
a fully invested participant.  It remediates the situated cultural production of 
one’s own knowledge and experience, which opens the possibility to become 
attentive to the individual differences that constitute the present.  The essays 
historicize three advents in interpretive anthropology: the repulsion of the 
study of mind by the study of interpretation, the flirtation with and rapid 
domestication of the self within the representation of the other, and the 
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divorce between the critical study of texts versus the empirical study of 
language.  The approach incorporates discourse pragmatics and practice 
theory, but also post-objectivist sensibilities.  However, the discourse of 
affirmation associated with poststructuralism is here replaced with one 
stemming from suffering and disability.  Collectively, the essays argue that 
the ethical practice of “thinking anthropologically” outside ethnography, by 
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Chapter 1.  Presentiments 
 
They say, the alien frog is saying “Hi, how are you?”  Words bubble up 
in a cartoon balloon above eyestalks waggling in a friendly way.  No wonder, 
really, that antenna with eyes seem always to be the archetypal way to make 
something into an alien: likely, it’s a sort of hyper-rational human wish 
fulfillment.  The eyes are just a symbol for the functioning of super-sensitive 
antennae, which can’t in itself be pictured.  I happen to remember the mural 
today, and so I see it as I pass it by, painted on the wall of what once was a 
record store.  The artist is middle-aged now, living with his parents and 
drawing pictures or writing songs at a little desk in their garage—all the 
independent living he can manage.  Few people look into who he was 
anymore or where he ended up, but so far enough have come out of the 
woodwork to save the mural.  My shoulder connects hard with the shaft of a 
light pole planted in the middle of the sidewalk, and I am brought up short.  
I’ve walked this route a thousand times without incident, so my body is 
apparently less reliable than the environment.  But that revelation, which 
ultimately has existential repercussions, isn’t my first reaction. 
“Who put that there?”  The simplest question, but one that only occurs 
to me now.  The sidewalk is narrow, and the pole is more than a foot in from 
the street.  There is nothing necessary or inevitable about its design or 
placement.  Ordinarily, what anthropologists call the “built environment” isn’t 
something I understand as built at all.  It was already there, part of the 
scenery, when I arrived.  Once the question of the builders slips in, though, 
the environment begins to shift uncomfortably.  I want to portray a sudden 
and momentary occupation of this space now strictly in terms of a sort of 
schizophrenia (but not the postmodern fun kind), while for the moment 
bracketing any question of what causes it. 
I am standing at a busy street corner hemmed in by enormous 
concrete buildings that reflect a palpable heat from the mid-summer sun.  
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They don’t announce their identities or address themselves to me in any 
way—they just loom over me, anonymous megalithic blocks.  If I take one 
step toward the ones across the street in either direction, I’ll go down under 
the weight of hurdling metal machines.  If there is a mind inside one of them, 
I will have to infer its existence by way of a subjunctivization of my own 
mind into the strange opaque carapace.  Is there a logic to it?  My body is 
tensed with flight response while I force myself to wait for some sense of a 
pattern.  To my left, the side of the building is a hundred unbroken yards of 
glass, but a spear of sunlight flashes before a man, standing on the sidewalk, 
framed for an instant before he disappears.  So there are doors, and there 
must be some sort of intelligible markings, unless they count their steps the 
way I do.  Behind me stands a homeless man, painting a sign for himself: 
“STRESSED?  YELL AT A HOMELESS MAN $1” (on second thought, he isn’t 
any longer so homeless).  I am standing in a place not meant for me, 
trapped in a blinding heat.  There was little thought of me in its design, no 
acknowledgment of me from the builders, even though I was born here and I 
have been present throughout their lives.  I was here before this street or 
these buildings.  I want to simply convey this sense of not-belonging to the 
built environment.  Who put that pole there?  I check my wallet, but only find 
a five, one green eye atop a pyramid blinking back at me.  Everything I will 
do to navigate this field will be analytical, tense, and a matter of dodging, 
slipping through, adapting my body to alien works.  I have become 
suspicious of everyone, everything, and especially of myself. 
Once, two Rwandan boys were deposited in a Michigan apartment 
along with a box of cereal, something they’d never seen before.  They still 
sat hungry the next morning, waiting for the aid workers to come back, 
looking at the smiling White family at table and having no idea that what 
they heard when they shook the box was the food inside (“Open Here>”).  
They were thirsty, too, since unlike stranded science-fiction heroes, they 
hadn’t discovered the function of the gleaming taps.  How many of these 
forgotten codes do we live by?  If this is culture, then most of culture has 
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forgotten its meaning.  Ideas of tradition, meaning, and practice all exhibit 
an obverse side well-suited for explaining how people get things done 
together or in conflict.  What brings me up short is the sense that culture is 
also an oppressive force—oppressive not like a regime but like humid 
Southern heat in September.  It keeps us as architects, aid workers, and 
even anthropologists from imagining the outside, and only on the outside do 
we feel it.  On this corner, I am standing below the ground. 
 
FROM ETHNOGRAPHY TO REFLEXIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 
I may as well set the tone with a confession: I have resisted 
ethnography.  It started during the late 1990s, in the middle of doctoral 
coursework, when I was finally able to name a frustrated sense that both the 
discovery of how collective life “works” and the suffering of marginalized 
groups were somehow epiphenomenal to another nagging concern.  No 
matter how small and oppressed the group, individuals claimed by it could 
still share one another’s practices and know or be told they had a valued 
identity, as documented by the resistance practices ethnographers almost 
invariably discovered.  Where did the first atom of resistance—the first 
spoken word, the first realization of value—come from?  I found myself 
reading in vein for signs of the failures of individual lives, for what wasn’t 
working, for how to learn from disorders or disorderliness, for inarticulate 
differences that would mark the moment antecedent to communicable 
practice.  The ethnographer as a so-called professional stranger (Agar 1980) 
proved more interesting in this regard than the represented natives, but the 
ethnographer’s situatedness in the home ground from which she came and to 
which she returned, as well as her knack of settling into the field, made it 
clear that the ethnographic concern for observed differences wasn’t a genre 
readily directed toward the degenerative force of being-different, of being 
located beyond the horizon of evaluation.  My task became the apprehension 
of that force and the description of its cultural ecology.  This undertaking 
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would remain inextricable from ethnography but would put me at odds with 
most of its conventions. 
During those same years of doctoral course work, my visual acuity 
declined rapidly, from the ability to read large text to what clinicians call 
“contrast perception.”  The question “how much can you see?” had always 
been part of a logistical problematic accompanying me throughout life, and 
responses that incorporated categorizations like “visually impaired,” “legally 
blind,” and “partially sighted” all boiled down effectively to “structurally 
ambiguous” (Douglas 2002 [1966]).  I could answer them by reciting my 
visual acuity, as if that were ever a meaningful number; or with a practical 
and always-contextual explanation of how my vision was a function of light, 
familiarity, a 3-degree field of vision, stress, rods versus cones, etc.  “How 
much”—they always wanted quantity, not qualities of sight.  Funny, too, how 
a description of what I saw always relied on using my own indirect access to 
normal vision as a referent—“I can see the distant tree but not the closer 
one” or “the tree is a blur”—which already overturned the communication of 
partial sight.  To settle under the “blind” label was a relief from the 
standpoint of my becoming socially predictable to others and functionally 
reliable to myself.  Others I know who have made this transition concur. 
Even so, blindness as a social category can’t be assumed to operate as 
an identity formed around culturally-reproducing practices or as a site of 
collective subjugation, although either of these assumptions can, in various 
ways, serve the cause of accommodative macro-level change in public policy.  
Most everyday disabling moments—when I tend most to think of myself as 
blind—happen with familiars who I’ve “trained” or else with people who 
appear never to have imagined blindness before, much less learned to 
discriminate invidiously against it.  That a lack of sight can always serve as 
the obvious anchor for identifying the blind as a sociological group obscures 
the fact that blindness never accrues meaning except in particular disabling 
interactions constituted by the wider society, while even this 
acknowledgement hasn’t yet begun to account for why the unreflexive 
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normativity of practice will make the accommodation to blindness in the 
emergent flow of interaction orders of magnitude more complex than a mere 
surface-order structural or political acknowledgment of it, such as putting 
Braille on elevator panels or passing a law to grant my guide dog status as a 
member of the public.  These measures don’t fix it, because the troublesome 
dynamics of structural ambiguity noted above are still at work in the 
overwhelmingly emergent aspects of public and private life.   
Blindness forever rejuvenates its quality of being, in effect, a first-
contact situation.  The scene is new, the actors are new, or my own learned 
habits and assumptions about familiar artifacts are disruptive in the sense of 
bearing such a strongly ingrained ocular-centric enculturation that I 
momentarily forget the conditions I should know about my embodiment, 
such as the need to stay attuned to senses other than vision despite the fact 
that others don’t.  Meanwhile, my practical efforts to navigate public space—
which in effect becomes privatized around me—take the form of an 
immediate and ongoing analytical preoccupation with micrological tactics and 
negotiations of bodies, spaces, actions, and interpretations, all of which 
effectively displace my attention from the general surroundings and to a 
degree actually determine more immediate interactions, simply as a 
consequence of moving through social space.  What has grated most, then, is 
not blindness as a social category, but the way socially unincorporated 
difference encircles me in a sphere of rupture, disclosing so dramatically our 
typical lack of agility in accommodating disconcerting situations.  The issue 
isn’t blindness, but the structural failure to anticipate it, the lack of strategies 
for accommodating it (beyond the technologies and legislation that displace 
the interpersonal labor of accommodation), the sudden destabilizing reflexive 
awareness by the sighted of how deeply vision is ingrained in the way they 
communicate, the hazy awareness the blind might have of how much our 
habits are socialized within a sighted milieu, and the lack of self knowledge 
on everyone’s part that would be required in order to change.   
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Emergent qualities of an interaction virtually guarantee that the 
possibility for accommodating radical yet socially unincorporated forms of 
difference will abut the limits of ordinary metacommunicative awareness.  
Information like “how much can you see?” or “what do you need from me, 
right now and whenever?” is no cure for the public or the blind.1 And yet, 
the disabled and able-bodied alike are strongly predisposed to seek a final 
solution or, worse, avoid the occasion for any critical inquiry by pinning the 
entire social life of disability on a biomedical impairment.  The supposed 
referent of the word “disability” is not the cause behind socially-ascribed 
disability categories or their attendant ideologies and behavioral symptoms.  
As I begin to suggest below, disability is an effect of a much more 
fundamental tendency of practice to enforce normative modes of 
embodiment while occluding actors’ awarenesses of the particular conditions 
under which their own knowledge and action are produced.  As an instance of 
this process, moreover, social scientists have largely reduced disability to a 
collective category of diversity, missing its generativity, insofar as this 
marginalized topic has been pursued from within conventional outlines of 
ethnography. 
Paul Rabinow (1977: 5) once borrowed a phrase from Ricoeur in order 
to describe ethnography as “the comprehension of self through the detour of 
the comprehension of the other.”  Several points about the immediate 
context of his Ricoeur quotation make it a good place to crack open a history 
of interpretive science that I argue, to the consternation of some, remains 
with us today.  The word “self” hides two very different contexts, in that 
 
1 This observation is made possible in large part by my position within a society that 
confers considerable legal and personal recognition upon the disabled through the Americans 
With Disabilities Act and other forms of institutional awareness.  Outside this context, clear 
systemic discriminatory attitudes remain the most pressing concern.  For example, a blind 
Fulbright researcher in the PRC describes being denied entrance to stores, restaurants, and 
taxi cabs solely on the basis of widespread assumptions that blindness poses too great a risk 
to business, presumably because of potential accidents (www.travelblog.org/bloggers/hong-
kong-fulbrighter).  See also Kohrman (2005) for a history of physical disability awareness in 
China.  My interest is located in the gaps where, even in fairly disability-aware publics, any 
discourse or set of prescriptions shows itself to be inadequate in the absence of a reflexive 
understanding of the present communicative event. 
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Ricoeur’s self and other are single individuals, but formally universal without 
reference to cultural differences; while Rabinow’s are culturally relativistic 
but otherwise generic (the Moroccan Other versus the audience who can 
embody Rabinow’s “I”).  the self refracted by the so-called “detour” of the 
generalized other will consequently tend to learn about itself in rather generic 
terms, because the degree of reflexivity appropriate to ethnographic 
investigation is limited to those categories that react to the cultural model in 
some way—we might know if the ethnographer is not White, not male, or not 
heterosexual, for example.  Likely, we could look behind the word 
“comprehension” as well to find two distinct usages, one being Ricoeur’s idea 
of in situ philosophical dialogue, a pragmatic relationship with a particular 
object or being; versus empirical data analysis on route to sociological 
models, generalizeable knowledge with a component applicable across 
contexts.  Accordingly, Rabinow offers his definition of interpretive fieldwork 
(for him, all ethnographic fieldwork) in a self-reflective account set off neatly 
from the grounded ethnographic research published before it.  Not even the 
second book is autoethnography, however, but what he would later call “dia-
ethnography” (Rabinow 1996: ix), aptly highlighting its dependence on the 
conventional project of cultural investigation.  Post-1970s ethnography tends 
to take the form of the first-person exemplary or idiosyncratic tales found in 
Rabinow’s Reflections, and certainly the appropriate use of ethnographic self-
comprehension continues to hinge on its applicability to cultural models.2
This should not be the only anthropological game in town, however. 
 
2 The communicable, transposable quality of the ethnographer’s experience is encoded 
in the very common writing convention that uses “one” in place of “I” when introducing the 
arrival narrative.  “One takes the road that leads west, leaving behind the stately buildings 
and palm-lined boulevards of Alexandria, passing rows of identical sand-colored buildings with 
balconies crowded with children, men in undershirts, women shouting across to neighbors, 
and clotheslines covered with multi-colored garments that dry instantly in the bright Egyptian 
sun (Abu-Lughod 1986: 1).  “Traveling through the Malaysian rainforest, one first senses the 
presence of a Temiar settlement through a change in the density of jungle foliage: primary 
forest gives way in patches to secondary forest. These once-tended fields, now overgrown 
with brush and young trees, might indicate that one has only reached a former settlement 
site” (Roseman 1991: 1).  “Even after passing through this fertile countryside, one is struck by 
the lushness of the city of Sefrou as it appears on the horizon. It is hidden from view as one 
approaches from Fez. The hills are now somewhat more substantial and the vistas less 
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Matters of individualistic action and process most often surface within 
social theory as the familiar “structure versus agency” clash of models.  But 
this dichotomy is a false one, so long as agency is described as a property 
exhibited by a (still-structurally-designated) categorical population.  The 
hermeneutics of cultural difference are not the same as the hermeneutics of 
individual perception, including for instance the interpretation of art (a 
favorite philosophical object of Ricoeur, Gadamer, Derrida, and ultimately 
Geertz).  The hermeneutic circle is very much alive in both projects, but the 
pragmatics of the two differ.  As a theoretical limitation, ethnography’s self-
other circuit is able to critique the self only by virtue of the collective 
qualities already recognizable in the other by way of extant anthropological 
concepts or else those behaviors recognizably expressed by the other as a 
shared practice.  In short, the loop carries considerable hermeneutic 
feedback.  The particularity of both the spatial and temporal present—what 
makes a particular momentary scene stand out as “the present” against past 
and absent ones—must be articulated as the token of a discerned type of 
event, hence losing grasp of the particularity.  Ultimately, this is a limitation 
of language itself.  The ethnographic speech act in specific enacts a double 
displacement, one to duck out of the immediate context of dialogue, so that 
people become markers of demographic and political coordinates; and the 
other to slide from the interpersonal to the sociological scale as a reduction 
of the experienced flow of action to significant patterns of practice.  Despite 
the fundamental ingredient of ethnography’s encounter with difference, the 
disciplining of ethnography makes it unsuited for comprehending the self 
where selfhood is (the) problematic.   
There is another well-trodden disciplinary dichotomy: social versus 
personal or mental behavior.  Does a turn away from cultural models shunt 
my project by default into the field of psychology?  Immediately following the 
 
sweeping and regular” (Rabinow 1977: 9).  The quality here of a revelation of secreted 
knowledge belongs to a very individualistic discourse of transcendental experience, transposed 
in the arrival narrative to the plane of knowledge the ethnographer shares with the reader at 
the outset of an adventure. 
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Ricoeur borrowing, Rabinow writes of his mode of personal reflection that “It 
is vital to stress that this is not psychology of any sort.”  Anthropologists will 
recall that the interpretive turn, as the study of what is publicly available and 
consequential (and therefore communicable and communal) about the 
products of minds, prompted many authors to push against psychology, 
sometimes with conspicuous intensity, effectively ceding the entire 
phenomenon of mind to that narrowly empiricist discipline as its exclusive 
domain.  Despite “psychological overtones,” Rabinow insists, “The self being 
discussed is perfectly public, it is neither the purely cerebral cogito of the 
Cartesians, nor the deep psychological self of the Freudians” (pp. 5-6).  
Surely, there are other possible psychologies, but the most forceful academic 
trend since the 1960s, regrettably, has continued to center on a fight over 
whose reified objects are whose instead of a critical discussion of what 
knowledge various particular intellectual formations like psychology and 
anthropology actually produce and what the limitations of their instruments 
and ontologies are (e.g., it wasn’t inevitable that we should assume that 
thoughts happen inside heads rather than in discourse).  It is neither 
inevitable nor necessary to discard matters of individualistic experience as 
“psychological,” as if this concept weren’t a historical advent.  A critical 
encounter with difference that problematizes the dynamics of how difference 
is both recognized and experienced belongs to anthropology as a field, 
thanks to anthropology’s holistic sensibilities, but not to a discipline restricted 
to the study of culture or society or language in their practical modes; and 
much less to a psychological discipline steeped in cognitivism to the exclusion 
of discourse.3 Comprehension of individual difference entails both critique of 
 
3 The emerging field of discourse psychology (Edwards and Potter 1992, Edwards 
1997, Potter 1999) adopts much the same position as I express in these essays by similarly 
embracing elements of conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, practice theory, and 
psychoanalysis.  Discourse psychology has thus far gained little traction in the U.S., and I 
suspect that the training and workplace contexts of anthropologists versus discursive 
psychologists will continue to support a distinction between these two amenable fields of study 
in a post-cognitivist Academy. 
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the present scene and reflexivity as self-critique—an interpretation of 
Ricoeur’s phrase slightly different from Rabinow’s. 
Participant-observation may be the only professional practice that 
seeks to immerse people fully within the flow of everyday life while at the 
same time compelling them to remain conceptually unsettled.  I was always 
riveted by the written records of this experience, because to be unsettled is 
to be disabled, sui generis.  After all, the achievement of stable agentive 
conditions requires that artifacts already anticipate one’s body and reliable 
tactics be already adapted as agents take the field.  As anyone who has had 
difficulty settling into a new situation knows, it is a struggle, and the struggle 
of accommodation itself in large part becomes the most immediate field of 
action.  By the ethnography’s final chapter, however, I would inevitably be 
disappointed, because instead of a pedagogy of unsettledness, the typical 
ethnographer ultimately settles in, gains mastery (practical or at least 
analytical), and then chooses to move on, her story an account of having 
accounted for difference.4 To the extent one achieves such agency, one 
ceases to be disabled or encounter the affects of individual difference, so 
long as we bracket the idea of disability as a cultural identity.  But to achieve 
such a position, an ethnographer who is still categorically disabled in the field 
must rely on additional stable forms of action, reliable environments, human 
assistance, and other prostheses—in effect, surrendering the nomadic 
practice that provides for the hyphenated perspective on social life.  As I 
describe in Chapter 2, I began to have a nagging sense that I was losing 
knowledge every time I settled into fieldwork.  I began by claiming to have 
resisted ethnography, but to put it the other way around would be equally 
true.   
 
4 I am overgeneralizing, but in service to a fairly conventional boundary line between 
ethnography and other forms of cultural critique, such as mine.  A study of not-closing-the-
gap becomes heterography (Pandolpho 1997), a quasi-fictional intersubjective story (Ghosh 
1992, Taussig 1997, Stewart 2005), or another kind of subjunctive staging executed as “an
anthropological mode that can claim a status equal to that of knowledge and experience insofar as
it allows us to conceive what knowledge and experience cannot penetrate” (Iser 1993: 299).   
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Ethnography has therefore played several important roles in my 
production of self knowledge, first as a practice through which I discovered 
that blindness wasn’t what I’d taken it to be and, ultimately, as the legible 
surface on which the Western Tradition has charted its encounters with 
cultural difference.  The dissertation constitutes a highly reflexive 
demonstration project in synthetic thinking that constantly returns to 
ethnography for inspiration.  It is not an ethnography, however, because the 
double displacement proved fatal to a productive encounter with the field I 
carry with me (and perhaps there’s some such field around each of us).  I 
have instead documented a long-term process in which I have used the 
anthropological literature and the philosophies of language through which 
interpretive theorists found their voice to profoundly redefine the terms in 
which I encounter myself as an individual and my social surroundings.   
As explored in Chapter 3, an anthropology of difference examines the 
social production of the possibility of agency, which implicates processes of 
self-constitution, thought, and experience encountered in particular scenes 
that are not thereupon reduced to a descriptive or predictive model.  Their 
particularities are foregrounded by ruptures, failures, and misunderstandings 
that can’t be corrected for once and all by way of specific knowledge in the 
form of prescriptions, inscriptions, injunctions, or institutions (societies have 
never really found a way to institutionalize critical thinking as habitus, policy, 
or law.  Reason seems not to be encodeable in social institutions).  The 
anthropological use of reflexivity does not set out to obtain authoritative 
knowledge of the self, but to take hold of one of the fundamental conditions 
that make up a present encounter—namely, that it is happening where you 
are, not somewhere else.  The other fundamental condition of the present is 
its particularity, manifested in the knowledge that this moment is discernable 
from the past—in short, one’s experience of time passing.  I term this two-
dimensional particularity “individual difference.” 
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THE PRAGMATICS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE 
Anthropologists can already identify a solidly grounded ethnography of 
individual difference in terms of speech play: the individuated voice in 
discourse (B. Johnstone 2000), the agent discursively navigating multiple 
identities (Kroskrity 2001), and the performer’s creativity in verbal art 
(Bauman 1986; Lavie, Narayan, and Rosaldo 1993).  I am greatly indebted 
to these works, yet there remains something worrisome for my present 
purposes about the way the two distinct domains of theory and data, 
mutually constituted by investigatory methods, provide for the precision of 
research texts, as well as their verbal economy (no pun intended, but there it 
is).  To start with, students of ethnography know well that quantifications like 
visual acuity or the poverty line beg the question of the practices from which 
these values derive their local import.  When psychologists study individual 
differences in terms of the tension between an individual’s metricalized value 
for a given variable in relation to values distributed across a normal curve, 
they are methodologically acknowledging that differences matter in the 
assessment of particular cases while nevertheless continuing to treat the 
variable (intelligence, personality traits, visual acuity, etc.) as a natural fact, 
often without reference to the institutional framework that has generated it.  
The quantum of the individual actor as an ethnographic or sociolinguistic 
observational unit seems to do something similar by depicting the individual 
as choosing among and utilizing what resources they possess or to which 
they possess access, or are authorized to use by virtue of something else 
they possess, and so on.  The exercise of those resources and abilities 
become the data, which must at some level, deemed beyond the pale for 
that research, beg the question of how the individual develops creative talent 
or how the agency to survey and make choices is generated—all well and 
good, so long as communicative practice is the unit of analysis.  If difference 
itself is the object, and not the individual agent in relation to a system of 
differences, it has instead to be studied as a generative process not pressed 
into the general description of a particular people, place, or practice. 
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I am writing not only against the presuppositional force of ordinary 
socialization, then, but also the parallel force of scholarly texts that 
systematize and methodologize socialized perceptions.  In order to bring 
these problematics to the surface, the essays have had to remain 
programmatically at odds with the discourses in which institutions and 
publics invest their presumptions to know what is going on, including 
privileged knowledge of self, knowledge of the Other, scientific knowledge, 
“and evening newspapers and eyes assured of certain certainties” (recalling 
some T.S. Eliot I had to memorize in grade school).  This kind of critique of 
objective knowledge became a focus for philosophy during the first half of 
the Twentieth Century, and interpretive ethnography attempted to 
incorporate it during the 1980s with only limited long-term success.  
Whereas the postmodern critiques of scientific and philosophical 
epistemologies quickly forged battle lines across Academe, however, a very 
similar framework slowly began to emerge as a linguistic methodology, 
following the publication of J. L. Austin’s How To Do Things With Words 
(Austin 1975 [1962]).  A basic linguistic distinction emerged between 
referentiality, which is the assumption that words are signs of objects or 
states of affairs that pre-exist their reflection in language; versus 
performativity, the potential for language to create the very realities it 
appears to passively describe.5 This time, the argument against 
representational objectivism met with little professional resistance, perhaps 
because attention centered on taking apart the ideologies of ordinary rather 
 
5 Austin’s initial formulation drew categorical distinctions between the class of 
performative utterances, such as “I now pronounce you man and wife,” versus constatives like 
“Those two are married,” but performativity has since led an interesting life, gaining 
recognition by poststructural theorists (Butler 1993, Sedgwick 2003) as well as sociolinguists 
who now view it as something closer to a pervasive modality of discourse.  Linguistic ideology, 
defined as “the situated, partial, and interested character of conceptions and uses of 
language” (Errington 2001: 110; see also Woolard and Schieffelin 1994), becomes the driving 
force of naturalized understandings.  James Wilce (1998) has described Bangladeshi labels of 
“madness” as an imposition of referential ideology upon performative discourses, and has 
explored schizophrenia as a breakdown in the “appropriate” use of referential language (2000, 
2004).  Kang (2006) presents an Indonesian example in which the performativity of magical 
language marks Petalangans as irrational and undeveloped (although the Petalangan genres 
are shown to be in a complex process of change in response to these ideologies). 
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than scholarly communicative practices.  The result is the field of discourse 
pragmatics, which replaces the post-Enlightenment priority of rational 
language with an understanding of language as a non-privileged social 
practice.  I explore the pragmatics of individualistic practical ruptures, 
especially my blindness, within discourse and other, more obviously 
embodied interactions.  One way to read the essay collection is as a 
reformulation of the radical critique of objectivism addressed to the 
framework of professional anthropology, this time grounded on analysis of 
particular sites where objectivism exhibits profoundly disabling 
consequences.   
The starting point will be a nominal and philosophical idea that seems 
to be the nub of my everyday experience of being disabled.  What interests 
me are the pragmatics of disability as an apparition (i.e., an “appearing”) of 
individual difference.  Communicative practices of all sorts, as practices, 
presuppose a certain largely tacit knowledge of what participants share, and 
to a usually imperceptible or intangible degree this assumption always misses 
the mark.  Individual difference obtrudes past the “largelies” and “usuallies” 
of collective life.  It is the uniqueness that obtains within a particular 
interaction, left unincorporated as a result of the uncritical tendencies of 
ordinary experience.  What I have described as a “sphere of rupture,” as the 
case in point, repeatedly re-emerges across social fields, constituting an 
identifiable disability; but it is generated by micrological social dynamics 
rather than a privately owned quality.  I stress individuality, in part to give a 
counterspin to how clinical psychology uses the same terminology, and also 
in contrast to ethnography’s object, cultural difference, which tends to be the 
unmarked referent of unqualified difference.  Derrida (1978) and Deleuze 
(1994 [1968]), both of whom play prominent roles in these essays, figure 
difference “in itself,” and yet as philosophy transits to the plane of human 
history, becoming anthropology, we have to mark difference as we find it: in 
particular.  At the same time, we have somehow to do so without reducing it 
to a system of pre-constituted collective differences like races or cultures.  
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Individual difference is that which goes unterritorialized by the term from 
which it differs while remaining unclaimed by any ordinary communicative 
practice.  It has the same impossible referent as Wittgenstein’s idea of a 
private language.  Nevertheless, sometimes this thing—this no-thing, I 
suppose—has considerable affective and practical force.  Individual difference 
is disabling.   
The cultural phenomenon of blindness and an immediate experience 
attributed to blindness are among the performative expressions of individual 
difference, which are nevertheless transacted as constatives, usually of a 
category of physiological difference.  The ordinary interpreting gaze 
continually drives any apparition of difference—awkwardness, frustration, 
incompetencies, non-standard comportments, etc., all of which manifest 
themselves only in the social field—back into the disability category as its 
defining qualifications.  The ordinary sense of the disability category solidifies 
as a determinate negation of what an unimpaired body can do, while the 
sociological process of the scene’s production is dissociated.  The apparent 
cross-contextual regularities of this emerging category are ascribed to 
qualities of the disabled person, so that the category remains mystified and 
intrinsically damaging through the undifferentiating force of the category 
itself—the sense that disability has an objective referent—in addition to the 
particular disabling context in which it is manifested.  Hence, the apparition 
cannot be directly addressed using ordinary discourse.  Suspension of the 
disability category means that the blindness of walking down the street and 
the blindness of knowing when I’m being spoken to in a crowded room 
needn’t be tied to the same essential quality, but are merely tied at a surface 
level to a word I can bracket at the outset of a critical phenomenology and 
then return to in a discussion of public circulations of discourse.   
The first step is to frame most if not all fields of action as 
communicative and hence interpersonal.6 I’ll focus here on solitary 
 
6 Habermas built his theory of communicative action upon the same observation, but 
the people in his society come to share ideas in communion through a process of rational 
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occupation of the built environment in order to make the point using an 
example that may seem counter-intuitive to most readers.  The structure, 
rules, and artifacts of a street corner can be understood as the displaced 
effects of how a public’s needs, desires, or chores have been interpreted and 
addressed by the architects of that scene.  Only the scene of their labor and 
the scene of usage have been sequestered from one another, opening a 
space of practical and semiotic play with what are now free-standing signs.  I 
am concerned with mundane and comparatively unplayful spaces in which 
assumptions about the generalized other of a public establish fairly rigid 
preconditions of use.  Freedom of movement is what architects produce, 
although shoppers, earbud-wearing students, graffiti taggers, and other 
passers-by will conceive of what they are doing as internally-organized self-
expression.  Prostitutes, police, and beggars who work the same street, by 
contrast, likely have a more critical eye on its social structure and 
organization.  Agency—that is, the ability to have an intentional impact on 
the field—is the use value of these kinds of materially displaced 
communications.  Once you’ve experienced not-being-addressed by the most 
passive structures of the built environment for whatever reason, there’s no 
retreating from the sense of someone out there behind it all, someone for 
whom you are mute and invisible. 
Agency is nowhere distributed democratically, even in public space, 
and even in a simple tool.  In its design, a chair anticipates a range of bodies 
and embodied uses in the same way that a modern urban street anticipates 
vehicular traffic, largely at the expense of pedestrians and certainly at the 
expense of anyone who doesn’t meet tacit standards of mobility.  The 
ideology of personal independence is grounded on the ability to take these 
productions of agency for granted.  Deborah Marks (1999) notes that this 
observation has been shown to describe men’s positions in traditional 
marriages, and notes as well that the idea of dependence regarding the 
 
discourse.  I do not conceive of communicative action as necessarily leading to agreement and 
in fact am more interested in the possibility of hearing and speaking to others who cannot be 
condensed into the mirror image of oneself.   
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disabled takes its meaning within this same ideology: critical disability 
studies holds that “people's level of independence should relate to their 
autonomy and control over their own lives, rather than on the ability to 
perform particular technical activities.”  Disabled people’s “needs,” 
consequently, “are not located simply in their individual bodies. Instead, they 
are located in a relationship between those whose needs are met 
automatically—and are therefore seen as having no needs - and those whose 
needs are not met and who must make a special plea for assistance and 
support” (Marks 1999: 97).  Thus, in disability we are always observing the 
products of socially-constructed competences and their concomitant fields of 
choice, not physiological incapacities that are meaningful in themselves.  This 
statement tracks a salient consequence of Karl Marx’s understanding of the 
artifact as congealed labor, but a consequence that extends beyond the world 
framed by self-interested exercises of power, which of course has been the 
conventional backdrop for discussions of agency.7
I should pause here to acknowledge that there exists a Disability 
Movement which has spent thirty years seeking to redress precisely this 
exclusiveness built into the naturalized social environment, although I’m not 
aware of anyone framing the problem in terms of communicative practice.  
Again, though, oppositional politics addresses generalized products, not 
generative processes.  the political awareness that one is “Passing” as the 
member of a normative category is, for example, the condition that obtains 
when a bundle of communicative practices becomes a palpable sense of self-
incarceration, which simultaneously renders up the sense that the horizon of 
the Other is describable (“you people!”).  But even this oppositional 
awareness will be difficult to formulate with any specificity in the absence of 
affirmative practices of difference, which of course at that point have become 
 
7 An inadequacy of Marx’s critique of capital likewise surfaces in this idea of need as a 
socially-erased, socially-constructed perception.  Marx frequently references “the hands of the 
worker,” with this opaque and uniform body, the only idea of the individual incorporated into 
his philosophy.  Human needs and their satisfaction can be imagined as part of a natural state 
only by way of this idea of the innately productive and independent individual. 
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instead sharedness, thereby moving into a more familiar anthropological 
field.   
The social condition of the blind does in some ways resemble 
hegemonic oppression of consciousness, but unless we can identify an 
independent ethos being repressed (i.e., the possibility of political recognition 
and emancipation of a disabled subject who somehow remains affirmatively 
disabled) or a particular group’s investment in keeping the disabled down, 
oppression is too blunt an instrument for understanding particular 
interactions.8 Since my argument is that all practice “oppresses” individual 
difference, that term can’t be applied without dissolving its usefulness.  Every 
time I extrude a commensurable, communicable bit of behavior and maintain 
it for the purpose of making a connection, this act occludes my difference 
from the other so that it is no longer available to my experience of myself, 
interlocutors’ experiences of me, or the ethnographer’s eye.  Without a pre-
existent contrastive set of practices that can highlight alternative possibilities 
for self awareness, this dissociation of difference usually goes unnoticed, 
although perhaps leaving the residue of an affect that will likely be 
misinterpreted as the familiar sign of one’s inherently incompetent self or the 
supposedly discriminatory attitudes of others.  More fundamentally, 
individual difference comprises what the sharedness of social practice tends 
to press out of the ordinary potentials for experience.   
Benjamin Whorf presents the idea of a Hopi cosmology in which 
thoughts, coming from the heart, operate on things in the world rather than 
mental representations (Whorf 1998 [1936, 1941]: 59-64, 149-50).  Only 
within a Western theory of mind does this notion seem impossible.  Surely, 
 
8 For example, deaf sign language users can conceive of themselves as a linguistic 
minority, which clarifies the social-relational ground of an experience of their being disabled by 
a public.  Without such a shared practice, groups who seek to affirm a physiological difference 
categorized as disability will largely be experiencing the alleviation of the conditions in which 
the disability forms.  Blindness is not an experience outside the context of a disability, except 
insofar as the blind can experience its practical absence and sharedness in the context of, say, 
a convention of the blind (see Chapter 4).  If a value horizon somehow intrinsic to the blind 
does exist or would naturally exist if not for its lack of incorporation, then, certainly, it is 
oppressed. 
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the ability to have thoughts outside one’s body is at the root of discourse 
pragmatics and the possibility of culture.  “Language must hence from an 
ontogenetic and sociocultural perspective be conceived of as a prosthetic 
device by which individual mental activity is expanded and transformed into 
genuinely communicative activity” (Rommetveit 1998: 357).  The human 
animal has skin as thin as tissue paper, claws defeated by shrink wrap, a 
nose absurdly far from all the informative smells, almost no night vision, 
hearing that is selective as well as insensitive, and can’t outrun any 
predators larger than a Jack Russell terrier.  Balanced against these 
interspecies deficits, we have a cybernetic ability to organize collective action 
to such a degree that the Earth itself is transformed.  Everything we have 
called culture and society (which is not to say all individual behaviors) 
accommodates limited capacities of the fundamentally inadequate individual 
human organism, and has done so very obviously more on the principle of 
urban sprawl than a panoptic, rational planned community… which goes 
especially for the privileged myopia of planned communities.  An 
anthropological understanding conceives language, social institutions, the 
built environment, social science, and the ideology of independence with this 
human ecology in mind.  For a human, individual difference—as opposed to 
distinction—is going to hurt.  It is going to be excommunicated from practice 
altogether, a fact that gives a fittingly anthropological sense to the word 
dissociation. 
 
PAPER DOUBT (READING TEXTS AS CULTURE) 
They say, the ethnographer’s consciousness is divided, because she is 
part participant and part withdrawn analyst.  I call that everyday survival as 
a blind person, and yet there’s still something further, a feeling of being 
more present to the played-back recording than to the event.  I mean this 
literally: I am more embodied in the moment of transcription, when I can 
concentrate, than I am in the event, when my aural attention is necessarily 
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divided. It’s a sensation I came to recognize as having been beneath the 
ground of my experience all the time as a result of the multiple modes of 
active scanning my mind has to do to extrapolate a functional understanding 
of the scene from inadequate sources.   
Maybe this is why, as I’m beginning to notice, many blind people 
record their lives in hi-fidelity stereo sound and thereafter publish these 
stretches of time to the Web as so-called “sound-seeing tours” of so many 
baby showers, ferry rides across the bay, weddings, and tours of their 
apartments (is this the same impulse as the to-me incomprehensible 
obsession with the Kodak moment?).  The publication constitutes their 
private experiences, falling just short of graphomania and usually well short 
of recording anything that perceptibly juts out of the ordinary.  The practice 
is not unique to the blind, but still one wonders what it “does” as a 
thoroughly unsorted, unthematized, and therefore unreflexive publication of 
memory.  Instead of building a coherent story about oneself or one another, 
they just keep pushing more audio fragments onto the stack.  I can’t stand 
listening to them, because I can’t learn anything from them beyond the fact 
of their circulation.   
For the ethnographer, the hyphen in participant-observation marks a 
freedom to modulate between two modalities of experience, and it is this 
modulation that generates knowledge across cultural horizons.  To be 
disabled is to be anomalous to both; the recording is immersive while I, in 
the event, am somewhat speculative.  When I went blind, then, I not 
surprisingly went to the library.  I went looking for some language on which 
to hang an experience of blindness, which I had already begun 
apprehensively to call a “language disability.”  At some point, however, my 
self-education became something very different from “reading the literature,” 
because neither the anthropology section (section GN) nor disability studies 
(section HV) addressed my nagging sense of what blindness was, unless I 
severely flattened my experience to suit the categorical subjects they 
described.  Here, too, the pragmatics of individual difference were at play.  I 
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began to work through the warrants and histories of texts, questioning them 
more in the way of objects of analysis than authoritative scholarly “sources.”   
Scholarly texts are the beginning as well as end of sociological 
knowledge.  The ideology that research investigates an object—a 
“penetrating” analysis—permits the researcher to ignore the sociology of the 
text because the book as faithful representation has the appearance of an 
end in itself (Oliver 1999).  The scholarly text as a fetishized product tends to 
occlude our awareness of the fact that texts, from their inception, take part 
in wider circuits of personal, professional, and public activity.  A pragmatics 
approach to scholarship constitutes a protocol of reading different from one 
in which data texts are read as documents of experience while theory texts 
are read as good or bad, true or false, interesting or not, addressed to my 
field or not, current or outmoded, semi-miraculous representations of what 
the author saw.  The latter reading assesses the text in terms of our present 
values, often understood to be objective standards of scholarship.  We often 
call This procedure “evaluating” the text.  As a special topic, we sometimes 
acknowledge the scholarly work to be a product of its historical context, but 
it’s a far more difficult task to additionally encounter it as written—as a 
highly contingent moment of discourse and experience, aspects of which are 
recoverable (Silverstein and Urban 1996), starting with the contextual, 
economically interested, performative dimension of one’s present reading.   
Early on, I began recording the distances between English publication 
dates and the first dated appearances of texts, either as manuscripts or 
publication in their first language.  These initially idle notations gradually 
opened a thought-provoking space between the communities of the 
producers and consumers of texts like Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1982 
[1975, 1960]) or the reworked version of Bakhtin’s 1929 book on 
Dostoyevsky (Bakhtin 1984 [1961]).  The bracketing of these earlier 
histories, which sometimes index geopolitical as well as scholarly moments at 
both ends, start to convey an impression that we might just be reliving so 
many adventures in bad intellectual karma.  However, the kind of 
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historicizing that would pinpoint the bracketed dates as the origins of 
particular ideas would be a useless exercise.  Instead, the brackets 
differentiate the bibliographic citations internally so that they make up a 
simple heuristic device by which I have been prompted to encounter the 
cited work as an artifact with a biography, a history, and an ecology.  The 
effect is to make the tacit evolutionary narrative of linear scholarly progress 
difficult to maintain.  This sort of textual pragmatics tracks through a diffuse 
field held together by the course through which semiotic matter circulates, 
this virtual field being observed in particular actual exchanges.9 Ethnography 
is one of the formations circumscribed within such a circuit.  The 
deconstruction of “reading the literature” as a referential ideology marks the 
point where discourse pragmatics and the postiest postmodernism overlap.  
The text is a factory, not a theater. 
Strange to say, encountering the surfaces around us constitutes one of 
the most difficult things humans aspire to do.  It takes a linguist to encounter 
language at its surface, behind and in front of the encounter with meaning, 
presupposition, and the past.  It takes an ethnographer to encounter what 
people do beyond what they think they are doing, and a critic to read a text 
for what it says and how it works instead of what it evokes in oneself 
personally.  The surface is almost impossible to come by, but that is where 
one is in the present.  I suspect that if the Interpretive Turn in ethnography 
had originated among anthropologists instead of diffusing from literary 
criticism and philosophy, anthropologists would have fastened not on the 
meaningful text but on the much older etymology of text as textile, a thing 
woven, something with a texture.  Certainly, there were already ample 
references to the warps and woofs of culture and spun webs of significance 
by that point.  Craftsmanship and aesthetic value still apply and can be 
 
9 Haraway (1991 [1985]) uses the term “integrated circuit” in a similar way, and the 
usage is echoed in Spivak (1988), Strathern (1991: 54), and Sedgwick (2003: 32ff).  The 
process—circulation—has become central to the study of capitalism (Lee and Lipuma 2002, 
Briggs 2004) and publics (Urban 2001, Warner 2002).  I’ve found myself very often relying on 
the idea of a circuit in reference to the not-quite-closed system of cultural production, 
consumption, and reproduction, where circulation is a prerequisite condition for all three. 
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tracked, but textiles have an advantage: we still encounter them as artifacts 
before expressions, and we want to know what they do before we ask what 
they mean.  As it was, interpretive ethnography went through its culture-as-
a-text phase (“read any good cultures lately?”), which had the shortcoming 
of blurring the distinction between the ethnographic representation as 
literary work and as theoretically adequate portrayal of local human 
conditions.  In other words, one problem was that the cultural worlds were 
fashioned with such nice integration and richness that they required an 
author, whose identity no one could quite fix on as either the natives or the 
ethnographer.  On the other hand, the text and the writing of it certainly 
succeed in formulating experiences in a new, productive, condensed form.  
As a method for passively recording culture, the question “what does it 
mean?” is suspect (because it is never passive), but the record of the text is 
itself a cultural document.  All texts are.  Texts are active in the contrary 
forces of the regimentation and reordering of experience.  They communicate 
experiences reflexively to the author and intersubjectively, creatively, in the 
reading.  The reading, if it is in turn recorded, documents the reader, just as 
the writing documents the writer.  Textuality allows this kind of reflexivity.  
In theory, it is infinitely recursive; in practice, this fact is only a problem for 
those who insist on a final reading.  An active surface, one never claiming to 
be anything but artifact, is always available.  There is therefore a virtue in 
immersing oneself after the fact. 
The failure of an ethnography to ever quite close solidly enough, which 
social science must apprehend as a real problem even as humanists 
celebrate it, has been my point of entry into another way of reading scholarly 
texts.  And, ultimately, into writing them.   
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I claimed to begin with a confession, but that’s not quite true.10 The 
ordinary sense of that speech act involves exposing something internal, raw, 
and private.  Accordingly, the story I assembled earlier implies that my 
repeated attempts to either be an ethnographer or read ethnography were 
“really” scenes of an oblique encounter with blindness after the fashion of a 
return of the repressed, unless it’s the oppressed or depressed.  In reality, 
my experiences of my theorized self are constructed on the page, and the 
self knowledge I record is discovered sociologically.  Perhaps this statement 
has become less in need of explanation in the age of the word processor and 
the Web.  Regarding my “online” identity, the point will never be to take a 
story I tell as a representation of an experience prior to the text, but to 
understand what cultural dynamics have to be in place in order for any such 
story to have emerged and seem plausible and coherent.  For me, the line 
between embodied experience and text is uncommonly blurred, and even 
abstract.  Individual difference may be embodiable only by way of writing. 
As has become plain by now, I hope, my target is neither blindness 
nor disability, but the presuppositional force of discourse and other practices.  
The essays elaborate a mode of anthropological critique capable of 
addressing itself to forms of difference, disabling in their consequences, that 
remain unattended or misrecognized (or are produced) by the study of 
shared practices.  They highlight the objectifying and therefore pre-
conceptualizing tendencies of the ethnographic field, which bears the marks 
of being modeled on the visual field, the only sense modality with both a 
 
10 Van Maanen (1988) nicely unpacks the rhetoric of anthropology’s confessional tales, 
which are those anti-realist accounts that point out the production of the research while 
nevertheless remaining distinguishable from the ethnographic representation.  “Though 
confessional writers are forthcoming with accounts of errors, misgivings, limiting research 
roles, and even misperceptions,” he writes (p. 79), “they are unlikely to come to the 
conclusion that they have been misled dramatically, that they got it wrong, or that they have 
otherwise presented falsehoods to their trusting audience.”  Foucault (1990 [1976]) wrote of 
confession as an exposure coerced by a discipline, which in a sense describes today’s enduring 
residue of ethnographic reflexivity.  However, he rethought his position (1999 [1982]), 
conceiving it as a more flexible constitutive publication of self, as discussed by Butler (2005: 
112): “Confession in this context presupposes that the self must appear in order to constitute 
itself and that it can constitute itself only within a given scene of address, within a certain 
socially constituted relation. Confession becomes the verbal and bodily scene of its self-
demonstration. It speaks itself, but in the speaking it becomes what it is.”  
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center and horizon (Ihde 1976).  Individual difference, on the contrary, can 
be felt on the skin as a series of contrasts, and the event-sensation of 
contrast is the apparition of difference.  Eyes closed, a touch from nowhere, 
just before you step back, eyes open, to classify what it is: the implicit idea 
of the (masculine) objectifying gaze is rather shop-worn, but it helps conjure 
an apt image.  Touch is utterly confined to the present time and space, which 
is not to say it is unmediated but that the practice of reading culture by 
touch—a critique instead of an investigation—is a fundamentally different 
exercise than reading the field of vision and passing through that field toward 
desired objects.  In terms of Malinowski’s classic formula, observation and 
participation turn out to be mobile exercises in which vision plays a 
fundamental role, as I explore further in the next two chapters.  They 
therefore give way to interrogation, conducted in place and in time like a 
conversation, a bricolage of irreducibly different perspectives to reckon with.   
 
THE SEMANTIC MITIGATION OF EXPERIENCE IN HELEN 
KELLER’S THE STORY OF MY LIFE11 
Here is an unconventional story about language acquisition.  It can be 
read productively in company with two very well-developed scholarly 
literatures.  One of these dismantles the assumption that “the self” is an 
individually owned, internally organized property, in favor of an idea of 
selfhood as a discursive trope always emergent in particular contexts of 
social interaction (Mead 1934, Ryle 1949, Johnstone 1970; discussions 
carried into anthropology and psychology represent enormous literatures).  
The other does much the same job on the Western category of “experience,” 
where the view that experience is a natural processing of sense data has 
largely been replaced with the study of experience as a practical and 
discursive accomplishment (Bauman 1986, Linde 1993, Desjarlais 1997, 
 
11 My source is the 1903 text, but from an online edition published by the American 
Foundation for the Blind entitled “Helen Keller—In Her Own Words: The 100th Anniversary of 
The Story of My Life” (http://www.afb.org/mylife/book.asp?ch=HK-intro). 
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Stern 1997, Mattingly 1998; again, however, the literature is extensive and 
multidisciplinary).  The question “where does language come from?” can be 
answered with reference either to innate cognitive structures, which do seem 
to be in there, doing whatever they do, or else with reference to a social 
career in which human primates cognize and recognize other 
consciousnesses and schemas of action that harness consciousness in 
practical, communicable ways.  I wouldn’t suggest trying to learn language 
without either socialization or a brain.  But certainly the case of Helen Keller, 
left deaf and blind at 19 months by illness, should provide some insight into 
either or both processes by virtue of its representing a boundary case.  
Although Helen did see and hear and during those months learned a few 
words “tea and wa-wa, for example), the idea of language had to be taught 
her formally through a pedagogy invented for the occasion.  It was a scene 
of communicating across irrevocable difference.  Be forewarned, though, that 
an tempt to read these historical records empirically for new knowledge 
about language acquisition will be frustrated.  What one emerges with 
instead is a theory of how experience circulates in written texts.  What I 
suggest is that the referent of what one would want to call (i.e., what I 
originally sought to call) Helen’s experience of blind deafness remains 
dissociated from communicative practice and, for all we can tell, from Helen’s 
experience of herself.  She gets on very well, regardless, in terms of social 
incorporation and the vocation she took up as advocate for the deaf and 
blind. 
A few weeks after Ann Sullivan’s arrival, Helen came to understand 
that the objects around her had a series of hand signs associated with them.  
“Doll,” moreover, was the same series of signs for both her dolls.  Then, the 
stumbling block: “Miss Sullivan had tried to impress it upon me that "m-u-g" 
is mug and that "w-a-t-e-r" is water , but I persisted in confounding the 
two.”  Miss Sullivan’s persistence ultimately prompted Helen to destroy her 
new doll in frustration.  “In the still, dark world in which I lived there was no 
strong sentiment or tenderness.”  Then it was out to the pump in the yard, 
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where Miss Sullivan put one of Helen’s hands under the flowing water while 
signing “water” into the other, slowly then quickly.  “Suddenly I felt a misty 
consciousness as of something forgotten—a thrill of returning thought; and 
somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me.”  In her letter 
following the event (April 5, 1887), Ann Sullivan remarks that Helen then 
showed affection to her for the first time and expressed curiosity about the 
names of other people.  “The word coming so close upon the sensation of 
cold water rushing over her hand seemed to startle her,” Sullivan writes. 
“She dropped the mug and stood as one transfixed. A new light came into 
her face.  She spelled "water" several times. Then she dropped on the 
ground and asked for its name and pointed to the pump and the trellis, and 
suddenly turning round she asked for my name.”  Helen continues: 
“Everything had a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. As we 
returned to the house every object which I touched seemed to quiver with 
life.”   
When “water” became a sign detachable from the drinking and became 
an object—a reliable sameness that could be brought into relation to her—
both predication and the self apparently became possible.  What has 
happened is the opening of the potential for an exchange system of value as 
a social order beyond immediate use value.  She has gained the human 
ability to communicate about non-present states of affairs by means other 
than pantomime (which in a sense presents its referent using the body, with 
just the one physical thing absent).  She has transited from a world in which 
self and experience were organized within the present context to a world in 
which they are drawn to a process of organization within a social order.  For 
Helen, this advent would have developed by her twenties into a rhetorical 
style characterized by a heavy reliance on visual imagery, romantic 
metaphor, and intertextual allusion. 
On the first page of her youthful memoir, Helen describes the process 
of remembering her life as “lifting the veil that clings about my childhood like 
a golden mist,” by which she is contextually making reference precisely to 
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the problem of remembering a past and absent self.  Her entry into language 
and the entry of Anne Sullivan into her life are ultimately two remembered 
modulations of the same moment, and these two stories are cast onto one 
another in the telling, thereby formulating her experience within the act of 
appearing to record it.  Everything she reports about her life before Ann 
Sullivan is a presentiment of that moment, in other words, reported from its 
far side.  After several vivid descriptions of smells and touch, as well as 
noting the precise date and her age (three months before her seventh 
birthday), she describes a sense of expectancy she caught from others’ 
activities that would turn out to be in anticipation of Ann Sullivan’s arrival:  
Have you ever been at sea in a dense fog, when it seemed as if 
a tangible white darkness shut you in, and the great ship, tense 
and anxious, groped her way toward the shore with plummet 
and sounding-line, and you waited with beating heart for 
something to happen? I was like that ship before my education 
began, only I was without compass or sounding-line, and had no 
way of knowing how near the harbour was. "Light! Give me 
light!" was the wordless cry of my soul, and the light of love 
shone on me in that very hour. 
A contemporary exasperation with this residue of Victorian prose 
would respond to the anthropomorphized ship with “no, have you?”  Another 
mystical lifted shroud, then: any path one might cut through this array of 
metaphors in search of a more prosaic meaning would either track the 
literary text in terms of its archetypes (fog, ship, etc., all of which have 
conventionalized symbolic usages in English) or else reduce the passage to 
the overall impression that she was, say, expectant.  Decoration here stands 
in for words that otherwise do not seem to have a more elaborate referent 
than that simple word.  Meanwhile the complete image of the simile must 
have been experienced by Helen in terms of language she encountered in 
other contexts, wherein things like fog and compasses take on their portable 
emotional valences.  In other words, an image the sighted reader will link to 
an embodied image functions, for Helen, as a comparatively abstract cipher 
she has learned to deploy appropriately across contexts.  Whatever image 
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may or may not accompany the word for Helen, we simply have no idea of, 
nor can we know that she knows.   
Helen also uses direct or indirect quotations and inserts them in place 
of, rather than in conjunction with, descriptions of embodied experience.  For 
example, here is her evaluation of the first thunderstorm she can remember: 
“I had learned a new lesson—that nature ‘wages open war against her 
children, and under softest touch hides treacherous claws’” (the quote comes 
from Robert Louis Stevenson’s “Pan’s Pipes”).  Such allusions are so frequent 
that they begin to stand out for me much like a glaring red “SENSORED” sign 
stamped over the personally authored text, but that is not what is going on.  
Quotation was a valued way to show one’s “breeding,” meaning one’s 
superior class and family quality as demonstrated by education.  I suggest 
that what one might call the public beautification project of Victorian prose—
perhaps especially women’s gentile prose, and perhaps most especially that 
of a sheltered young woman writing her way into social incorporation and 
recognition as something other than a freak—provided a publicly-available 
resource by which individual difference could be mitigated, which is to say 
that Helen could communicate her radically individualistic experiences 
through quotation and other metaphoric gestures.  However, she 
communicated them by obviating the encounter with them, whether she was 
trying to do this or, as seems more likely, could conjure no better linguistic 
resources than these for sharing them.  The home ground of the experience 
ostensibly pointed out by her metaphors and allusions are unspecified, and 
may be unspecifiable.  Perhaps her embodied experience can only be 
formulated by way of other domains, because there is no sense in which they 
exist “in themselves.”   
Finally, she utilizes a related process in which someone else’s verbal 
account becomes the basis for Helen’s claim to an experience.  On August 
17, 1893, she wrote to a friend about her experience at the Chicago World’s 
Fair: “I think I enjoyed the sails on the tranquil lagoon and the lovely scenes 
as my friends described them more than anything else at the fair. Once, 
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when we were out on the water, the sun went down over the rim of the Earth 
and threw a soft, rosy light across the white city, making it look more than 
ever like dream land.”  Again, a surface reading today recognizes the 
standards for polite prose of the era (fairyland, indeed), and I do not have 
access to Helen as a speaker.  If we take her at her word, however, and then 
attempt a more active encounter with her experience, we have to consider 
that Helen’s world consisted of physical contact (including sound waves and 
odor), Braille (through Annie Sullivan as typist, in particular), and signs 
formed against her hand.  If, after being allowed the chance to touch any 
exhibit she liked, her favorite part was a visual image, then perhaps the 
strongest resonance belongs to the social relation, the appreciation of the 
physical experience of others; or, equally likely, the enjoyment belongs to 
the virtual—to the imagination as her primary reality, which had just been 
augmented in a beautiful way.12 A function of such experience must surely 
be her participation in a social order. 
Metaphor, as a transfer of the sense of an object from one domain to 
another, has been shown to be a basic constituent of both semantics and 
experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Fernandez 1986, Johnson 1987).  
Taken as given is that the human body can experience the metaphor’s target 
domain concretely in a non-metaphorical way.  Sensibility of money as a 
concrete object or the concrete experience of economic exchange allows us 
to subsequently experience time as “saved” or “spent.”  The exchangeability 
of value across semantic domains in this way constitutes the economy of 
language.  Throughout her autobiographical writing, Helen’s use of metaphor 
serves to semantically mitigate the unsharedness of her embodiment, such 
that the overall sense is that of perhaps flowery or schooled prose expressing 
 
12 Compare her much later description of a sunset in her journal entry for November 8, 
1936, where she is more explicit about embodiment’s relationship to metaphor: “This evening, 
after a brilliant day, Polly kept telling me how marvelous the sunset was. She said sky and sea 
were suffused with a rose tinge defying the power of the brush or the pen to capture. Often I 
had felt petals showered upon me by a passing breeze; so I could imagine the sunset as a 
vast rose-garden from which the petals had been shaken, and were drifting through the sky 
before sinking into the grey November night”  (Keller 1938). 
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her personal experience quite eloquently.  Yet in terms of mechanics, the 
target domain of the metaphor is generally not an embodied experience or 
an experience that would be embodiable by Helen herself.  The completed 
sentence of the form “subject+verb+[allusion or metaphor]” provides the 
means for Helen to employ the largely discursive world she inhabited as a 
reader of others’ texts to specify her embodied (now we need a question 
mark for this term) experience.  The sentence passes on an experience, 
passing over the question of embodiment.  Her “strategy,” which may well 
not be pre-meditated, works so well that she appears to be an excellent 
writer by any contemporaneous standard, and yet we really learn very little 
about something called “her world.” 
We seldom have occasion to recognize the probably enormous extent 
to which ordinary language usage—what Bakhtin calls its inner dialogism—
generates what passes as embodied experience by way of formulas learned 
from the discourse of interlocutors, although at a critical distance we are 
more aware of how such formulas become a substitute for reflexivity (e.g., 
everyone on the news describes personal tragedy as if all were trying out for 
the same movie role).  Banalities, formulas, strange language, and cop-outs 
like “it is unspeakable” or “indescribable” in commonplace speech situations 
prompt one of at least three responses from the listener (these constitute a 
politics of the utterance): dismissal, interrogation, or passivity.  If we as the 
listener catch on an image like fog-bound ships or golden mists, we can 
interrogate by asking “what do you mean?”  Or, we can hang up on it and 
decide not to care, dismissing anything in the utterance that is contingent on 
it and just parsing the utterance without that part.  Most often, there is no 
rupture so long as the habits of usage are maintained and there are viable 
selections in the right slots, combined with appropriate syntax.  Passively, 
the listener is left to specify underdetermined elements, to whatever extent 
seems warranted, with what passes for a normal range of possibilities that by 
definition needn’t be specified immediately.  That is, we work to bend 
unfamiliar language into our version of what it could mean, based on our own 
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perspectives.  Tropes like “indescribable” actively promote this kind of 
disattention, since one is asked to intuit nothing very specific at all other 
than something affective. Of the three, only the interrogation does anything 
but return to us what we already know.  One can read Helen’s memoir easily 
enough and come away with the feeling that one has learned the story of her 
life.  Interrogation of the text turns out to be far more difficult. 
Helen projects spiritual sanguineness on every page, and that smooth, 
utterly “composed” face is one I can’t believe, one I as a particular reader 
tried and failed to crack in order to read some subtext.  I want her to 
struggle with discourse, to show signs of a technology of self, to have a 
desire, to demonstrate agency against something and discover its limitations.  
But the discourses of a well-thought-out spiritualism, a discourse of 
affirmation, fulfillment, and progress runs from cover to cover, and from one 
book to the next throughout her career, with only a very few indistinct 
internal fractures into which one might lever a critical theory about the 
production of the author and the text.   
There are days when the close attention I must give to details 
chafes my spirit, and the thought that I must spend hours 
reading a few chapters, while in the world without other girls are 
laughing and singing and dancing, makes me rebellious; but I 
soon recover my buoyancy and laugh the discontent out of my 
heart. For, after all, every one who wishes to gain true 
knowledge must climb the Hill Difficulty alone, and since there is 
no royal road to the summit, I must zigzag it in my own way. I 
slip back many times, I fall, I stand still, I run against the edge 
of hidden obstacles, I lose my temper and find it again and keep 
it better, I trudge on, I gain a little, I feel encouraged, I get 
more eager and climb higher and begin to see the widening 
horizon. Every struggle is a victory. One more effort and I reach 
the luminous cloud, the blue depths of the sky, the uplands of 
my desire. 
Metaphor triumphs again.  Which modality of experience counts as primary 
and which secondary, which concrete, which personal and which cultural? 
In the end, I’m the one who is forced to rely on a sort of metaphor—
specifically, a potentially invalid trick of up-scaling the unit of analysis—in 
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order to encounter a scene of Helen caught in a process of self-production 
rather than as a finished, polished product of what must have been an 
ongoing struggle.  In 1892, a year after she learned to speak, she wrote a 
short story that the Perkins Institute printed in one of their publications.  
When a very similar story was found, written before her birth, she was 
accused of plagiarism and was put on a sort of trial before the faculty and 
officers of the Institute.  “I racked my brain until I was weary to recall 
anything about the frost that I had read before I wrote "The Frost King;" but 
I could remember nothing, except the common reference to Jack Frost, and a 
poem for children, "The Freaks of the Frost," and I knew I had not used that 
in my composition.” 
Here are the results of the investigation by which Helen was linked to 
the other text.  It was used to explain the formal congruities with Helen’s 
story: 
With the assistance of Dr. Alexander Graham Bell, [Ann 
Sullivan] investigated the matter carefully, and at last it came 
out that Mrs. Sophia C. Hopkins had a copy of Miss Canby's 
"Birdie and His Friends" in 1888, the year that we spent the 
summer with her at Brewster. Mrs. Hopkins was unable to find 
her copy; but she has told me that at that time, while Miss 
Sullivan was away on a vacation, she tried to amuse me by 
reading from various books, and although she could not 
remember reading "The Frost Fairies" any more than I, yet she 
felt sure that "Birdie and His Friends" was one of them. She 
explained the disappearance of the book by the fact that she 
had a short time before sold her house and disposed of many 
juvenile books, such as old schoolbooks and fairy tales, and that 
"Birdie and His Friends" was probably among them. The stories 
had little or no meaning for me then; but the mere spelling of 
the strange words was sufficient to amuse a little child who 
could do almost nothing to amuse herself; and although I do not 
recall a single circumstance connected with the reading of the 
stories, yet I cannot help thinking that I made a great effort to 
remember the words, with the intention of having my teacher 
explain them when she returned. One thing is certain, the 
language was ineffaceably stamped upon my brain, though for a 
long time no one knew it, least of all myself. 
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She attributes the re-emergence of the story to “unconscious 
retention,” although the exact point where plagiarism begins and the 
repetition of natural language learning ends remains hazy.  We might even 
consider her reproduction of the earlier text, if that is what went on, to be an 
outgrowth of the habits she had developed as part of the mitigation of her 
experience. 
My thoughts flowed easily; I felt a sense of joy in the 
composition. Words and images came tripping to my finger 
ends, and as I thought out sentence after sentence, I wrote 
them on my braille slate. Now, if words and images came to me 
without effort, it is a pretty sure sign that they are not the 
offspring of my own mind, but stray waifs that I regretfully 
dismiss. At that time I eagerly absorbed everything I read 
without a thought of authorship, and even now I cannot be quite 
sure of the boundary line between my ideas and those I find in 
books. I suppose that is because so many of my impressions 
come to me through the medium of others' eyes and ears. 
There is one and only one crisis within the text that remains 
rhetorically unresolved, and that scene is, for me, the crux of the reading I 
put to the text.  The plagiarism incident has not left her.  She carries it as an 
apprehension into the present scene of writing, and it is a reflexive 
consciousness capable of instantiating a theory of the self: 
I have never played with words again for the mere pleasure of 
the game. Indeed, I have ever since been tortured by the fear 
that what I write is not my own. For a long time, when I wrote a 
letter, even to my mother, I was seized with a sudden feeling of 
terror, and I would spell the sentences over and over, to make 
sure that I had not read them in a book. Had it not been for the 
persistent encouragement of Miss Sullivan, I think I should have 
given up trying to write altogether. 
Departing from conventional usage, I want to define a presentiment is 
the affect that primes one to encounter the present, because ordinary 
expectation will deflect presence categorically.13 A presentiment isn’t 
 
13 The Latin praes equates with the word “before,” in both the sense of “in front of” as 
“present” and temporally before, the prefix pre-. 
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primarily a foreshadowing, but the felt, unrepresentable awareness of 
present particularity.  Affect is feeling the present, the fact that something is 
happening now but which can’t be recognized yet.  All affect can instruct one 
to do, however, is to start paying acute attention.  This is perhaps the only 
practical move in the direction of attending to present difference.  Helen’s 
apprehensions as she sits down to write may be of this kind.  The only way 
to present the present itself, though, is to creatively put it in the present 
tense or, as Helen does, in a retrospective that conveys the aspect of being 
there as events unfold.  Both of these construct (fictionally, I would say) 
presentiments in the sense of conveying a present-making affect.  This 
present is an apparition, something we conclude must be present but which 
cannot be ordinarily represented or even sensed in its own terms—such as a 
sighted or hearing person attempting to embody Helen Keller’s experience, 
or Helen herself trying to communicate it.  Only in critical moments can these 
presentiments become experientially productive, leading to new and 
potentially instrumental self knowledge.  Ordinarily, on the other hand, 
discourse is apt to deflect the particularity of experience in the very process 
of communication, including the texture of one’s own apprehension of it. 
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Chapter 2.  A Crack in the Ground 
 
“Do all the rocks out here have names?”  I’m in a gleaming white land 
cruiser making its way across the Navajo Reservation en route to a 
settlement north of Tuba City.  Baby Rock, which I suppose looks a little like 
a baby lying on its back, is a huge red statue against a cobalt and yellow 
back drop.  Thinking of Window Rock, Ship Rock, and other such names, I 
turn to the driver. 
David is in his early forties, with wire-rimmed glasses and hair 
gathered into a knot at the base of his neck.  Black slacks and a white dress 
shirt negotiate between traditional male Navajo dress and the appropriate 
clothes for a modern pastor who lives in Flagstaff.  In what I’m coming to 
think of as typical Navajo fashion, he considers this simple question a full 
minute in silence before replying.  “Lots of them do.”  Sixty seconds later, he 
chuckles, pointing to another monolith, then recounts a story about how 
Coyote once tricked the People in that spot.  He tells the story somehow both 
as folklore and history at the same time, which is a  good skill for a 
missionary to have. I’ve always held on to my impression of this trip and this 
conversation. 
We pull up to the church to the sound of gravel crunching beneath the 
wheels, which to me has always brought comfort, signaling arrival in a rural 
inter-personal space not yet paved over by capitalist forms of mobility.  We 
join a loose assortment of twenty or so people standing before the totally 
featureless concrete block building with its cross.  next to the church is an 
open tin-roofed structure with picnic tables alongside (the fellowship hall, at 
least as we would later use it).  The vacant bleachers of the rodeo ring stand 
across the street.  The proper time for church to start will be when everyone 
arrives, and so I stand, already beginning to sweat in the beating sun (white 
shirt, black jeans) as David makes his rounds as the mission director on a 
pastoral visit.  A rail-thin old man in a striped dress shirt, tan slacks, dress 
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belt, and polished boots walks over to me and somehow we are talking about 
his stint in the Army during World War II—not as a code talker, though, 
because he says he was “nothing but a drunk” back then.  Except for this 
man, everyone else ignores me, now and throughout  David’s bilingual 
church service and the communal meal afterwards. 
To be ignored at church is, first of all, already very refreshingly at odds 
with the sort of impersonal joviality that takes me as the raw material of 
Protestant good works—“meet and greet,” which scans very much like 
“search and destroy.”  Second, I am not in fact being given a cold shoulder; I 
am simply unconnected and no one has any obligations to me, a White non-
member, with a familiar tell-tale tape recorder and regulation size spiral 
notebook, brought by the mission director.  Furthermore, in the scene I am 
recounting, I still qualify as “visually impaired,” though in two years my eye 
condition will progress suddenly and I will switch to “blind.”  The social signal 
sent by my white cane usually activates a more palpable sense of separation 
than this, especially when I need something and find that I’m invisible or else 
am visible in a way that provokes someone to dip in and take things from me 
or try to get things for me, either to assuage their anxiousness or as another 
form of spiritual labor.  The rare anonymity I am experiencing feels as 
comfortable as being at home alone.  The simple layout of the built 
environment and silence of the desert help.   
After the service ends, I go to stand near David and belatedly realize 
that a man in a wheelchair is holding out his hand to shake mine.  His face 
wears a wide grin.  I once heard a wheelchair-bound journalist explain that in 
Latin America, his disability carried very little of the stigma it does in the U.S.  
As I would phrase it now, when something breaks, an American returns it 
under warranty, gets it fixed, or throws it away; while in less-privileged 
zones, one takes what one has and lives with it.  I leave the Res with the 
lasting impression of the wheelchair-bound man’s respectful handshake, 
which seemed in fact to have nothing to do with either of our stigmata at all. 
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Only many years later would I suddenly realize that my standing next 
to David had constituted me as part of the greeting line.  A pastor always 
ushers worshipers from the sanctuary, and they are bound to offer a 
handshake to anyone occupying this position.  Regardless of what kind of 
interloper I am, given that I am not a worshiper and neither sang or recited 
with them, a Navajo can still observe etiquette and pointedly be observed 
doing so; while a Christian can practice charity.  Navajos don’t often grin like 
that, either. 
 
FIRTH AND I 
The most primitive documents from which my writing for this project 
has drawn are voice recordings made at all hours of the day or night when I 
was too exhausted by computer-generated speech to read or write (both 
activities are for me entirely mediated by text-to-speech synthesis).  Some 
notes are attempts at a theoretical synthesis of different areas of scholarship, 
while others serve an obvious therapeutic function by abstracting the 
conditions of my life to a place where they would be described in 
anthropological terms.  At their best, the notes are so unconcerned with 
genre that theory and experience can’t be separated.  A comparison to 
psychotherapy has occurred to me, but that discourse proceeds toward a 
different kind of “adaptive” resolution that interests me very little.  In a 
sense, all of the essays are transcriptions from a body of recordings, but then 
again all books largely are.  The following discussion is not particularly linear,  
bearing instead the traces of the practice of taking headnotes in sound, the 
only one-dimensional medium.  Beyond a certain point, I found it 
counterproductive to override these traces.  The structure conveys some 
sense of the dialectical process in which I used the idea of Ethnography to 
disclose the fabric of blindness while using that experience to question 
Ethnography. 
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My brief period of Navajo fieldwork took place in 1995 and sought to 
describe how something as ineffable, transformative, and epistemological as 
faith could be communicated through ordinary language and an adopted set 
of fairly mundane practices.  Today, I can’t remember my rationale as to why 
my writings about those four months of research were so entirely devoid of 
narratives or of any reference to embodied experiences, but the document 
reads like the panoptic and causal social-structural accounts of the 1960s, 
front to back.  For example: 
While rigid theology and forms of practice will be discussed 
later, there are also several aspects of Christianity which have 
found unique manifestations among Navajos. First, services are 
conducted bilingually in response to the linguistic backgrounds 
of congregations, though there is a definite trend toward 
English. Second, services on the Reservation conclude with a 
communal meal, just as traditional Navajo ceremonies do. 
Perhaps because the meal comes after--and is thus not a part 
of--Navajo religious functions, it is perceived as a strictly social 
activity which, since it brings participants in the religious 
function together as a community, is maintained by Christians. 
Third, religious functions are not as tightly scheduled as their 
Anglo counterparts. It is the fact that the event takes place, 
rather than when or for how long, which is of most importance. 
Services can therefore last several hours, from the beginning of 
Sunday school to the communal meal and beyond. Fourth, tent 
meetings play a major role as a means of cementing social 
bonds in a Christian context. Tent meetings occur several times 
per year and last several days, during which time meals, hymns, 
preaching, prayer, and less sacred social activities take on 
increased intensity through the large number of participants and 
the nature of the meeting as a special occasion. Fifth, the 
specific rituals practiced by FMN pastors express a particular 
character, though the Mission churches are nondenominational. 
Of these, most significant by far is baptism. As a symbol of 
spiritual rebirth, this rite receives great emphasis where other 
varieties of Christianity (in the context of cultures which have 
integrated Christian practices into the mainstream, such as the 
U.S. or the European Community) practice infant baptism and 
appeal to other rites of initiation for adults such as catechism or 
other fundamentally liturgical performances. 
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The 70-page ethnography is an unvariegated edifice of authoritative 
statements about the mission’s practices in their Navajo, Christian, and 
American cultural contexts.  As one likely contributing factor, I was in my 
first semester of anthropology graduate training and was adapting my 
academic voice to that of a social scientist, pith-helmeted if not pithy.  Of 
course, the proscription to “overcome blindness” and learn to dodge any 
potential source of discrimination was also likely in play.  The ability to 
conflate my own observations and the consensus of reports made by 
informants during random moments often appears, in my texts, to sideslip 
the problematic fact that even my “direct” observations are largely by virtue 
of informants’ interpretations of what is going on, as well as their selective 
reports of what objects and people exist in the scene.   
Under the rules of topically-organized ethnography, this collapsing was 
not a sin and not particularly relevant.  For example, John Gwaltney (1970) 
pursued fieldwork as a blind ethnographer by grounding his descriptions in 
conversations and interviews with informants who “made statements that 
were apt and indicative of general Yoleno Chinantec ethos” in order to “afford 
some Yolenos an opportunity to speak for their own culture,” although in fact 
some of these audited reports were municipal records read to him by field 
assistants.  Margaret Mead’s letter of recommendation envisions Gwaltney’s 
fieldwork in a way very different from the Mead-surrounded-by-children 
image that had become the standard: “Blinded at two months, he manages 
his life and work with extraordinary skill and bravery, including the most 
onerous fieldwork alone in a Mexican village" (Freedman 1998).  The layers 
of relationships and in fact co-authorships of Gwaltney’s field experiences are 
all erased.14 Gwaltney’s subsequent classic of native ethnography, Drylongso 
 
14 In an appendix, Gwaltney describes the technologies that enabled his fieldwork, 
including steel canes, Braille writers, child guides, native readers, and very extensive multi-
site training in everything from language to horseback riding, all of which amount to an 
extraordinary personal and communal effort aimed at producing the conditions that would 
allow him to participate in this professional rite of passage.  The project’s occasion was a 
national health effort to fight a mosquito-borne blinding disease common in the area.  The 
accommodations that enabled Gwaltney’s fieldwork fit today’s sense of what disability 
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(Gwaltney 1980) is founded on the idea that “core Black culture” is identified 
by collecting and culling verbal reports.  He developed a methodology that 
made blindness a non-issue in the text.  Under the terms of New 
ethnography, an accommodative methodology would have to be conceived 
quite differently.   
In my interviewing technique, as I sat across the table from a number 
of stony-faced old medicine-men-become-pastors, I had been reading a book 
that instructed me to “probe” in the face of long silences (Spradley 1979); 
while the Navajos were reading from a book that said, “anyone who can’t say 
what they mean the first time doesn’t know what they’re talking about, and 
anyone who won’t give you time to think wants to hear themselves and not 
you.”  Since the 1970s, of course, anthropologists have learned to read the 
ethnographic interview as symptomatic of their own metacommunicative 
(in)competence (Briggs 1984), a problematic that is transformed but not 
averted by native ethnography.  The work of tracing the epistemologies of 
various kinds of data, especially the ethnographer’s body, became a 
responsibility.  But for me, that would come later. 
Perhaps most ethnographers remember the shock of recognizing at 
some moment that they’ve entered the research circuit and aren’t just 
readers anymore.  I was sitting in front of a Genu-ine Indian, an old man 
talking about his evangelical mission to save his own family (an entire clan…) 
from damnation.  Not only had I arrived as an ethnographer, overcoming 
blindness, but I had immediately latched onto a classic topic conferring 
professional capital, which I would continue to need to combat disability 
discrimination.  His speech, I would faithfully transcribe to capture the 
 
accommodation involves.  What Gwaltney calls “cultural accommodation to blindness” in the 
Mexican village is quite different: “The transgenerational link between the elderly 
onchocercous blind and child guides, the role of mendicancy in the maintenance of a sense of 
participation on the part of the blind, the ascription of ritual efficacy and public merit to 
deferential behavior toward blind persons, the obverse ascription of strong supernatural and 
social opprobrium to undeferential behavior toward them, and the absence of curative traits 
from indigenous medical technology and sorcery are indicative of an essentially 
accommodative adjustment to blindness” (Gwaltney 1970: v-vi).  The contrast highlights a 
difference between an accommodation directed at self determination versus one geared to 
social incorporation at the lowest rung. 
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choppiness of the local accent—I secretly thought of the result as “cigar store 
Indian” talk, and fretted over whether this phonological accuracy on the page 
wasn’t at some level a misrepresentation of the naturalness of the sound of 
their talk in context.  My tape recorder was whirring.  An idiotic grin spread 
involuntarily across my face in the middle of whatever the pastor was saying.  
That was after the forgotten scene in which I had taken his elbow and I had 
instructed him how to lead me to his office, after which he awkwardly tried to 
verbalize where I should sit and anxiously kept reformulating his words, then 
ultimately taking hold of me until I was safely brought to rest.  When I ran 
out of questions, The interview finally trailed off (the tape recorder’s 
batteries had already trailed off unnoticed).  Maybe there were photos on the 
desk I could have asked about, or books on the shelves that would have led 
to greater rapport or insight (“Please describe all the objects in the room”).  
By retracing the path I remembered, I was able to leave independently, then 
take the familiar route home.  
The acknowledgments section within a piece of writing is a way to 
portray oneself within a thick social network that juts in a different direction 
from the networks of the reader (Ben-Ari 1995 [1987])—part of the 
discourse of “I was there [and you weren’t].”  More definitively, though, 
acknowledgments construct that network as being forged of exchanges and 
sometimes reciprocal bonds.15 The value of naming colleagues and friends is 
obvious.  To the human data, on the other hand, the gesture reads “I give 
thanks back to you.” My fieldnotes record a process of my musing over the 
ethics of the research.  I reasoned that our encounter was a two-way street, 
given that my quest for a grade and professionalization was matched by their 
sacred charge to spread the Word to anyone as missionaries.  Whatever else 
I seemed to be, I as a listener—even if not as an author—represented an 
 
15 In anthropological parlance, reciprocity is an exchange relation that is ongoing by 
virtue of (in Bourdieu’s understanding) the immediate perspective of game-play in which each 
new move is likely experienced as starting a new exchange rather than simply completing the 
old one.  I will be using the idea of reciprocity in reference to an ongoing cycle of exchange 
that may nevertheless be inherently limited to a field or a period of time. 
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opportunity for doing so.  Of course, it’s just as likely that my being a 
student or my being blind were occasions for their pity.  Navajo generosity 
was still another force I wasn’t prepared to contemplate in our exchange.  I 
wrote a gushing page of acknowledgements, like everyone else does, 
thanking David and the pastors and others who had sat through group or 
individual interviews, allowed me to sit in the back of Sunday school 
meetings, etc., etc. “I regret that I could not include a great deal more of 
what I learned from all of you who were kind enough to assist in my 
research.” I also remember writing that I hoped the ethnography would be 
useful to them, but I must have been able to recognize the weakness of that 
statement, since it isn’t in the final version.  The acknowledgements are 
written in the format of a personal letter, but the page is included at the 
front of the copy submitted for the course.  I slid their copy under the door of 
David’s darkened office on my repentant but unconverted way to catch a bus 
out of town. 
Knowledge “for its own sake” enacts precisely the formula by which 
any social institution in its ordinary mode plays upon the field established by 
its own rules and in so doing enthralls the players in a web of natural-feeling 
motivations.16 Academic anthropology, as opposed to applied projects, has a 
great deal of difficulty repaying the labor of the informant in its own coin.  It 
pays them in cigarettes, hitched rides, money, NGO-related services, expert 
witnessing within the judicial system, and even vaccinations—although this 
last is sometimes discouraged because the responsibility makes the 
ethnographer liable for an unpredictable set of consequences.  The pure 
research paradigm of most ethnographic projects, which intend simply to 
learn for the sake of “increasing our understanding,” whatever its productive 
 
16 Bourdieu is closely associated with this idea, which he terms “illusio.”  In one of his 
last discussions on the topic (Bourdieu 1998), he seems to back away slightly from a 
characteristic proscription against one’s ability to be conscious of structuring structures, 
insofar as we can achieve a “disinterested” position within one game if (and only if) one joins 
a different game that intersects it.  “If disinterestedness is sociologically possible, it can be so 
only through the encounter between habitus predisposed to disinterestedness and the 
universes in which disinterestedness is rewarded” (p. 88).  I return to this idea of a 
perpendicular practice in later discussions of pedagogy. 
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value in the abstract or in the long term, does have a concrete political-
economic life in the present.  The ethnography extracts labor from 
informants and builds the anthropologist’s career, but the ethnography in 
itself isn’t likely to come with an explicit or even articulable program for how 
the representation will serve the group’s needs.  Hence, we sometimes pay 
informants, which I find an entirely honest practice; or ethnographers 
occasionally observe that natives are suspicious of their motives, which in 
fact is a step toward transparency; or we read the narratives of native 
generosities that ultimately embrace the ethnographer as fictive kin, which 
bothers me.  m sure some sort of calculus could be developed to depict the 
native labor of cultural production against the work of its collection, 
processing, and the annual income and prestige garnered by the published 
dissertation as commodity.  This is not a new thing to say (Clifford 1988, 
Rosaldo 1993 [1989], Bourdieu [everywhere]); but because it is never a 
natural thing to say, each practitioner either learns it by heart or doesn’t. 
By way of analogy, I am reminded of having been posed very often as 
an educational exhibit about blindness.  These are known as “teaching 
moments” in the blindness discourse.  To educate the public about “my 
condition” would benefit me, naturally, and so the role of prophet was 
instilled in me formally through special education classes and mobility 
instruction from the time I was six until the age when I learned to disrespect 
authority, a stage one can experience prior to reaching the age when the 
cost of doing so becomes so high.  When I was about nine, my mobility 
instructor invited my vice principal to observe my skills, or perhaps hers.  
She threw a few coins onto the asphalt and had me demonstrate proper 
technique for groping in ever-widening concentric circles to systematically 
find the dropped items. “You mean he can’t see that big old shiny quarter 
down there?” the principal asked.  What very local economy gives value to 
the coin on the ground?  The problem with such a display... well, one of the 
problems... is that of displacement, since the scene isn’t a real problem of 
needing to recover dropped coins but is instead the representation or 
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simulation of such a problem; and the audience, just like the classes of 
school children I was asked to speak to, was not the same public that would 
be present at the actual event.  Displacement holds the public in the 
suspension of being an unhelpful observer to, yet part of, the scene.  The 
generalizeable knowledge is formed by abstracting me to the category of the 
blind and abstracting them to the category of the public, a two-fold 
displacement from the present.  Whatever lesson they learn will be exercised 
elsewhere, not with me.  They are reading an ethnography of the blind. 
When I played author to the Navajo evangelists, my text’s panoptic 
authority preempted my recognition or admission that I as a disabled 
ethnographer without field assistants or funding occupied a dependent 
position relative to my informants orders of magnitude greater than the 
norm.  Not only was I entirely dependent on them for transportation to the 
Reservation, but I required sight assistance to learn the layouts of buildings 
or to move from one person to the next.  I paid no one, but also spent their 
time in small ways that I myself took for granted, because these chores fall 
into the daily round of unacknowledged favors I have to ask of people if I 
want access to what is going on in an unfamiliar place—to find a door, a seat, 
a bathroom, a bus.  By doing the work of accommodating my vision and 
mobility, my informants were supporting my ability to reinterpret their 
conversion narratives in a way that went against their own literalist 
interpretive framework.  These interactions are not part of the ethnographic 
model.  The ethnographer is a participant, a child, fictive kin, a suspicious 
agent, but is an agent nevertheless over and against whatever the natives 
do.  Consequently, I failed to conceptualize my dependence as part of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge in which I was active: one scene, but two 
discourses to produce ideologically segregated experiences of myself.  My 
self the ethnographer was, in fact, meant to be the professional cure for my 
quotidian disabled self, and so the ethnographic text erased disability.  
Ultimately, though, the discourses I inherited about what the ethnographer 
is, who the informants are, and how we can explain to ourselves what we are 
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doing all failed to cover me.  They were never calibrated to cover the peculiar 
kind of social relations I encounter during fieldwork. what was absent from 
the written ethnography exerted a pressure, such that the politics of 
fieldwork became more than a special topic for me.  I haven’t gone back to 
Navajoland.  
But neither has it left me.  That experience of my own particularistic 
condition of fieldwork, as an unbalanced reciprocity in which I both possessed 
the means of production and was invariably left in debt, would become 
productive years later.  I now can’t help but juxtapose the labor of gratitude, 
enacted in such things as written acknowledgments, to that same labor as I 
perform it each time a friend or stranger does something for me to make up 
for my disability.  So much easier to hire everything done.  What have I done 
when I offer a friend money as I get out of his car? What has he done in 
accepting it? What has he done by never asking for or indeed accepting any 
other labor from me but my thanks, or by failing to recognize something I 
later do as being “in return”, or failing to value it? “Bumming” a ride is a 
normal scene which can be played in isolation without invoking disability, 
because it is a scene anyone might play from time to time.  However, it 
carries with it the long-term expectation of reciprocity.  The labor of 
gratitude is hard labor, especially when it becomes constitutive of one’s way 
of life and a precondition of basic forms of participation or even subsistence.   
The informal logic of practice that makes economic reciprocity possible 
is reproduced at any analytical level of social life we care to observe.17 In 
the flow of a local interaction, however, there is little room for a structural 
matrix in which a set of gestures, words, implications, and other elements of 
interpersonally coordinated action can be reevaluated and substituted.  The 
 
17 Tall talk, but this claim is central to the theory of practice (Bourdieu 1977 [1972], 
1990a), which tends to observe institutional contexts; as well as to a long tradition of 
philosophical and linguistic mutuality (Mead 1934, Garfinkel 1967, Rommitveit 1998, Wilce 
2004), not to mention person deixis, although I just did (Hanks 1992).  The language system 
provides the framework in which semiotic contrasts can be evaluated and communicated, 
while discourse shapes and constitutes the language system in practice.  See Chapter 2 for 
additional discussion. 
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evaluation of me hangs.  The moment I become an interactive presence in a 
public social field—which includes my being visually scanned—the dynamics 
of the field itself shift to the extent that I am recognized as being non-
exchangeable with the class of “normal” actors who might stand in my place.  
In fact, the shift itself is the practical constitution of what “abnormal” means 
in a given situation.  People might become more self conscious, anxious, 
solicitous, judgmental, fascinated, etc., but the general awareness that I 
represent a new and unpredictable factor in the social field exerts an 
influence that wafts across the setting.  This shift in the atmosphere extends 
from me at all times and moves with me, so that I do not experience it as a 
shift at all.  The sphere expands in direct proportion to the freedom of 
mobility granted by the social field to a standard actor, the mobilized status 
of the participant-observer being an extreme example.  It shrinks in 
proportion to my ability to develop stable strategies for navigating that field 
as a consequence of my having already developed a mutual acquaintance 
with it and it to me.   
In the daily round, we who are disabled may feel the impact of 
suspended evaluations or frank devaluations, which are continually being 
repeated, as any sort of affect: a surge that will become anger, a depression 
that will become withdrawal, an awkwardness that will become a self-effacing 
joke, a sense of inevitability that will become an assumption of one’s due or 
one’s debasement.  Affects become entrenched as these things as they are 
incorporated as signs read by social practice.  In the absence of a structural 
understanding of communicative exchange and reciprocity, however, there’s 
no guarantee (or even likelihood, based on my life-long observations of 
disabled friends and strangers) that the impact will be attributed to an 
inherent relational structure of the constituted field.  Instead, the 
unreciprocal relationship is so much part of the ambience that one can 
become inured to it, except sometimes as affect.  One can also end up 
restructuring one’s life so as to avoid the activities in which dependency 
becomes not worth the price of a shit-eating grin.  Above all, the magic of 
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forgetting was, in my life, responsible for the “out-going” attitude for which I 
was rewarded.  “You don’t let being blind stop you from doing anything,” 
although it always stopped me from choosing how to be involved and also it 
stopped me from realistically imagining what my actual involvement would 
be like.  In Steve Martin’s comedy sketch “The Death of Socrates,” Socrates 
turns to his students and says, “I drank… what?” 
By the time I began thesis fieldwork in 1997, I had turned to 
ethnomusicology and verbal art as areas where the natives and I shared both 
an interest in and framework for taking their work apart, as well as for 
evangelizing it.  I had also learned to work in the New Ethnography, although 
the situations I described remained largely atmospheric while the analysis 
mapped out the participatory frameworks of various “ethnic” musical genres 
based on my listening to recordings I made.  I wanted to track the “phatic” 
social-relational function of ensemble performance as it communicated 
embodied self awarenesses that were coded as experiences of cultural 
difference.  The 1998 text alternates among theoretical exposition, a very 
few first-person narratives, and Geertzian aerial perspectives on places and 
practices presumed, I would think, to have come from direct observation 
rather than culled reports.    What amazes me in rereading my writing from 
that period is how descriptions of specific events can at once erase their 
experiential origins and yet actively give the impression of displaying them.   
[1] As I sit squeezed into the circle of twenty musicians at 
Fado's, I hear behind me someone quietly picking out each 
melody on a guitar.  [2] Meanwhile, fiddle player Eila Ross of 
the band Crazy Jane and the Bishop uses eye contact and head 
movements while she plays in order to encourage a less 
experienced player to adopt a more active role in the fast, 
ornately-decorated melody.  The shy younger fiddle player 
signals her reluctance by averting her eyes and continues to 
play only occasional melodic phrases.  [3] At another point, a 
bagpipe player wordlessly shows a jig melody to a flute player 
by allowing him to watch a few hurried runs through the tune.  
[4] At no time are musical scores or verbal descriptions of songs 
presented.  Participation in a given song relies on having it in 
one's repertoire.  [5] Mention is made at one point of a song 
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book someone recently bought, [6] and musicians do use scores 
to expand their repertoires alongside recorded music.  But the 
competence to perform accrues in real time, as the guitarist in 
the shadows behind me and the shy fiddle player attest.  [7] 
The performance does not halt, and so players learn to 
participate in the group not by practicing each part of a song, 
but through gradually admitting themselves into the ongoing 
performance context over the course of several sessions during 
witch the song is played. 
Teasing apart the above passage, an embodied experience (1) immediately 
becomes a set of visual observations (2) and interpretations as to what 
they’re doing—made, as it happens, by a field assistant who I thank in an 
endnote.  That the first narrated detail is aural and embodied seems 
important for inaugurating a non-problematic reading of the whole scene.  
Next (3), something audible is given interactional meaning by visual data, 
and (4) is significant, but stated so broadly that it seems to be drawn from 
not only immediate visual evidence, which at least this time I would have 
asked for specifically, but also a deductive quality implying deeper knowledge 
of the form of these interactions.  The next sentence contains this same shift 
in aspect, from the present interaction (5) to the ethnographic present (6), 
which is then grounded with reference to one audible and one visual event.  
(7) begins ambiguously, either referencing the present interaction or the 
ethnographic present, then becomes clearly generalized, both in time and 
with respect to how the ethnographer (that’s me) knows.  We can continue 
to trace this trajectory in the way it would next offer a theoretical gloss 
lashed to this raft of field experiences. This technique mirrors the much-
critiqued writing—style? Methodology?—of Geertz, a native point of view with 
no natives’ points of view in it.  I do include dialogue occasionally, and, 
again, its insertion casts the remarkable aura of embodiment over 
surrounding collapsed, synoptic descriptions of context. 
To my knowledge, the human brain cannot engage with the idea of 
spatial relationships, such as being presented with the verbal description of a 
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scene, without visualizing it.18The writing technique here exploits a passive 
mode of reading that, having accomplished a flowing visualization of the 
scene, finds no occasion to distrust the ethnographer.19 In effect, “I saw” 
remains a presupposed but absented component of descriptive sentences, a 
fact which ultimately has consequences for generating disabling encounters 
further down the road, when the trick can’t be performed consistently.  
Neither would or probably could I have contrived the text so strategically.  In 
all these respects, moreover, my own habit of visualizing narrative action 
transpires in just this way as I read my own texts.   
My authorship and therefore my authority and a degree of liability 
belong in part to others, although I wrote the text alone.  The theory-
mongering form of writing toward which I gravitate so strongly is a much 
simpler matter of reporting on what I have experienced while in an author’s 
verbal world.  It’s a fine, truthful story, but it asks to be read as an accurate 
representation and I am frustrated by the lack of any means to assess it on 
these grounds.  Nowhere in the thesis do I mention blindness, in fact, which 
is often the only way to be taken seriously in the first place when the text is 
judged according to standards tied to one’s deep participation and access. 
I am on the edge of A community center dance floor crowded with folk 
dancers. A statuesque blonde, red dress incongruously formal, is lilting 
rapturously about the fine art of ballroom dancing when the band starts an 
East European circle dance and she is off.  I step back and fiddle with my 
cassette recorder.  I am well aware in the moment that this is where I as a 
good ethnographer am supposed to jump in with both left feet.  My 
reluctance has less to do with the fact that I have a documented allergy to all 
geometric forms of dance (circle, line, square) than with my realistic 
calculation regarding what my learning the dance would require.  I don’t 
 
18 Chapter 5 discusses the possibility that some congenitally blind people may visualize 
as well; but in any event, a blind reviewer, so to speak, who does not constantly visualize as I 
do might be the most prone to notice the epistemological layering in the passage quoted. 
19 Compare Tedlock (1983 [1972]), who discusses various oral and embodied 
techniques of verisimilitude that connote realism to stories in performance. 
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want to get sucked in by someone who assumes that teaching a dance will 
be easy because it’s physical.  What my teacher would discover is that it will 
require a painstakingly unfamiliar linguistic effort.  The collective event would 
stagger to a halt if my instruction were forced on me in the flow of the 
interaction instead of at some remove.  A group dancer only knows by 
looking at others how to repair a forgotten step or how his body’s 
movements are being collectively mirrored, which I would think must be a 
primary source of enjoyment of folk dancing.  So long as my attention 
centers on taking very underspecified verbal commands and isolated body 
movements and turning them into something like a fluid body practice (the 
poetic sense of which I tend still not to apprehend), my embodiment of the 
dance would for a very long time not have much to do with the native point 
of view.  I see myself as I would appear, incompetent but supported because 
I am a blind man struggling to participate at any level.  The appearance of 
incompetence derives from the field and from what I perceive as others’ 
metacommunicative incompetence, but it won’t be seen that way.  It would 
have its own lasting consequences for my relationships with any of them, as 
well as my relationship with myself.  As the dancers go around, I  am 
suddenly reminded of all those school days on the gym sidelines, straining to 
track the ball by sound so as not to get hit in the nose.  Growing up during 
the 1980s, my three great fears were basketball, nuclear war, and group 
dance corvée.  Choose your battles but never play anyone’s fool.  Naturally, 
folk dancing is hardly what I am really talking about here.   
When the dance ends, the massive participatory framework in front of 
me dissolves into a pebbled wall of white noise.  I seem to be in an 
unpopulated eddy, so I try to distinguish a familiar voice or topic of 
conversation to which I can attach myself.  The field is underpopulated in 
terms of items of interest.  My “key informant,” who has brought me here, 
returns to me and tells me that there is a well-known local musician I should 
meet.  I take her elbow and she leads me to him.  He’s been recording the 
band, because songs are made to be recorded and learned.  Our 
52 
conversation ends when he runs off to catch the next one.  I begin scanning 
again to find something to move toward.  My challenge is to hear, identify, 
navigate toward, and then interrupt the flow of others who have either taken 
my isolation to be a matter of my own choice, or who have not noticed me 
because what I am doing does not register on their map of desirable or 
immediately relevant activity choices.   
There is nothing remarkable in my discomfort.  It is always present 
when I’m “independent” in a mutable environment, unless I simply cease to 
think of myself as being in relation to the context, which I find myself doing 
more and more often.  Neither is there anything remarkable in my not 
presenting these kinds of details in my ethnographic account, since I have 
learned not to consider them at all in conventional conversations in which 
they would be taken as an uncomfortable change of topic.  Because this 
conditional mode of limited participation is endemic to my life, it doesn’t 
occur to me to qualify it as a constituent of how I specifically move through 
the ethnographic field.  Ethnographic narrative conventions therefore met 
with little resistance in erasing my radicality.  I consider it now only because 
I am studying the disabled ethnographer, his behaviors sans all the 
prostheses by which he actually accomplishes his objectives.  I can 
characterize his overall pattern of movement as follows: there is virtually no 
extra-discursive flow within a particular field or from one social field to the 
next, and rarely anything that acts as the impulse for him to set out across 
the floor toward the next object of ethnographic desire.  His flow hinges upon 
language, reliable structure, and an intentionality that inaugurates actions 
according to an abstract agenda frequently disjoined from the present 
context, such as a plan he brings with him or something he invents to say or 
do that will reconnect him with the participatory framework.   
But I’m not aware of any of this in 1997.  All I tend to do is wonder 
where all the data is and how to get myself there, even though every time I 
arrive the anticipatory image I had of myself remains elsewhere.  Soon after 
I set myself to realizing my disability, I became able to formulate it as a loss 
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of improvisation, spontaneity, and independence.  All three of these forms of 
agency fluctuate with the present field of action and are comparatively 
“enabled” when I occupy that field in company with one of my familiars, to a 
depth I doubt they can imagine.  As a result, the transition from a biomedical 
understanding of blindness as a visual condition to the beginnings of a social 
model of disability (Oliver 1990, 1996) seems never to be a natural step.  
Later, I would trace the three factors to one. 
I did most of my research in “public houses” for that project.  The 
microphone and headphones, especially in a town like Austin, fixed me in an 
identity stronger than blindness.  A pub is richly sedimented with things and 
people to look at, just as in a coffee shop or on a bus there’s always a 
newspaper with which to control one’s hands and eyes.  Normal public 
sociality requires that the eyes, at least, be occupied, although the etiquette 
varies as to whether or not eyes can be closed, if listening to music qualifies 
as occupation, etc. The bar is structured to provide a variety of 
organizational frameworks of interaction and selective interactional 
bypassing.  As in most public places, however, what to do with my hands and 
gaze becomes a real problem when I am not directly engaged.  Empty space 
is not a viable object of one’s gaze, and print-reading can be explained as 
much in terms of occupying the hands as the eyes.  If I look uneasy about 
my bodily suspension, I am judged socially awkward; if I am at peace with it, 
I am aloof.  Either of these interpretations is based on the assumption that I 
have the same choices of engagement and self presentation as anyone in the 
public.  A better gloss is that I have been misplaced.   
The immense privileged status of being able to apprehend the 
constructedness of one’s own agency only as a condition of being free to 
choose is sewn deep in the fabric of consumer society in general and 
American graduate studenthood in particular, where narrative markers of 
agentive experience constitute the conversational, relational capital.  Happy 
hour with young anthropologists: the talk always returns to their 
connoisseurship of foreign places.  Travel is simply what an anthropologist 
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does with her disposable money and time, well beyond any idea of fieldwork 
but perhaps as a global landscape on which the desire for ethnographic 
fieldwork sometimes forms—an experience of oneself in difference, the 
unpackaged tour, alive, re-created, liminoidal, rewarding.  “My mind was able 
to escape from the claustrophobic, Turkish-bath atmosphere in which it was 
being imprisoned by the practise of philosophical reflection.  Once it had got 
out into the open air, it felt refreshed and renewed. Like a city-dweller 
transported to the mountains, I became drunk with space, while my dazzled 
eyes measured the wealth and variety of the objects surrounding me” (Levi-
Strauss 1997 [1955]: 56). 
Insofar as ethnographic fieldwork becomes professional capital traded 
on the basis of the speciality and quality of field experiences, anthropology 
remains likewise disposed to take for granted the force of desire active in its 
professional culture.  Because the ethnographer’s kinship obligations are 
fictive in the sense of being temporally and consequentially bounded by the 
game being played, the ethnographer is free to interrogate the game and, 
ultimately, to opt out of it.  To the extent that her livelihood doesn’t depend 
on native forms of labor, she is free to slide from the role of worker to that of 
observer to that of VIP, from female worker to male worker roles, etc.  
Whatever constraints the society imposes on the ethnographer,  fieldwork 
depends on her being unusually mobile, since otherwise she would have 
precisely a native point of view and might not be economically or politically 
able to enter or exit the field.   
Participant-observation has virtually always been described in terms of 
an ethnographer traveling across a cultural border zone of some kind and 
entering into a new sphere of relations.  Rosaldo (1993 [1989]) has noted 
the transparency of the Western episteme in the constitution of this cultural 
exchange, but it should also be noted that participant-observation creates a 
social organization in which the fieldworker is entirely engaged, entirely 
constitutive.  Institutionalized desires for information, inclusion, knowledge, 
understanding, data, and professional recognition coat every surface of the 
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field.  Ethnographic desires give texture to culture.  The objects of this 
desiring perception might end up on the anthropologist’s walls back home, 
become field relationships, or form the basis of a practical activity through 
which she comes to an embodied understanding, but in all events 
participant-observation is founded on the ability to forge a relationship 
among the ethnographer, a ground, and the object of desire.  The ground is 
the set of structures, the solidity of which can be taken for granted as the 
precondition of mobility, the ability to move toward the desired object of 
fieldwork, in precisely the same procedure that allows participants in a verbal 
exchange to identify and move toward their object insofar as they can take 
the organizational framework of talk largely for granted.  In the absence of 
very local forms of field-activated, flow-generating agency such as eye 
contact, recognized status as a person, a built environment engineered to the 
specifications of the ethnographer’s body, or the ability to survey a field 
overflowing with potential items of interest, the ground crumbles and 
attention shifts from items of “intellectual interest” to the problematics of 
one’s own participation in organizational structures, exposing the privileged 
construction of “intellectual interests” in the process.  Certainly in my case, 
the social organization of participant-observation materialized in stark relief 
by virtue of the disorganizing force of disability, which popped all the seams.  
“In most fields of social action there are alternative courses open, and there 
must be selection between them if social life is to be carried on. Such 
decision-taking has social repercussions-social relations are created or 
modified and adjusted as a result of the choices made. This continual 
ordering and reordering of social relations is the process of organization. 
Even where no choice seems to be involved, but only impulsive action, the 
consequential adjustments in the activities of others mean social 
organization. . . The preferences in social relations, their worthwhileness, the 
standards of judgment applied, give a content and meaning to social action. 
This is the field for the study of values” (Firth 1953).  My center of critical 
attention has become the many forms of standardized (and thereby 
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exchangeable) values, seldom recognized as such, by which the people 
around me circulate their labor, experiences, and roles.  For anthropologists, 
mobility near tops the list. 
I still occupy the apartment I would come home to while I was 
conducting my Master’s thesis fieldwork.  The places I visited then have 
continued to occasionally recall and reinterpret my memories of that time, so 
that a later rereading of the 1998 text was vexed.  When I sat down to write 
my next conference paper (I’d traded in ethnomusicology for a project at an 
outdoor museum), I was determined to ground the narrative 
epistemologically, which is to say unconventionally.  I was determined to 
excoriate the artificiality from my narratives and tell embodied stories.  And 
now we come to it, because I found myself unable to write such a narrative, 
either as anthropology or fiction.  Given the state of my vision in 1995, much 
less 1998, I could not physically have perceived many of the visual details or 
observed some of the activities I describe in the Navajo story that begins this 
essay, except to a degree that is much more imaginative than the 
transparent norm.  They are mirages and must invariably have been 
constructed from a combination of (1) hearsay taken from various indirect or 
direct references over time; (2) a longitudinal accumulation of vague visual 
impressions, each highly revocable but which accrue a functional reliability 
over time as a working image; and (3) assorted stuff my mind made up and 
presented to me, since a man with no face will always be more difficult to 
remember than a man with an imaginary face.    As a critical exercise, I can 
differentiate elements of an experience narrative that probably arise from 
any of these three sources, but when I attempt to re-imagine the story 
without the rhetoric of images already constituted by these procedures, I 
simply cannot do so.  “What can you see?” I open my mouth to reply, but 
what comes out are objects, not blind spots, while it should go without 
saying that my memory at best presents the objects I saw and so comes 
back to me within the same loop but now with the holistic character of dream 
knowledge.  “What does the fuzziness look like?”  My eyes immediately begin 
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looking for the outline of fuzziness.  In 2000, I gained a sense of how I could 
“accurately” communicate the practical reality of partial blindness, which 
would be as an optical illusion—a Rorschach world in which contextual cues 
alone would finalize the image and yet one sometimes in the end is left with 
no basis for distinguishing between dappled sunlight on water, the jagged 
floor of a canyon far below, or broken ground inches away.  For years, I’ve 
intended to show such a scene rather than just tell about it, but now my 
vision has deteriorated and I can’t reproduce such an image based on a 
memory of what sight was like, except as the kind of speculative fiction 
anyone can write if they try.  My earliest inklings of this essay collection, 
often first worked out in my reading notes, evidence a dawning realization 
that my blindness was only incidentally a matter of vision; blindness was 
instead what I could only call a sort of language disorder. 
I am strongly disposed to divide my experience into two parts: the 
accident of my blindness, which I work to control for and cancel out of my 
image of the second part, which is the idea I have of the scene in its 
normativity.  “Me, not me”: there is nothing unique about how I as a blind 
person turn myself into an observer, but the result for a blind person is 
markedly unproductive because the observer perspective as a storage 
medium cannot without skilled phenomenological effort be transposed back 
into the embodied field perspective except as a normative embodiment.  This 
“cancelling-out” procedure demonstrably works on two levels.  The first is the 
set of strategies for achieving social incorporation despite a radical 
difference, while the second involves a consistent and coherent cover story 
that fosters a self transposable with the kind of social actor anticipated by 
the social field; that is, I try to find in myself the qualities accorded to my 
role, which I have been enculturated to recognize, and then I act in  a 
fashion that will meet the standards of this position in order to successfully 
navigate the field (Biddle [2002] has likewise written of identification in this 
way).  The self constructed within this procedure only tends to recapture and 
recontextualize the elements already made available by the rhetorics 
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responsible for my perception.  Hence, blindness tends to disappear from my 
past, present, and projection of the future, except in certain gross categorical 
ways.   
If the cover story were transparent, I would be able to inwardly 
recognize the dimensions of difference that are at odds with or passed over 
by the manner in which I am called upon to act. In short, I would be “just 
acting,” a self-conscious subject of oppression.  But someone who “acts out” 
their ordinary existence at all times, public and private, tends to receive any 
number of psychiatric labels and, more importantly, has difficulty engaging in 
productive activity.  The more likely scenario is that we tend to be aware of 
ourselves in ways that are conditioned by social practice (Goffman 1959, 
Bourdieu 1990a, Foucault, Whorf, etc.).  The perdurant nature of the troubles 
I’ve had, along with their echoes in the oral and written accounts of other 
disabled people (see Chapter 5), make a case for suggesting that the 
awareness of radical difference is not only unexpressed, but unavailable and, 
within the framework of the most immediate game-play, unproductive.  
Anthropologists always seem to write about the “constraints” of the social 
field, as if actors were bound-up balls of freedom waiting to explode—the 
celebrated will to power.  The model begs the question of how these qualities 
or intensions come into being in the first place, if not through their social 
production.  Self knowledge comes from the field of practice, or else we 
would have to lay a good deal of culture alongside species instinct.  
Consequently, a distinction can be made between self knowledge that is 
“repressed” by a hegemonic social field versus “dissociated” qualities of one’s 
situation that never become adequately formulated as part of a discourse or 
habit (Kirmayer 1994, Stern 1997). 
Memory turns out to be already inscribed by a communicable version 
of a scene, which is to say a normative-literal record of relationships and 
features that will pass in public discourse.  As I interact with my 
environment, the habits of turning my gaze  to an object, taking it in hand,  
and calling it to mind all bring a visual image; and only with considerable 
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effort, even after recent years of practice, can I “unsee” it.  When my vision 
was better, I didn’t have this problem to a noticeable degree, and of course 
most humans seldom notice it at all.  Now, though, I am apt to turn off a 
lamp and the room fails to go dark until I remember to mentally turn the 
lamp off as well.  At some level, I am sure that this form of forgetting, which 
is a forgetting of production, is what provides the ground of my self 
awareness and my ability to act.  Nietzsche wrote something about this 
forgetting being the only thing that stops interpretation from sliding all the 
way down. 
By way of analogy, analytical procedures of data collection such as 
mechanical recording or fieldnotes limit the creative license of one’s much-
later acts of remembering.  By recording comparatively thin events before 
they are framed within the arc of a theoretical presentation, fieldnotes also 
maximize the transposability of one’s observations to other observers and 
thereby form a building block of scientific reliability.  They have this property, 
regardless of one’s theoretical predilections.  Wilce (1998) notes  that real-
time note-taking withdraws one from the flow of interactions, which will have 
another kind of limiting effect on what one takes notes on; while his 
preferred method of taking notes as soon as  possible post-facto inevitably 
introduces a limitation on accuracy and the degree of verbatim print 
recording  one can do.  Jean Jackson (1990, 1995) has interviewed 
anthropologists about fieldnotes, and the results overwhelmingly indicate 
that one important dimension of these fetishized objects and the practice of 
creating them is the presence of the institution of anthropology standing over 
the shoulder of the scribbling fieldworker.   At this most immediate moment, 
the inscription is already consciously bestowing professional identity on the 
ethnographer, providing the scene of writing its raison d'être.  Finally, 
Lederman (1990) documents how her own process of reading her fieldnotes 
recontextualizes them in the process of drawing them into a narrative told at 
a great distance from the field and amidst a climate of theoretical order.  As 
argued by Clifford (1990: 57), ethnographic inscription, transcription, and 
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ultimately description are all “intertextual, figurative, and historical all the 
way down to the most ‘immediate’ perceptions.”  As memory-writings, 
fieldnotes put a stop to that as a practical matter, a matter of forgetting. 
When I make any record of research, I confront a quandary.  If I take 
on the task of producing an objectively accurate account, I am forced to 
apply a sort of second-guess skeptical procedure that moves a step away 
from experience, in which case I am no longer documenting the pertinent 
conditions under which I interacted with my environment.  I’m taking a 
strange step back to ask “now wait, what would this experience have been 
fashioned from, really?”  That procedure would require an objective 
foundationalist instrument to apply to my visually-colonized imagination, and 
so the effort to recover the objective world would send the first-person 
account further into experience-distant territory.  On the other hand, if I 
approach experience phenomenologically, I know myself to be writing a sort 
of fiction, in the sense that details are produced through a synthetic 
procedure that is not the same as it is for a sighted person, and so the 
written culture is not reliable, vis-à-vis someone standing beside me.  Of the 
two options, however, only the second is valid, because it exhibits its 
epistemology on the page where unreliability can at least be tracked, if that 
is someone’s goal; or where the Rorschach dynamics of my meaning-making 
are open for me and everyone else to critique as cultural product.  And, of 
course, the use of myself as an extraordinary example is only intended to 
present a magnification of what goes on fundamentally in ethnographic 
writing.  Fieldwork creates the ethnographer, who creates the text, which 
creates new knowledge.  However, the process is also recursive at every 
stage; experience creates oneself as the subject who understands as a 
process of signification embedded in a methodological field (habits, 
disciplinary discourses, ethnomethodologies, rhetorical tropes, interests), and 
the perceptual datum of experience is constructed from this process.20 This 
 
20 Compare the representative assertion by Marx that "The forming of the five senses 
is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present" (Tucker 1978: 4). 
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latter statement characterizes the ordinary constitution of self awareness 
from which ethnography extends as a formal art of everyday life.   
The process of my professionalization is thus a complex one, as it 
turns out.  In trying to practice the art of everyday life, I came to recognize 
the dimensions of my difference—the difference between me and the person 
the discipline anticipated through its procedures, and also my difference from 
the person anticipated by the natives with their habituated communicative 
practices.  Without something extraordinary thrown into the works, these 
ruptures are never resolved and never enter me into a deeper layer of public 
participation, as the legend of the ethnographer would have it. Yet my 
disincorporation is certainly providing me a productive commentary on 
practice.  In a philosophical sense, interpretive ethnography is the surface on 
which our ruptures of mutual understanding are recorded.  Even responses 
like native ethnography still rely on graphocentric procedures to construct 
collectivized self and other as disjunct objects; while autoethnography, which 
has varied definitions (Reed 1997, Bochner and Ellis 2002), always returns to 
the self’s outlook on an ethnos. I am fixated on ethnography as an object of 
fascination for this reason.  My life, my reading, and my conversations with 
other disabled people prompt me to argue that   I came to know my 
disability for the first time only as a disabled ethnographer.  I was able to 
cobble together a sociological explanation of my ordinary experience only by 
first reading it on the surface of ethnographies, once that surface had a 
texture decomposed by reflexivity. 
There are three pivotal characters in the opening story: David and I 
are present, while Coyote is absent.  In reality, everywhere one looks there 
is nothing but coyotes.  And so it was that I came into this place made of 
fabulous texts.  Barring an absolute refutation of Wittgenstein’s explosive 
idea of meaning, Derrida’s of writing, Althusser’s of ideology, or Foucault’s of 
knowledge, we can all be said to live here, in theory.  It’s a claim that many 
in anthropology today find extraneous, because past discussions of textuality 
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have been abstract and, ultimately, of little use “on the ground.”  In my life, 
however, these ideas take on special urgency.   
 
SELF-ANALYTICS: REFLEXIVITY AND REFLEXIVE TRADITIONS 
I want to take a turn beating a long-dead horse and, worse, I am 
doing so to get it back on its feet.  The literature on anthropological 
reflexivity can be divided into three areas, each of which momentarily 
became prominent lines of discussion within anthropology during the 1980s: 
the power structure of ethnographic interviewing and fieldwork itself, which 
fits under the heading of the sociology of scientific knowledge; the rhetorical 
strategies of the texts, as part of a pan-academic, post-objectivist 
rediscovery that the sciences are written; and a related Rationalist 
examination of argumentation and the status of empirical truth claims, which 
belongs to the philosophy of science.  Comments made by Watson (1991: 
85-6) accurately foreshadowed what would be the result of all the 1980s 
rattle over experimental forms of ethnographic writing: “I imagine that only a 
small minority of readers who are urgently interested in matters 
epistemological are likely to persist with them; the rest, once the novelty has 
worn off, will drift back to more familiar forms of writing. In New Literary 
Forms we can see the future of interpretive anthropology, and it does not 
work.”  Doesn’t work for whom and to what ends?  Practically speaking, it 
seems inevitable that any interpretive project will ground its deconstructive 
efforts in  a world that remains otherwise conceptually solid, and so Watson’s 
prediction has proven prescient for mainstream ethnographic practice.  The 
revolution in experimental writing failed to materialize (because, after all, 
reflexivity cannot be taught objectively as a method).  The scientists were 
unmoved, while another contingent listened for a while before apparently 
deciding that, even if the world were semiotically unstable, there’s apparently 
nothing to be done about it and so one should just duck and plug away at the 
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routinized post-Geertzian methodical residue of those discussions of “things 
epistemological.”   
Both strategies can be valid, depending on how the text is to circulate.  
Realism will remain the approach of applied anthropology, for example, and 
for political advocacy and the documentation of communicative practices.  
Between the resolutely scientific versus postmodern modes of inquiry, we 
also find a large corpus of ethnographies that don’t declare a strong 
allegiance to a particular epistemology regarding their own inquiry, and so 
they are caught trying to finesse their way between full-bore hermeneutics 
and social science in order to be recognized.  Usually this takes place as part 
of a tacit professional socialization that includes certain features of a 
linguistic ideology of academic discourse.  For example, I went through a 
period in which certain phrases and especially titles rang the bell of cultural 
capital, without my understanding quite why except in terms of their 
iconicities to other valued expressions.  We find an abundance of New 
ethnography titles that combine an artistic figure of speech, often marking 
cultural dialogicality by way of an appropriated decontextualized bit of native 
speech (“’I’m In Stitches’: Selfhood and hegemony among Easter Island 
doily-weavers”) or a pair of something akin to conceptually dizzying gerunds 
(“Shrunken Heads, Expanding Minds: Post-hegemonic cannibalism among 
Easter Island psychoanalysts”); combined with subtitles that denote the real-
world object of study, following a variant of the form [practice] + [people] + 
[place].  Given that ethnographers tend to be among the very best writers in 
Academe, the endurance of these extraordinarily hackneyed tropes should be 
read in terms of their social rather than their erstwhile poetic function.  The 
titles index an ethnography that is intertextual “all the way down” to its 
fixed, reliably-observable object, such that interpretivism is subordinated to 
realist science for the purpose, usually, of upholding Academe’s dominant 
standards of value.  This double-voicedness is a characteristic of speech 
genres, and not just anthropology (Bakhtin 1986 [1953]).  A quick survey of 
several academic presses (contradicted by a survey of several recent journal 
64 
issues) suggests that this hybrid form is giving way to a new breed of titles 
that instead head discussions of ethnographically-observed processes, so the 
“radical” dialogical and feminist work of the 1990s may be coming to center 
stage after all.  What I want to suggest, however, is that the 1980s hoopla 
over the nature of [the] ethnography can be attributed to a contest over an 
ideologically unitary, objective referent of the word “ethnography.”  In other 
words, both the book and the figure of its author were, for the purposes of 
the discussion, taken out of their many different courses of circulation.  
Ethnographies were all constructs, but somehow the category to which they 
belonged remained reified.  In the wake of these debates, Reflexivity became 
something talked about far too little, too loosely, and to superficially. 
Meyerhoff and Ruby (Ruby 1982) distinguish between self reference, 
which is a modern Western preoccupation with the privatized self, 
particularly the outward expressions of its presumed interiority; versus the 
metacommunicative expression of the self in its social relations, which in 
effect holds presuppositions of interiority in abeyance for the purpose of 
rethinking that relationship and its parts.  They suggest that reflexivity 
requires not one mirror but two, so that the construction of images is seen as 
an infinite regress.  “Narcissus' tragedy then is that he is not narcissistic 
enough, or rather that he does not reflect long enough to effect a 
transformation. He is reflective, but he is not reflexive—that is, he is 
conscious of himself as an other, but he is not conscious of being self-
conscious of himself as an other and hence not able to detach himself from, 
understand, survive, or even laugh at this initial experience of alienation” (p. 
3).21  For example, when the camera backs away from Dustin Hoffman’s 
embodiment of Willy Loman in Volker Schlöndorff's 1985 Death of a 
Salesman, it keeps backing until we see the footlights, the microphones, and 
 
21 The image sharply evokes Hegel’s dialectic of recognition.  However, reflexivity here 
is a process of differentiating the self from itself rather than coming to reflexive consciousness 
of itself by way of the mirror of the other as in Hegel or, in fact, a Ricoeurian interpretive 
ethnography.  Thus the mathematical axiom of reflexivity “a=a” becomes subject to a 
deconstruction, in which antecedent variables are recovered, instead of representing the 
unified end of a proof. 
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all the other edges of the play world within the play within the movie within 
(arguably) the Raeganomics world order.  It’s a broad canvas on which we 
can now theorize as critics about how elements are pointing to one another 
or to even broader contexts and discourses.  This analytical stance toward 
the self, whether an informant’s self or the ethnographer’s, applies equally to 
both cases by virtue of its being a method of reading a text, and not a 
sensitivity to embodied experience—although experience obviously has to be 
where it starts. 
Far from being a self-referencing claim to an interior and thus 
inviolable truth, reflexivity is a form of deconstructive textual criticism, a 
fundamental process of  human understanding employed by but separable 
from both philosophical and practical introspection.22  It produces 
expressions and interprets the conditions under which they are constructed, 
this work often occurring on the printed page, and we really must keep in 
mind this image of reflexivity as building up from experience rather than 
unearthing it in some essentialistic way.   Subjective experience becomes 
subject to interpretation only as a textual report, and not as an experience; 
hence, Freud worked from dream texts, not dreams; Geertz interpreted what 
Balinese observably did, which can include the act of speaking their minds; 
and introspecting Philosophers read arguments, not minds.  Boyd (1983) 
notes that even as this linguistic-deconstructive moment in critical theory 
was opening, it was closing within the novelistic tradition figured in Joyce and 
Faulkner, for whom reflexivity was the basis for the production of novelistic 
experience (my own interest in interpretation, several academic disciplines 
ago, stems directly from reading Faulkner and Dostoyevsky).  Boyd’s 
 
22 See Lee (1997: 90ff) for a roughly parallel but very technical discussion of the 
semiotics of self-reference, as the qualification of an object; versus self-reflexivity, in which 
the object becomes interpretable only on the basis of its indexical relations to the contexts of 
its production, such as deixis or the signaling of its token-source reference.  Reflexive 
utterances are deeply implicated in performativity in that this forging of complex co-textual, 
inter-contextual bonds creates the context it appears to simply describe.  Hence, first-person 
accounts of experience are rather complex performative discourse productions.  This 
summoning of meta-communicative attention defines self-analytics, in distinction from 
psychoanalysis, according to the premise that “the reality of the inner psyche is the same reality as
that of the sign” (Volosinov 1973 [1930]: 26).
66 
observation makes sense from the standpoint that the capitalist knowledge 
economy that courses among writers, publishing houses, critics, consumers, 
and Universities must continually move onto new ground as the precondition 
of its livelihood, so that the identification of reflexivity as a paradigm already 
marked it for death.  Today, there are many literary critics and 
anthropologists alike who celebrate the passing of deconstruction (and 
reflexivity along with it).  In what follows, I review a few of the influential 
sticking points that seem now to endure as reflexivity’s traditionalizations, 
quite apart from its analytical formulation.  I feel a need to reclaim reflexivity 
from the histories of its reception so that it can be put back into service as a 
heuristic tool, both for remediating the ethnographer’s own involvement in 
the field, which has been the subject of this chapter; and for limbering up 
theoretical understandings of what one is observing, whether or not “I” 
remains the subject, as taken up in the next chapter. 
First, the paradigm is self-critical, so I can dispense with perhaps the 
most casual reference to ethnographic reflexivity as a thickly-laid-on self-
referencing elaboration of the ethnographer’s thoughts and feelings.  That is 
a literary technique, not a method, and so it needs to be evaluated in terms 
of what the author is doing with the technique rather than itself serving as 
the basis for evaluating the text as “very reflexive” as if that tells us what it 
is doing.  The ethnographer’s autobiography, understood as a factual recall of 
the significant past, has sometimes been introduced in order to explain the 
ethnographer’s situated understanding in the field (cf. most of the essays in 
Okely and Callaway 1992), a technique that demonstrably contributes 
wonderful depth and breadth to the ethnographic field but which 
nevertheless does nothing to change the ontological grounding of the 
ethnographic account, which is no more “veridical,” if that’s the idea, than if 
the field experiences were presented in isolation.  Autobiographical claims do 
not alleviate the responsibility of the reader (or the writer as his own critic) 
to understand the text constitutively as a complex site of discourse.   
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Thwacking our proverbial dead horse in a sensitive spot, I would note 
that Translated Woman (Behar 1993) often provoked strong negative 
reactions toward reflexivity as a result of a very valid reading in which Behar 
uses the last chapters to interpretively as well as textually close her subject’s 
story with her own, seeming to insist on her reading of Esperanza’s story as 
final.  Behar’s is a highly motivated reading, and by her account a motivated 
writing:  
From the first time I heard Esperanza tell her story, I thought of 
her as a woman warrior. I was attracted to the image of the 
tough woman who had struggled to define herself in opposition 
to the way society would define her. But I was also repelled by, 
and more than a little afraid of, the woman who had tried to 
advance her female cause by appropriating characteristics 
culturally ascribed to men, even to the point of beating her own 
daughter and women rivals. Although I could render her 
attitudes and actions intelligible, how far could I go in 
celebrating them as models of feminist resistance and agency? 
(p. 294).  
The fourth part of the book, “Reflejos / Reflections,” intends to problematize 
the parallels between translation of a story from its context of production to 
that of consumption, attending to Behar’s mobility and control over the 
means of production, but claiming for herself the status of a “literary 
wetback” (p. 329) and certainly never surrendering feminism as an 
authorially-imposed interpretant transcending both their stories.  “The 
violence directed at me was psychic, not inscribed on my body, as it was for 
Esperanza, and, given my class position, I was properly fed in the midst of 
my sufferings. But the pain was nonetheless profound; its thick ink still clogs 
my pen” (p. 328).  In a chapter overviewing her feminism, Behar imagines 
Esperanza wondering what the chapter has to do with her, first in Spanish 
then translated to English (p. 296), even being imagined to tell Behar to 
leave her out of any feminist discussion (p. 300) as Behar begins to reread 
Esperanza’s life (and many other things) in a strong light of male oppression, 
before she ultimately uses the final chapter to describe her own life in these 
terms. In a linear sequence of stories, each story interprets the one before it; 
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reading from back to front, then, Behar’s sense of oppression informs our 
understanding of her feminism, and her feminism seemingly controls her 
presentation of Esperanza, forming the book into the reverse of a 
hermeneutic dialogue.  She deploys Esperanza to enforce what she already 
knew.  Again, the appropriateness of the strategy depends on the circuit of 
the text: therapeutic, activist, ethnographic, or some complex combination.  
Unfortunately, the text seemed to lodge obstructively in the path of 
anthropology’s evaluation of reflexivity, where it had very little business.  
The text could have been written differently and retained its intentions, but a 
reader can’t get past a writer’s clogged pen nor can the writer do anything 
about having one, except to write her way through it. 
In a more abstract vein reflecting on ethnographic representation, 
Writing Culture managed to collect to itself the rays of all the past and even 
future elucidations of culture as ethnographic product, and so I’ll note a few 
characteristics of those essays that seem to still shape the discussions I’ve 
read or been party to over the past fifteen years.  A sensitivity to dialogue 
was everywhere in their discourse, except in the ensuing discourse among 
anthropologists.  Clifford’s introduction develops an elaborate rhetorical 
figure (Clifford 1986: p. 2) through parallelism and a very exclusive (perhaps 
even elitist) set of intertextual references:  
Ethnography's tradition is that of Herodotus and of 
Montesquieu's Persian. It looks obliquely at all collective 
arrangements, distant or nearby. It makes the familiar strange, 
the exotic quotidian. Ethnography cultivates an engaged clarity 
like that urged by Virginia Woolf: "Let us never cease from 
thinking—what is this 'civilization' in which we find ourselves?”… 
Ethnography is actively situated within powerful systems of 
meaning. It poses its questions at the boundaries of 
civilizations, cultures, classes, races, and genders. Ethnography 
decodes and recodes, telling the grounds of collective order and 
diversity, inclusion and exclusion. It describes processes of 
innovation and structuration, and is itself part of these 
processes.  Ethnography is an emergent interdisciplinary 
phenomenon. 
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“Ethnography” is a unitary field of practice, but is a set of diverse and 
sometimes incompatible practices.  Yet, surely as a word it must be able to 
be constructed as a being of some sort (although at the end of this motif, 
Clifford offers that Ethnography is “changing and diverse,” and he doesn’t 
want to “impose a false unity on the exploratory essays that follow”).  What 
hermeneutically-informed writer worth his salt can resist the eternal 
challenge to define a rich cultural concept in a non-reductive way, after all?  
It is a performance of ethnographic hermeneutics.  The allusions, presented 
as tools to think with, in the product become forces to reckon with, indicating 
that he is defining as well as writing for his peers.  Crapanzano begins his 
essay developing “The ethnographer” by way of the same rhetorical motif 
(Crapanzano 1986: 51-2): 
The ethnographer does not…translate texts the way the 
translator does. He must first produce them. Text metaphors for 
culture and society notwithstanding, the ethnographer has no 
primary and independent text that can be read and translated 
by others. No text survives him other than his own…The 
ethnographer is a little like Hermes: a messenger who, given 
methodologies for uncovering the masked, the latent, the 
unconscious, may even obtain his message through stealth. He 
presents languages, cultures, and societies in all their opacity, 
their foreignness, their meaninglessness; then like the magician, 
the hermeneut, Hermes himself, he clarifies the opaque, renders 
the foreign familiar, and gives meaning to the meaningless. He 
decodes the message. He interprets.  The ethnographer 
conventionally acknowledges the provisional nature of his 
interpretations. Yet he assumes a final interpretation—a 
definitive reading. "I have finally cracked the Kariera section 
system," we hear him say. "I finally got to the root of all their 
fuss about the Mmdlyi tree." He resents the literary critic's 
assertion that there is never a final reading. He simply has not 
got to it yet.  The ethnographer does not recognize the 
provisional nature of his presentations. They are definitive. He 
does not accept as a paradox that his "provisional 
interpretations" support his "definitive presentations." (It is 
perhaps for this reason that he insists on a final reading.) 
Embedded in interpretation, his presentations limit 
reinterpretation. 
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The figure here becomes obviously ironic, and also one whose stature 
has shrunk somewhat in the intervening years under the heat of this very 
text and, to a greater degree, feminist critiques (Mascia-Lees, Sharpe, and 
Cohen 1989; Abu-Lughod 1991; Behar and Gordon 1995; Wiener 1999 
[1997]).  Even in its irony, however, the figure is monologic in its 
presentation of the good hermeneut versus what science, from the evaluative 
framework of interpretivism, is doing wrong.  I am not here concerned with 
the obscurantist romanticization of the super-hermeneut per se (see Fine 
1994 for that), although my attempts to embody even more mundane 
models of the New ethnographer from 1995 to 2000 would make me acutely 
aware of disability.  My intrest instead fastens on how the rhetorical camera, 
if you will, stays centered on the ethnographer as protagonist to the 
exclusion of both the natives and the consumers of ethnography.23 The 
decontextualized New ethnographer tends to be a very muscular but faceless 
figure who acts intentionally, moves freely, enters whole-heartedly into 
choice social relationships, is either strongly gendered or else strongly 
hermaphroditic, is wide awake to aporia, and is loving it.  No one does this 
hero narrative better than Stoller (1989) in passages such as the following 
(p. 55; there are many more like it): “On their existential path in inner 
space, sorcerers, in the end, create their own sorcery; painters create their 
own styles. And just as writers need to spend many years searching for their 
own voices, so we anthropologists need to find a ‘voice’ and create works 
which bring readers to dwell within us as we walk along our solitary paths in 
the field, exposing our hearts so full of excitement, fear, and doubt.”  These 
figures are representative of how, almost inevitably, ostensibly-reflexive 
discussions of practice carried out at a very decontextualized remove 
(perhaps in accordance with the broad public being addressed) must 
fictionalize their object, personifying a collection of qualities that can be true 
 
23 Such is true for proponents of ethnographic realism as well, by the way, although 
the inherent exchangeability of the scientific gaze keeps the figure of the realist ethnographer 
from becoming quite so (to twist a famous phrase) full of himself through the detour of the 
other. 
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for the generalized portrait without being potentially falsifiable within any 
given instance.  That is, New Ethnography can never be the wrong thing to 
do.  Literary critics call this technique a forced subject position.  
The often vitriolic responses of committed realists, who seem to feel 
rather justifiably threatened, were equally adamant in their refusal to 
understand interpretivism, much less postmodernism, as anything but the 
bad practice of their own scientific project (Gellner 1988, Sangren 1988, 
Spencer 1989).  The recognition that even the most panoptic ethnographies 
embody rhetorical strategies (E. Brunner 1986, Ramos 1987, Van Maanen 
1988, Geertz 1988, Fardon 1990) provoked some to call for a literal return to 
reason.  Jacobson (1991) offers a cogent set of protocols for evaluating the 
arguments of ethnographies, but one keyed to a distinction between personal 
experience (“reflexive accounts”) versus the accurate, “verifiable” (his word) 
model of a culture.  Thus he seeks explicitly to read for the intrinsic 
separation of reason (including Toulmin argument schemes) from rhetoric.  
To the extent that an ethnography does adhere to his warrant by claiming 
“this place is out there,” rather than “this happened to me and needs to be 
explained,” there is indeed a crucial question of whether the variety and 
quantity of evidence adequately backs up the claims, and Jacobson provides 
excellent readings based on these terms.  On the other hand, Lett (1997) 
adopts a purely logocentric standard of rhetoric (bad) versus free-standing 
Reason (good), constituting a total Enlightenment revival.24 
What remained largely off the table in all these discussions—among 
other things, I’m sure—was the irreducible fact that at least two very 
different pragmatic concerns, requiring different forms of reasoning, were 
being indexed as “ethnography.” Logicians distinguish between universal 
generalizations, which we can say aren’t quite so universal, such that “for 
 
24 Incidentally, hearty kudos to Steven Tyler for his accomplishment of being the only 
person I know of to first be kicked for the “excesses of the cognitivist fallacy” (Geertz 1973: 
12) and later the “metaphorical delirium” of interpretive anthropology (Lett 1997: 107), with 
Geertz this time thrown into the same bin after him.  Anyone who undisciplines himself or 
herself by force of scholarly commitment (like Wittgenstein, Bateson, Haraway, Oliver Sacks, 
and Henry Johnstone) has a special place in the heart of my text. 
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everything in this domain, the following holds true”; versus existential 
generalizations, such that “it is true that the following exists in at least one 
place and it couldn’t have gotten there by itself.”  The former is realistic, 
overarchingly inductive, and undergirds our human as well as ethnographic 
ability to refer to objects that can be communicatively exchanged with 
others.  Its discourse fits within the circuit that generates and monitors 
macro-level structures like public policy.  The other, which is reflexive with 
respect to its own language and intentionality, marks the supercession of 
abduction over induction.  It has proven more suited to the study of 
movement (which can’t be observed in itself) and cultural generativity.  It 
circulates among individual readers, who ideally will do the work of 
synthesizing the textually-opened world into the fabric of their personal and 
professional practice, often without entering into any practical context in 
which they might reasonably be expected to give a hoot about whether the 
ethnographic present is past or ever came to pass.  The valid postmodern 
argument that scientism categorically mistakes its “we can act as if” models 
for positive descriptions of objective reality was often levied on the basis that 
postmodernism’s agnosticism is epistemologically “right,” which it often is in 
its soberer formulations; and therefore, so the claim goes, all anthropologists 
ought to do the right thing, sometimes glossed as the even-more-scientific 
thing.  A very different, rarely-adopted tack would be to address the real-
world dangers of naïve realism, which often manifests itself by mistaking an 
image effected by one’s theoretical lenses as the cause of one’s theoretical 
observation.  “Grounded theory” (Glazer and Strauss 1967) adopts this sort 
of scientism by assuming collection practices to be entirely passive, but again 
the point is not to decry science or even scientism, so much as to monitor its 
contingencies so that scientific Gnosticism doesn’t start hurting people.  Any 
turn away from reflexivity poses this risk. 
The Ethnographer figured in Crapanzano’s essay may be the only 
translator I’ve heard of who translates for no one in particular (except an 
often-cited “we”), in no particular context, and into no particular discourse 
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but his own.  The passage figures translation within a particular speech act, 
or a plurality of such acts in which we “overhear” him do particular 
hermeneutic feats, while taking for granted the abstraction of this trope to 
the level of a public, where the dynamics can in fact be very different.  The 
fetishization of the ethnographer and of ethnography from within the 
framework of Ethnography as a free-standing institution provide no materials 
whatsoever for a view of ethnographic practices in their contexts of use by 
students, natives, or policy makers.  When ethnography is taken either as 
the end product or the process leading to it, the circuit of anthropological 
knowledge is artificially closed.  All parties to the discussion did and largely 
do adopt a training-centered orientation, such that, given that anthropology 
is what anthropologists do, the  institution ought to be defined in terms of 
conduct.  Bourdieu terms this orientation “illusio,” which of course doesn’t do 
much to bring about the Revolution.  Rose (1993: 197) says it well: 
“Ethnographers' lives, like the works they have written, have been 
standardized since Malinowski.”  I am suggesting that the question of what 
an ethnography ought to be—in fact, what all ethnographies turn out to have 
always been—depends on where, for whom, and to what end it is to be, 
which has been almost universally taken for granted within the public 
debates.  As a case in point, I agree with a common critique that to do meta-
ethnography is explicitly to not-do ethnography.  But the George Stockings, 
James Cliffords, and all the students in the world, ages one to ninety-two, 
can claim to be productively studying anthropology in the way that I am 
doing here, from a critical distance.  Doing so teaches about more than what 
anthropologists do; New ethnographies are where the Ricoeur meets the 
road, after all, and so they interrogate what it means to be human by way of 
their legible process as much as their subject.   
As another form of self-reference, embodiment has become a well-
theorized phenomenological method, which should be distinguished from 
casual misrecognitions of sensuous narratives as being in themselves “very 
phenomenological.”  Where self-referencing narrative and self-critical meta-
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ethnography focus on the ethnographer’s fabrication within institutionalized 
methods and discourses, embodiment as a method has often sought to 
reduce the load carried into the field as a means to apprehend other 
embodied perspectives in dialogue—that is, without the institution of 
anthropology constantly giving voice to the ethnographer and natives.  
Thomas Csordas (1994, 2002) provides one of the most rigorous 
formulations of a cultural phenomenology that seeks to get away from 
(implicitly) Ricoeur’s model of the text (Ricoeur 1979 [1971]), which was so 
formative for interpretive anthropology:  
[T]he starting point of my analyses had been language—
symbols, rhetoric, performance, persuasion, narrative, and ritual 
utterance were the substance of healing rituals and of patients' 
reflective accounts of those rituals. All of these were primarily 
forms of representation, and stopped just short of capturing the 
existential richness of being-in-the-world. Understanding healing 
in terms of representation is not adequate because, even 
though concepts such as performance and persuasion have 
substantial experiential force, ultimately representation appeals 
to the model of a text. No matter how successful literary 
scholars might be in animating texts, in bringing them to life, 
textual(ist) interpretations remain inflections of experience, 
slightly to the side of immediacy. The missing ingredient is 
supplied by the notion of being-in-the-world, from 
phenomenological philosophy, insofar as it speaks of immediacy, 
indeterminacy, sensibility—all that has to do with the vividness 
and urgency of experience. My attempt to place these ideas in 
dialogue rests on the proposition that if studies of 
representation are carried out from the standpoint of textuality, 
then complementary studies of being-in-the- world can be 
carried out from the standpoint of embodiment (Csordas 2002: 
3).  
The idea of cultural representation of which Csordas accuses his earlier 
self is indeed a valid target for criticism; there is more to cultural dynamics 
than semiotic coherence.  However, we can also understand Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of suspicion as a much more phenomenological method for 
exposing the contingencies and histories of texts, which takes the bottom out 
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of the anthropologically-inherited idea of the text as a dehistoricized surface 
to be read at face value.   
Merleau-Ponty’s much-celebrated “being-in-the-world,” which in its 
wide circulation has been a little simplified relative to its Heidegerian context, 
is ethnographically useful only insofar as the ethnographer is out to recover 
shared modes of interaction.  The idea of “immediate” experience establishes 
a barrier against historicizing the regimentation of the senses, emotion, 
remembering, self awareness, and experience, as argued and exemplified by 
Desjarlais (1997: 24-7; see also O’Neill 1972).25 This point becomes clearer 
when Michael Jackson develops embodiment as a dyadic method for the 
encounter between himself and culturally-different others, terming this 
approach “radical empiricism” (1996) and also “ethnographic minimalism” 
(1998).  As these terms imply, the Real is decidedly out there, literally at our 
finger tips, naturally experienceable, and all we need do as ethnographers in 
order to inaugurate a truly grounded mode of theorization is keep theoretical 
truth regimes from standing in the way.  His aim is practical: “Our search is 
for some common ground or vocabulary that will serve as a point of 
departure for comparison and dialogue across cultures; it is not a search for 
universal truths or essences” (Jackson 1989: 49).  He defines 
intersubjectivity, which lies at the root of subjectivity itself, as “a domain of 
inter-est (inter-existence) and intercorporeity that lies between people: a 
field of inter-experience, inter-action, and inter-locution” (Jackson 1998: 3: 
emphases in original).  The truth of all that he says can, I hope, be seen 
from the botched scenes of my fieldwork, as well as the botched interactions 
 
25 Worth noting is the fact that cultural phenomenologists routinely appeal to Merleau-
Ponty’s early classic (1962 [1945]), although the philosopher rode a steep learning curve until 
his death, at which time his unpublished papers (1968) show a renewed concern for a non-
Hegelian dialectic much more grounded upon the socially-organized quality of “immediate” 
sensation.  “To have the idea of ‘thinking’ (in the sense of the ‘thought of 
seeing and of feeling’), to make the ‘reduction,’ to return to immanence and 
to the consciousness of . . . [sic] it is necessary to have words”; and, 
although there is wordless perception, it comes down to the fact that “there 
are fields and a field of fields, with a style and a typicality” (1968 [1959]: 
171).    
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presented in the next chapter, both of which also demonstrate the limitations 
of any ideology of “immediate” experience and the productivity of a 
theoretical interruption of the senses.  Embodied understanding plays upon a 
dialogue between shared embodiment and semiotic difference, which 
establishes the theoretical limits of this method.  The endpoint of 
ethnographic minimalism would perhaps look like Stoller’s imaginative 
horizon for a form of ethnographic representation in which “the event 
becomes the author of the text and the writer becomes the interpreter of the 
event who serves as an  intermediary between the event (author) and the 
readers” (Stoller 1989: 54).  This disappearing ethnographer walks on 
privileged ground. 
These Dialogical approaches expressly seek to counter the sort of 
analytic that extracts its materials from the field only to refine them into 
instruments in a different location for ultimate use in carving up the field.  
The critiques against Freud’s structural model, British structuralism, and 
cognitivism are examples that needn’t be rehearsed here.  Ethnography 
dislikes the detached analyst who looks for the controls that will filter out 
complex interference.  The process and principle of social organization 
exemplified in the previous section, on the other hand, incorporates the 
phenomenological critique of structure while using the textual products of 
interpretation as the instrument with which to interrogate the field.  Attention 
to the social organization undergirding “immediate” experience marks a shift 
from a dyadic understanding of field relations, in which participants and 
observers negotiate understandings on the basis of functional iconicities 
within some embodied or semiotic domain, to a triadic relation that is 
analytical in its instrumental use of a third discourse to drive a wedge into 
the appearance of the scene.  Analytical reflexivity, then, projects a 
metacommunicative layer that arises from the field, interpreting it.   
This analytical usage became fundamental to the projects of both 
Garfinkel and Bourdieu, albeit in ways diametrically opposed to one another.  
Garfinkel conceived of subjects as (ethno)methodologists constantly 
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displaying a reflexive process of making sense out of one another’s actions 
according to typified schemas, which were themselves the object of 
methodical attention.  This orientation is to be found in the linguistic concept 
of metapragmatics (Silverstein 1993, 2003) and in G. H. Mead’s formative 
idea of the self as nominal subject (“I”) who is always a perception by the 
speaker of the speaker’s self in relation to a field of action (Mead 1934).  
Caton (1993) nicely brings Mead and metapragmatics together in a 
formulation of “implicit metapragmatics,” intimating that embodied as well as 
all semiotic modes of self awareness may well be interactional, as I have 
been arguing, although his discussion quickly returns to the specific topic of 
reflexive language.   
Meanwhile, the paradoxical consequence of the ethnomethodological 
observation of reflexivity is to treat the observer’s gaze as unclouded.  
Because analysis records what actors display about their understandings of 
one another and the scene, the analysis is treated as passively objective (see 
Chapter 3 for further discussion).  On the other hand, it is instead the 
unconsciousness of actors with respect to objective conditions that 
constitutes the foundation of Bourdieu’s theory of practice.26 Reflexivity 
becomes the property of an observer who has to be in a position of 
indifference with respect to the awareness actors possess as a function of 
their investiture in the field: “It is only on condition that we take up the point 
of view of practice-on the basis of a theoretical reflection on the theoretical 
point of view as scholastic point of view, as a nonpractical point of view, 
founded upon the neutralization of practical interests and practical stakes-
that we have some chance of grasping the truth of the specific logic of 
 
26 In Bourdieu’s classic example (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 5-8), to have too perspicuous 
a grasp of the self interest inherent in balanced reciprocity would destroy the gifting 
institution.  It is important, then, that actors misrecognize structure in terms of the flow of 
practice, and that a culture not have a theoretical concept of itself.  “The principles embodied in
this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary,
deliberate transformation, cannot even be made explicit; nothing seems more ineffable, more
incommunicable, more inimitable, and, therefore, more precious, than the values given body, made body by
the transubstantiation achieved by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a
whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as
‘stand up straight’ or ‘don't hold your knife in your left hand’” (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 94).
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practice” (Bourdieu 1990b [1989]: 384-5; see also Bourdieu 1998 [1994]).  
His contribution to the idea of reflexive sociology, then, counters its own 
empiricism by taking up a position surveying the logic of its own practice 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).  This is a strange legacy of Plato’s 
formulation of action as an inhibitor of reflection.  Disinterest is established 
with respect to “the game,” so the same individual can, in theory, modulate 
between objectivity and interest; but because the outcome of the game, as a 
social field, invariably plays back upon the individual, there seems in reality 
no possibility to be disinterested if one is a participant, schizophrenia not 
withstanding.  As it happens, the sociologist in Bourdieu’s account does turn 
out to be fundamentally an outsider to the social milieu, with the notable 
exception of the reflexive sociologist.  I can’t quite get my mind around it, 
practically speaking, since Bourdieu is writing reflexive sociology and thereby 
seems to be violating his own precondition.   
A very routinized, domesticated form of sociological reflexivity has 
turned out to be the most enduring residue of ethnographic reflexivity, so 
that the “I” of the ethnographer is virtually always transparent, save for 
whatever master sociological categories become relevant as mechanisms of 
solidarity or oppression.  We know if she is not male, not White, not straight.  
Anything more individualized, anything more dynamic within the interpretive 
process, must inevitably remain a matter of one’s particular sensitivities, and 
its incorporation into research will likely be labeled “experimental.”  Once 
analysis moves beyond the macro-level institutional structures with which 
sociology tends to concern itself—in fact, as one moves toward immersive 
ethnography or everyday life—self awareness as a modulation between 
Mead’s subjective-reflexive “I” and the practical-objective “me” has to have a 
much more porous inside edge than Bourdieu portrays.  Even more 
fundamentally, however, I argue that the observer stance is itself a 
sociological cover story for the participatory field in which observer and 
objects are constituted in relation to one another.  An analytical reflexivity 
grounded in the interpretation of this third field, in which the analyst is not 
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transparent (Garfinkel) and not the isolated product of a game located 
outside the field (Bourdieu), is what I have tried to practice. 
Julie Tailor provides an apt metaphor for this procedure as she 
describes looking at her experiences of Tango in an unorthodox way (Tailor 
1998: xiv). Almost as a joke, she began to make a flip-book out of still 
frames taken from the video recording of herself dancing, only to realize that 
the stylized pixilation produced by thumbing through the pages transformed 
the experience of what she saw on the film into what she had experienced in 
the act: 
I looked among the many extra photos that had been omitted in 
my first selection process, and restored many more of those 
that had been photographed from the film. The slight 
improvement suggested something completely new: I could add 
from my reserves even more photos, some of them duplicates, 
some of them photos of contiguous frames, contrasting with my 
initial use of every three or four frames of the film. The result 
was that the flipbook sequences could accentuate movement in 
a way that the original film had not, drawing attention to a 
movement that had moved me deeply but one that had been 
fleeting. What I saw corresponded to what I had seen and what 
I had danced in Buenos Aires. Other images not dealing with 
dance brought memories and associations that many Argentines 
make as they dance, as intimated by the fact that this imagery 
arises in a film about tango. This was what I had seen, what I 
had danced, and what many of us had felt. Insofar as those 
associations corresponded to what I remembered and therefore 
wanted to communicate about dancing, it was, as dancers 
sometimes say, my tango. But in this case all of it was on 
paper.  I was choreographing my paper tango. 
Perhaps the most interesting facet of her experiment comes from the fact 
that the continuity of the film was, in the first place, an optical illusion in 
which the mind projects fluidity onto a series of still-lifes at perhaps sixty 
frames per second.  According to vision science, natural vision is hard-wired 
to dis-attend this pixilation (Rensink 2002a).  “Change blindness” is the term 
psychologists use to describe an effect in which subjects fail to perceive rapid 
changes of the visual scene, such as removing the engines from the picture 
of an airplane for a split second of viewing if there is a single blank frame 
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between the two different images.  “It should be emphasized that change 
blindness is a true blindness (failure to see the change), and not an amnesia 
(forgetting a change that was perceived)” (Rensink 2002b: fn. 1).  Verbal 
cues or something else that tells the person where to look makes change 
visible.  After numerous experiments, scientists conclude, “perception of 
change is mediated through a narrow attentional bottleneck, with attention 
attracted to various parts of a scene based on high-level ‘interest’” (Rensink, 
O’Regan, and Clark 1997).  It is this sort of loop that refutes the idea that 
stylization, as a management of attention, is a simple abstraction from the 
real.  Immediate experience is anything but simple.  Remember in order to 
attend; attend in order to understand; understand in order to remember. 
Tailor’s ethnography exemplifies a reflexivity in which the culture being 
read and written is, in its personal origin and its textual return, written into 
her life.  Scenes of political violence, the pleasure of Tango, its community, 
and its sexual domination begin to form a circuit in which the traumatic 
memory of being raped by her father ultimately surfaces for her and 
becomes narrateable.  This revelation is not what the ethnography is “about.”  
The book’s topic is established at the outset: “What the tango says about 
Argentina, the nation that created it, illuminates aspects of Argentine 
behavior that have long puzzled outsiders” (Tailor 1998: 1).  The breaching 
of her dissociation does not further this thesis.  But it creates Julie Tailor, the 
ethnographer, forging experiences of tango and “Argentine behavior.”  The 
absence of these passages would give the textual structure a false bottom, in 
that her encounter with Tango wouldn’t have been explained.  At the same 
time, the text doesn’t defend itself against the kind of reading that dismisses 
the whole account as being purely subjective upon finding the traumatic 
memory to be a fundamental interpretant (and forgetting that Tango is 
fundamentally its present interlocutor).  For those who do stay engaged, 
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what we read is the imprint of what it means, fully, when her teacher tells 
her to “dance a tango that screams” (p. 117).27 
Now, we ought to be analytically bothered in a sense by Tailor’s claim 
to have recovered her tango from the past.  We don’t know that, and we 
don’t know that she knows.  But we do know that its textual presence is 
constitutive, and has to be read juxtaposed with the presentation of tango: 
they give one another meaning.  The surge of affect Tailor claims to have felt 
in her moment of recognition identifies the moment as productive.  There are 
occasions when nothing but stories will do.  A method that senses the 
dissociated forces of everyday life, dwelling on them, synthesizing them 
theoretically, replaying their affects and tactility like a traumatic memory, is 
not in itself a method for understanding collective ways of life, but it can 
serve ethnography by disclosing otherwise-inaccessible features of practice.    
Failures, mistakes, misunderstandings, crises: unlike social practices, these 
sites are always particular and have to be scanned systematically from 
beginning to end, one move at a time, in order to learn what they uncover 
about the ground of practice.  The telling is necessary and necessarily 
stylized.  
We have returned to my ethnographic mirages, where this essay 
began.  Based on my recent experiences of writing the embodied accounts 
for this chapter and the next one over the course of a few days, let me 
briefly propose a theoretical description of what goes on micrologically in the 
process of my writing, and perhaps to a degree the process of writing 
embodied experience narrative generally.  Because memory is constructive, 
no one can rely definitively on veridical recall, particularly of a thought 
process or emotion, neither of which can be remembered except by being 
relived with much the same sort of detail, sequence, and impact they had on 
 
27 Here is where my ad-hock term “self-analytics” most strongly calls forth the echo of 
psychoanalytics.  In fact, much of what I suggest can be traced to Crapanzano’s careful 
transduction between Freudian psychoanalysis, especially the 
transference/countertransference phenomenon (Crapanzano 1992), and discourse pragmatics.  
Each time I revisit this text (reprinted in the same volume as Caton [1993]), I find more of 
“my own” thinking in his text, alongside my marginal notes which span ten years of rereading. 
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the occasion one is reenacting (Casey 1987, Larsen 1998).  Such data aren’t 
recorded in any recoverable way, even by quasi-real-time fieldnotes, since 
inscription is itself a reflexive interpretive process.  For each of the scenes I 
have presented, what I am conscious of in the act of remembering is, 
initially, far less than what I write.  It is like looking through a pinhole and 
catching just a flash of color and a shape (which is something like my vision, 
as it happens, although I can no longer see color [or keep from seeing it]).  I 
write it down, and in so doing I can flesh out what comes before and after.  
So it goes, until the scene is done, and so one scene urges the next or 
previous one.  The text is not a representation or “write-up,” but a role-
playing scenario that puts me in a situation and then recalls the procedures 
recorded by my body—affect, motion, tactility, somatic attention, 
intercorporealities—as driven by my enactment of the scene.  I write it down.  
The feeling of getting it right, which any fiction-writer knows, is an 
assessment that the body-recording has been transposed to discourse in a 
potentially sound and valid form, which really means a productive form 
within a presupposed circuit of the text’s use.  The product can readily take 
on the solidity of veridical memory.  Data are generated through a process of 
story-telling that starts with the thread of what we can say happened, with 
as much certainty as ethnography ever provides.  “I was there (and you 
weren’t).”  My position as a participant is privileged only by virtue of what 
my body has recorded over a very extended period of time during which such 
scenes have repeatedly overtaken me.  The methodological assumption is 
that this process is not likely to remember an embodiment that wasn’t in the 
scope of what could have been learned in such contexts.  I read the text, and 
“correct” it where remembering suggests that the description isn’t realistic.  I 
tend not to grant much fundamental importance to the line between fiction 
and so-called “creative non-fiction,” but non-fictionists often emphasize a 
commitment to what “really happened.”  I can agree, on an abstract level, 
that ideological commitments shift between the two from veracity to 
verisimilitude.  Because representations are the only surface available for 
83 
analysis, I prefer to suspect my data rather than get in the muddle of calling 
some level of interior claim “true.”  In short, fiction is natural language by 
virtue of its reflexive (in Garfinkel’s sense) reliance on an exchangeable 
framework of communicative practice.  To quote Wittgenstein—gratuitously, 
as most quotes of Wittgenstein are—“If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction” (1958 [1936-1951]: para. 307).  Food for thought: “It 
occurred to me that the phenomenon of 'the possibility of literature' is 
something noticeable while I was looking at psychiatric reports about 
delusions that patients have. In these reports, the writers take it that the 
delusions are understandable, though what makes them 'delusions' is that 
they couldn't possibly describe something. Literature has a similar character; 
it's composed of possible potential descriptions and possible potential rules, 
and a reader can look at assembled strings of language and decide that it's 
'realistic' or 'not realistic,' compelling or not compelling. And in that sense, 
the possibility of literature and the possibility of logic are very, very closely 
related” (Harvey Sacks 1992a [1965]: 112). 
Jay Ruby informs us that the title A Crack in the Mirror (Ruby 1982) 
plays off Clyde Kluckhohn’s A Mirror For Man, such that the image of 
ourselves we see in cultural others is distorted by imperfections and lines 
ingrained in the glass itself, and reflexivity examines those lines.  I want to 
play once more on this image.  There’s a crack in the mirror that glares at us 
(you, anyway, if you’re sighted) each time you look.  This is a part of culture 
shock, the realization that one’s assumptions were geared to a specific place 
and not the whole world.  There’s a crack in the ground, though, that is just 
a thin fisher no one can see without knowing first where to look and then 
running your hands over the surface systematically before you’ll find it.  That 
is individual difference. 
As the eleventh hour of salvage ethnography jerked toward the 
midnight of globalization, as the natives and consumers of ethnography 
became more visible to one another, and as disciplines ranging from nursing 
to market research began adopting qualitative research methods, the New 
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ethnography was coincidentally shifting its values from the synoptic 
representation of observable ways of life to intimate, inter-personal, deeply-
hermeneutic, densely-textured, hyper-immersive encounters that required a 
skilled hermeneut, which would be a commodity one could keep selling 
through the unique product of one’s laboring body until the end of time.  The 
role of ethnographer thereby came to depend on a very exclusive set of 
standards of embodiment.  It mattered where one’s data came from, and the 
decoupage of reports, histories, census data, etc., were to be scrunched in 
between narrative observations of one’s own participations.  Expressed in 
terms of immersive embodiment and the ability to pull one’s own weight in 
the field, ethnography took on a set of standards that made the idea of a 
disabled ethnographer run counter to not only conventional methodology but 
the hero narrative tacitly sewn into how one’s work should be written and 
evaluated.   
Inevitably, I had to confront the question, “how will I as a blind man 
conduct ethnography?”  I found ways to follow the traditional procedures, 
and I folded those procedures into the conventions of ethnographic writing.  
The smooth surface of the resulting text (and of my memory) made the next 
question much more difficult to formulate: can the product be comparable in 
terms of the soundness of its observations, given that social participation will 
be quantitatively diminished and qualitatively altered, regardless of the 
energy I as a typical human can expend?  The evidence of my ethnographic 
memories suggests that a text, broadly conceived, can be thicker than the 
data of lived experience, with the result being a set of source amnesias as to 
what “happened” versus what was told, read, or extrapolated.  The minutia 
of my social and spatial navigation, which in any event were entirely carried 
over from my quotidian life, weren’t part of the scene.  These conventions 
drove me toward authoring texts that implied a full, rich, able, mastering 
participation in culture, without significant reference to the untransposable 
experience of a disability, which I had ostensibly overcome.  The ability to 
create such texts are more a cause for public applause than interrogation, 
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usually, and this fact in itself lays the groundwork for how quickly and 
completely I tend to forget the unique conditions that produced the text.  
Although there’s no law against passing off thin ethnography, better options 
for knowledge production are at hand.  In both the process and product of 
my anthropology, the trick has been to unlearn the ingrained habit of 
overcoming disability, since I have found that what I overcome is the 
occasion to encounter it rather than the disability itself.  A hermeneutical 
suspicion born of reading Continental philosophy combined with the model 
provided by Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological studies (both of which are 
explicitly phenomenological) set me to interpreting my experiences in terms 
of practice instead of meaning.  The data that became available included 
biological and/or emotional and/or political-economic suffering engendered 
by being individually excluded from conditions of agency within a 
consequential set of social fields.  By virtue of this definition, the “meaning” 
of my disability will always be a functional and processual one, not a 
categorical-expressive one.  This is the view from a forced position outside 
the ceremonial tent (I don’t see what they’re doing) and outside the 
ethnographer’s tent as well (there’s no cool dark place to look out of at 
“them”).  It is an undisciplined, destabilized, unsettling place to stand. 
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Chapter 3. Making A Scene 
 
A discriminator is a gizmo you can place within an electrical circuit.  It 
takes in a continuous wave of whatever amplitude, but lets pass only the 
flow that falls within a set range of values.  In common applications, the 
output into the rest of the circuit is digital: presence or absence.  Hence, 
what passes has value whereas what doesn’t pass is unknowable and the 
observer can make no meaningful inference about it from within the rest of 
the circuit.  In logic, the discriminator is the simplest function for translating 
values from one set into another.  In asserting that this idea of discrimination 
is also a mapping function involved in translation between one system of 
values and another, I am pointing to a constituent of semeosis and not a 
loose analogy.  A political circuit is already aware of discrimination as a 
prejudice against a present other, and that other can learn to identify and 
perhaps identify with this oppression within the realm of political discourse.  
Societies discriminate against groups in this political way, but societies 
discriminate against individuality in the other, more fundamental sense.  That 
the two senses of discrimination are conjoined can be seen in the familiar 
ideology of workplace productivity.  “We aren’t firing you because you’re a 
woman, but because you’ve missed work while your baby was sick.”  “It isn’t 
because you’re blind that we’re not hiring you, but your resume displays a 
lack of attention to visual detail.”  “The City Council meeting was open to the 
public, so anyone wanting to be heard was free to attend.”  Without an 
obvious, traditional category like women or the disabled, both of whom are 
already known to be objects of discrimination, all we’re left with is the 
internally-referential logic, which has dissociated anything outside the circuit.  
It feels objective, and the only place to place blame is oneself.  Interestingly, 
policies that prohibit employers from broaching the topic of any personal 
category that has historically been a basis for discrimination—race, sexuality, 
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gender, disability, or anything implicating these topics—lays the groundwork 
for interpreting one’s existing biases according to other, “objective” criteria. 
But you won’t believe all the things you can do with this gizmo.  The 
discriminating circuit projects a value-defined field, where “value—despite 
our knee-jerk reaction for thinking about it as a scalar quantity from good to 
bad or more to less—denotes anything that can be evaluated as a single-
place predicate. Inside the circuit are all the qualia that can be compared to 
one another, either through explicit quantification (money) or a performative 
comparison that conjoins heterogeneous forms of value based on shared 
knowledges (“John is taller than the grass is green”).  Screw in a color value 
discriminator and the result is the figure-ground relation.  Tune it for race 
and a system of differences swims into focus.  As a value horizon, it has the 
aspect of a natural habitat.  Thus, the perspective from which racial 
discrimination can be thought as structural oppression  is one in which 
something has broken in the projector and we’ve already transcended what 
Bourdieu calls “the practice perspective.”  One way to comprehend the circuit 
in which one lives is to be confronted by an Other as an oppositional politics, 
an ethnographic encounter, or the impact of one domain of values upon 
another as a product of one’s movement across a pluralistic social terrain.  
The other way is an immanent critique that tries to conceive of other 
possibilities outside the realm of one’s own values.  The latter constitutes an 
ethics and, unlike a politics, doesn’t rely on historical bifurcation to be 
activated; it can be a self-discipline that dilates a set of differences 
intentionally and subjunctively.  Since we’re really talking about practice and 
not a circuit board, this imagining of the negative (i.e., what the circuit’s 
structure itself negates) is always possible in many directions, and not just 
as binary opposition.  Speech play is an apt model, since it’s no model but 
constitutive of the real thing.   
What the circuit projects is the world as it seems, and most of its 
scenes are not ordinarily open to participatory forms of play.  There is a 
definite tendency for what the discourse of rehabilitation calls “high-
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functioning” blind people and others with disabilities to make light of their 
physical (social) conditions.  They definitely do open the circuit to an 
awareness of difference in a way that avoids implicating others, thereby 
facilitating the interaction in the disabled person’s interest, at least on the 
surface.  I don’t do self-deprecating humor anymore, however.  My play and 
critique are coming together. 
 
FIELDNOTES FOR A MICRO-SOCIOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC GAZE 
The word “scene” has a dramaturgical ring: actors encounter one 
another, interact, and then the scene thus created disbands.  In everyday 
life, what bounds a scene and packages it as an object is the act of 
recognizing what is going on.  As always, I consider a lone actor using 
technology or passing through the built environment as a social scene, 
because the lone individual is interacting with other people who, despite 
being displaced by time and space, interpret actors’ occupations of the social 
field in the structure of the place they left behind.  Let’s say that a scene is 
particular and historical, in contrast to a scenario that takes a generalized 
form and structures hypothetical scenes.  In ordinary language, “making a 
scene” means acting up.  I like both idioms very much, because they encode 
the way we foreground and circumscribe an event by virtue of its breach with 
the smooth running of things. 
The interactions I want to examine do not stem primarily from the 
deployment of typified, categorical thoughts or feelings about me as a blind 
person.  I have instead collected several disabling scenes of everyday life 
where blindness as a category isn’t in evidence, at least until the scene is 
described as a scene of blindness.  The public behaviors I describe here do 
not suggest that any such pamphlet as “My Blindness and You” could dissolve 
the awkward moments, even if the essentialization inherent in such a 
pamphlet were at all acceptable, and even if such a pamphlet were 
universally read; first, because all codes leak (as Sapir would say), and 
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second, because most of us who teach anthropology know that readers have 
difficulty recognizing the scene on the page as a scene they themselves play, 
especially regarding scenes of discrimination.  The popular belief is that 
unfamiliar encounters with the disabled feel awkward because the disabled 
are alien and the able-bodied person doesn’t know what their limitations and 
“special needs” are.  A somewhat more adequate explanation instead depicts 
the anxiety or awkward sensation as a sudden realization that we often 
possess all the agility and quick wittedness of a deer in headlights when it 
comes to navigating a radically new situation.  A scene of disabling can 
happen at any moment.  The conundrum, moreover, is no less likely for the 
disabled person than for the able-bodied one.  Some of us tend to be more 
apt or more creative than others in our responses to disconcerting situations, 
without much significant correlation with social-science training or even past 
experience.   
Regarding the ten scenes of blindness I present below, I knew them 
first by a sense of frustration that always slid off into a destructive anger 
directed at others (“Why don’t you understand?”) or myself (“Why can’t I do 
it right?”).  In that light, they were meaningless in the sense that dwelling on 
them was an unproductive, negative thing to do.  I was taught to forget 
about them.  They were drawn together thematically as scenes “of” blindness 
by, I would suppose, a very long term emerging awareness that they belong 
to a category of interactions that aren’t reported by others around me or the 
media, except where disability is topicalized.  Each item in the list nominated 
itself by virtue of repetition; they are among the scenes that I would always 
forget when I used to assume I was like everyone else, and which now 
intrude on me whenever I think about going out of my home, because I am 
very likely to face one or more of them whenever I pass through a public or 
where public spaciness mediates my interaction with intimates.  They are 
episodic bits of narrative debris I write in the present tense so that their 
assessment will rest firmly in the idea of their plausibility, read as experience 
narratives, which doesn’t require any trust as to their correspondence to an 
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original event (the usage is not a commentary on or instance of the 
ethnographic present).  Although each commemorates a specific 
remembered event, each memory is informed to an indeterminate degree by 
its repetitions and so they must be said to be lived on the page rather than in 
the past.  At the point of accomplishing their synthesis, I locate my first 
viable experience of blindness.  I was thirty years old, and it would be 
another five years before I could use theory to fashion the evaluative 
component that makes these troubled scenes into experiences of what they 
identify as individual difference.   
All these stipulations intend to locate the text as emerging very much 
from within a practice perspective.  Hence, they in no way can be taken as 
elements of an objective system that I am presenting, a system of blindness.  
Neither have I isolated the role blindness plays as a sufficient or even 
entirely necessary cause of any aspect of them.  Still, they happen.  Bourdieu 
would discount it all as pseudo-theory.  The theoretical statements I make 
about the publics through which I move are, however, open to falsification or 
reformulation or use.  A deconstructive reflexivity generates the scenes and 
lays open their constitution, which is the point of presenting them. 
 
Scene I, concerning the performativity of blindness. 
With a beer in one hand and a plate in the other, I stand talking to a 
close friend—an anthropologist—at a crowded party.  We have slipped into a 
serious discussion about my dissertation.  I try to explain the confounded 
attitude some people have had toward my disability, such as a girl I had 
begun to date having recurring nightmares of being in a car and discovering 
that I was driving.  Then my friend says those words that I used to take as a 
complement, but now hear as a big red flag of things to come: “I never think 
of you as blind.”  Blindness has never been a big deal at all to her, she 
insists; it’s only a practical consideration, easily dealt with, not a texture of 
my humanity at all, as I insist it is.  I begin moving from the kitchen to the 
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living room, walking toward a wall.  Walls are often handy means of finding a 
straight line into the other room, but that is not what I am doing: I am 
walking into a wall.  The house is too noisy for me to hear the tell-tale signs 
of how the space is configured, and both my hands are full.  She calls out 
urgently and with obvious panic to her husband in the next room to “come 
get neill.”  Her hands wave uselessly in front of her.  I am a loose cannon, 
the plate of food a deadly weapon about to go off in my hands.  She is 
powerless and in fact frozen except for her hands, splayed out in front of her, 
ready to catch or push something away or make mystical signs, but not 
knowing which to do.    Disability leaps between us like the monster in a pop-
up book when I transit from a context of fixed motion to a less-constrained, 
more disabling one.  When the context shifts, I become a very different, 
surprising being to her and her reaction is panic.  Naturally, for me this 
reflexive knowledge of what is going on stands shoulder to shoulder with the 
feeling evoked by suddenly being dehumanized, as I in my strangeness have 
ceased even to be someone she can address.   
The scene in which I suddenly become visibly disabled is too much for 
many people to confront with composure.  The gaze assumes that an object 
in place will remain the same object in motion.  Disruption brings a sudden 
meta-level awareness into being of several new realities: (1) disability is the 
product of contexts of interaction, (2) the disabled person is not the 
exchangeable perspective you thought he was, (3) you are now adlibbing a 
scene that wasn’t in the script, and (4) “Yes, Virginia, there is a social 
ordering of everyday life.”  The return of disability—the repetition, rather—
will be traumatic, in the fairly strict sense of defying interpretation, unless 
programmatic attention is given beforehand to its precipitate conditions.  
Unfortunately, this reflexivity would mean divesting oneself of certain 
certainties that accompany privilege, such as the right to be inattentive to 
things that aren’t of immediate interest.   
I have classified this scene as an enactment of a public gaze, even 
though the house is a private residence and the interaction is with someone 
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familiar.  As I discuss in Chapter 5, the analytical concept of publicness 
relies, conversely, on a broadcast addressed to strangers.  However, this is 
the scene in which, just as when one’s White middle-class friend and 
neighbor suddenly begins dropping the “n word,” a local exchange suddenly 
exposes itself as the site through which public-defining discourses circulate.  
Participants become aware that they have been addressing or addressed as a 
generalized other: uncommon partners in common places.  To such a degree, 
we remain strangers to one another.28
Scene ii, in which “a rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms 
and strengthens the definitions to which they do not 
conform.”29 
one way to handle having an anomalous being appear in your midst is 
to carry on with one’s ready-made habits, letting them sort of bend around 
the anomaly.  I enter a restaurant with a friend and my guide dog, a German 
Shepherd named Adler.  In heavily-accented English, the hostess asks my 
friend, “Does he need the dog?”  Attached to the elbow of another friend, I 
approach a pharmacist’s counter and listen as my companion points to a 
scrape on my leg, asks a question, and then enters into a conversation with 
the pharmacist who never once addresses me.  She began speaking before I 
had any way to know that the pharmacist was attending to us.  In 
Garfinkelian fashion, I finally interject, glaring at him: “He isn’t interested in 
how it looks.  He just wants a disinfectant.”  But he answers as if my friend 
had spoken.  Many factors now occupy me in the decision of what to do next, 
and so it goes. 
 
28 Without the concept of a broadcast, on the other hand, the scene is on the line 
between public circulation discussed by Warner (2002) versus social reproduction in 
Bourdieu’s formulation.  It is the house’s occupation by a party of strangers, making it a public 
house, that has produced the disabling array of sounds and unreliable space behind this scene. 
29 Refer to Douglas (2002 [1966]: 49) to find this passage within a discussion of 
several strategies (Bourdieu would call them strategies) by which societies cope with 
structural anomalies.  All of them are apropos to disability and can be identified with particular 
scenes in this chapter or Chapter 4. 
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I am interested, first and foremost, in the interpretive work 
undertaken by the hostess and the pharmacist.  Prejudice against blind 
people or dog walkers seems an unlikely explanation, so this is not an 
occasion of following a rule, although it is likely to be empirically described as 
discrimination.  A better one begins with the fact that I have not been 
categorized as an addressee as part of the frame being enacted.  In the first 
example, we can take account of possibilities such as the hostess’ 
uncertainty over her own ability to communicate in English without the 
benefit of body language, plus the fact that guide dogs are only protected by 
law in affluent English-speaking countries.  The scene with Frank the 
pharmacist reaches more the status of an ethnomethodological display 
because I made a move that tried to falsify any idea that I was not party to 
the talk.  We can assume that Frank the pharmacist would have spoken to 
me if I were alone, or perhaps if I had spoken first instead of my friend (note 
to self: add another mental rule for how I need to behave).  Regardless, he 
made a choice, intentionally or not, to encounter an unfamiliar situation by 
putting his head in the sand to avoid relating to difference. 
A disability advocate (Kendrick 2006) observes that this scene is 
played out not just by the disabled, but anyone whose personhood is in 
question, even though blind people are likely to endure this scene the most.  
She sets out a number of guidelines to file away for when it happens: 
If you are the outsider, speak to the person who is different—
older, younger, disabled, foreign—with the assumption that he 
or she will respond. If you are the companion of the visibly 
different individual, simply smile and say "Ask him" or "Tell him" 
to move the dialogue in the appropriate direction. If you are the 
person being discounted for disability or any other reason, 
Assert yourself. Answer the question, pick up the conversation 
on your own—or, for quick understanding, try talking about 
yourself in the third person. You might get a laugh, and you'll 
definitely be counted back into the circle. 
Practically speaking, it is good advice and good that it circulates, even in a 
local newspaper, especially since sociological and sociolinguistic factors will 
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keep this scene on disability’s top-ten list indefinitely.  The development and 
communal sharing of scene-specific or task-specific tactics constitutes a 
significant topic of verbal exchange among blind people.  On a very mundane 
level, this activity makes up disability self-advocacy, where the tactics intend 
to inform the present representative(s) of the public (“Never pet a guide dog 
in harness”) as well as an attempt to manage the present scene.  Its efficacy 
varies in direct proportion to several factors: (1) the salience of those scenes 
for which strategies have been learned, (2) the appropriate and consistent 
recognition of a scene, (3) one’s tactical skill, (4) the absence of any 
determined intent by others at invidious discrimination, and (5) emergent 
conditions.  As a legislative approach that deals with specific expressions of a 
more basic dynamic, it will have limited effectiveness.   
 
Scene iii, what paying attention looks like 
 At the guide dog school I attended, instructors and students alike 
were often frustrated by students’ seeming inattention to what the instructor 
was saying.  I could be given a simple command repeatedly for over a 
minute and still not hear it.    Talking loudly to a blind person is a much-
ridiculed bit of socially-revealing idiocy, and I have occasionally myself been 
accommodated by being shouted at.  “I’m blind, not deaf!”  This exact 
phrasing is almost irresistible.  But is that the interpretive work behind the 
action?  Suddenly with a dog in place of a cane—a new intelligence to 
apprehend—with no knowledge of the route or the area, with someone giving 
directions from five feet behind me, shouting would indeed be 
accommodative.  Sensory overload is functionally equivalent to sensory 
impairment, and the instructor behind me seemed far, far away.  This 
explanation stands in addition to another, externally-observable one: 
Speaker A cannot make eye contact with blind Speaker B, whose gaze might 
wander up, over, be behind dark glasses, or appear unfocused, giving the 
impression of a wandering attention and, in effect, widening the 
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intersubjective gap across which Speaker A judges he has to speak.  Or, 
Speaker B has turned his ear toward the speaker (makes sense, right?), 
which in the common parlance carries the implicature “speak up,” though 
usually accompanied by a gesture to one’s ear.  But in this case he is 
responding on the basis of tacit and in fact contextually-inappropriate 
signals.  A person concentrating on a sound looks very different from one 
concentrating on a face, but only the latter is taken as concentrating on the 
speaker.  Neither Speaker A nor my instructor seem able to pose a theory of 
what a different consciousness might look like face to face, though obviously 
the materials for such a theory are in the scene.  Meanwhile, guide dog 
trainers around the country are daily reconfirmed in their assessments of the 
blind as paradoxically deaf or spaced-out, while dog recipients end their 
routes feeling exhausted and incompetent.   
 
Scene iv, on unreasoned solicitude. 
If someone—even a stranger—is walking close behind me as I open 
the door into a campus building, I make an automatic calculation as to 
whether the other person will encounter a closed door or one half-way in the 
process of closing.  If the latter, my arm holds the door after I have gone 
through until the person behind me is able to take it.  If I am the one walking 
behind, the person in front of me seems usually to assess that this casual 
gesture is likely unworkable.  Arm-back door opening reveals itself to be a 
gesture, a communication, just as the door itself communicates us from one 
place to the other .  The gesture acknowledges that two people are sharing 
the same action.  It is a silent gesture, usually, because one looks back only 
to see out of the corner of an eye that the other person has caught the 
gesture and the door.  To speak would be to speak over one’s shoulder, 
which we virtually never do with strangers.  Some awareness of the gesture’s 
unworkability prompts the door-opener to revert to a more formal strategy of 
holding the door all the way open and waiting for me to enter ahead of them.  
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Now the gesture has become an act of doing something for someone else, 
rather than sharing an action.  The relationship and the potential for speech 
have both changed.  “How are you,” “I have the door,” or some other 
essentially phatic enactment of the relationship would be entirely at home, 
especially since the beneficiary is expected to express gratitude directly 
through a smile, nod, or verbal thanks (which of course potentiates use of 
the whole procedure as a tactical means to establish this relationship when 
desired).  This fact is what makes noteworthy the typical silence of the 
tableau as I am trapped in it. 
The door is being held open in front of me by a silent figure.  How the 
scene subsequently unfolds depends on whether I am using Adler or a cane.  
After one instance when my dog took me through a held-open door and I 
split open my forehead on the still-closed opposing door, he hasn’t trusted 
anyone who holds doors for us and instead stands still watching them with an 
anxious furrow around his eyes until I grasp and open the door myself.  So 
the silent figure and the dog and I all look at each other.  I talk to the dog 
(“Adler, forward?”), but the silent figure doesn’t talk to me, even to let me 
know what they are doing.  If I am using a cane, it reports to me that there 
is empty space where there ought to be a surface.  I might therefore be 
completely turned around, and so I have to grope with the cane to find the 
surfaces that will locate me in a particular identifiable place; or, if I am not 
turned around, then there is a door that isn’t where it ought to be.  It is likely 
open, but at what angle and how far away, I don’t know.  And so I grope 
again with the cane.  If I find the door, I have to next grope with my hand to 
take hold of the door, and as likely as not I make contact with the person 
who has been watching me, observing signs of a blind man groping their way 
through space.  The silent figure has created this scene by taking away the 
reliability of my environment without telling me, thereby neutralizing the 
conditions of my competence and bringing higher-order strategies of 
exploration into play.  Perhaps they assume that they are simply removing 
the door from my awareness, as if I would now never have to know that 
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there had ever been a door or a wall there to begin with, MacGoo-like.  They 
will do this service for me, but not talk to me.  If, on the other hand, I 
choose not to grope blindly, because I know what is going on and am waiting 
for them to speak, the tableau can go on for a stunning length of time.  The 
first mistaken assumption was that opening the door would be more helpful 
than closing it.  The rest of the scene unfolds according to habitus and the 
rupture to habitus I introduce.  Perhaps one in three doors on a busy college 
campus misbehaves in the manner I have described, which is likely more 
than the norm for sighted people and perhaps more than would be the case 
in a population not so weighted toward teenagers.  Perhaps one in twenty 
door openers speak, either out of simple acknowledgment of the relationship 
or because they have managed to think through the scene against the grain 
of habit.  From the perspective of the silent figure, they’ve only chosen not to 
verbally enact a relationship with me: opening the door for a blind person is 
only part-way the same action as opening it out of politeness, with the 
difference effectively constituting charity versus exchange.   
I’m tempted to read this uncommunicativeness against the backdrop 
of a culture that has developed a myriad of technologies to support personal 
isolation.  Ear bugs let us attend sounds from another place instead of the 
present one, cell phones do the same with absent people, and PDAs grant 
one a form of socially-condoned control over who will be allowed eye contact.  
The scene provides evidence that this trend toward the creation of personal, 
private space through detachment may be overwriting forms of public 
sociality more generally, even where there is no outward sign of trying to 
create this private space.  The idea, habits, and skills of public sociality seem 
to be receding.  When I once asked a student why she liked the online 
community of FaceBook so much, she innocently replied “It’s better than a 
conversation because you don’t have to actually deal with the other person.”  
A relationship exist between verbal articulateness and reflexivity, albeit not 
an isomorphic one, and consumer culture offers ever-more ways to avoid 
being articulate in unchosen situations. 
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Scene v: schemas habituated in one context are not readily 
available in another. 
I can never quite become accustomed to how inept sighted people are 
at verbalizing articulate directions in face-to-face interactions.  At some 
point, an absolute description like “five feet in front of you and two feet to 
the left” becomes too much of a cognitive load, and it is replaced by “that 
way.”  Left, right, north, south, and all units of measure, as decipherable 
language-only systems of reference, seem to occupy a fringe layer of grey 
matter that any faint breeze will send out of a person’s head in a dandelion 
puff.  Invariably, what begins as a request for information ends with the 
tongue-tied person, perhaps surprised at their own lack of words or perhaps 
not caring, taking hold of me to move me bodily.  Direction-giving appears to 
be not one kind of utterance but a complex of speech genres.  Normative 
habits of deixis utilize the body and tacit assumptions of interobjectivity to an 
extent that doesn’t seem at all easy to remediate.  The ubiquitous velveteen 
and steel queue barriers are a reliable way to bring about this kind of 
interaction. 
“Is this the end of the line?” 
“No, it’s over there.” 
“I can’t see where you’re pointing.” Or, sometimes I’ll try to avoid the 
next step by helping out pointing in a plausible direction. “Over there?” 
“At the end of the counter.” 
“Which end, to my right or left?” 
“This way.”  It could be my arm, shoulder, or even my neck that is 
grasped, tentatively or with force. 
“Get your hand off me please.”   This would be a futile place to have a 
teaching moment, and my reaction to being grabbed like a piece of luggage 
invariably puts a tone of command rather than request into my voice.  The 
interaction often ends there as a result, because I’ve violated my role.  The 
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effect is what is known as “being an asshole.”  It feels better this way, 
though. 
The revelation I have had regarding direction-giving is that the 
problem is not a lack of knowledge, such as knowing left from right; nor is it 
simple laziness that keeps this knowledge from being exercised.  The 
linguistic resources really do depart from the face-to-face scene of direction-
giving. 
“Hello?” 
“Let me ask you a question about the layout of your restaurant.” 
“Ok.” 
“I have a visual disability.  So, if I am standing at the counter across 
from you, how do I get to the outside door leading onto the porch?” 
“Sure.  It’s… oh, I’d say about fifteen feet beyond the end of the bar.  
So just turn ninety degrees to your right if you’re at the cash register and 
walk forward until you reach the door.” 
“Thanks.  That’s great.  Now, if I want to find the beer cooler—“ 
“Dude, are you the guy talking on your cell phone at the corner table?” 
I have to admit that I haven’t actually tried this approach in real life 
yet, but I am quite sure that it would work just this smoothly, and not just 
because I would be out of grabbing distance.  The dialogue is well within the 
scope of telephone directions I receive.  For example, the text of an e-mailed 
reply to my request for directions reads:  
Walk east across the intersection and then turn north.  Go north 
approximately one hundred feet and then enter the building.  
The elevators  are to your left, on the west wall of the building.  
When you exit the elevator on the second floor, you’ll be facing 
east.  There’s a desk in front of you that you’ll walk around and 
then take the hallway on the left. 
Once I was there, I met with the man who’d sent me the e-mail, and when 
he needed to direct me through the innards of the offices during our visit, 
these skills weren’t available to him.  Even if their availability were strictly a 
function of having adequate time to concentrate (and I doubt this), they are 
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still placed in the realm of learned habit instead of “personal” ability.  At a 
very deep level, the speech event organizes awareness according to an order 
of operations (obviously, a “test me empirically” flag has just gone up, but 
consider my life a pilot study).  In a face-to-face interaction, what locks into 
place is the set of communicative habits keyed to an interlocutor who has 
access to the same indexical ground as the speaker.  A pointing finger, a 
turned body, head nod, or simple look are automatic.  They have evolved to 
keep the linguistic machinery young by virtue of inactivity, perhaps.  The 
words aren’t there until the machinery lumbers into place, and this happens 
automatically when the addressee is not in the same space.  In a face-to-
face scene of direction-giving, my interlocutor frequently has to do a double-
take after pointing and talking for a while before realizing “oh, but you can’t 
see that,” while sometimes I have to stop them and ask them to go get their 
other deictic machinery out of the back room of their mind.  It’s a multi-
layered, pain-staking process. 
 
Scene vi, in which my behaviors are misread several times in 
quick succession. 
Of course, stereotypical assumptions about the blind do circulate 
within our culture.  Sometimes an active preconception is the missing 
variable that explains a number of micro-level interactions that wouldn’t 
conceptually hang together without this final explanatory push.  The fanciful 
positive stereotypes that attribute special abilities to us are silly, sometimes 
annoying, and, at a deeper level, a saddening blockade against any hope for 
realistic understanding.  Avoidance is another practice, one not only 
generated by structural principles but also reproduced in socialization 
practices, as noted very aptly by Kleege (1999: 39): 
"Don't stare," parents warn a child watching a blind person with 
a cane, a deaf person speaking sign language, a person in a 
wheelchair. Don't stare. Don't look at that. Close your eyes and 
it will go away. Out of sight, out of mind. The child receives two 
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messages. First, that people with disabilities should be ignored, 
pushed to the periphery of society, if not over the edge. And 
second, that sight is preeminent, that the Almighty Eye controls 
both consciousness and the world outside. What you can't see 
can't hurt you, can't matter, doesn't exist. 
Parenthetically, I should note that “out of sight, out of mind” is a cognitive 
principle that we would assume applies equally to the self knowledge of a 
blind person acculturated through sight-centric modalities of consciousness: 
what we aren’t in the habit of being aware of, we won’t tend to be aware of. 
Finally, there are active negative assumptions, which sometimes have 
no explicit definition but lock onto visible scenes.  These are the worst.   
Somewhat proud of myself for remembering the layout of the car, I 
turn toward where the button to open the compartment door will be.  “To 
your left.”  It is a brusque, bored voice, one from the other end of the line in 
Chicago.  I feel for the door, still to my right, not processing what he is 
saying until the door refuses to be there and he repeats himself.  I’ve ridden 
this route a dozen times or more, but it will turn out that this is the first time 
the seats have been turned rearward and the car hooked onto the train 
backwards.  This means that the seat I am heading for, with its generous 
dog-friendly space opposite the luggage rack, doesn’t exist.  “No sir, back 
this way a few steps.  There.  Your hand is on it.  Sit there.”  He’s verbal, at 
least.  Northerners respect physical privacy. 
I drop my duffle onto the seat.  “Is the seat free at the front of the car 
with more space in front of it?” 
“Your bag is where you sit.  You need to move it and sit down so you 
can get your dog out of the aisle.  Do you want me to take that?” 
I push the bag toward the wall.  “Usually, there’s a seat at the front of 
the car with a space that’s really good for my dog.” 
“He will fit in front of your seat.  But you need to get him out of the 
aisle,” he says, standing in the aisle. 
“I asked you a question,” I say more forcefully, standing erect to look 
him in the face. 
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“Yes sir?”  Finally, I have found a register that cuts through his gaze. 
Once I fall into the seat and situate Adler, though, the dog as 
conversation piece is all that remains of blindness as a rupturing force unless 
the idea of mobility resurfaces.  Meanwhile, by the time the train has made 
its first stop, Adler is once more sprawled in the aisle and begins to whine 
urgently every time the door slides open.   
“It’s all the excitement ,” a woman says. 
“Poor dog,” says a second.  “It’s ok…” 
“He needs to go,” says a third.  I’ve learned that everyone… 
everyone… is a dog psychologist.  She’s right, as it happens, but what 
demonstrably obsesses Adler at all such times is simply the act of “going” 
and not what she implies.   
“Is he named after the psychiatrist?”  asks an elderly woman in the 
seat across from me—either One, Two, or Three, I’ve lost track.  For the first 
year after I began working with Adler in 2003, I was amazed by how many 
people seemed to know who Alfred Adler was, and thereafter I would just 
ponder the irony of receiving a dog bearing the name of the so-called father 
of individual psychology. 
“I keep him on a tight leash,” I reply.  And so begins a conversation 
about the intelligence and Protestant work ethic of dogs.  It seems to last for 
hours. 
We are lumbering through Crawford in the dark as I grope for the 
panel—they misleadingly call it a button—that slides the compartment door 
open and lets Adler and me into the rumbling corridor.  Adler immediately 
swings us around to face the outer door of the car.  His canine wits do have 
their limits.  “No exit, buddy,” I say, stroking his ear.  Then, remembering 
the famous line, “Hell is other people.” 
The door behind us automatically slides closed again, and suddenly 
this private, swaying space feels very comfortable.  Something in the 
fluorescent light on the floor reminds me of a linoleum-floored kitchen in the 
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middle of the night.  I am very tired, so that the kitchen sense overwrites my 
spatial image and a slight vertigo creeps over me.   
A man appears at the base of the stairwell.  University t-shirt and NFL 
logo cap, unless it’s the other way around.  “Are you trying to find the 
stairs?” 
“No, I’m good.”  I pull out Adler’s water bowl and feel for the water 
dispenser.  The space beneath it is going to be too small for the bowl. 
“Do you need some water?” 
“I’m fine.” 
“Push the button.  Here.” He pushes the button. 
“The bowl won’t fit under there.”  I show him the bowl.  Then I bring it 
up close to the narrow space.  It’s too big.  I smile at him.  “I’ll just get some 
water in the bathroom.  Adler, let’s go this way.”   
“Stop!” he shouts.  Adler has once again turned us sharply toward the 
outer door. 
“Why won’t you go away?”  I drag my service animal toward the 
bathroom door, knock, open it, and am turning the tap on when I hear him 
say “The door is open!” 
By the time we enter Austin, the train is running nearly four hours 
late, and I can picture the locked, darkened one-room station house floating 
in the dim cloud of lights reflecting off its wrap-around patio.  Pulling out my 
cell phone, I am rehearsing how I will navigate that space and get myself 
home.  Calling a taxi now will be easier than trying to get Adler to find the 
pay phone or trying to get sighted help, but the phone battery has died.  “I’ll 
call for you,” the woman across the aisle offers. 
“I’d prefer to do it, if I can borrow your phone.”  She hands it to me 
and I run my thumb over the keypad, asking the mental question I always 
employ to reverse-engineer new objects that have print-labeled parts.  Three 
elongated buttons on the top row are probably call, off, and something else—
channel, perhaps.  “Is this call?”  I hold up the phone, pointing.  It is.  “And 
this is off?” 
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“Here, I’ll show you.”  She grabs my index finger, pushing the rest of 
my hand off the phone so that I no longer have any context for knowing 
where the little plastic key is on the landscape of the device.  She is merrily 
moving the finger around so that it lifts off one key and then swoops down 
again somewhere distant.  I stop her when she begins going through the 
number keys. 
“Right.  I see.”  I retrieve my finger and cradle the device again, 
gesturing this time with the index finger of my other hand.  “You said this is 
off?”  I guessed wrong again.  She takes the phone away from me and the 
new finger is likewise appropriated as a sort of laser pointer.   
 The train has stopped and Austin-bound passengers are crowded into 
the passages adjacent to the car’s door.  A small, frail old woman looks back 
at Adler and I nervously.  “Don’t run over me when they open the door.” 
“I won’t.” 
“Because I can’t move very fast and I don’t want you to run over me.” 
“No Ma'm.  We’re not going to.  I’ll wait until your off before we 
move.” 
“Because your dog…” 
“He won’t move until I tell him to,” I say with false confidence.  
“You’re going to be ok.”  I can feel her casting nervous glances back at us.  I 
smile down at her encouragingly.  Adler does the same.   
In the event, I just managed to catch the barest glimpse of a streak of 
waddling white ground lightning and then the passage is deserted.  Now, a 
man is trying to take my arm from behind to push me forward, because 
there are thirty passengers behind me and he assumes I am just standing in 
the dark.  I break free.  Adler takes me to the lip of the exit. 
 Watch it!” the porter cries, reaching for me.  “You’ve got a step. 
“I’m fine, thanks.”  I let Adler take the step first, so that what his body 
does communicates to me where the steps and the ground are.  But that 
movement leaves me leaning down out of the train car in a way that must 
look like a red flag.  I am not holding onto anything for support, and as I 
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move my foot downward the porter again grabs me with both hands, one on 
my chest and one on my free arm, as if I were in free fall instead of 
purposefully shifting my weight downward while at the same time looking for 
the step with my foot.  “Get your hands off me, sir.”  This is a formula that 
I’ve found works instantly, even said quite calmly.   
Adler waits as I step down and pick up his harness handle.  “Ok,” and 
he leaps forward to follow the other passengers, then we weave through 
them along the length of the train, then across to the station house.  There 
are people hovering here in a swarm.  I don’t have a mental map of the 
layout or my place upon it.  I listen, but a sound of idling cars comes from 
several directions and so I will have to orient myself to the entrance I had 
used weeks before when I left town, and remember the steps I had taken 
from the taxi to that entrance.  At my “inside” command, we dodge several 
knots of people, turn the corner of the building, and then Adler is placing his 
nose near the handle of the door.  Blessedly, no one takes responsibility for 
the blind man going this way and that, touching the door of the locked and 
darkened station, or subsequently moving out toward the curb. 
The incandescent dot atop the taxi bobs toward me, and it is time to 
begin planning for contingencies in case the driver is afraid of German 
shepherds or speaks broken English.  In the former case, the recommended 
strategy is to get the dog into the cab the minute the driver starts to protest, 
so that you can carry on the argument from inside.  I’d rather skip it.  The 
night air has shed most of its heat and there is a breeze that makes space 
itself something good to touch.  Theoretically, I know with confidence how 
we would walk the twenty blocks to my apartment.  The only barrier, which 
is absolute, is not knowing how to get from the station house through the 
parking lot to the street, because I know the taxi swerves to get here.  I hear 
the door to the cab open, twenty feet ahead and to my left, so I move Adler 
purposefully toward it.   
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Scene vii, in which I recover context awareness despite my 
tacit adaptive strategies 
A voice off to my left and slightly in front of me says “It’s behind you” 
and I turn around, immediately feeling anxious because somehow I know I 
have turned the wrong way despite knowing, too, that I have followed the 
instruction according to a rational procedure.  What procedure?  What 
direction?  I have turned a hundred twenty degrees to my right rather than 
180 degrees.  There’s never enough time to work it out properly, and frankly 
I don’t even know what piece I’m missing.  Surely, this is what aphasia is 
like, but here the problem always involves indexical references to my body. 
Why?  Because, as I have finally concluded, I transpose my 
perspective with the speaker’s, whose vision I habitually appropriate, then 
draw a line from that person through my body so that “behind” is where it 
emerges on the far side.  I turn in that direction.    Similarly, “in front” of me 
is likely to be more in the direction of what is in front of the person giving 
directions.  Coincidentally, I happened to be in the midst of typing this 
paragraph when a blind colleague entered the office and, without any priming 
from me, told me the precise same rationale for problems she has been 
having with directions her husband gives her when they are walking 
together, despite ten years living together with her blindness.  “And he gets 
frustrated with me, like, ‘Why don’t you listen?’  I don’t know what it was, 
but last night I suddenly realized.  When he says ‘in front of you,’ I turn 
toward what’s in front of him, and what’s behind me will be what’s behind me 
from his perspective” (in fact, she began the conversation by recounting a 
“silent door opener” scene).  She spent ten years repeating the scene of 
being an incompetent direction-taker before the pieces came together, while 
it took me much longer.  All one would need is a camera and an undergrad to 
test the viability of this theory as a predictive framework; but even if the 
numbers don’t line up precisely, what remains evident and in fact inevitable 
is that a blind person accustomed to using another person’s eyes to see will 
be habitually decentered from the axis of their own two eyes, as well as 
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being likely to be less aware of the relationship between the orientation of 
their body as it compares to their head, which might well be turned toward 
the speaker. 
My colleague was relieved that her theory had some support.  “So, it’s 
just par for the course, then.”  Ten years isn’t long enough to keep her from 
feeling like a newcomer to blindness, and she listens to me as to an old 
veteran.  It might be significant that it’s a sighted student in an adjacent 
office cubical who asks, “so what is the right way to do it?”  I ponder.  Maybe 
it’s just always going to be rocky?  I think about it some more.  How about 
standing shoulder to shoulder with the blind person, so that the problematic 
variable is removed?  I also suggest to my colleague that we as blind people 
ought to get into the habit of centering ourselves bodily, starting with where 
our feet are pointed.  One more skill to learn, one that’ll have to be practiced 
in the flow of complex movement under an already divided consciousness, 
one that in fact works against the adaptive skill of decentering one’s 
perspective in the first place.  She is reluctant to think of it as her 
responsibility, and is skeptical that it can be done.  I am meanwhile skeptical 
about the educatability of the public in the way of standing shoulder-to-
shoulder, but her husband might be trainable.   
 
Scene viii, on the ethics and benefits of being reflexive. 
“I forget that you are blind” is something I hear either after blindness 
has become a topic of discussion or else when the first bump occurs after 
passing out of an inclusive field into a disabling one where I have stumbled 
or had to ask for help.  A hearing-impaired friend for a long time had to 
pointedly twist my head back to face her or move aside my arms because I 
have a habit of propping my elbows on the table and clasping my hands in 
front of my face.  “I can never remember that you are lip-reading.”  
Interactions can be made disabling because the disability category is not 
present enough.   
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A similar example is my standing at full height to talk with a colleague 
confined to a wheelchair.  This arrangement forced him to always crane his 
neck at an uncomfortable angle, which is what he pointed out to me, and 
also might well in effect inscribe the interaction with a power imbalance that 
the wheelchair-bound person is incapable of escaping (i.e., being talked 
down to).  I might, on the other hand, feel inferior in this posture of standing 
at attention, but I have a freedom of movement to shift position.  I was 
talking to a prominent disability scholar at an academic conference, and what 
he pointed out about my standing position clarified an ambiguous sensation 
I’d had while talking to him.  Squatting down was an act outside the 
protocols for corridor talk.  It felt extremely rational and liberating, like new 
knowledge.  It’s amazing how squatting in a conference hotel hallway can 
grant such a superior perspective on the flow of traffic.   
Disability, and in fact any other condition that defines the horizon of 
agency,  can be too present to actors or not present enough.  As with any 
habituated practice, reflexive awareness of how one is operating can easily 
slip out of reach, leaving one with a set of routinized procedures applied 
bluntly to new situations.  That awareness is very difficult to retrieve, and to 
a varying degree might not even lie within one’s own history.  At that point, 
we are left interacting with an array of essentialized objects and proscriptions 
in place of an agile attentiveness to signs of difference.  Because my mother 
had two visually-impaired children, she acquired the habit of rapping her 
knuckles against the car in order to orient my brother or me as we 
approached it.  The friends she has made since the two of us left home 
stayed slightly bewildered until, apparently after years of turning to each 
other with quizzical looks whenever she performed this strange ritual, they 
finally broke down and asked her what she was doing.  Naturally, she didn’t 
know she was still doing it. 
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Scene ix, A walk in the city. 
If I make the prescribed arc, which is very wide, I very often end up 
with a cane broken in two by the scissoring legs of an undergraduate lost in 
his or her own world, leaving me to get home with no cane, as I’ve had to do 
several times.  So I fold into a smaller space on this crowded campus 
sidewalk and swing the cane tentatively, relying on memory and hearing, this 
compromise yielding the fastest pace overall in this setting but much slower 
and uncertain than it should be.  Forty-five paces to the next branching, 
which I mentally recalculate to fit these slower steps; then listen for the 
sound of the heavy doors atop a flight of steps.  “Pay attention.”  We the 
blind have indeed fashioned adaptive habits for ourselves.  Some of them are 
similar strategies we have each derived independently.  Others are inculcated 
through institutional rehabilitation services.  They do not, in ordinary 
interaction, become cultural practices, because their value is solely in their 
use (negotiation of a field) and not in their exchange (meaning, as in a 
valued way of life).  The arc of my aluminum cane fills my mental image with 
a tactile and visual landscape, as well as a sonic one, as its tip runs over dirt, 
concrete, steel, and wood.  This modality is a habit of attention, not a special 
ability.  I’m obligated to acknowledge Merleau-Ponty’s famous image of the 
“blind man’s cane” (never a blind woman’s cane, in our mythology): yes, its 
length is incorporated and the surfaces of things are experienced 
immediately (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945]: 143).  But things are simple for 
the philosopher, because he can try the stick out without having to become 
acutely conscious of its length on a crowded street, or the basic perceptual 
fallacy by which I come to take the arc of this perception as a landscape.  I 
am extrapolating the entire field through which my body moves on the basis 
of a few brief points of contact. 
The scene branches into one of several common variants: I strike an 
overhead branch, I miss a curb and come down hard on one foot, I realize 
my mind has wandered and now I’ve lost track of where I am.  The 
environment is stable.  My route has been the same for years.  Granting that 
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I’m not a computer, one would still think that the site marker of a blood-
soaked handkerchief or the memory of half an hour spent lost like an 
amnesiac within blocks of my house would be strong motivating factors to 
get the practice of certain skills down literally to a matter of course, 
especially since I hit these things several times in the same places (or, I did 
before I began sharing responsibility for situational awareness with a dog).  
To dismiss the phenomenon by saying that humans are not perfectly reliable 
begs the question as to why, of all possible candidates, these impacts are the 
ones I cannot seem to remember—not only fail to anticipate, but fail to 
remember after the fact.  They slip out of the imagination of a “typical” walk 
to work, for example, which I conceptualize as a perfectly normative 
schematic map of streets and landmarks. 
De Certeau (1988: 118ff.) launches a theory of practice rooted at one 
point in a distinction between the historical representation of space in 
schematic maps versus subjective tours—in his terms, seeing versus going.30 
A tour is given in embodied detail: “you turn right when you see the sign for 
the auto parts store and go straight for about three minutes.”  A map is a 
schematic diagram of the same route: “Twelfth Street is three blocks north, 
then turn right and go a mile east to the Interstate.”  The dichotomy mirrors 
one drawn by Jerome Bruner (1986: 11ff.) between argument and story, 
paradigmatic writing versus experience narrative.  These terms are more 
apropos, since de Certeau carries out his argument in the domain of 
inscription and discourse.  Rubin (1998: 56) incorporates the story versus 
 
30 A few brief historical notes might be worth bearing in mind regarding the study from 
which de Certeau takes the terms “map” and “route” (Linde and Labov 1975).  First, as de 
Certeau acknowledges, the earlier study is expressly concerned with the “rules” by which 
people (or New Yorkers, at least) encode communicable images of their apartments to an 
audience who will presumably not go there.  Second, the article’s presentation is clearly 
shaped, to a significant degree, by the vital dialogue then taking place around the idea of 
discourse analysis and the thrust to define a field of study independent of semantics and even 
more fundamentally committed to establishing the roots of linguistic competence in 
performance rather than the Chomskian (and cognitive scientific) assertion that competence is 
based in brain structures.  Finally, Linde and Labov foreground a concern for documenting a 
psycholinguistic method for the linguistic evidence of thought, available only at the level of 
discourse.  Both authors had and would continue to offer major contributions to the linguistic 
study of experience narrative (e.g., Labov 1972, Labov and Fanshel 1977, Linde 1993). 
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paradigm modulation into a theory of autobiographical memory in order to 
understand image-based “flashbulb” aspects of a remembered scene versus 
the constructive inferential elements that help a person flesh out a schematic 
recollection based on what “must have” happened.31 From my perspective, 
the distinction between specific social practices of navigating according to a 
set of map-like relations (paradigmatic remembering) versus an embodied 
flow of experiences through a space (storied remembering) turns out to have 
a great deal of explanatory force. 
Without question, my projection of what my walk will entail builds on 
schematic elements keyed to the way I would describe my path to someone 
else: it’s so many blocks this way and that, past these stores, streets, etc, 
none of which has any specificity for the way I will, as I go, suddenly 
remember to duck under a tree limb, move left to avoid a stop sign, feel for 
a cross-walk.  That knowledge will have to spring to mind in the flow of my 
action, unless it fails to.  The habitual schematic map has social advantages.  
First of all, I like the specificity of “three blocks.”  A block is something I 
experience acutely in terms of its boundary at a street—parallel and 
perpendicular traffic patterns, light, stop sign, curb or slope, busy or quiet, 
wide or narrow.  A block is generally more noticeable than a structure off to 
one side, and determining what constitutes a street versus a driveway keeps 
the idea of a block constantly in my mind.  From the standpoint of a 
pedestrian, a street is always an event, not a conduit.  I like cardinal 
directions, too, because  they literally orient any traveler using the same 
language, regardless of whether the traveler is coming or going or whether 
or not the speaker transposes their left to mine, or correctly knows their left 
from right in the present context (most don’t).  I keep a compass with raised 
 
31 Bartlet (1932) had long since demonstrated that remembering involves a 
constructive aspect by having his students listen to the recitation of a Kwakiutl story collected 
and translated by Boas.  When he asked them to recount the story, the results indicated that 
their primary memory was an emotional response that then dictated a set of recollections that 
would justify the response according to a familiar set of Anglo narrative conventions.  See also 
Casey (1987).  Bartlet was the first psychologist to operationalize a theory of mind based on 
schemas (see Chapter 5).   
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markings for those times when I get too preoccupied to keep my mental 
needle pointed while, simultaneously, other cues are absent—when the sun is 
diffuse, the clocks silent, etc.  I like maps because they are a code that can 
be transposed between two different modes of attention, the one in terms of 
driving or at least vision and the other keyed to the elements of an inclusive 
analytical orienting procedure.  I work hard to elicit viable verbal maps from 
people unused to constructing them, often scaffolding their utterances in 
map-like reworkings until, bit by bit, we agree on a text that will, more often 
than not, be totally wrong.  “So it’s the first entrance past the driveway?  The 
door is on the street side or the driveway side?”  A more reliable strategy is 
to ditch this procedure altogether and keep asking different, sometimes 
contradictory people until a mile becomes a block and then three doors and 
then “you’re in it.”  My guide dog has demonstrated consistently that he is 
able to replay with perfect fidelity practically any length of route learned 
through this broken process of fits and starts, but my divided consciousness 
needs a mental map for shorthand.  Note, finally, that these rationales are by 
no means universal among blind people, many of whom instead express a 
predilection for embodied navigation. 
Insofar as they become part of a verbal interaction, tours are tied to a 
presumption that speaker and addressee have transposable bodies, such that 
either body on the same route not only is capable of attending the same 
features, but will remember to do so at the right time.  “The crosswalk is 
right before the outdoor speaker that is usually blaring pop music.  Another 
one is right after the smell of stale cigarette smoke.”  My success with this 
tactic, even making these notes solely for myself, is very uneven.  A map is, 
by contrast, a transposable code, a pidjun for communicating experiences of 
space from one body to a different one.  I think in this pidjun, because I also 
often need to translate my map into a sight-friendly tour in order to use a 
sighted person cybernetically.  This trick is accomplished very naturally, since 
most of my knowledge of the spaces I don’t directly touch comes to me in 
the form of sight-biased tours that I have to translate into maps before I can 
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rely on them.  The assemblage needed to forge reliable experiential tours 
keyed to my embodiment would constitute a private language—not just a 
collection of particularistic landmarks, but a system for attending to them, 
remembering them, narrating them, and fitting them together so that the 
meaning of a missing feature could be extrapolated from other elements of 
context.  Map-making is a continually reinforced practice while touring is left 
as an underdeveloped skill, so that map-making is the kind of systematic, 
reinforced, habituated apparatus that underwrites the ability to constitute 
experience as a narrateable event one can learn from.  It also, obviously, is 
an adaptation that conflicts with my need to be attuned to my own 
individualistic way of walking. 
De Certeau’s famous metaphor of a walk through the city (De Certeau 
1988: pp. 97ff.) pits a pedestrian speech act against the city as langue.  
Walking selects some elements and abandons others, but also reforms the 
whole structure through the privilege, muting, or recontextualization of 
elements as they exist for the walker within the route.  De Certeau’s 
pedestrian is very free.  For de Certeau, the city’s mapped-out structure 
quickly becomes the emblem of a dehistoricized, decontextualized imposition 
of structure—the regimenting force of a mapping exercise.  By contrast, the 
tour becomes the liberating tactic by which a pedestrian can encounter, 
refunctionalize, and ultimately reimagine space, because the tour can record 
things not inscribed on the map.  Walking becomes a form of play that 
deliteralizes the text of proper places.  Naturally, I live in a constant state of 
envy for those who have this mobility.  De Certeau is not aware of how 
deeply the city has responded to and in fact produced the mobility of his 
pedestrian, whose choice is founded upon a built environment that has 
removed so many layers of negotiation from his interaction with the city and 
those who build it. 
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Scene x, inscription. 
There is another important connection I want now to draw between 
the story versus paradigm distinction and what are called the field versus 
observer perspectives of remembering (Robinson and Swanson 1993, 
McIsaac and Eich 2002).  I became aware that my imagination of routes is 
only one site in a much more general imagination of both past and future 
action, and that my imagination of action is virtually always from a third-
person observer perspective rather than an embodied field perspective.  
Whether the projected future is ten years or ten minutes away, I imagine 
myself from the perspective of someone visually looking at the scene in 
which I am a player.  The past might be slightly more embodied than the 
future, but is still largely denuded of those aspects that, stemming from 
individual difference, fail to conform to the norms of what a generalized other 
would report.  The practicalities of blindness evaporate in the description of a 
mundane activity like traveling, meeting someone, or getting a job.  Being 
there and being blind never matches the imagination of being there from the 
outside.  The spatial distribution of objects in the observer perspective is a 
map that simply never inscribes affective and tactical realities, with the result 
that I cannot realistically plan my occupation of the field, a state of affairs 
that dramatically demotes my emergent competence.   
Because this level of reflexivity isn’t usually called for, I doubt we can, 
with any reliability, know how typical of either the blind or the general 
population this bias toward the observer perspective really is.  After all, one 
can usually modulate between field and observer perspectives as an act of 
will, large or small, or even mistake which one is being employed, so long as 
embodiment remains an unproblematic mechanism for transposing the two 
perspectives with the same practical result.  I might never have noticed this 
intense bias toward the observer perspective, if not for the fact that the 
machinery kept breaking down.   
I locate the origin of this project in two discrete events.  The first, 
noted in the preface and in the next chapter, was a sudden recognition of the 
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city as a “built” environment rather than a natural landscape.  The second, 
equally sudden and following close on the heels of the first, was the moment 
of awakening from a dream to realize, first, that blindness had played no part 
in my dream interactions; and, second, that I could not then remember ever 
having been blind in my dreams.  I began to keep track, and for three years 
blindness continued to be absent from the dreams I could recall.  Neither was 
I sighted, and so this was not wish fulfillment.  Nor was it digestion, given 
the narrative character of the dreams.  My visual field in dream life could, of 
course, not give me an experience of vision beyond what I’ve had in waking 
life; but, as is the way in dreams, people, objects, and environments flowed 
together unproblematically and the concept of vision simply never 
materialized.  I began to feel as though my dream life followed a sort of 
discourse, although the line between discourse and schema was starting to 
fade.   
One factor separating dream life from “real” life is that all the practical 
consequences of action have been removed.  So long as my dream 
interlocutors fail to interrupt my agency, and to the extent my self awareness 
is generated through enculturation, there will be no experience of blindness. 
 
SELF-ANALYTICS: PLAYING OUT OF TUNE 
Precisely because all the scenes described here do keep happening, 
the only reasonable conclusion is that there is nothing to remember at such 
times, nothing to be learned.  It can’t be interpreted as a lesson, because I 
already know the skills that should have been in play to avert the scene.  
“Just forget about it.”  Because there seems nothing else to be learned from 
each new instance, the only way they might become constitutive of my self 
awareness is as general trepidation about going out or else a lowering of self 
esteem.  But I have ample defenses against these affects, and so instead the 
scene simply slides off my self.  When it returns, it will once again be the first 
time, another crisis.  Therefore, they will in retrospect seem like rarities, 
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although in fact they are patterned and normative, thanks to the normativity 
of ocularcentric practice.  In his study of a homeless shelter, Desjarlais 
(1997) calls this relationship to lived events “struggling along” in contrast to 
modes of experience that concur with the conventions in which events are 
anticipated by narrative conventions that render them easily entextualized, 
interpreted, and exchanged as experiences.  Only the sighted observer might 
have a sense that stumbling is normal to the blind, and that observation will 
be attributed to blindness as a privately owned condition—the blind will reject 
this incorrectly-grounded supposition, and a gap of misunderstanding 
thereby widens.  The perspective of practice does not yield an understanding 
of the mutual constitution of blindness and the context into which blindness 
appears simply to be placed.  The scene becomes hard to remember, 
because it was affectively hard to forget, and so it becomes hard to 
experience blindness in terms of a memory that can become a future 
resource.     
The themes from Scenes Two, Three, and Five appear on one 
organization’s list of “do’s and don’ts” for “When You Meet A Blind Person” 
(www.helpinghandsfortheblind.com).  The last item in the “Do” column reads 
“Treat us as individuals.”  This last point strikes me as a little ironic, since the 
reader is addressed categorically, and actions are proscribed for the category 
of blind people.  Both their list and mine reference fairly regular elements of 
the encounter with blindness.  No such list can be exhaustive.  Dangerous 
thing that it is, a little knowledge in the form of do’s and don’ts still helps; 
but the direct encounter with disability becomes productive and cross-
contextually reproductive only when I as a blind person or you as my 
interlocutor can conceive how the unlisted eleventh scene might look.  I 
argue that disablement is an inadvertent function of habitus countered by 
reflexivity (i.e., presupposition versus critique).  In other words, explicit 
knowledge of cultural dynamics anticipates the series of scenes potentiated 
by blindness.  A flexible mode of inhabiting a social field comes from asking 
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questions, and from being attentive.  That is the ultimate accommodation of 
radical difference. 
I want to recall a few of the moments when my readings in linguistic 
pragmatics and conversation analysis led me to recognize how certain formal 
limitations of linguistic approaches founded upon ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis explain a significant factor in how individual difference 
becomes disabling.  As a documentary method of interpretation, discourse 
analysis itself provides a legible document of a formalization of ordinary 
interpretive processes, particularly in its optical mode.  That is the source of 
my present interest in it. 
Garfinkel (1967) defined common sense as “what anyone like us 
necessarily knows”; then, by staring at people in elevators and many other 
invasive procedures that would unfortunately be banned today, he set up 
deliberately provocative episodes for observing what we didn’t know we 
knew.  One such study exposed subjects to what Garfinkel told them was “a 
new form of therapy [snigger, snigger]” in which the counselor  in the next 
room, contacted via intercom, would conduct the session entirely through 
yes/no responses to the subject’s questions.  In fact, the yes/no responses 
comprised a pre-set list for all subjects, but that didn’t stop participants from 
displaying whatever interpretive work it took to rationalize the monosyllabic 
therapy as rational, engaged, and above all sincere.  Subjects continued to 
formulate questions based on their reflections upon the previous yes/no 
answers.  Based on the presupposition that the monosyllable made rational 
sense, the interpretive work consisted of fabricating a line of reasoning of 
which yes/no would be a proper entailment.   
Whenever a speaker says “et cetera,” as Harvey Sacks and Garfinkel 
both made note of, the speaker is explicitly displaying an understanding that, 
not only is the talk orderly, but the hearer has sufficient knowledge to 
complete the series according to the logic with which the speaker has begun 
listing things.  “Et cetera” reflects upon the interaction and its orderliness, as 
do all expressions that indicate (index) specific conditions of the present 
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interaction, such as “over there” (relative to the speaker and hearer’s 
position and other spatial factors), “that day” (indexing a prior utterance), or 
“him” or “you” (words whose referents shift each time the speaker changes).  
Garfinkel put indexicality and this form of implicit reflexivity at center stage, 
in contrast to formal-analytic sociologies which, like Boasian anthropology, 
worked to   control for all occasion-specific and shifting references in order to 
detect the underlying, speaker-independent structures.  Garfinkel developed 
the insight that ordinary speakers have implicit methods for interpreting one 
another’s speech (and other actions) beyond the narrow range of 
denotational reference.  Ethnomethodology (which properly references the 
object of study but became synonymous with the analytical approach itself) 
provides a non-formalist account of our typified grasp of the present. 
Minor punch line: practically anything can readily be taken as the 
document of an orderly, recoverable process, as the “yes/no” mock therapy 
demonstrated.  Major punch line (about which Garfinkel is adamant): 
sociological data collection is itself grounded upon this documentary method 
of interpretation.  The basic insight is not that sociological theory is 
fallacious, but that research is a formalization of ordinary interpretive 
procedures that we can observe, more or less everywhere we look.  Garfinkel 
emphasized the potential for ethnomethodological analysis to, on this basis, 
describe interactions in their actuality; I will, conversely, locate the 
suspension of what counts as “actual” over a subterranean level of 
assumptions keyed to normative embodiment and communicative practices 
shared by the analyst as a socialized human.   
The disciplinary use of the documentary method of interpretation relies 
crucially on one of two approaches: either an experimental breach in which 
the experimenter forces others to display the presupposed workings of 
common-sense orderliness in a particular situation, as in Garfinkel’s early 
studies; or, as in the sibling discipline of conversation analysis, the recording 
of natural-language interactions in which analysts can programmatically 
control for their own attributions, thanks to the fact that participants are 
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displaying their practical reasoning about local and cross-contextual and 
inter-discursive connections.  As in any hermeneutic approach, “meaning” is 
the resulting synthesis, a contextualized text—“we know what we’re talking 
about and how it fits in with what we’re doing”—and an entextualized 
context—“we know what kind of situation this is by virtue of what we’re 
exchanging” (Briggs and Bauman 1992, Silverstein and Urban 1996).  
Because the analyst is thought to be controlling for his own influence on the 
scene, the documentary method takes what it sees as being immediate and 
actual.  Thus, in what Harvey Sacks labeled a “proof procedure,” the 
analyst’s understanding of what an utterance does is checked against what 
interlocutors display about what they take to be going on in the utterance (at 
a certain level, I would think that ethnographers of any stripe are bound to 
carry on according to the same abductive procedure).  Interactive processes 
between speaker X and audience Y, along with one-way interpretation by X 
and Y by the lurking analyst Z, are thereby diagrammed. Attention to 
indexicality within that frame can incorporate indefinite orders of other 
contexts and interactions as well.  So, conversation analysis observes 
reflexive language in which X and Y interpret one another and utterances of 
X and Y reflect on themselves.   
The arrow indicating Dr. Z’s interpretation of all this is one-way, 
usually.  Rarely have I found accounts of natural-language analysts asking 
natives what they meant, perhaps because the demand-response character 
of interviewing is thought to make the response unreliable for anything but 
formal-linguistic data, while asking people what they’re doing in itself 
drastically reforms the interaction.  Still, by returning to Garfinkel’s 
somewhat less-explicitly studied arguments about the work of the analyst, 
we can identify the formal assumptions that underwrite the efficacy of 
discourse analysis: 
(1) The recording displays an achievement of interactive order or its 
failure.  Thus, the transcript is metricalized and attended according to the 
question “how does it work?” 
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(2) the recording, and then the transcript, contain the brunt of the 
interaction.  The discovery of  local orderliness within the interaction depends 
on locating indexical presuppositions and entailments within the transcript.  
The assumption is that they are likely to have more local connections than 
distant ones.   
(3) inter-discursivities can be recognized.  The linguist generally 
recognizes when another context is being indexed, either in an obvious 
allusion or in the fabric of what Silverstein (2003) calls “nth-order 
indexicality.”  The transcript one has made defines the perimeter of what will 
constitute local versus inter-textual indexicality, although the same processes 
are tracked at both levels.   
(4) Especially for the reader, the transcription conventions are 
assumed to accurately reproduce the analytically significant aspects of the 
interaction, and explanation will be sought within the transcription code.   
Harvey Sacks (1992a [1965]: 113) puts it succinctly: “The kind of 
phenomena we are dealing with are always transcriptions of actual 
occurrences, in their actual sequence. And I take it our business is to try to 
construct the machinery that would produce those occurrences. That is, we 
find and name some objects, and find and name some rules for using those 
objects, where the rules for using those objects will produce those objects.”  
The observed orderliness of interactions becomes an intricate, dense, 
analytical account of complex indexical and inferential logics deployed by 
seemingly-innocuous individuals who the analyst has usually not tracked 
longitudinally.  “But if something like what I've been saying is so,” Sacks 
continues, “then: It is not merely that the notion that you need to know a 
great deal about somebody before you can say this or that about them may 
be a lot of nonsense, but the way that society goes about building people 
makes a nonsense of such a notion. That is: A task of socialization is to 
produce somebody who so behaves that those categories are enough to 
know something about him.”  The linguists position over the transcript, 
surveying it, acts as a fairly strong guarantee that orderliness will be found in 
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the desired proportions—which, in the X<->Y<-Z diagram, poses linguistics 
as, I think, what Peirce calls “thirdness.”  Sacks again, in a Q&A session at a 
conference: “I have a set of rules which give me back my data” (H. Sacks 
1992a: xi).32 Fortunately, this guarantee is mostly provided by the ordi’ness 
of ordinary language as linguists have observed it.  However, given that this 
history of careful observation does depend on observing data to be the 
entailments of an indexically-presupposed order consisting of such 
phenomena as adjacency pairs and deixis, there are no grounds for making a 
fundamental distinction between linguistic analysis and reader-response 
criticism, which will come as a shock to anyone not equally invested in both 
paradigms.  It isn’t a very consequential claim on the ground, except that the 
recall of Dr. Z into the frame as the reader establishes the formal conditions 
under which analysis can be misdirected, realized in situations where the 
empirical presuppositions fail in some way while the method by which the 
data are recognized as their entailments nevertheless succeeds.  This state of 
affairs is what we call a misunderstanding, in which an individual difference 
goes down under the force of (metapragmatic) practice.33 
Analytical misrecognitions are not likely to be detectable after the 
stage when the data has been recorded, but I’ll note some boundary cases to 
illustrate the risk.  I like the example of Wilce (1998), who in rural 
Bangladesh encountered a woman labeled mad by her family and everyone 
else.  What he instead heard as her “tuneful texted weeping,” he took back 
 
32 These quotations from Harvey Sacks come from transcriptions, not publications, 
which underscores the resolutely in-process character of his inquiries.  His studies never back 
down from the basic analytical engine articulated in these remarks, however, nor does 
contemporary conversation analysis stray too far from their application. 
33 Garfinkel (1967: 38) demonstrates misunderstanding, in the sense of unshared 
knowledge, to be a ubiquitous presence (or absence) in everyday interactions.  His 
demonstration consists of asking conversational partners to gloss what they had understood 
from one another, under the condition that both thought they’d understood the other, and 
comparing the differences, an exercise which simply recalls the productivity of discourse.  
McDermott and Tylbor (1995) examine “collusion” inherent in conversation, which not only lets 
unshared knowledge pass, but relies on its underdetermined qualities for constituting states of 
affairs.  “Collusion refers to how members of any social order must constantly help each other 
to posit a particular state of affairs, even when such a state would be in no way at hand 
without everyone so proceeding” (p. 219).  Thus the dichotomy in which misunderstanding 
manifests itself is interactive, not objective. 
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to the city, where an academic recognized it as a once-valued lament genre.  
Leaving aside the question of whether her communicative deviance 
nevertheless indexed her posing an unusual danger to herself or others, the 
incident exemplifies the distance long-term, immersive fieldwork must be 
prepared to  travel on the hunch that inter-discursivity is present in the 
transcript when the proof procedure fails to reflect it.34 My scenes ii-iv, vi, 
vii, and ix share this overdetermined quality, such that a breach in the 
presupposed order is played back upon me as a privately-owned disorder.  
Alternately, disabilities often express themselves through “botched” 
interactions signaled by repair procedures that bump the discourse to higher 
levels of complexity in order to accomplish Mr. X’s social navigation.  The 
observer (or the participants) first recognize a move as botched by the way it 
negatively indexes the presentation of the smoothly-enacted schema now 
perceived as having been derailed, suddenly replaced by strange territory.  
Scenes i and v force actors to improvise under these conditions without, 
apparently, having much to draw on in the way of models.   
In scenes viii and x, on the other hand, the very smoothness of the 
ongoing interaction becomes the problem, because disability is conceptually 
absent.  The obstructed deaf lip-reader, the wheelchair-bound conversation 
partner constrained to look up at the speaker, and the blind dreamer are 
responsible for recognizing the nature of the normative conditions, their 
individual difference with respect to them, and ultimately for forcing a break 
in the flow.  For this third category, participants (including the disabled 
person) don’t necessarily know what is going on, based on the apparent 
accomplishment of the scene.  We have probably all observed or heard of 
innumerable children in school who don’t fit normatively into the 
 
34 Two studies of childhood socialization are also worth noting.  Ochs, Solomon, and 
Sterponi (2005) are able to demonstrate that  habituated styles of child-directed 
communication have significant disabling effects on autistic children, which becomes evident 
on the basis of cross-cultural observation of different communicative models.  Keating and 
Mirus (2003) show that hearing children lack forms of visual communicative competence that, 
in their absence, isolate deaf children in mainstream education.  In the latter case, knowledge 
of visual communication as a coherent language system, particularly the “topic+comment” 
structure of ASL, enables observation of the disabling force of linguistic habits. 
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regimentation, such that they can’t readily attend what is being written on 
the board or stay “on task” given the standard ensemble of sticks and carrots 
mass distributed for that purpose (note that I can position them 
pragmatically without requiring a diagnostic label, which could have been 
anything from “blind” to “immigrant.”).  They can “pass” year after year, 
both in terms of their accession and their social unmarkedness, but very 
often simultaneously believing themselves to be stupid, because difference 
has been misrecognized as a sign of some variant token of individual 
difference in the quantitative sense of, say, being born at the shallow end of 
the gene pool.  “Passing” is a disability brought about by the visible 
accomplishment of such a practical order.  We’ve come to a real Cilla and 
Carribdis of analytical alternatives, then: externally-imposed diagnosis, which 
invokes a causal model like Freud’s or cognitivism; versus a passive 
approach that lets one’s own tacit standards ride until someone gets our 
attention, this being a sort of self-interested liberalism that disengages itself 
on the excuse of cultural relativism (“they’re ok, I’m ok”).   
Charles Goodwin (2004) documents how an aphasic named Chil—who 
can utter only three words—employs prosody, gesture, and a co-speaker 
possessing a great deal of shared knowledge in order to produce (guide, 
repair, co-construct) a complex narrative despite extremely little access to 
referential language (note that the setting of Chil’s home, where most of the 
video taping occurred, should likewise be regarded as one of his most 
significant resources). The first few pages of the article detail several 
surprising communicative strategies Chil has adopted, including use of the 
prosodic musicality of his speech and a lexical coding made by recombining 
his three monosyllables.  Goodwin concludes that he thereby becomes “a 
competent person, indeed a powerful actor” (Goodwin 2004: 151).  His 
competence is not clinically recognizable but is contextually, interactionally 
evident.  Goodwin states his critique strongly in terms worth inserting into 
the present discussion for their own sake:  
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Sitting at the core of almost all theories about human language 
ability…and social action in general is…an actor, such as the 
prototypical competent speaker, fully endowed with all abilities 
required to engage in the processes under study. Such 
assumptions both marginalize the theoretical relevance of any 
actors who enter the scene with profound disabilities and 
reaffirm the basic Western prejudice toward locating 
theoretically interesting linguistic, cultural, and moral 
phenomena within a framework that has the cognitive life of the 
individual as its primary focus (ibid). 
The target here is, of course, the sort of structurally-driven cognitive science 
assumptions I deal with elsewhere (see Chapter 6), as well as, perhaps, the 
doctors who declared that Chil, Goodwin’s close relative, would remain a 
vegetable. That having been said, I wonder how sharp the dichotomy truly is 
between the de facto normative speaker of formal linguistics—Mr. X—and the 
visible “powerful and competent” actor returned by the recognition of an 
accomplished interaction.  Let me say plainly that I applaud everything 
Goodwin observes and calls for in his article; but I am responding to a 
troubling sense of what he doesn’t say.  That should position my remarks as 
a use of his text rather than a critique. 
Actually, there is one sentence I do disagree with, which turns out to 
be the source of the trouble: “The process through which Chil’s ability to act 
as a speaker is mediated through others does not in any way put him in a 
subservient position.”  Although Chil can exert a force through which he can 
demand attention, he remains subservient to aspects of the construction of 
the field in which he finds himself, as do we all to greater or lesser degrees.  
Goodwin’s phrase “in no way” holds true for the context of observation, but it 
gestures to a cross-contextual property of the actor, which I doubt Goodwin 
intended.  From an experiential standpoint (Boazman 1999), even an aphasia 
that is extremely mild by comparison becomes a massive communicative and 
social bottleneck, especially when transiting an ocular public.  Chil’s agency is 
produced in very dramatic ways by the very boundedness of the 
communicative world he inhabits—a recognition Goodwin glosses 
euphemistically as “how he operates in the midst of a relevant, richly 
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sedimented social world.”  Without co-participants’ willingness (or coercion) 
to project Chil’s subjective life, as part of his communicative resources, the 
ordinary public protocols of communicative competence wouldn’t give Chil a 
chance.  As suggested by my scene “i” above, competence is an observed 
product of one’s confinement to a field in which disability can be reliably 
averted.   
Nothing of substance in Goodwin’s basic argument hinges on the claim 
that he is, in effect, not only unsubservient but an independent agent; but it 
marks an undercurrent of the circuit in which scenes marked by the 
disability/competence contrast (cf. Goodwin’s title, “A Competent Speaker 
Who Can’t Speak”) seem to exercise , as part of their agenda, a “baptismal 
essentialization” (Silverstein 2003) by which a public is taught to expect a 
repetition of the same “level” of individually-owned ability in subsequent 
contexts that are taken to be analogous according to able-bodied observers’ 
own privileged accounts.  Communicative competence means that “parties 
with very different resources and abilities (Chil providing an extreme 
example) are nonetheless able to use language, including grammatical 
structures that are beyond their capacities as individuals to create, to build 
relevant action.”  The hugely begged questions here include: when, with 
whom, “relevant action” within whose agenda, with what resources, and in 
possession of what kind of self knowledge?  Anthropology tends to count the 
peaks or mid-points of performance curves as the de facto afterimage of 
cultural life, but this is not appropriate when the scale of observation slides 
from “a culture” to the individual. 
Goodwin abstracts his observations of Chil to the plane of 
generalizeable knowledge by first placing Chil in the social category “actors 
with extreme disabilities” (where the usage “people with disabilities” enforces 
the privatization of disability as a personal condition) and by constructing the 
analytical category “of which Chil is an extreme example.”  I worry about 
how each of the vignettes of my blindness could, assessed on ocular criteria 
instead of my reflexive tellings, lead to an empirically grounded description of 
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blindness as a condition characterized by deficient orientation and mobility, 
as in fact it seems to represent for each of my interlocutors (nor would a 
supposedly affirmative “he does really well for his condition” go any deeper).  
Any number of interviews in which blind people voice their frustrations might 
do little to alter that interpretation, since living under a particular condition 
has never meant having a perspicuous grasp of it (hence, anthropology; 
hence, psychoanalytics).  We don’t know how the story to which Chil accedes  
his authorship compares with what he wants to say, nor how what he decides 
to say has already been prefigured by his sense of what he will realistically 
be able to accomplish.  So long as what we observe is an achievement, we 
can’t know even the potentials of how the field-constitutive agency toward 
which actors strive might have been constructed differently in the first place.  
Just because the system normally works doesn’t mean it’s inevitable.  An 
anthropology of individual difference requires a mode of inquiry grounded on 
failure rather than function.  It needs a negative valence capable of exploring 
the idea that what we observe might be something other than what we are 
pulled to interpret (the subjunctive mood is the door out of Foucault’s world 
of oppression).  But the subjunctivizing of the field can’t be undertaken by an 
individual as a sort of private language; while, if it is a communicative 
activity, it will require a reflexive mode of self knowledge capable of 
refiguring the conditions of exchange among self, other, and field. 
Given that self knowledge is produced largely via publicly-organized 
means of accounting for oneself, a form of self-analytics will be required in 
order to construct the agentive voice when its occasion is locally-constituted 
individual difference rather than a locally-different but recognized person.  
Here are some well-known options, recalling the discussion from the previous 
chapter.  By most accounts, anthropologists have had enough of the sorts of 
analytics that read all scenes according to the same structural and functional 
story.  Ethnomethodology’s legacy replaces that story with observed 
schematizations or patternings, including patterns by which the analyst 
recognizes signs of participants recognizing what schemas and patterns are 
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in play.  But this approach is specifically not engaged with the observer’s self 
knowledge of the observer, who is largely absent.  Dialogue and the 
programmatic observance of dialogicality are the alternatives to conventional 
objectivizing analytics, but as Goodwin points out in his article, the voices 
already have to be coherent to be dialogical.  A third variant of analytics 
overcomes the assumption of orderliness in two ways.  First, there can be a 
programmatic incorporation of non-signifying tangible affects that don’t make 
sense in the model of orderliness.  Although any form of intersubjectivity, 
intercorporeality, or interaffectivity will due for a start, each of the “inter” 
components of these terms simply kicks the can of underlying organizational 
mutuality so much further down the road.  No matter how vaguely likely a 
negotiated shared understanding within one of these domains might be, the 
virulence of able-disabled and cross-cultural fiascos that end up expelling the 
other as radically alien demonstrates that individual difference can 
significantly cut through any model that takes as given an accomplished 
orderliness or attunement through any level of compensatory negotiation of 
difference .   
In theory, an individual difference might be more in the way of a bump 
in the night or the impression of having awakened in the wake of something 
loud but unheard.  So it may be grasped as irrational; but, just as 
conversation used to seem irrational, it might still lead somewhere.  As in 
traumatic dissociation, there may be repetitious symptoms, such as an 
apparent resistance to being able to embody an adaptive strategy (scenes vii 
and ix) that signal a preter-orderliness at work governing the inability to 
formulate experiences and strategies.  On the other hand, the protocol for 
encountering individual difference when things seem “entirely natural” can 
only be to somehow imagine what isn’t there.  This turns out to be the most 
important protocol.  It becomes something manageable and mundane when 
recast as a speculation about the negative of what one knows about the 
present social organization.  That is, test the consequences that follow from 
negating each of the constituent factors of agency within a field and see if 
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something shifts productively in one’s understanding of the present.  It’s a 
simple procedure that could have generated ramps from the observation of 
stairs without a fight, and which generates something like Philip K. Dick’s The 
Man in the High Castle, a classic of speculative fiction, from the negative 
inquiry: what if the Japanese had won the War?  This social-organizational 
study of the dis/order dialectic (I dislike word-mutilating devices, but this one 
was prefigured by the word “disability”) can be practiced as an ethical 
commitment, as Chil’s family does, or as a critical-phenomenological 
discipline.  Both labels converge as remediations of ethos.  Framed in terms 
of an ethical moment of reflection within an argument, say, or an 
ethnography, it asks, “what else might be going on here?”  Given the weight 
of the baggage ethnographers in the field have to unpack, this line might be 
the most appropriate way to begin any field journal. 
Both disability and agency can be expressed in the same terms.  For 
any given field, agency is a function of the magnitude of difference between 
the individual and the actor presupposed by the social field, compounded by 
the emergent conditions entailed through the interaction, mitigated by the 
deployment of prosthetic mechanisms.  By correlating agency with 
congruence in this way, the formula is an expression of Bourdieu’s concept of 
a system of conformity and distinction (Bourdieu 1984), but with some 
variables identified.  The “given field of action” can be largely inter-personal, 
as in a conversation, or largely a matter of the structural anticipation of 
bodies—thin bodies, bodies in wheelchairs, bodies pushing other bodies in 
strollers, bodies whose eyes aren’t always following the expected cues, 
bodies whose attention has to be drawn in by a storefront display or billboard 
because the builders know that bodies don’t pay attention unless they’re 
made to.  Prosthetic mechanisms include adaptive strategies, the routineness 
of activities, skills, improvisational awareness, assistive devices, computer 
technologies, dogs, and the momentary employment of other people’s labor.  
None of these prosthetics are disability-specific, but many of them become 
things the disabled carry around in response to social regularities.  relative to 
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a discussion of radically-different bodies in ordinary places, emergent 
conditions are introduced by the accident of particular people or events that 
would, if replaced, lead to a very different scene.  I’ve presented several 
scenes in which emergent affects have a disabling valence, but the emergent 
can alternatively be accommodative.  Likewise, “difference” and “mitigate” 
seem to preconceive disability, but the set of relations can also generate 
extraordinary agency.  As Rommitveit (1998) has explored, language is itself 
a prosthetic mechanism vis-à-vis the individual’s limited ability to think and 
act independently.  However, we generally also recognize that discourse 
genres are standardized elements of a field’s social organization, so that they 
can be oppressive and disabling.  So, the relationship of prosthetic to field is 
mutually constitutive, and as a practical matter all three relationships are 
calibrated by a particular context and what one takes to be going on.  The 
key is for the three components to dynamically differ from one another 
according to how agency is being locally generated. 
The three factors warrant a few comments.  I regret the formulaic 
presentation, since it appears to invite quantification.  In fact, everything 
that can be quantified through this function already has been, and has made 
possible, as one instance, the statistical portrait of the disabled in American 
society.  But quantification relies fundamentally on the reduction of each of 
these factors to decontextualized categories—nominal and ordinal scales—
which has yielded good macro-level understandings of disability without 
having much if any impact on how individuals cope with the texture of public 
and emergent interactions, which after all comprise the ground of those 
statistical regularities.  The function cannot be very effectively used to make 
a predictive model, then, but these three terms have proven to be the factors 
minimally adequate to form a heuristic tool for thinking about disablement as 
the negative of agency.  The function depicts a set of relations, not relations 
among pre-existent quanta.  It’s a schematic I can call up in the thick of 
things and use to generate understandings of scenes I’ve played or haven’t 
played before, without the presupposition that “my disability” is a variable 
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that has already been assigned a specific value beforehand.  It is, in fact, a 
function that, because it operates upon social organization rather than 
structures, doesn’t presuppose functionalism’s perspective on orderliness.  
The idea of a “difference” that can possess “magnitude” does imply a 
structure, whereas a practice perspective would favor “attunement” 
(Rommitveit 1998, Wilce 2004), which is the process of achieving 
intersubjective positionings and thereby agency within an interaction.  
Individual difference is certainly a practical matter of being somehow out of 
tune—which, barring a tin ear, we know is more quickly felt as dissonance 
than identified within the functional system of a musical key.  However, 
individual difference may be fed by processes in addition to attunement, 
inasmuch as the built environment is indeed already a rigid structure, and so 
I prefer to stress the product rather than process of attunement.  In this 
formulation, an experience “of blindness” is not one in which a way of being 
is revealed, but a fully staffed construction site.  Difference in itself makes no 
difference, but it never exists in itself.   
The functional conception of agency coalesced for me as an 
understanding of how I encounter public spaces, since the indefinite and 
presupposing structures that permit public occupation, combined with the 
underdetermination of the emergent event, generate these factors in 
conjunction with prostheses as an immanent system of differences. In 
retrospect, the same formulation could clearly have been derived from an 
observation of Fordist logic; the system of mass production and mass 
consumption maximizes its agency just as the disabled person does, by 
incorporating prosthetics into the basic structure of the field and controlling 
for emergent conditions.  Every Motel 6 is leaving its light on for us in the 
same way, both as a physical structure and standard of service industry 
comportment; while, to the extent that my environment remains reliable and 
my computer keeps talking, my dog keeps walking, and my skills are 
maintained, the situation is not emergently disabling and the analytics of the 
field pass out of my awareness of comparatively “unconstrained” action.   
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Post-Fordist dynamics of flexible accumulation and the self as a stylized 
pattern of consumption (Harvey 1990, Giddens 1991) mobilize forms of 
agency based on grand-scale circulation, but it nevertheless continues to 
materialize in local communicative exchanges.  Therefore, the dynamics of 
selfhood and agency under a post-Fordist capitalism, in which circulation 
predominates over production itself as the mechanism for creating surplus 
(Lee and Lipuma 2002), disability will continue to be correlated with 
productivity and agency, albeit complexly.  Disability has been largely 
consigned to the status of being yet another other, one small marginalized 
special topic staffed mainly by the disabled.  The truth is that a theory 
launched from the standpoint of disability ought to be as powerful as the 
concept of agency.  Ultimately, no account that incorporates capital, in all the 
senses Bourdieu and Deleuze ascribed to it, ought to be considered closed 
until it likewise, at its opposite pole, incorporates disability, conceived as 
anti-capital. 
This essay has attempted to depict a dialectic between the practical 
ramifications of a preconceiving gaze versus a critical interrogation of the 
present.  To conclude, I argue that the formal training that the blind receive, 
as well as the strategies we invent and often share with one another, do not 
have the arbitrary learned character of cultural values or alternative ways of 
life, although certainly it becomes useful at times to submit to the feeling of 
having shared interests, strategies, and mutual understanding.  Oliver Sacks 
made an observation that has on this score always evoked ambivalent 
feelings in me.  Under his clinical gaze, disabilities are displays of “nature’s 
imagination” and a disabled person is a unique form of life to be studied: 
“Defects, disorders, diseases. . .[rubbing his hands together?] can play a 
paradoxical role, by bringing out latent powers, developments, evolutions, 
forms of life, that might never be seen, or even be imaginable, in their 
absence” (Sacks 1995: xvi).  I’m taken aback by being dehumanized in this 
way, but my faith in Sacks as a scholar gives me pause (anyone who can 
conceive of the accordion as a medical instrument has earned the permanent 
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benefit of the doubt).  Clearly, the assumption that a disabled person 
functionally “achieves equilibrium” by virtue of a set of practices deflects any 
real encounter with the genesis of disability.  Such is the result when a 
disabled person is viewed as a cultural form of life separate from the 
dominant norm.  However, something very productive happens when we hold 
back the tendency to attribute meaning to the physical evidence of disability 
while yet engaging the difference of a disabled body—a different form of life, 
not a different way of life; not a sign of anything, but a material.  And yet, I 
still don’t quite like the gleam in his eyes. 
Those behaviors that appear to be practices of blindness condense the 
strategies any human being will tend to develop through paying close 
attention to specific repetitious problems in the absence of vision’s instant 
fusion of object, meaning, and action.  Yes, these could become a culturally-
reproductive land of the blind, but we don’t live there—and even if we did, it 
would probably be in the same neo-colonial boat as every other developing 
region under conditions of globalization: how much would a land of the blind 
import?  The spark of recognition that ignites when I and other blind people 
discover common problems and solutions really does convey a foundation of 
group identity (see Chapter 5), but it should be kept in mind that each 
disabled person is the product of a privatized parallel evolution, a process of 
adaptation, rarely perfected, that, hopefully, learns uncommonly well how 
not to fall under the weight of tradition.  There is one statement we can 
make as the basis for interpreting the meaning of blind behaviors: blind 
people are made to concentrate very, very hard on many ordinary tasks as a 
precondition of competence.  Contrary to popular belief  (a belief propagated 
by media as well as habitus), blindness is not a mystery unknowable by the 
sighted.  Forget about closing one’s eyes and imagining a life in the dark—
that is entirely beside the point, and inaccurate in any event.  Instead, 
become aware of yourself, of how vision takes the place of having to 
remember or analyze spatial relationships, how the environment is keyed to 
smoothing visual interactions, and how interpersonal relationships are 
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framed by indexical relations to visually-shared space.  Now off-load these 
things onto attention, memory, and reasoning, and maintain that indefinitely.  
There is no history to take account of, since being blind rarely becomes a 
stable set of practices that would push the instability of present public 
contexts into the background.  Disability is a socially-organized cultural 
location, and any usage of disability based on its inducted cross-contextual 
regularities passes, for better or worse, into ideological terrain.  
Ethnographies such as Simon Ottenberg’s Seeing With Music: The Lives of 
Three Blind African Musicians (Ottenberg 1996) impose a functionalist 
assumption so that their solitary lives as beggars can be read as 
unproblematic social incorporation; while Blind People: The Private and Public 
Lives of Sightless Israelis (Deshen 1992) and many other regularizing 
accounts observe various strategies and discourses of the Israeli blind as a 
“life world” of the blind, effectively invoking Oscar Lewis’ Culture of Poverty 
trick in a way that dissociates blindness from any ongoing generative 
relationship to the flow of interaction.  The unimaginability of blindness for 
the sighted has less to do with anything like cross-cultural failures of 
translation than with how perfectly feasible it would be in theory to imagine 
blindness, which is met with the commensurately strong taboo against doing 
so, mediated through a visual rhetoric of blindness.  This rhetoric emplots 
blindness, not as a lack of vision, but a lack of knowledge—being blind to 
consequences or else the withdrawn figure of justice with her scales.  Or, the 
rhetoric imagines the totally disabled person, withdrawn from the system of 
value in which they would be responsible or enter into exchange relations 
other than begging.  Or, conversely, it imagines the blind spiritualist, the 
super-hearer, super-toucher, or whatever else compensates for missing 
cultural matter so that, in all events, the blind individual becomes the symbol 
of nature’s balance of good and ill instead of an existential throat-clearing.  
The affectively and semantically charged figure of the blind stranger is a 
vehicle  through which this taboo operates (and that is, at last, a speculation 
about culture). 
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Chapter 4. The Interpretation of Difference 
 
As part of a 2003 interviewing project, I spoke with a woman—
affluent, attractive, professional—who managed to graduate from high school 
and join the Army as a nurse without being able to read, this being somehow 
the result of a brain tumor.35 “The doctor found me out.  I thought they 
would kick me out of the Army, but instead the Army taught me how to 
read.”  It wasn’t the story I was researching—I was supposed to be collecting 
data about computer technology in the lives of disabled people—but it is the 
story I remember, because it was a classic moment when the research 
prospectus disclosed itself to have been a red herring that lands the bigger 
fish.  She’s in medical school now.  I wish I could have observed what the 
activity of “passing” meant to the process of transformation as she became 
literate, what influence the secret exerted on her self conception, and how 
she learned to act like she shared literate knowledge.  Her outward 
appearance helped her pass, I’m sure, since illiteracy in the U.S. comes with 
visibly encoded class and race preconceptions. The project would have 
disclosed unique evidence of the relationship-maintaining (“phatic”) function 
of written discourse and the social organization of practice surrounding it.  It 
would have been about writing as everything but a representational code.  If 
I’d been there, however, I doubt I could have merely observed and made it 
into a story about her achievement of communicative competence, because it 
was a hard road she would want her story to spare others from traveling.  
Her world was privatized by her difference in significant respects.  The happy 
ending seems too much like a false guarantee, and teaches the listener 
nothing about the process. 
Another woman, who’d suffered traumatic brain injury, was a senior 
systems analyst at IBM until doctors discovered that the medication she was 
 
35 Interview quotations are taken from a 2003 research project I conducted for the 
Institute for Technology and Learning at the University of Texas at Austin. 
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taking for a bi-polar disorder was destroying her kidneys, and so they 
changed to a different one that took away her ability to use a computer, to 
read, to focus, and to remember her past.  “Between your kidneys and your 
brain, you have to have your kidneys.”  To the degree she has regained a 
level of these abilities, recovery was inaugurated by playing the pipe organ, 
an unorthodox rehabilitation regimen to make Oliver Sacks proud.  “I used to 
love to play the organ in my church…I could still work the foot pedals some, 
and my teacher would simplify the songs to where I could remember them. 
…When you play, you have to focus.  And when I was playing, I started to 
remember things.”  By “things,” she meant her memory and how to read.  Of 
whatever probable value a purely cognitive explanation would be, the most 
rudimentary anthropological understanding starts by observing how things 
like individual memory and skills ideologically said to be “stored” in 
someone’s head might be more properly understood as things produced and 
reproduced in particular contexts of embodied activity (Faulkner’s “idiot” in 
The Sound and the Fury is a famous exemplar).  “Being” oneself may have a 
great deal to do with “playing” oneself, especially as a language game but 
apparently in music as well.  Again, to leave the encounter with these 
individuals and report to our readers that they are managing their practical 
competence in the ethnographic present would not only ignore the dynamics 
of how it happened, which would be the part really of use to others, but 
would also use the force of the scholarly text to foreclose on the claim 
suffering makes on us as witnesses.  We can’t assume everything’s going to 
be ok, for them or for members of any social category into which the 
theoretical account places them.   
Conventional interpretive ethnography, like most forms of human 
subjects research, produces its generalizeable knowledge by way of a double 
displacement that abstracts the researcher to the collectivity of her 
audience—the “we”—which usually comprises anthropologists or 
anthropology students, while the studied other becomes a case in point for 
applicable, often cross-cultural concepts.  Any reciprocity of the ethnographic 
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exchange between researcher and subjects on the basis of the research (as 
opposed to payment) will be on this abstracted plane.  There are suffering 
subjects, however, who will not accrue benefits on the basis of belonging to a 
collectivity that can be addressed at this level, or whose suffering is not 
addressed by mid-range social theory.  I’m interested in the possibility of an 
anthropological discourse that encounters the present scene of suffering not 
as a case in point but the point at issue.  This decision will force the 
anthropologist’s understanding to articulate with that of the research subject, 
thereby privileging a speaking to difference over speaking about it.  It may 
be possible to say that the disarticulation of the two understandings 
distinguishes therapy from ethnography, since the latter can use its view of 
the native perspective to give voice, offer an objective account of it, or 
several other permutations, whereas therapy is organized around the local 
dyadic situation and must invariably aim to address itself to ameliorating the 
subject’s suffering.  However, I prefer, on the same basis, to identify the 
anthropological speech act as pedagogical rather than therapeutic.  It uses 
differences and prejudices as materials by which to encounter something 
outside our culturally conditioned awareness as real, present, and making a 
claim on our attention.   
Sometimes, those of us attracted to anthropology can identify a 
certain self-selection process at work.  In partial caricature, I tend to explain 
to people that anthropologists (or at least the interesting ones) are social 
misfits the way that psychologists have personal problems.  But there is a 
chicken-and-egg problematic.  In my own case, for instance, was it the fact 
that partial blindness removed me to the position of participant-observer that 
then forged an affinity with the study of culture, or did ethnographic 
sensibility train me to experience and thereupon react to blindness as a 
social condition of excommunication?  I can collect evidence to make the 
priority go either way, a fact that itself forms a more interesting problematic.  
Anyone still reading these essays in order to understand blindness as a 
physiological or even cultural condition has hold of the wrong end of the 
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argument.  Certainly, my entry point was to begin systematically questioning 
what disability and blindness meant, but I have written from a place where 
the study of the processes that have given rise to these terms can no longer 
be confused with the study of the discourses that give them meaning.   
Blindness can function as a critical instrument very akin to 
ethnography, whereas little can be usefully said about it as a content-bearing 
condition of experience; that is, blindness cannot address decontextualizing 
questions such as “what is it like?” except as such responses can accrue 
consequential meanings within the flow of a local interaction.36 In practice, it 
is virtually always inadequate and harmful to assume knowledge of the 
abilities of a disabled person without first understanding disability as a 
process generated in the present context (neither does the blind person 
automatically have privileged knowledge in this regard).  Hence, I am 
arguing for a reconceptualization of disability by anthropology, moving it 
from the status of cultural domain or object of ethnography to the status of 
an anti-cultural process, an inverted world coordinate with ethnographic 
practice.  The “dis” of disability—more properly the “dys” of it—is a rupture 
that appears in the middle of quotidian things, and this is the origin of 
cultural critique.  Accommodation of disability requires critical awareness.  
The material for cultural critique is always present in disabling moments, but 
the awareness tends to occur in fits and starts, a coping process which, I 
hold, can be practiced in a much more disciplined way by virtue of 
understanding its dynamics.  Hence, I am definitely not glossing disability as 
a condition of being “differently able” or as conveying gifts automatically.  
Instead, I am simply pointing to the widely-recognized potential for adversity 
to activate one’s critical potentials.  The perdurant and continuously 
 
36 E.g., any question “what is it like” is asking for a cross-contextual analogy, a poetic 
figure employed to make the strange familiar.  Yet the analogy will be taken as denotative, 
ultimately fixing common sense understandings of what the thing “is” rather than “is like,” and 
this move will limit the speech community’s ability to be reflexive in subsequent encounters.  
Forgotten is the role of language as the crucial communicative intermediary between shared 
and unshared qualities of experience.  Strictly speaking, “what blindness is like” identifies 
what blindness is not in-itself. 
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emergent character of disability, however, can make critique an ongoing way 
of life. 
Cultural critique has different dynamics than scientific investigation, 
even though both tend to become entangled within something like an 
ethnographic project.  I suspect that ethnography as an institution formalizes 
and deploys the position of being out-of-place, but I am convinced that 
disability responds to this relation at its core, without recourse to any 
externalized perspective from which to survey “a field.”  As a handicapped 
reader, one is always already in the middle of the sentence, the by-play of an 
ongoing dialogue, the crevasse of a misunderstanding one is trying to climb 
out of.  There is no arrival narrative and no exit: only the identification and 
breakdown of presuppositions to render the field of play navigable.  That is 
why discussion of disability as such is properly grounded within a theory of 
criticism rather than as material for the scientific method.  The present 
chapter locates critique within the philosophical literatures that have 
influenced ethnography.  However, my motivation has had less to do with my 
desire to back-track discussions of ethnography for their own sake than my 
passage through those discussions as I have had to make sense out of 
blindness as an individual difference.  
There is little or nothing new in my formulation of cultural critique, 
which is in a sense just another heralding of Socratic dialogue.  Below, I very 
briefly gesture to its three basic components: first, the dialectical form of 
interpretation; second, the ethical excavation of that movement from within 
rigid naturalized structures; and third, the pedagogical discipline—ultimately 
always a self-discipline—that compels ethical engagement.  All on Plato’s 
heels, virtually every voice in Continental philosophy fashions a particular 
assemblage from these terms, as do contemporary postmodern theorists 
such as Robert Scholes, Donna Haraway, Gaietry Spivak, Eve Sedgwick, 
Judith Butler, and others.  Because I am after a cultural critique rather than a 
philosophical one, however, my task here is only to tell a coherent story 
about how I am using the components, so that my usage isn’t confused with 
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the distinctive philosophical formulations that have occupied me.  I am 
displaying my educational passage through the literatures without claiming to 
accurately represent their nuances. 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY’S HEURISTIC MOMENT 
The movement in which any ethnographer recognizes a stretch of 
interactions as a scene belonging to a type of discursive intersection—
between gender ideologies, races, classes, or even obviously warring 
factions—takes place only partially in that locale and extends well beyond it, 
especially to the scene of writing.  The ability to retrace and explore this 
terrain defines what we call critical distance, and it is in this space that we 
are open to claims by the Other that might overturn our predispositions.  
One starts with the classic blockade of aporia, “what is going on here?” and, 
working from that given, experimentally juxtaposes different sorts of other 
scenes and theoretical ideas to test whether the new assemblage created by 
the two together will move one’s understanding in a productive direction.  
From the instant one recognizes such an encounter, research is formed of a 
dialectic in which repetitions of this  poesis are coupled with a unilateral 
empirical movement that tests whether subsequently collected data can 
corroborate or falsify one’s explanation.  Synthesis cognizes objects while 
empirical analysis observes them systematically.   
There is a sense in which all who take on the role of ethnographer 
enact an empirical thrust, long before they decide on a theoretical reading or 
problem-specific methodology.  Ethnography is built upon a system of fields, 
which can be defined geographically, as domains of social life, as theoretical 
interests, or as methodical disciplines (“subfields”).  Each field is inscribed as 
a set of qualities that correspond to the field’s originary definition, and other 
qualities fall outside the field.  Furthermore, in order for data to be collected, 
the field to which the ethnographer goes must be constructed as a plane of 
surplus experience, although the surplus generated by the labor of 
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ethnography will be valued in widely varying ways in both personal and 
professional circuits.  Put simply, we know from ethnographers that the field 
experience exceeds its representation within the ethnographic literary work.   
At a minimum, surplus must be spoken of as a plane consisting of at 
least three points: two to correspond as a line (of argument or data, etc.) 
and a third which remains superfluous.  Perhaps the most fundamental 
aspect of representation as a sculpting process is the use of ethnographic 
materials to produce generalizeable knowledge.  Particularism can be taken a 
long way, but I have yet to read an ethnography that does not understand its 
object through communicable domains such as kinship, ritual, globalization, 
metaphor, power, gender, capital, language, hierarchy, the sacred, violence, 
etc. Concepts bind clusters of qualities into objects and differentiate between 
these data and the unqualified ground across which the ethnographer walks 
to collect the data.37 The data correspond to concepts, or else the degree to 
which they can potentially modify the prefiguring concepts is constrained by 
the conceptual assumption that served as starting point.  “The field” (of 
perception, the ethnographic field, the field of study) is constructed in this 
way, and disciplined ethnography cannot opt out of its construction, any 
more than can ordinary sense perception.  Again, however, the field as 
ground is only half the process of ethnography. 
The heuristic act of reaching back for the right theoretical or 
comparative widget to stick onto the local ethnographic scene—that critical 
move which generates the innovative line of data from the surfeit—remains 
the mysterium tremundi of ethnography’s romantic fascination with itself.  
Einstein called it “trained intuition” (Howard 2004).  Charles Peirce labeled its 
mechanism retroduction or abductive reasoning.38 It lives in one corner of 
 
37 Below, this process will be labeled with Kant’s term, disjunctive synthesis. 
38 C.S. Peirce introduced the apparently synonymous terms retroduction and abduction 
to indicate a type of inference which is perhaps at the root of everyday perceptual problem-
solving.  Whereas an inductive inference states a probability, such that a hundred black swans 
leads a child to assume that all swans are black, ethnography tends to work at building or 
invoking models to explain the experience of being in a “different” place: here is a new thing 
to make sense of, and there is anthropological theory that, when I bring it to bear, helps 
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Creativity.  Of course, it’s largely a matter of putting into practice in 
emergent contexts what one has habituated in the course of long-term 
disciplined learning from people and places.  Like procedural memory (i.e., 
acting without deliberation in response to learned patterns), the 
schematization of critical inquiry must rely greatly on one’s having already 
developed the right kind of habitus, with the trick being to simultaneously 
keep oneself from becoming too much the creature of it—which is what has 
happened when one learns to assume that the world is all about hegemony 
and resistance, for example (Brown 1996).   
We tend to tell our undergraduates that anthropologists develop 
special expertise at studying culture, but then struggle to define what this 
consists of beyond those ground-level practices such as interviewing and 
(once upon a time) census data, none of which add up to the holistic picture 
we ultimately write.  The missing ingredient is often too obvious to be seen: 
we’ve read and reread the ethnographic literature until anthropological 
concepts like kinship or capital prefigure the interpretive circuitry, hopefully 
in a contingent and flexible way.  We know that we are theorizing, and so 
considerable play abides in our interpretations (here is where fieldwork at a 
cultural distance helps keep the ethnographer tentative and attentive).  As 
noted by Squires (2006), this theorization process is lacking in recent 
appropriations of the term ethnography outside anthropology. 
The dialectical relation between investigation and heuristic 
interrogation can be imagined as a double helix or, even better, the two 
snakes intertwined around the staff of Hermes: the strong one is truth 
making, and the more tenuous one that interrogates our truth-making 
machinery coils around it.  This watermark runs throughout my writing.  I 
regret the insertion of what reads like a gimmick at this juncture, but I 
 
explain it.  The theoretical framework derives from discourses apart from the data being 
speculatively interpreted by the framework.  Where ethnographies offer explanations rather 
than predictive models, they are retroductive.  As noted by Geertz (1973), anthropological 
essays particularly adopt this rhetorical form as a function of assaying explanations of local, 
often singular scenes (although he refers to the form of reasoning as “clinical inference,” and 
thereby hangs a problem addressed in Chapter 5). 
142 
suspect that I am reading the symbol according to its historical records, from 
mysticism to medicine, and not rhetorical whimsy; and, in any event, it is a 
more faithful totem than that of an endless stack of immobile, immutable, 
mute, silly turtles.39 The strong serpent is empiricism, while the weak one 
has had several names—dialogue, hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
deconstruction, reflexivity—all of which ultimately share the task of 
explicating their relationship to their empirical partner.  The strong one 
stands under the presumptive declaration “I see what you mean,” and the 
weak one gives us the neglected tactile etymology of “comprehension.”  
Disability is the result when individual difference enters this field and suffers 
under the regimenting force of facticity, a force countered to whatever extent 
by a reflexivity that is given a chance to refashion the field more inclusively. 
This version of dialectics bears only partial connections to Hegel and 
more closely resembles Platonic dialogue as reflected in Bakhtin’s concept of 
dialogism, although I depart from Bakhtin’s position that his neologism is a 
necessary alternative to reclaiming Platonic dialectics (Bakhtin 1984 [1963]: 
270-80, 1986 (1970-1]: 147).  Bernstein (1983), Coole (2000), and Butler 
(2005) provide excellent paths through the usual suspects in the lineage of 
non-Hegelian poststructural philosophy.  The following paragraphs very 
narrowly discuss one or two of these key issues as they relate to interpretive 
ethnography’s philosophical foundations in order to expose some of the 
hinges I have used to hang a reflexive anthropology.  In other words, non-
 
39 The problem with the image resides less with the text that introduced it (Geertz 
1973: 28-9) than in the way that “all the way down” became a gesture anthropologists quickly 
adopted as a way of saying, without having to say, “I’ve looked down this corridor far enough 
and it’s just more of the same”; or, in a more analytical sense, “I already know the function 
that generates all these things in an infinite series, and there’s no point in elaborating the 
series any further.”  This statement is only valid for certain modals.  The fact that 
ethnographic inscription, transcription, and ultimately description are all “intertextual, 
figurative, and historical all the way down” (Clifford 1990: 57) happens to be one of them, 
provided that what Clifford terms “the most ‘immediate’ perceptions” are understood to be 
likewise interdiscursive.  The problem with turtles or any other totems lies in their apparent 
naturalness and natural boundaries.  The theoretical representation of meaning should never 
have caught on quite so tenaciously to this particular image.  Of course, whoever the 
supposed Indian cosmologist was, I like to think that “oh, it’s turtles all the way down” was 
just his way of dismissing a tiresome Englishman’s questions.  The question is, would that 
invalidate the rhetorical figure? 
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philosophers can easily skip down to the “Pedagogy” section of the chapter.  
Ultimately, I describe individual difference as that which interpretive science 
cannot directly address.  The approach to an experience of unshared 
difference will need to be oblique, which is to say, not surprisingly, artistic.  
Hegel launches his phenomenology with the precise problem that will 
limit interpretive ethnography: on the one hand, the individual human is 
assumed to possess the ability to recognize objects of its desires as the first 
step toward being able to seek satisfaction of its basic needs; but the shared 
stuff of socialization has already prefigured the subject and the objects of 
“immediate” sense perception.  Practice obtains within this dynamic loop.  
Thus, the theoretical groundwork is laid for the possibility of a being with a 
different body who is nevertheless taken up within normative practices of 
subject-object relations.  This is the disabled body, which will be constituted 
less by a physical impairment than the dissociation of vital regions of 
efficacious self awareness.  It cannot be encountered within the dialectics of 
need and recognition that was articulated by Hegel and which still stands 
behind anthropology’s Interpretive Turn. 
In the essay by Ricoeur that sparks Geertz’s famous “read culture like 
a text” ruminations (Ricoeur 1979 [1971]), a basic functionalist assumption 
is built into Ricoeur’s idea of language, which in turn underwrites his idea of 
culture.  Hermeneutic method operates upon a systematic plane of possible 
meaning, and what the method exposes is what he calls the “deep 
semantics,” not of authorial intent or psyche, but of the text as it is housed 
within a (linguistic) order of things.  This methodological death of authorial 
intention effectively guarantees that any act will be potentially 
understandable (or misunderstandable, which amounts to the same thing) 
within the ocular framework of the interpreter/reader, so long as the text is 
recognizable as significantly a text in the first place.  The aperture in the 
hermeneutic circle running between the methodical interpretive guess and its 
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confirmation is provided by the assumption that there can always be 
competing interpretations.40 
In this essay, Ricoeur has no concept of hegemony, much less 
dissociation: “It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, 
to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them, and to seek for an 
agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our reach” (Ricoeur 1979 
[1971]: 91).  The historical development of interpretive anthropology 
demonstrates that the idea of hegemony is not incompatible with Ricoeur’s 
version of the explanation/comprehension dialectic, but the hermeneutic 
framework, transposed to the provocation of resistance by hegemony, has 
seemed incapable of accounting for the first germination of the competing 
voice.  Somehow, resistance is always first encountered as already being in 
practice within a community; or at the very least, individual resistive artistic 
acts are already expressed in an intelligible discourse that identifies them as 
resistance, even if only the ethnographer sees it for what it is.  In every 
case, it’s already potentially sharable as cultural knowledge, understood or 
misunderstood but in any event voiced.  A method projected back from the 
theoretical endpoint of agreement—sharedness, identification—is not one 
predisposed to understand difference philosophically as that which cannot be 
shared.  
In contrast to Ricoeur’s death of the author, Gadamer remains 
committed to an idea of a truth that travels in nature, artifacts, and 
expressions, one that makes an authorial claim on us, one that the self-
confirmatory movement of method will never fully grasp.41 Methods can 
 
40 Geertz (1973) here recognized the fruitful conjunction between Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic method and Gilbert Ryle’s almost off-handed term thick description (Ryle 1971 
[1968]).  Today, anthropologists tend to use the phrase thick description in reference to 
thickly-described field experiences—laying it on thick—but Geertz’s essay remains faithful to 
Ryle’s idea  of multi-layered, potentially competing interpretations.  A text that enables 
competing readings from different perspectives offers a thick description.  
41 Interpretive anthropology had already formed itself in the presence of Ricoeur 
before Gadamer’s book appeared in English, but interpretive anthropologists validly recognized 
their culture-read-as-text object as a Gadamerian idea of meaning.  Note, however, that 
Gadamer stresses the disjunction between the truth of understanding and empirical methods, 
whereas some ethnographers do not. 
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explain any surface, but comprehension relies on encountering (and in a 
sense acquiescing to) the horizon of meaning projected by the other.  An 
image conveys his point more succinctly than a synopsis:   “an ancient image 
of the gods that was not displayed in a temple as a work of art in order to 
give aesthetic, reflective pleasure, and is now on show in a museum, 
contains, in the way it stands before us today, the  world of religious 
experience from which it came; the important consequence is that its world 
is still part of ours. It is the  hermeneutic universe that embraces both” 
(Gadamer 1982 [1975]: xix).  To “think historically,” as he often puts it, is 
never a trip into the past (or, by extension, the native point of view), but a 
critique of the other from within one’s own horizon, a critique dedicated 
ethically to surpassing that horizon by interpreting the other according to the 
claims it makes on one’s attention.  One’s prejudices are the necessary 
horizon from which to interpret anything (p. 358).  Hermeneutics, as a 
dialogical understanding that discloses aspects of the world beyond oneself, 
is a universal, continual, historically-situated process, and as such the 
dialectic of understanding is interminable.42 I will take up this approach to 
understanding in the next section under the rubric of ethics.   
“Tradition,” however, remains an unproblematic, somewhat Herderian 
concept for Gadamer.  There is no place, within philosophical hermeneutics, 
for a being that does not already project a horizon of meaning based on its 
tradition, its  history of relations in the world.  It has to be ready to make a 
claim, much as Ricoeur’s texts already have to receive competing 
interpretations.  The object of the interpreting gaze has to be in possession 
of a tradition, and the tradition has to surpass the world of the interpretor, 
who can’t learn from a meaningless object (or one that has circulated into 
the field willy-nilly rather than being produced to satisfy a need). 
 
42 Compare Deleuze’s idea of repetition (1994 [1968]), likewise inspired by Nietzsche.  
Gadamer’s disclosing/concealing dialectic was inspired by Heidegger, who had a profound 
influence on poststructural French philosophy, especially Derrida, who would remain at 
loggerheads with Gadamer over the centeredness of the horizon of meaning.  Gadamer’s work 
did not appear in French translation for quite some time, however, and so hermeneutics 
would, for French poststructuralism, refer to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion. 
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Both Gadamer’s idea of tradition and Ricoeur’s abstract idea of 
language (langue) conceive of “a culture” as a ball of relations, traditions, 
and adaptations held together by a strong centripetal force.  The ordinary, 
meaning-bearing aspects of human interaction are captured by a 
hermeneutic approach to culture, because there is agreement on both sides 
that the “ethno” level of communicable behavior is an adequate basis for 
understanding a particular situation.43 Interpretive anthropology largely 
accepted the presumed philosophical adequacy—perhaps even universality—
of this horizon uncritically, however, when the ideas were transposed to 
ethnographic practice.  The world of anthropology has turned out to be larger 
than that of philosophical hermeneutics.  We did indeed need to surpass 
symbolic anthropology in order to de-reify culture.   
I have argued that the observation of how semiotic systems “function” 
is a totalizing but not totally inclusive paradigm.  Hermeneutics demonstrates 
that interpretation, as a condition of maintaining an interlocutory space and 
moving it along, always presses difference into the frameworks of functional 
systems.  Put another way, understanding always presses particularity into 
normatively presupposing semiotic practices.44 Conceived as a shared 
assemblage of semiotic resources, culture becomes what Crapanzano (1992) 
calls a guarantor of meaning.  Culture further establishes the experiential 
 
43 “For in the broadest sense,” write Keith Basso and Henry Selby (1976: 3) in 
introducing an early collection by several summit theorists in symbolic anthropology, “where 
does ethnography begin if not in a disciplined attempt to discover and describe the symbolic 
resources with which the members of a society conceptualize and interpret their experience? 
And why else, if not in an effort to gain access to these conceptualizations and interpretations, 
to grasp, however obliquely, the ‘native point of view,’ do we struggle with difficult languages, 
describe events we do not at first (and sometimes never) fully comprehend, and spend 
countless hours questioning native consultants about everything from plural suffixes to 
ancestor worship? Why indeed, if not to construct a theory of the way in which a particular 
version of being human—a particular culture—a particular system of symbols—   confers order, 
coherence, and significance upon a people, their surroundings, and the workings of their 
universe.” 
44 I.e., the indexical presuppositionality of referential language.  Hermeneutics grants 
language priority over other communicative practices. The hinge of the present discussion is 
communicability rather than language per se, and so I will leave this assumption be without 
questioning the priority of language over music or other semiotic modalities, all of which in 
any case ultimately face the same problem of the incommunicability of radically unshared 
experience. 
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horizons within scope of the signifier as a negativity, an imaginative horizon 
(Iser 1993, Crapanzano 2004).  This space surrounding the signifier 
constitutes the space of desire, encompassing (1) the object that the self can 
objectify in relation to its subjective need, (2) the illusion of wholeness as the 
reflecting self finds itself in possession of its own otherness (Crapanzano 
1992: 89), and finally (3) the space that permits the play of interpretation 
necessary in order for the self to employ this illusion of wholeness for the 
purpose of perceptual consistency and coherence across contexts (Ewing 
1990, Linde 1993).  …And that’s a good thing.  Without the space of desire 
opened by culture, reflexivity is not possible.  All one would have in such a 
case would be the sameness of habit, without imagination or the territories 
that give shape to experience.  Note, though, that a “guarantor of meaning” 
holds experience in its hand so that one side shows while the other remains 
in unsignified darkness, and we take the unknown side of this object 
uncritically on faith.  The offer of a “guarantee” has for me a sinister ring, 
because what is dissociated in the reader’s cultural “text”—that is, the 
difference which cannot be grounded on fundamentally transposable 
perspectives of self and other—will run as dissociation throughout its likely 
interpretations, short of extraordinary critique. 
In the practice of interpretive science, itself observed as a social 
practice, I would note that anything particularistic that doesn’t work within 
the cultural system under scrutiny, or which doesn’t serve to correct the 
anthropological model such that the model does begin to account for the 
available data as a set, tends to drop out of the ethnographic field 
altogether, often as a “personal” rather than cultural phenomenon (has the 
excluded category of the personal endured in anthropology’s otherwise anti-
psychologistic climate because it shores up cultural models?).  The 
ethnographic imaginary has great potential, owing to its heuristic 
generativity; but it is limited by the underlying mechanisms that predispose 
it to record the ethnos in its functionality—conflict, agreement, change, but 
in any event its communicability.  I take this not as a problem to be fixed, 
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but an identification of the scope of the ethnographic project with which most 
practitioners ought to be comfortable.  And so, an anthropological 
understanding of individual difference will not be ethnographic.  It will fasten 
on anthropology’s heuristic moment and develop it as critique instead of 
organized data collection. 
 
ESCAPING THE DISABILITY CATEGORY 
In terms of philosophical nuts and bolts, the dialectical movement at 
the heart of cultural critique can be distinguished from Hegelian dialectics in 
key respects.  First, to be disabled is to be excommunicated from the 
dialectic of desire, and hence disabled from becoming the specifically self-
sufficient, needs-satisfying, laboring consciousness required to enter into the 
master-slave dialectic.  The presupposition that the socialized individual 
remains naturally able to recognize objects of desire at the level of basic 
needs carries over from Hegel into Marx, and thence implicitly to interpretive 
anthropology writ large, because it is the only apparent explanation for the 
origin of counter-hegemonic resistance.  That is, the oppressed come to 
consciousness by collectively understanding their needs, most likely by 
watching each other’s practices.  For this reason, resistance is always 
discovered in the form of a shared minority practice.  Second, although 
Bourdieu makes only passing references to Hegel, the structuralist synoptic 
diagrams temporalized and thereby dethroned through the theory of practice 
(e.g., gift exchanges aren’t actually transacted “on the ground” as Mauss’ 
metricalized system) are owed largely to the central place Levi-Strauss gives 
the Marxist forward-moving systematicity of dialectic (Levi-Strauss 1997 
[1955]: 32, 49, 54-5, 504).  The gift exchange as a system is sensible from 
the culminating standpoint of the survey of the gift and its return.  Bourdieu 
shows the unifying gaze to be a product of practice rather than the Hegelian 
absolute elevation of knowledge.  Practice expands the scope of the terms of 
both negativity and of synthesis geometrically beyond Hegel’s determinate 
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negation and ultimate agreement.  However, Bourdieu leaves intact the 
strong dialectic between the perspective of practice and the objective 
“inverted world” of theory, whereas I favor an idea of deconstruction that    
exercises the negativity of critique from within the game as an invested 
participant (an immanent critique).  Cultural critique is a surface-ordinal 
process that finds differences critically through projecting the negative of the 
local scene combined with a synthesis with other ideas.  Negativity is nothing 
mystical at all, nor is it the exclusive possession of an extra-ordinary 
theorist; it is a process of change often documented in speech play, for 
example (contrast the cultural coherence model of ethnography, which could 
scarcely grasp change as anything other than an external imposition). 
Let me return to “my own” situation in order to now suggest why the 
issue of critique at times represents more than a fun “posty” alternative to 
the ostensible rigor of social science.  The moment an observer authorizes an 
event as an experience “about” disability, the ethnographer defines the field 
in terms of a disabled population recognized on the basis of a quality—
usually physiological—that will remain its bedrock definition, even though the 
ethnography will likely acknowledge that its meaning is culturally 
constructed.  To identify the disabled as ethnos does far worse than just 
essentialize disability; it immediately deflects observation away from the 
pragmatic process the research wanted to apprehend, focusing instead on 
the population constructed out of the observed regularity.  So long as the 
social construction of disability leaves the disabled as an intact population in 
sole possession of its defining quality, the product continues to reproduce the 
naturalization on which the initial field of observation was constructed.  One 
has ceased to study the process of disability—the phenomenon of dys/ability, 
a phenomenon at the core of anthropological understanding—in favor of an 
ideological category, a content-bearing condition of the individual.  New 
knowledge as a sort of friction is produced by making the round of this 
hermeneutic circle, but it will only be new knowledge about the condition of 
“the disabled” and so Disability Studies endures as a very regrettably 
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specialized, Balkanized, segregated topic, despite its best efforts to claim the 
attention of the sociological disciplines toward which it turns as a 
counterdiscipline.   
The problem of interpretation occupied me from the start in terms of 
how sighted people interpret me and how I as a blind person interpret the 
world through ocular-centric habits learned and reinforced tacitly through 
social incorporation.  Interpretation is always, to some degree, a disabling 
force that misreads a unique event according to familiar signs.  Where the 
gap thus created becomes a problem to any perceptible degree at all, such a 
misunderstanding might be easily dealt with in conversation through a repair 
procedure: “Let me explain what I mean.”  When the crux of the difference 
runs beneath the level of common awareness and runs across a vast stretch 
of social terrain, it creates what we properly call a disabled person.45 
Misunderstandings are typically conceptualized as phenomena of discourse 
whereas disabilities are conceptualized as properties of bodies, but we can 
dismantle this essentialized dichotomy by acknowledging that what both 
conditions do, ultimately, is establish constraints on the horizon of 
interaction.  As a force that limits agency, interpretation is the process 
through which culture itself oppresses difference. 
At the same time, interpretation is the writerly pursuit in which one 
moves intentionally through and beyond the rim of the hermeneutic circle.  
Achieved competence for a blind person often hinges on an implicit 
interpretive science in which one has to extrapolate, from very inadequate 
data, the pertinent architectural features of an invisible, unspoken, 
unspeakable world taken for granted by the public.  I suspect that the further 
one goes with this interrogative mode of interpretation without finally 
identifying self versus other or one’s agreement with the other, the closer 
 
45 In anthropological usage, personhood is a social category conferring (somewhat 
naturalized) agency and identity upon the individual body (Mauss 1985 [1938], Harris 1989).  
As I discuss in many places, selfhood by contrast denotes a reflexive construct that becomes 
both the subject and the object of experience, often through narrative (Mead 1934, Linde 
1993, Ochs and Kapps 1996). 
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one gets to, if not particularity itself, then at least an important realization 
about particularity.  Somewhere along the way, the press of habit in a 
concrete world makes writing necessary in order to face oneself with the 
material of one’s own concepts in order to carry the critique further.  The 
dissertation certainly uses the page in this manner.  It also occupies a place 
on the philosophical edge of a genre of disability writing.  Although, can one 
call it a genre when each exemplar must invent its discourse from scratch as 
a solitary endeavor?  
I am by training both a social observer and a psychological 
counselor.  Yet for over two decades I have succeeded in hiding 
a piece of myself from my own view.  Given the obviousness of 
my handicap, this has taken some doing (Irving Zola, Missing 
Pieces, 1982: 1-2). 
I started to write this account each year for the past four, and 
each time the project foundered on an inability to look upon 
myself as both subject and object of my observations, to act 
simultaneously as author and chief protagonist, to be both 
ethnographer and informant. . . . This is . . . not my 
autobiography, but the history of the impact of a quite 
remarkable illness upon my status as a member of society, for it 
has visited upon me a disease of social relations no less real 
than the paralysis of the body (Robert Murphy, The Body Silent, 
1987: 3-4). 
In the [Continents of Exile] series, I explore many continents, 
real and imagined, that I have inhabited and from which I have 
been exiled, and also examine some of the things that I have 
come to understand about my personal history, things that, in 
many instances, I had no idea even existed before I began my 
self-exploration. In fact, my aim in Continents has been to take 
subjective experiences and put them into an objective 
framework and so avoid the pit falls of confessional writing. I 
know that I would not have been able to do that without the 
long, arduous journey, which, among other things, changed my 
attitude toward my blindness (Ved Mehta, All For Love, 2001: 2-
3). 
Early jazz and blues musicians would take apart a rhythmically flat-
footed popular song, taking apart time and the rhythmic experience of time 
along the way, thereby seeming to bring about a fuller understanding of the 
song and of music itself.  At least, that is how I experience improvisation.  
152 
Driving this syncopation of the beat and adjustment of the melody into the 
song became known as “playing a breakdown.”  The above quotations 
articulate an authorial intent very common within the disability studies 
literature.  An author’s discovery of this form of writing marks the moment 
when a social-structural breakdown begins instead to be played as a 
breakdown, a critical tool (and who ever really needed the French, anyway?).  
As I discuss in the next chapter, the fundamental building block of this 
heuristic, reflexive writing process  virtually always involves juxtaposing 
accounts of disabling scenes with other, more conventionally understandable 
events.  A contingent understanding obtains from this synthesis.46 Authors 
reflexively write against inherited narrative scaffoldings of experience in 
order to generate new, productive experiences of themselves/ourselves.   
As always, I stress the inappropriateness and inadequacy of a 
sociological account that, discovering this kind of “resistance” in expressive 
culture, takes it to be the sign of a functioning, agentive social body and 
thereupon leaves the field.  Such a disengagement shrugs off the role of 
addressee through the usual “I’m just an observer” excuse—where 
anthropologists are no more or less apt to disengage than any other kind of 
bystander.  To witness the critical process that generates the expression, on 
the other hand, fastens on that which can pass from the other to one’s self, 
pedagogically, a lovely danger.  I suggest that the authors quoted above 
want such an audience, and want even more to become such a reader of 
their own text.  I have discussed this kind of engagement as critique, and 
next I put critique at the center of ethical practice. 
 
POWER AND INFERENCE 
I find it personally too easy to fall back onto a Hobbsian notion of 
ethics and desire as two arrows at either end of a linear segment: I can do 
 
46 As a process of metaphor, this hermeneutic procedure compares with the “argument 
of images” characterized by Fernandez (1986: viii) as “the predication of one domain of 
experience upon another.” 
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what I want, or I can stop beating up my little sister.  From this perspective, 
it makes sense that ethnographies should so often describe collectivities 
operating alternately through consensus or opposition, while ethics largely 
disappears from ethnography because it is either subsumed by the idea of 
cooperation or else it is perceived as an individual moral act committed 
against the logic of practice.  I am beginning to understand ethics in a 
different way, however.   
Whereas social science has been most familiar with the Marxist and 
Frankfurt School touting of dialectics as the path to a rational society, the 
dialectical structure of human understanding does not necessarily pose 
synthesis as a unifying state.  Gadamer (1982 [1960]) writes of the fusion of 
horizons, but the horizons remain necessarily distinguishable like two 
conversational partners, an image developed further by Rorty (1979).  In 
other words, difference has priority over sharedness, and agreement in any 
absolute sense is not the only imaginable goal.  Synthesis, instead of being a 
unifying stage, is the vehicle that moves the dialectical process of 
understanding along, so long as any synthetic operations are carried out 
immanently (i.e., pragmatically) rather than as operations that lop off 
possibilities in the distinction of truth from falsity according invariably to 
some external standard.  The first goal of critique, then, is the differentiation 
of component structures.  Actual dialogue between two points of view 
remains the model of this encounter, while cultural critique as a single-
authored scholarly instrument brings about differentiation intentionally 
through synthetic operations.47 One very concrete product of ethical practice 
is the curb cut, a ramp from the sidewalk to the street negotiable by 
 
47 The process is describable as a Peircian phenomenology ([1867] CP1.545-559), 
such that qualities experienced as single-place predicates of a thing (firstness) are tracked by 
way of their dyadic exchangeability and combination with other things (secondness—this is the 
synthetic part) to yield an account of their social production as representations (thirdness), at 
which point, a thing having been decomposed into various constituents, the whole process can 
restart as what would be, from the original perspective, a subterranean exposition of any one 
of those building blocks whose firstness now becomes the object.  This process thereby 
recovers the historical constructedness of ostensibly unitary object-expressions.  This 
formulation should be carefully compared with that of Deleuze described below.  Both put 
down deep roots in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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irrevocably different bodies.  It is an inclusive social structure.  The question 
of when and under what terms observers accept difference as making a 
relational claim on their own practice is the subject of ethics. 
Foucault (e.g., 1971), Bourdieu (e.g., 1992), and Paul Rabinow (e.g., 
1996) all demonstrate that projects to engineer a rational society are 
founded on the interests of particular powerful groups, while Henry 
Johnstone (1978 [1952, 1970]) and Steven Toulmin (1958) effectively 
regrounded the study of rhetoric as a textual anthropology through their 
demonstrations that philosophical arguments are conceived and 
communicated in the muck of social fields and not on a purely logical plane.  
And, again following Foucault, we know that we live our lives engulfed utterly 
in multiple fields of representation and knowledge, both of which are always 
the products of power.  At the same time, as observed by Johnstone (1978 
[1963]), to argue with someone implies that one’s interlocutor stands outside 
one’s effective control: argument is only necessary when you can’t force 
belief.  For knowledge and power to be always mutually constitutive, 
inference as a political tool must always be capable of being held 
independently by the other as the vehicle for hegemonic consent.  Reason 
can be used strategically precisely because power and inference differ.  In 
other words, power may be everywhere, but it can’t be the only thing that 
matters.  Argument as a speech genre can only exist through being sustained 
in a space distinguishable from politics.  Ethos, as a legitimated field of 
knowledge, remains at risk in the encounter.   
I use the term ethics in reference to the critical denaturalization or 
literal re-mediation of ethos brought about through the argumentative 
encounter with difference.  Accordingly, ethical practice is the willingness to 
turn toward difference and attend the claims it makes on us.  Ethics renders 
more orders of social relations possible, and does not refer to a code of 
ethical conduct—any such code is a historically particular expression of ethos, 
the origin of politics, not to be confused with the critical process that would 
generate such a code.  Ethics is to value as poetics is, more narrowly, to 
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language.  As a field of professional study, anthropology can opt to 
compartmentalize ethics as a topic; as a field of action, as in the influence 
anthropologists hope to have on students and readers and perhaps even 
natives, ethical conduct cannot be reduced to a set of guidelines. 
The problem with using philosophical argument as a model for ethics, 
however, is laid bare in the rhetorical anatomy of an argument; namely, the 
idea of common ground.  The grounds for making a proposition comprise a 
level of presupposition shared by both parties.  The argument can only ever 
be resolved if there comes an answer to the question “on what grounds do 
we still disagree?” such that common ground is reached or else both parties 
reach the point where they don’t know what they think.  The search for 
common ground belongs to an encounter with difference that seeks to 
subjugate difference, somehow proving that it doesn’t exist.  “Underneath, 
we’re all just alike: Anglo middle-class heterosexual American individualist 
Christians who just grew up differently.”  My experience of disability has 
prompted me to view the anatomy of philosophical argument with some 
despair.  Every communicative effort aimed at re-engineering my social or 
physical environment that builds a bridge across one set of differences will, in 
the next context, collapse the ground below it, recursively, bottomlessly, into 
individual difference.  Oppositional politics is not an adequate basis for a life 
when opposition can’t be contained within a field.  What remains ethical in 
argument, though, is the suspension of argumentation over the descent into 
oppositional politics: both sides uphold a discourse in which they work to 
adopt the other’s frame of reference (this sounds better than “the native 
point of view”).  I looked for a way to use this attentiveness that would make 
an end-run around shared knowledge, and found Gilles Deleuze branded as 
the philosopher of difference.  Somehow, I don’t remember anything after 
that…  
By way of a synthesis of several actively non-Hegelian thinkers, 
Deleuze’s Repetition and Difference (1994 [1968]) offers a systematic 
exploration of differentiation and the perception of difference.  Difference in 
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itself is outside the Hegelian (and mainstream anthropological) dynamics of 
identity: 
We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it (from 
the point of view of the concept or the subject: for example, specific 
difference presupposes an identical concept in the form of a genus). We also 
have a tendency to subordinate it to resemblance (from the point of view of 
perception), to opposition (from the point of view of predicates), and to 
analogy (from the point of view of judgment). In other words, we do not 
think difference in itself (p. xv). 
“All identities are only simulated,” he continues, “produced as an optical 
`effect' by the more profound game of difference and repetition. We propose 
to think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation 
which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different 
independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative” 
(p. xix; “negative” refers here to a determinate opposite). 
The data by which we can ultimately encounter difference come from 
repetition.  Once we recognize one “tick-tock” as a repetition of the last one, 
we have the material needed to take a short contemplative step: the two 
sounds sound identical, but yet they are recognized as two different 
instances.  What’s the difference, then?  The answer brings about an 
encounter with time, which is only recorded as a simulacra on the clock face.  
Now, for as long as we listen to the clock, we experience the flow of time and 
the (eternal) return of both the repetition and difference.  We might further 
come to reflect on the habit that has contracted “tick” and “tock” into a 
single case, such that we count these metronomic pulses instead of tracking 
two parallel series, ticks and tocks.  Taking up Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, Deleuze labels as “passive synthesis” the ordinary mode of 
contemplation of objects, wherein their identities are preconceived and their 
future instances prefigured.  “Passive synthesis or contraction is essentially 
asymmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus from 
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the particular to the general, thereby imparting direction to the arrow of 
time” (p. 71). 
We ought perhaps to bear in mind here that only the present exists, 
even in theory; whereas the experience of passing time requires a 
contraction by way of identity, measuring the moments in terms of what 
stands out.  Another way to put it would be that the subject is subject to the 
force of habitus, contracting the hermeneutic circle to press forward.  
Uncritical uses of the word reflexivity qua reflection are those that do not 
interrogate the historical, institutional, cultural, perceptual foundations that 
preconceive and prefigure the objects of reflection.48  Deleuze writes of the 
identified “same” objects as displacements of a hidden process of repetition.  
He identifies four distinct processes of passive synthesis that define what we 
as humans can ordinarily encounter as “being”: identity in the concept, 
opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgment and resemblance in 
perception (p. 262). 
“Active synthesis,” by contrast, forms an intentional use of the passive 
syntheses.  Memory and understanding are its processes, while its products 
are “ideas” in a philosophical sense of the word.49  While representations 
congeal in practice, ideas are produced in an act of contemplation that, after 
recognizing repetitions and differences, goes on to draw out the threads of 
habit and expectation which ground one’s ordinary acts of memory and 
contemplation.  This process is therefore neither objective nor subjective, but 
reflexive.  Whereas ordinary memory imagines a little self surveying the 
 
48 As discussed in chapter 1, the ethnographer’s past and her sense impressions are 
often employed uncritically as authorities in this way. 
49 Kant uses the word “idea” to denote a concept generated by reason but to which 
there is no corresponding sensible, empirical reality.  Immanent ideas belong to history, while 
transcendental ones, as the name implies, are the unconditional ideas that ground the plane of 
human experience, to which we only have theoretical access through dialectical reasoning as a 
“logic of illusion” (qtd. in Grier 2007).  Anthropologists describing their positions as “post-
Kantian” tend to be allying themselves with trends in 19th and 20th Century philosophy which 
took a baseball bat to the idea of the purely disinterested regulative exercise of reason, its 
goal of a unified knowledge, and to the bounded list of Categories into which Kant reasons 
every possible experience must fall.  The danger would of course lie in dismissing Kant as a 
consequence, in effect  assuming that an influential reading by a very few critics was a final, 
ahistorical, exhaustive, representative reading.  
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plane of one’s experience, one creates an idea only by understanding the self 
as the product of practice and then imagining something new, something not 
already at the end of one’s lens.  Where Husserlian phenomenology and its 
anthropological legacy take the objects of perception to be cultural 
projections surrounding the sought-for essence of a shared world—the 
intersubjective ground—Deleuze outlines a phenomenology in which the 
perceiving subject apprehends objects that are projected by the field of other 
objects.  The horizon doesn’t extend from the focus, but locates it (pp. 281-
2).  This description accomplishes the unification of poststructural philosophy 
with linguistic pragmatics under the rubric of the dynamic relationship 
between text and context.  Deleuze calls the plane containing reflexive ideas 
a virtuality, since philosophical ideas are neither ontologically real nor 
imaginary in the conventional senses.50 Only as a virtuality, for example, 
can we think difference in itself; doing so is Deleuze’s project, however, not 
mine.  Mine is to use repetition and difference to think disability and agency.   
The zany, self-indulgent world subsequently created by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1977 [1972]) further systematizes the distinction between passive 
and active syntheses, tracing their contributions to the fascist objectifying 
tendencies common to Freudianism and capitalism.  Now the ordinary force 
of representation becomes portrayed through Kant's idea of disjunctive 
synthesis, by which perception identifies the parts of a system.51 a
transcendental (and therefore in their view illegitimate) use of the disjunctive 
synthesis fetishizes objects, manifesting them as either/or expressions of 
pre-given foundations, disjoined from one another and dissociated from the 
processes of their production (capital and the Oedipal myth are examples).  
An immanent use of the disjunctive synthesis, as part of what they call 
 
50 Being influenced by Coole (2000), I tend to instead use the term “negativity” to 
denote this space of otherness, ripping it out of the hands of Hegel and the Frankfurt School. 
51 The disjunctive synthesis belongs to one of Kant’s many pre-Peircian triads.  It sits 
alongside the categorical synthesis of a subject (identity) and the hypothetical synthesis that 
projects the members of a series.  All three are logics by which we relate different objects to 
one another.  In practice, as Deleuze seems to acknowledge, the disjunctive synthesis 
presupposes the ongoing operations of the other two.  
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schizoanalysis, instead tracks all the possible connections among all the 
constituents of objects in the field, thereby multiplying the potential objects 
that can be fashioned (74-5).52 The synthesis creates new objects—new 
virtual encounters with the Other, let’s say—which remain sensitive to the 
ongoing, eternal disclosure of difference that will never be conquered by a 
regime of names.  This break with the regime of language marks the freedom 
and the “constituent flight” of their theoretical schizo, for whom every step 
along his walk multiplies his creative power.  Or, in some famous last words 
of Slim Pickens, “Yee-haw!”  What Freudianism understands as a return of 
the repressed is instead affirmed as an eternal return of difference, a 
difference in oneself as a decentered subject responding to every new scene 
(cf. p. 20).  The self as an assemblage desires to make new connections, and 
so the schizo is practicing a conjunctive synthesis by piloting its connections 
and disjunctions autonomously.  For Deleuze and Guattari, following 
Nietzsche, this is the creative power of that almost-extinct breed, the 
philosopher who risks philosophizing openly before tenure review or still feels 
impelled to do so after: whatever one wills, will it in the form of an eternal 
return of difference, because that is creation.  The role of the philosopher is 
to create ideas. 
What joins the subjunctive synthesis to the foregoing discussion of the 
dialectic is the projection of negativity (virtuality), that sense of the actual-
but-not-present, intertwined with the map of the known world.  This 
continual projection of negativity remains, in their philosophical discussions, 
a matter of looking for aporia like any good philosopher.  This point is vital: 
philosophical discussions of deconstruction or any other so-called 
poststructural mode of critique tend to be addressed to an audience 
 
52 The synthetic movement is “the passage of a subject through all possible 
predicates. I am God I am not God, I am God I am Man: it is not a matter of a synthesis that 
would go beyond the negative disjunctions of the derived reality, in an original reality of Man-
God, but rather of an inclusive disjunction that carries out the synthesis itself in drifting from 
one term to another and following the distance between terms. Nothing is primal” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1977 [1972]: 77).  Hence “there are no problems of meaning, but only of usage” 
(p. 77-8). 
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disciplinarily predisposed to be reflexive.  Remediation of ethos is a non-
natural mode of thought.  Philosophers can identify a very abstract field, 
located on the page, where it will be practiced as a matter of discipline.  
Deleuze and Guattari never say what it is that sends the schizo out for his 
walk, other than a desire that suffuses the whole works as its energetics.  For 
philosophers, the direction of that walk is a given.  But for anthropologists, it 
isn’t.  Is the ethnographer’s role to create ideas?  The question can’t be 
answered out of context.   
Beyond the field of philosophy, we will need either a disability or 
another form of critical self-discipline to be prodded into ethical engagement 
with difference, especially in that field of action carried along with us, in 
which we always constitute fully-engaged participants (was it the onset of 
disability that made Deleuze set out on his final flight from his window 
instead of the door?  I don’t pretend to know, but on my walks I have run 
into many dead ends).  When real human life is the subject, and not a formal 
idea of it, the encounter is either programmatically ethical or it is not, in 
precisely the same way that scientific observation programmatically sets out 
to control the predispositions of ordinary perception.  If direction is left to the 
public, as when critique is posed as a personal stylistic alternative to 
empirical investigation, the shape of field relations—who is written in and 
who is written out—remains a voluntaristic attitude of openness, subject to 
one’s own idea of one’s own openness to those others one already tends to 
notice.   
I hold that the value of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference lies in 
its ethics, not in its politics; because, read as a philosophy of affirmative 
action, it falls to the same corruptive powers of self-interested empiricism 
that fashion regimes in the first place.  Three differently-shaped cellular 
machines stand on a plane.53 Two present sides to one another that 
 
53 Guattari adopted the word “machine” in an effort to overcome ideological categories 
such as unitary objects or an essentialized self.  They wrote during the height of Freudian 
psychoanalytics and before anthropology had begun to understand the self as a discursive 
trope.  I frequently find it useful to bear in mind the world of the 1960s when coping with the 
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correspond and they lock together to form a new assemblage.  Deleuze and 
Guattari call this operation “connective synthesis,” and it’s the stuff we’re 
made of.  The third machine is dissociated.  Three hundred machines stand 
on a plane.  One, a schizoid, actively turns itself so that it presents a 
corresponding side to a neighboring machine (click!) and then another 
(squish!), revolving to connect with everything it can, the shape of each new 
assemblage always presenting fresh options within a madly-copulating box of 
blocks.  What, then, dictates its gaze as it scans for new mates?  And what 
other than privilege gave that precocious bumpy blue Lego the consciousness 
to exert a critical will?  The desire that turns the procreative machine toward 
the other has no bearing on the movement of turning away from the one that 
remains dissociated.   
At this point, the abstractness of their formal ontology gets in the way 
of understanding what is going on.  A significant region of the plane referred 
to here lies in the virtuality of contemplation.  Much of what the schizo takes 
such pleasure in is contemplative action, though Deleuze and Guattari assert 
that there is no boundary between a poetic revolution and a historical one.  
Hence, the product of the conjunctive synthesis can take the form of a more 
expansive semiotic awareness of the present, as well as social intercourse.54 
The turning-toward is therefore necessary, but the turning-away is unethical.  
It is not usefully described as political oppression, but as the ordinary 
scanning of a field that still assumes that one’s own point of view, if not one’s 
knowledge, is inclusive and exhaustive.  On the other hand, as an 
anthropological domain, ethical activity can be observed in child rearing 
(where the explanation “they’ll take care of me when I’m old” is not 
 
special uses of language Deleuze and Guattari invent, since the intervening years saw several 
parallel lines of poststructural scholarship that generated their own, now more familiar 
vocabularies. 
54 Stewart (2005) has perhaps gone the furthest in exploring the writerly potential of 
such a mobilized subject to apprehend cultural generativity—things that are not yet practices, 
but nevertheless have impacts that light up something new about culture in its ongoing 
process of constitution.  I am, by contrast, theorizing from a subject that is mobility impaired; 
and, I think as a direct consequence, the present project does not address itself to the study 
of culture but the cultural study of dissociation.   
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adequate, especially in contemporary U.S. society) and many other areas of 
life.  Most of this culturally-normative ethical practice is learned through 
socialized repetition.  It does not operate against self interest, nor as a will to 
power over others, but as an often-derailed manifestation of an animal’s will 
to act within a fully disclosed and trustworthy reality, and that world expands 
geometrically through the maintenance of good relations. 
Theoretically, the remedial process of conjunctive synthesis, as an 
active synthesis, can redress the naturalized figure-to-ground discrimination 
that dissociates undesirables.  But there is a missing element of self-
discipline.  Already, one might suspect  that this road leads to an infinitely 
regressive scholarly practice, insofar as Reason must remain always 
practiced from some limited situated perspective.  But self discipline is 
qualitatively different from both method and desire; and, in any event, the 
cases introduced by my stories illustrate that we needn’t worry about what 
disciplines the discipline too much until the elephant is shooed out of the 
living room or else offered a beer, both of which first require one to see the 
elephant.  I have found two very simple heuristic questions, neither of which 
can ever be posed well or often enough, that together programmatically 
participates in sharing the other’s Burdon of the voice: “why do I think that?” 
and “what else might it mean?”  The first opens the path of reflexivity and 
the second to cultural critique.  A third question, “how does it work?” has 
already been mastered fairly programmatically by ethnography.  Whenever I 
teach, I use these three questions in conjunction. 
 
(PEDAGOGY) FOR AN ANTHROPOLOGY WITHOUT FIELDS 
2004: My guide dog Adler and I enter through the open doors of the 
lecture hall and have made our way down the steps almost to the front 
before I realize that someone is already at the lectern talking.  We pause, 
waiting in the wings. In a brisk, authoritarian voice she is saying something 
about exams sorted by students’ electronic IDs, and she is saying it to the 
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desk as she arranges piles of bluebooks without looking up.  I lean toward a 
baseball cap next to me and whisper “Is this us?”   
The glistening, chewed end of a pen comes out of his mouth, but he 
doesn’t turn his head as he whispers back, in a bemused tone, “Yeah.  She’s 
messed up.”  She is, or she has?  She is.  A hundred students and I and a 
dog watch, mesmerized, as she keeps talking.  It’s only polite not to 
interrupt someone until you’re noticed.   
At length, Adler licks his chops and dips his ears in a way I’ve come to 
interpret as “I like you seeing me.”  In the next moment, a hundred 
bluebooks come down on the desk with a thud like a dropping body.  “It’s the 
wrong room.”  Fluorescent light reflects off her glasses.  She is looking up 
now, but is talking to herself.  She sweeps up the exams, keys, her leather 
executive briefcase, and mutters as she clatters past me on her heals, but 
talking to the students.  “And you all were [pause 0.5 sec] just going to 
[pause 1.3 sec] SIT there and let me go on until [unclear].” 
 “It’s easy to do,” I call after her.  “All these rooms look alike.”  But 
she doesn’t seem to hear me as she slams the door.  Belatedly, I recognize 
that having a blind man say this might not make her feel better.  She wasn’t 
an anthropologist, but if it is possible for such an anthropologist to exist, I 
worry that she might be able to deliver a consummate professional talk about 
her life “in the field,” where she was warmly adopted into a family of long-
lost Easter Islanders who she still misses.  If it were true, furthermore, it 
would bode worse. 
Ethics cannot circulate the way specific knowledges do, in terms of 
free-standing facts and methods one can learn and then pack away as a 
toolkit.  To elicit an ethical affirmation from the thinker in the context of 
reading does not teach the body how to respond ethically in emergent 
contexts of practice, because there might well be no recognition of oneself as 
playing out a scene’s repetition.  Without an additional regimenting force, 
one can agree in the context of reading that Haraway’s cyborgs and 
companion species, Warner’s and Sedgwick’s abstracted queer, or the 
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schizos of Deleuze and Guattari are great, and still be unaware of what one is 
unaware of in one’s own behavior.  Those celebrated figures belong to the 
spectacular Marti Gras of Poststructuralism (and they are able to celebrate 
because they can practice an identity), but such figures are themselves at 
risk of reification, ironically enough.  The ethical awareness that can be 
encoded in a text is still essentially ocular in the sense that the student must 
be primed to interpret new situations as instances of the relativistic 
encounter, just as habit primed them to preconceive and ignore it before.   
By pedagogy, I refer to an intense and methodical critical scrutiny of 
what is in front of us.  Pedagogy builds relations out of the present, and 
works not to displace those relationships into an abstract layer only 
expressed by the present people and artifacts.  It is not a scientific attention, 
since empirical attentiveness collects data methodically; rather, we  here find 
ourselves in the middle of a collection of odds and ends—a bricolage—and 
have to abductively sort out what kind of sense these sense data make.  
Various things are making claims on our attention, and for certain kinds of 
care; whereas the methods of scrutiny we employ can be more or less apt to 
orient toward these claims.  Whether the scene will become one of ethical 
attention or else control is always going to remain uncertain, but it hinges on 
whether the interaction proceeds by disciplining ourselves within an 
encounter or disciplining the encounter to produce objects of study.  The 
pedagogical process does not receive adequate attention within 
anthropology, but we know when the process has taken place by the palpable 
sense that someone in the room “gets it” amidst the huddle of slumped 
bodies trying to record the facts. 
There are two usages of the word “scholarship,” one to grasp each of 
the two strands of the dialectic of understanding.  Scholarship conceived as a 
commitment to the object of special knowledge—a Middle East Scholar, a 
National Merit Scholar, etc.—confers the right of authorship based on the 
authority achieved through distinctive mastery of the field.  The professional 
scholar is profoundly attached to the object of scholarship, and yet 
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subjectively detached from it by a gaze that can recognize it as a bounded 
field of interest.  During my first University years, I was taught a different 
idea of scholarship that claims to denote a commitment to the search for 
understanding, an acquiescence to learn from whatever is there (and 
especially from the archaic texts we as students were told to read, not 
surprisingly).  This usage values the process and the attempt.  It is more 
engaged with the passing world than with a selective object of intellectual-
professional desire.  We usually term it “intellectual curiosity,” though 
curiosity should be understood as itself an ethical exercise of a privileged 
position.  The right of authorship is here conferred by the mandate to 
question things rather than to possess the answers.  Bourdieu consistently 
reminds us that the Platonic etymology of scholarship accords with the first 
usage, since scholasticism is a reflective gaze withdrawn from the scene to a 
position of some critical distance or even indifference—an “institutionalized 
situation of studious leisure” (Bourdieu 1990b: 381; he was evidently reading 
my mail).  The two orientations aren’t incompatible in practice.  They cannot 
be untangled from one another, in fact, but I will continue to lionize a 
scholarly engagement with the world that remediates its own ethos and 
doesn’t choose its proper objects too selectively.  In this regard, Malinowski 
helped inaugurate a powerful pedagogical component of ethnography, in that 
the best chance to overturn one’s research prospectus comes from asking 
questions and being led into questionable places. 
Linguistics represents the flip-point between ethnography and 
pedagogy, because it professionally gives the ethnographer microphones for 
ears and cameras for eyes.  Linguists cannot engage the present as linguists, 
how ever they might manage at the same time to engage as people.  The 
linguist can only encounter the scene as data, which involves first living 
through the scene at the end of a lens, then removing oneself to a distant 
mechanized room called “the lab,” and there metabolizing the scene as data 
through transcription.  On the other hand, the reading is intensive rather 
than extensive, and in fact is the most methodical, most intensive available 
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to ethnography today.  Once a linguistic transcript is before us, we can work 
from every item we read, which is a reading very different from taking simply 
the content of the talk as a one-dimensional discourse “about” the World 
Bank or spirits or kin terms.  A growing set of discourse-analytic methods 
intercedes between the text and our ordinary presupposing encounter with 
talk so as to permit the recording and reading of prosody, paralanguage, 
indexes to prior discourse, indexical incorporations of space, and let’s say 
optimistically that the list will always grow.  A major reason linguistics 
remains so inaccessible to the uninitiated is this obsessive methodical 
attention to and technical labeling of apparently meaningless and 
unimportant details.  However, the methodical reading is in itself an ethical 
one, because the set of methods legislates an inclusive mode of scanning—
left to right, top to bottom, in and out.  Each perceived structure is 
interrogated, listened to, considered, although interpretations ultimately 
come up against the backboard of analytical instruments and the proof 
procedure, unless the linguist is an uncommonly heuristic one. 
Like rigorous empirical data collection, pedagogy is an intensive 
reading that turns toward each structure in the field, and has a protocol for 
resisting the urge to skip a step, while by contrast it remains presently 
engaged in order to correspond with those structures pluralistically—that is, 
things can be “interesting” beyond any single agenda and lead to new forms 
of action from agents in the field besides the analyst.  Pedagogy isn’t quite 
the scene of research, then.  The modulation from participant to observer 
does not apprehend the scene as a case study, but as a present interlocutory 
space, a conversation.  The work of theory is applied to the present 
encounter, and so this is not participant-observation but observant 
participation.  When the hyphen vanishes from participant-observation, the 
ethnographic field vanishes with it.  This is how to not-do research as a 
critical mode of knowledge production.   
The classroom isn’t just one special academic topic among others (and 
in fact a topic generally sidelined in the sciences), but is instead a regular, 
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accessible site of the encounter with difference.  Difference is its raison 
d'être.  For example, most who have taught a course dealing at all with 
American society have confronted the barrier that racism and racial 
disparities are “never” about the unmarked student who is hearing a lecture 
on race.  I had asked my students to write down how they value people and 
how they thought their parents’ generation valued people at the same age, 
leaving blank the meaning of “value” except insofar as we had been talking 
about social hierarchy.  Somehow, everyone mentioned race.  All the White 
students (out of a total of 45), without exception, wrote that racism had 
been eliminated from American society as of their own generation, or soon 
would be.  All the African-American, Asian, Latino, South and East Asian 
students, again without exception, wrote that racism remains endemic to 
American society and shows no signs of abating.  When I latch onto the 
pattern and form their statements into data, then rummage through my book 
shelves for something to think with on route to an explanation, I am 
functioning as an ethnographer.  Here is what I came up with, by the way: 
an ideology of passive individualism (“It’s not connected to anything I do”) 
seems to combine with a reduction of race to racism (as a disavowed 
psychological attitude of active dislike and invidious discrimination), so that 
the racial history of material social disparity becomes invisible to members of 
dominant groups, whatever their skin color or lineage.  Racial disparities 
endure because dominant groups reproduce the status quo, while racism 
continues to be generated as the product of an ocular assessment of this 
status quo psychologized as attributes driven into racialized individuals.55 
Observation of this particular closed circuit, among others, is precisely where 
my understanding of critique, ethics, and pedagogy has come from.  
Pedagogy, on the other hand, happens when I respond to an individual paper 
 
55 Even among race critics, it becomes too easy to misread evidence of the ubiquitous 
ongoing inertia of race history as a sign of “unconscious” psychological attitudes about racial 
groups, attributed ubiquitously by the critic to an individual based on the other’s racial 
category; which is not a critical perspective, for all that it might sometimes creep into the 
practice of “critical race theory.”  The same confusion has manifested itself in “critical disability 
studies” as an offshoot of race and queer theory, as I describe in Chapter 4. 
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or ask a question to an individual student, then use that datum as the basis 
for a critical dialogue.  This is what I can do to break the circuit. 
Beyond selecting our texts, all we can do as pedagogs is compel 
students through a routine of work and interrogation in hopes that, from 
these formative years onward, an ethical practice of attending the claims 
being made on them will become a matter of course.  Pedagogy is a form of 
regimentation that extends well beyond the grasp of coercion, and so it will 
always be at risk.  There are good Socratic questions, such as “why do you 
think that?” or “what else might it mean?”; and bad questions like “Why 
won’t they listen better?” and (Pink Floyd nailed it with this one) “How can 
you have any pudding if you don’t eat your meat?”  But the distinction 
between good and bad disciplining is not relative; or, if it only seems 
objective within my framework, I’m still ethically bound by it (across the 
board, ethics is that which has always kept cultural relativism from running 
amuck, though it hasn’t always succeeded).   
The attentiveness to language practiced by the linguist is a far cry 
from the most common form of reading practiced in the public sphere as an 
entertainment or “info-tainment,” a fine line between recreation and 
reproduction.  My students arrive with a well-developed protocol of reading in 
which they catch on primarily to familiar signs by which they can evaluate a 
text that agrees with them or else dismiss it as belonging to the other side.  
If only there were a manual, or perhaps a drug, or a torture device that 
would compel students to read arguments methodically, then our task as 
teachers would be lightened—or else we would have no task at all, perhaps.  
But any teacher has likely recognized that a rigorous mode of reading 
requires an ethical rather than enforceable engagement with the text 
suffering at students’ hands.  I asked them to write a short piece on an 
experience that engaged them politically or prompted them for the first time 
to think of politics as something very local to them.  A reading of the 
introduction to Dave Marsh’s Fortunate Son (Marsh 1985), about the impact 
of Smokey Robinson’s Black yet altogether human broadcasted voice 
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penetrating the historical and perceptual segregation of Marsh’s White 
company town, delivered a payload of perhaps 90% of students grasping the 
fact that they, too, had all experienced the power of a song to recall very 
specific moments in their own lives, usually tied to someone they dated.  
Meanwhile, we had been reading Mary Douglas (2002 [1966]), as yet 
undiscussed in class.  A depressing number of students extracted the words 
“pollution” and “dirty,” which were confirmed to have a negative tang for 
Douglas, and I read several papers about the polluting acts of dirty 
politicians, including a triumphant reference to Bill Clinton and bodily fluids. 
As tempting as it remains to foreclose on them with “they just don’t 
get it,” the moment is in fact a productive one that establishes what question 
they have put to the text, what they recognize in it, and in short who they 
are in the encounter.  Students are, as rhetoricians say, “fishing for data” 
that will corroborate their perspectives on the world.  An anthropological field 
appears.  The display establishes the ground for our subsequent dialogue.  
The gap between the lectern and the regimented rows of desks is not an 
inert space across which Speaker A and Speaker B trade turns.  The gap is 
infinitely productive within a communicative event.  Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics insisted on the productive use of prejudice: the fact that we 
perceive things according to biased values is what gives dialogue the 
leverage to begin interrogating our values in the first place.  When 
miscommunications, assumptions, uncritical attitudes, slurs, arguments, and 
even silences enter the gap from any direction, they become part of the 
pedagogical collection from which our understanding of what is going on 
derives.  As I move beyond a simple judgment of them against my own 
expectations, they become my ethnographic data about not just first-year 
students, but ordinary privilege.  When I sponsor a rereading of the text and 
of themselves, much against the will of some, I am a pedagog rather than an 
ethnographer; and yet the anthropological antennae don’t go away in the 
way one might put away a camera. 
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I’ve spent more of my life in the classroom than in any other non-
domestic space.  Doubtless, I gravitated toward education, both in the sense 
of “liking” scholarly learning and taking it up as my vocation, because the 
classroom is such a controlled space.  The precise trait that alienates many 
students granted me agency on a near-equal footing, a status almost 
unknown to me elsewhere.  Movement is controlled and orderly.  People are 
in predictable places.  The built environment is not fluid.  Communication is 
verbal and observes a turn-taking procedure.  These are methods of 
pedagogical disciplining—not just setting up a sender-receiver relation, but a 
programmatic constraint to attend the topic—though we point only to the 
disciplining part when we so often use the evil regimenting of desks to 
introduce Foucault to freshmen.    Especially as a disabled person, I tend on 
the contrary to encounter the much-celebrated freedom of the public sphere 
as a space of non-listening, non-methodical reading, a space that takes 
pleasure in being that way and in seeking only pleasurable connections.   
To identify the structures that permit freedom of movement between 
one object of sustained attention to another, which is also to say the freedom 
to turn away from claims to our attention, is one way to establish the 
dimensions of privilege.  If we think of the public sphere as a space 
comparatively free of the institutional constraints on attention and movement 
imposed by the market, the family, the State, or other institutions such as 
the classroom, then a few rough aspects of the claims to attention made by 
various media echo the foregoing image of non-analytical reading.  A 
newspaper reader picks up the text, puts it down, scans the pages for 
something interesting.  The radio listener, on the other hand, cannot skim.  
Listening is a one-dimensional attentiveness, and one can either attend or 
switch that particular signal off.  Although we can spatialize that dimension 
as a linear text, that would be a somewhat deceptive representation of how 
we listen, which is solely as a function of time.  So long as we in fact attend, 
time forces us to stand for a sequential listening.  For this reason, I relate 
more to the conversational metaphor preferred by Gadamer and Rorty, over 
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the Derridian metaphors of writing and reading.  One has to additionally turn 
text into discourse in a reading, whereas listening is already discursively 
situated. 
Meanwhile, the World Wide Web, in which we are caught and which we 
ourselves have spun (to bend Weber and Geertz a bit), represents a newly 
constructed horizon of freedom.  It provides the ability not only to turn it off, 
turn the channel, and scan for one’s interest, but also provides for any such 
signal “on demand,” which is currently such a marketing buzz word.  Writing 
in 1994, Kadi (1999) observed astutely that, since information has no 
meaning of its own outside the context of a question prepared to use it, the 
Internet has a billion answers and no questions.  And, we have defined 
ourselves…that is, we are constantly being defined in terms of…that 
knowledge we search for because it agrees with what we already know, in 
place of what could have been a more Socratic pride in learning to feel our 
way through the dark, untried spaces of what we don’t know.  Most 
presciently of all, Katie suggests that a degree of self awareness profoundly 
lacking in our society would be needed to make use of these billions of 
answers in any sense other than to twist the closure of the hermeneutic 
circle even tighter.  One’s attention is “on the go” in a way uneasily 
reminiscent of a Deleuzional schizo gone to seed.  Like any text, the Web 
embodies a Jeckel and Hyde dynamism, depending on its use.  “No one ever 
taught me how to ask a question,” she muses. “I answered other people's 
questions, received a diploma, and now I have an education.” 
I think about power, inference, and how small the classroom really is 
each time I run out of food.  I enlist the random grocery store employee, 
often barely-literate or else barely-arrived in a consumer society from a 
producing one, who I must follow around, willing him to scan the shelves 
more methodically, to read faster or more accurately, to understand that a 
grape is indeed a fruit but not a grapefruit, etc.  This is perhaps a worst-case 
scenario, but I live through the worst more often than the best (“good help is 
sooo hard to find these days [sniff]”).  “Bread” has, until recent weeks, 
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always had only one referent for him, and so the “bread aisle” is an Andy 
Warhol canvas reproducing a thousand images of sameness; he runs back to 
me with one of the breads.  The achingly slow frustrating pace of our 
progress through the aisles and through these discourses is something over 
which I have no control, no matter how much terrible will I exercise in my 
space of mental agency.  It is a pedagogical moment for both of us, since I 
cannot eat without him and he cannot be paid unless he does this job.  Our 
journey, though, ultimately becomes a cybernetic exercise: “read me 
everything you see,” I say until the item is miraculously spotted within this 
sequence, whereas it was invisible before.  Inevitably, I will forget to control 
one moment of my assistant’s movements (“check it for mold,” “what is the 
date?,” “what does the label say, precisely?”) and I will have a wrong or 
spoiled thing.  Force is all there is, because he will virtually never be the 
same individual the next time I enter the same store.  I can’t train anyone 
the way I would need to, one at a time.  Purgatory: a no-learning zone. 
I’ve argued that what we’ve learned from ethnography about how to 
attend difference is also useful outside ethnography.  In particular, we 
already know that our training informs our everyday lives and our dialogues 
with students, despite the absence of recording devices or opportunities for 
systematic data collection.  In our introductory cultural anthropology courses, 
we tend to want students to understand Trobriand Island yam exchanges as 
some kind of window onto their own habits of occupying the world.  Yet 
ethnographic research will play a far lesser role in the lives of most students 
than will the practice of reading, and so the most effective courses 
incorporate ethnographies into an explicit pedagogy that promotes both 
reflexivity and cultural critique.  The classroom is the field in which 
anthropologists spend most of their time, although “where do you do your 
work?” focuses attention elsewhere.  Anthropology transits from the status of 
a profession to that of vocation when “anthropological thinking” becomes 
something we communicate to students by way of our practicing it the way 
we would have them do, which is to recognize a potential anthropological 
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field everywhere one looks, everywhere one goes.  Pedagogy is an applied 
anthropology. 
The dialectical movement that renders difference as an apparent 
relation to oneself cannot be bottled and distributed; it has to reproduce 
itself, and experiential data is its host.  The relation only appears when it is 
inscribe, and so we have them write.  Their transformation will seem 
miraculous, and we as teachers will wonder if we can take credit (often, we 
will take credit only for the knowledge transmission and miss the process of 
repetition in which we’ve been active).  Critical thinking is an embodied 
discipline that precedes recognition of the scene.  This is not the Foucaultian 
discipline of the prison or of research, both of which regiment their subjects.  
It is the Gadamerian discipline to use one’s prejudices instrumentally, 
subjunctively.  Step one is to encounter the collection making up the present 
in a way that is able to hear claims being made on one’s attention.  If I were 
a philosopher, I would be in a tangle over the idea of how to do such a thing 
from within the horizon of my own institutionalization.  But the examples 
given above indicate that these claims are often out there in a fairly 
mundane way.  Even in the most inaccessible extreme, it can be 
apprehended playfully through a negation of common sense.  If that seems 
too abstract, then a good start is to ask somebody a question.  Step two 
creates a discourse.  The discourse of an anthropologist is likely to be much 
more thickly intertextual and cross-contextual than that of an eighteen-year-
old, and so the anthropologist-pedagog hasn’t given away the research store.  
Step three speaks this discourse into a space occupied by others, thereby 
adding to the collection, assuming anyone hears, and the process begins 
again.   
Over the past twenty years, education theory has expressed a growing 
sense of urgency about critical thinking, precisely because the postmodern 
condition has made a survival skill out of the intentional navigation of 
multiple, conflicting, suspect, potentially harmful layers of information.  
Meanwhile, advanced capitalism feeds middle-class students’ privileged sense 
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that everything they attend to is and ought to be a matter of personal choice, 
so that nothing need be coped with outside their interests.  The 
anthropological literature invites a pedagogical application that addresses 
this problem very broadly and concretely.  The patterns of exotic life 
recorded in ethnographies are necessary windows but aren’t the object of 
pedagogy, since they are as frozen and disjoined from students as a 
television screen.  Students’ reflexive openness to forging an ethical 
relationship with difference is the thing.  Pedagogy is the art of turning 
information into an active reading, which leads to the scene of new 
knowledge’s return.  Encounters will be recognized for their connections to 
what is already known, but ideally the particularity of them is met, their 
claims at least heard, thanks to a protocol of reading, one that is a far cry 
from a master narrative of unilinear progress in which successive generations 
of theorists are proven to have been wrong.  The scene of anthropological 
learning is to a point held in common by the institutions of ethnography and 
education.  It is also the scene—the only one, I suspect—in which the 
disability category regresses to the surface of individual difference, where it 
can be anticipated and incorporated by a public educated in a protocol for 
attending difference.   
Scholarly disciplines are what discipline us to attend the claims new 
knowledge makes on us (even while an unfortunate side effect of being 
disciplined is to narrow one’s field of attention).  By contrast, there is nothing 
but law to impose accommodation to difference upon the public, and law 
doesn’t govern the tacit orderliness sewn into the fabric of face-to-face 
interactions on the street, in relationships, or in a job interview.  And so an 
accommodating public encounter with individual difference will be a function 
of ethics, not merely politics; and it will not be an ethics practiced only by 
virtue of a celebration of post-dualistic, post-scientific, post-modern 
sensibilities.  It will spring from a critical pedagogy that encounters difference 
programmatically despite the absence of such voluntaristic attitudes 
(although more power to every ethically inspiring text, by all means).  
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Working from the pedagogy of blindness—not as a cultural object but as a 
diffuse field of crises—the dissertation attempts to help formalize our 
understanding of what it is like to attend life with antenna instead of lenses.  
Substantively, it is a trip through my education, the dialectical counterpart to 
my training.  It is a scholarly text, but not an authoritative one. 
 
CODA 
One last question, intended as an entree to the next essay: is this a 
story about knowledge production or circulation?   
My self education has demonstrably been a process of synthesizing 
ever-older knowledge, because, starting from the surface of my experience, 
every new discovery led me to something written in 1972 or 1939 or 1850, 
or else to a revelatory second reading of the anthropological canon, where 
the problematics of my discovery had already been explored; although this 
redux in itself may also have been responsible for making what had 
previously been an unintelligible text or third-hand reinterpretation of the 
idea legible for the first time in my second glance.  I suspect that a good deal 
of philosophical learning takes this acculturative form.  I read some Foucault, 
read some people who read him, I wrote, read what Foucault doubtless read, 
wrote, then read more Foucault and more criticism.  Within this circulation, 
there’s little chance of failing to rediscover the door through which one came 
in, at which point the worked-for “new knowledge” as an undiscovered 
country goes out the window: “Damn!  That’s what I was saying!”  What is 
the game in which scholarly agreement sparks an expletive?  How much of 
what we gloss as the production of “new knowledge” relies on the failure of 
institutional memory and the localization of communication?  Still, the 
recognition of truth doesn’t make the present an expression of something 
past, and much less an expression of someone else’s idea—even Foucault’s.   
When we take an old book off our shelves and find the very language 
we are in the process of crafting, displayed there centuries before, we can 
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understand this phenomenon in one of two ways.  If the knowledge has lain 
intact and dormant in our heads between our first reading and the writing, 
which somehow led us back to the book, we have to posit the unconscious as 
a storehouse and then fashion a causal argument about how that first 
forgotten reading caused everything we’ve thought since, now devalued as 
less-than-new.  The best we can do at that point with what we’ve been 
writing is to call it “applied theory”—a derivative work grounded in Foucault 
or Marx, or even Derrida.  The other explanation posits the text as something 
altogether livelier, such that discourses and syntheses never let the text be 
finished or finished with us: it remains present and, by way of the discourses 
that compose it, we read it by degrees in the present.  New knowledge would 
then be about the synthesis and what one does with it. 
Anthropology has no problems of knowledge production: new 
knowledge is in great supply, and demand is way, way low.  The crisis is in 
its circulation.  Maybe knowledge in circulation has the same reality as 
money in circulation.  How does ordinary language circulate, and does its 
circulation determine the value of new knowledge?  What is at stake for 
intellectual formations that proceed from an ideology of simple production 
versus circulation as a sort of textual pragmatics?  A discipline that invests all 
its energies for the production of a subject who can say “I study them” 
produces texts that are necessarily displaced from the process of their 
application to both social suffering and the education of student bystanders, 
leaving pedagogy to be ideologically glossed as a personal interest or natural 
gift.  The complementary mode of reflexive anthropology has no idea of 
knowledge for its own sake as the bifurcation between knowledge production 
and its distribution, but rather forms its practice on the basis of a particular 
usage, which is the generation of a subject that can speak about its own 
social production, its own suffering, and its own potentials.  The stories I tell 
about myself are more than illustrations, and the essays as a whole are more 
than a published passage between my past and the reader’s future.  The 
ability to write the text by way of the tropes discovered in the writing process 
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constitutes the work of the text.  I regret to say that most of my students 
gravitate toward facts instead of ideas, as do most of the people I encounter 
in the disabling public.  “We have to do something!” cries the social scientist, 
hands waving in the air.  “I know,” his colleague replies, “but to whom?” 
March 1, 2007: I know myself to be an apprentice player in a very old 
game.  The first University course in anthropology, I suppose, must have 
been the one Kant began teaching in the Winter semester of 1772 and 
thereafter taught alongside his ethics course every year.  His idea of 
anthropology was a holistic empirical study of the human being, intended as 
an antidote specifically against the introspective-rationalist psychologies of 
his day (e.g., Descartes).  The products of these lectures were collected in 
the little book Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View in 1798.  The 
lectures formed the basis of Foucault’s complementary dissertation in 1961, 
and Arianna Bove has recently written a doctoral dissertation entitled “A 
Critical Ontology of the Present” incorporating unpublished portions of this 
commentary.  Kantian anthropology was the pragmatic study of how people 
could live their lives in the presence of those questions that formed the basis 
of his three critiques: what must I know, what must I do, and what can I 
hope for?  My students all want to know these things, and the three essays 
culminating here document my anthropological search for answers.  We 
aren’t in a replay of Kant’s world, of course.  Our discourse is very different, 
and our world is very different.  Our ontology is different—or at least it is for 
many of us.  I just discovered Kant's book today, incidentally, on the very 
last day of editing the dissertation.  Just now, I’m deciding not to read any of 
the texts I mentioned.  Beyond a certain point, historicization becomes its 
own specialized pursuit.  I am already in possession of a pragmatic view of 
anthropology—like Kant’s, it is a reflexive anthropology—which I have 
tracked far enough to identify this point of origin.  I believe that when I open 
Kant’s little book, I’ll find my own, but in a more profound, more abstract 
discourse, formed around an almost unrecognizable set of topics and 
addressed to a very different audience (had I any sign of a fundamental 
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disagreement, I would have to read the book carefully before continuing).  To 
speak the work of a text one hasn’t read: this is the mark of an oceanic 
success of pedagogy.  The fact that I have recovered this history as the 
product of years of counter-disciplinary research, meanwhile, indicates that 
we still need much more of it.   
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Chapter 5.  Self Knowledge, from Circulation to 
Production 
 
We finally discover the parking lot, a moonscape of potholes stashed 
behind the boarded-up Mrs. Baird's factory.  The theater space has been 
reclaimed from one end of the building.  I wouldn’t want to be lost in this 
neighborhood at this time of night, and I wonder if I am here because one 
finds theater space where one can, or if it is because the performers are 
disabled.  The sponsoring organization is called “Very Special Arts of Texas.”  
Five minutes before show time, director Terry Galloway, a long-time 
successful performance artist, beer in hand, announces that they’re running 
late because all the cast members got nervous and there’s only one 
bathroom stall that’s wheelchair accessible.  When everyone accepts this in 
stride, she stomps her foot and says it was a joke.   
The lights finally go down and carnival music comes up.  The 
performers make their way to the stage on crutches, wheeling themselves or 
being helped by those who can walk, all of them wearing things like party 
hats or clown wigs.  Many blow on party favors.  Some are on hands and 
knees as they laboriously transfer themselves onto the stage and pull their 
chairs up after them, whereupon some perform feats of strength by lying 
onstage and lifting the wheelchair into the air.  So begins “The Gimp Parade,” 
this year’s installment of the Actual Lives workshop that presents 
autobiographical sketches by disabled people.  Few if any of the participants 
are otherwise artists in this medium—the show is about self expression, not 
artistic standards.  The show is sold out.  The friend with whom I came is 
about to reveal herself to be unprepared and uncomfortable.  I am prepared, 
but will also be uncomfortable.   
For the next two hours, the performers present scenes that stress their 
frustration with the chronic lack of understanding—frankly, the lack of 
recognition of their humanity—each of them faces, both in public and with 
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their familiars.  A woman on crutches dances a fantasy in which everyone on 
stage mirrors her movements and her dependence on the crutch; then the 
dream collapses as everyone else drops their crutches and disappears, 
leaving her to hobble offstage alone.  A woman in a wheelchair describes the 
importance of Depends in her daily life, since she cannot control her bowels.  
Depends are so important that she wants to make sure we all have them, so 
she throws stacks of them into the audience.  Two men, likewise in 
wheelchairs, swap tips, one-liners, and stories about their sex lives, 
beginning with the fact that they have sex lives, have desires and partners, 
and going on to detail the techniques and technologies employed to bring 
things about.   
Three men sit quietly on stage.  When Galloway speaks into her 
microphone, I find her standing in the aisle near me.  Although I can tell 
from her prosody, just barely, that she is deaf, she nails the overblown 
intonations of a game show host as she names the skit in a way that makes 
it clear the three men have traumatic brain injuries—something like “what 
are they thinking?” or “what’s my disability?” but I can’t remember.  In her 
game show voice, she asks the kind of fascinated, possibly exoticizing or 
intrusive questions someone in public might ask.  It’s hard to know what the 
shtick is, exactly, because the men take turns answering each question 
thoughtfully, without offense or irony.  She chuckles sota voche after one 
answer, but again I can’t tell if the laugh is an attempt to frame the skit as a 
comedy, or if it’s a sort of private maternal appreciative witnessing of the 
honest way the cognitively-impaired performers calmly cope with their role 
as very public speakers. 
I recognize the voice of one of them.  He is the long-time friend of a 
friend, a former psychiatrist who lost a great deal in a car crash.  Now living 
on disability income, he plays paint ball, speaks slowly with a slur, has a 
better and much more humorous perspective on life than any of those friends 
and former colleagues I know, cleared six figures on the stock market the 
year the .com bubble burst, and, nearly in panic, retreats to the bathroom to 
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escape the confusion of a noisy room whenever people try to talk to him for 
more than a few minutes.  Here, though, we just see him in a chair, patiently 
thinking about thinking.  I could be wrong about the voice, though I seldom 
am.  I never managed to ask him afterwards if this performer had been him.  
Despite the performance being a public event, there is something so intimate 
and cathartic in it that I don’t want to bring it up around his friends in that 
other context. But this is what I am thinking about during “What’s My 
Disability?” 
The sense of almost-recognition continues to cling as a deaf man takes 
the stage to tell us in sign about his own sex life.  How does a blind man 
recognize a deaf man on stage?  Either I’m forgetting other facts, or else it is 
just something ineffable in their shared comportment, and of course their 
deafness.  I had been playing post-Irish-conjunto accordion in an improvised 
band at a party when a man, standing too close, tried to suspend his hands 
over the accordion’s grills.  When I was finally made to understand that this 
man with his outstretched arms was deafly enjoying the percussive 
vibrations, my acute discomfort shifted, from the embodied knowledge of an 
invisible, silent, too-close figure to an observer perspective on the scene of a 
blind and deaf man caught in a strange juxtaposition under a public gaze.  I 
suppressed that unease, in turn, by mentally severing my interest from the 
whole idea of public evaluation, but the position in which one ceases to feel 
engaged with the evaluation of others makes for a lousy party experience, 
especially in a jam session.  On stage now, the deaf man begins doing 
something else.  I’ve had a Very Special Arts lady narrating the stage action 
through an earpiece.  My companion could do this job and in an idiom that 
would be much more interpersonal, but I was curious to try the narration 
service.  Only, the Very Special Arts lady has wandered off.  My friend tells 
me the deaf man is miming, very graphically, several sex acts with an 
imagined deaf-blind girl.  They do it with the lights on, naturally.  The Very 
Special Arts lady returns when he finishes. 
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We are forced to confront their bodies in private, inappropriate, 
affronting ways—so long as we do confront them, which I take to be the 
point.  However, this production for me has the shape of an anthropological 
problem.  There is undeniable evidence that the performers seek to 
communicate their experiences of disability to the audience.  It bears 
mention that participants have delivered some kind of draft to the Actual 
Lives staff, who then edit and shape it before returning it to them as “the 
script.”  This circuit through the hands of others is nothing more than a 
graphic illustration of the dialogicality by which discourse “about” disability 
passes through a public formation—the history of which happens to be 
steeped in identity politics—before the discourse can be spoken by an 
individual.  I suspect that performing the script to some degree moves the 
performer’s self awareness along in the direction of the discourse they now 
speak as they perform their own “actual” lives.   
Additionally, I would suppose that the impulse to participate might 
belong to an ongoing process of individual accommodation to the experience 
of difference.  If so, the Actual Lives performers stand publicly on the road to 
formulating their experiences of disability: they are working through and 
performatively working out self processes geared toward some efficacious 
understanding of their social realities, carving a space for difference between 
the medicalization of their bodies and their abduction by cultural stereotypes 
surrounding the horror, freakdom, spirituality, and transcendence associated 
with being radically different.56 They do so in a social setting of immense 
acceptance of their conditions from other cast members, in a spirit of 
readiness to do violence to all the limiting norms that occupy the public.   
On that night, they gave angry voice to the problem with “normal,” 
and their problem with normals (cf. Warner 1999).  But did they address the 
 
56The performativity of disability has been discussed both in terms of disabled 
performances that act out against the oppression of difference and in terms of disability’s 
inherent performativity in everyday life (Kuppers 2003, Sandahl and Auslander 2005).  These 
discussions have been inspired by Judith Butler’s considerable expansion of J. L. Austin’s 
concept of the performative utterance, especially as brought to bear on sexuality and the body 
(Butler 1993). 
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public?  All of us, as friends, families, and familiars of those onstage, were in 
the audience precisely because the public being addressed never would be.  
My own discomfort was the feeling of being held captive and squeezed into 
this subject position.  If, on the other hand, they allow themselves to see 
into the darkened theater, they are directing their performance to an 
audience of shills, a room filled entirely with complicit overhearers.  Perhaps 
my discomfort arises from recognizing myself as the coerced transference 
object within their therapeutic monologues.  Sitting in the darkness, I craved 
dialogue to fill the gap they opened, but that space was made rigid in the 
framework of spectator and performer.  I told one of the producers later that 
the performance had made me uncomfortable.  She was writing a 
dissertation that understood disability in terms of queer theory.57 She 
laughed and said it was a good thing, without inquiring further.  I wanted to 
ask them to stop throwing Depends at me. 
 
CAN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE ADDRESS A PUBLIC, OR 
ADDRESS ITSELF AT ALL? 
Warner (2002) provides a discourse-centered framework for the study 
of the circulations that constitute publics.  First and foremost, a public is 
constituted by its being addressed.  A public is imagined by the broadcaster 
(a better term here than “speaker”), but, ordinarily, it manages to exist 
someplace as a social aggregate within earshot of the discourse.  A public 
either attends, thereby becoming a public, or else disattends and remains a 
virtuality; therefore, a public is self-organized, but in actuality is always 
being generated within and against the frameworks of other institutions and 
actual discourses (p. 106).  Aside from this single acknowledgment in 
 
57 Apparent parallels between queer identity and the affirmation of one’s difference as 
a disabled person have been widely noted (McRuer 2006), expressed in terms of the “coming 
out” of the disabled (Reeve 2002) and disability as “the other drag” (Mitchell 2001).  “If we 
think disability as a different kind of drag,” write Breckenridge and Vogler (2001), with one 
heck of an unproblematized “if,” “a lively conversation may be made possible between queer 
and crip theorists.” 
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Warner’s text, however, the study of public culture fastens on imaginaries as 
the units of analysis to comprehend publics in their virtuality: enter 
venerable faceless figures such as “the viewer,” “the reader,” or sometimes 
the culturally marked versions of each, such as Inuit versus Western 
audiences.   
When interpretive anthropologists began to read cockfights like a text, 
they understood that this literary “possible reader” ought to be mediated at 
least by a culturally-emplotted reader, whose discourses are read as they the 
ethnographers read the observable field.  Philosophy and literary criticism 
seem to link the structural text to its virtual interpretive horizon figured only 
as “the reader,” and thereby tend to study the production of the text; 
whereas anthropology recognizes the text as discourse connected to a ready 
or at least willing speech community, prioritizing the so-called first-order 
interpretations interpreted by the ethnographer (notice how “a culture” 
mirrors the virtuality of a public).  Neither paradigm studies the individual 
member of the public, who is left for the psychologists.  The individual can 
correspond to the discourse or not, but neither the broadcast nor the cultural 
institution can correspond with them in a way that could work through 
individual differences.  That move falls to local communicative exchanges as 
a matter of individual accommodation.   
A public is always poised on the brink of a dialectic of recognition, by 
which I mean that the addressees can be abducted into the “we” or “I” or 
“you” or “everybody” of the discourse, even if one’s sudden recognition of 
being addressed in one’s own language comes as a surprise, because one is 
being personally addressed by a broadcast and finds oneself suddenly in a 
speech community among those who had been strangers. On the flip side, 
one can become acutely aware of being misaddressed or unaddressed by 
public culture.  Many of my bi-cultural students want to write about this 
experience of slipping out of both cultures.  For my part, I spent a few years 
tending to avoid music with lyrics, because I couldn’t stand the pull to project 
a seeing self into the lyrical or cinematic world, knowing that I could never 
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actually embody this subject position except in terms radically different from 
the glue of eye contact and observation that grounds the sung dynamics of 
human relationships, aspirations, accomplishments, pleasure, freedom.  To 
embody a song means to embody a discourse as part of a public, which in 
my case was a lie; and I lacked the translating machine that would allow me 
to hold onto my self while still relating to the experience of an other.  This 
state of affairs could only come about as the mid-point of a process of 
accommodation, because only reflexivity could create the situation.  The 
determined encounter with radical difference meant recognizing how thickly 
the discourses I was hearing on all fronts, interpersonal and public alike, 
were coded by exclusive elision and presumption.  In Hegelian-Marxian 
terms, members of a public are already constituted as practical subjects of a 
dialectic of desire and laboring needs satisfaction, along with the concomitant 
formation of a dissociated region.   
Although the virtual study of publics remains sound in its own terms, 
its relevance to individual difference hinges on the fact that at no point is 
circulation not passing through an actual social space, transacted as a 
communicative exchange.  Warner is at pains to negate the dyadic speaker-
listener model, but discourse pragmatics had already done so without 
abandoning the local interaction.58 Without observation of the context of 
exchange, any idea of circulation will retreat to analysis of “the text” and 
describe how it works on the basis of projecting a virtual public it presumably 
knows or believes is out there.  Criticism can therefore seem somewhat 
 
58 In discourse-pragmatics terms, for example, circulation is objectified as 
intertextuality (Silverstein and Urban 1996) and interdiscursivity (Silverstein 2004).  The 
primary semiotic mechanisms of exchange by which individuals recognize themselves as in a 
sense participating inclusively and exclusively in a mass subject comprise forms of indexicality 
and iconicity that have long been argued to be fundamental to cultural dynamics.  Mimesis 
(Taussig 1992, 1993) offers the discourse for apprehending self and/or generalized others in 
terms of certain qualities (see also Biddle 2002).  Metonymy (Friedrich 1991) encodes the 
single-place predications of whatever/whoever, establishing the axis of syntactic and 
combinatory relations (coordinated with metaphoric exchanges among different fields).  
Dipping below the Peircian vocabulary, these operations make up Kant’s categorical and 
disjunctive syntheses.  Put more plainly, if reductively, the individual addressee has the 
experience of expressing the quality of representing that public, or has the experience of 
imitating and thereby joining it. 
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emptied of real-world consequences, except insofar as the critic can be 
observed to display her own actual, perhaps transformative reading.   
Without the Bakhtinian loopty-loops of public circulation, on the other 
hand, discourse pragmatics would lack a vital fulcrum by which to identify 
forms of misaddress, overhearing (certainly a huge empirical category of 
mass media reception), and ideology.  I would think that ideology can be 
glossed as the ghost of a public address system—an impalpable yet forceful 
communication that defines a group—although the study of public culture 
tends to focus on those circulations that cross-cut the workings of 
conventional social institutions.  Nevertheless, culture circulates (Urban 
2001).  Mass production constitutes an important sociological underpinning of 
public broadcast.  For example, as Hebdige (1991 [1979]) describes, 
mundane objects can constitute a subculture by acquiring a public-defining 
distinctive semantics in which objects at once constitute “a sinister presence 
- the presence of difference - and draw down upon themselves vague 
suspicions, uneasy laughter, 'white and dumb rages'” and, within the 
counterpublic, “sources of value” (p. 3).  Even if the first trend-setter 
displays only for a small population, the public is thereby formed and its 
subsequent reproduction set in motion.  Word-of-mouth market researchers 
identify “twenty percenters” as those who somehow read the scene well 
enough to know how a new object or perverse use of an old one will be 
correctly recognized by strangers as a sign of hipness.  The “buzz” spreads 
by local exchange, but it is the mass availability of the object that allows the 
public to constitute itself.  Of course, few will understand themselves as 
consumers of a broadcast: they are all “expressing themselves.” 
Hence, the virtual (circulation) and the actual (production) are 
dialogically bound.  There is the sociologically-mappable circuit through 
which value courses which, when seen locally at any point, is a moment of 
production and reproduction (the Kula ring is the beginning and the end of 
anthropology, it seems).  Circulation is the economic process in which distant 
products are imported and exported from a social field. The economic 
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metaphor here is obviously forced, but language and economics have both 
long been recognized as systems for the exchange among differing forms of 
value—aesthetic, monetary, moral, and strategic.59 Whereas the structure of 
a social field produces agency in the exchanges among subjects and objects, 
the wider circulation that brings distant subjects and objects into the field 
can only operate through the recognition of preconstituted value, and value 
within this virtual order is acculturated—it is learned through socialization, 
and its particular form is historical and arbitrary.  These dynamics can be 
seen to impart the force of authority to particular incidents, interpretive 
judgments, little Hitlers in the making (ethos); while the same dynamics are 
employed to remediate them (ethics). 
In Chapter 3, I related several scenes of my botched occupations of 
public space.  My use of writing was deconstructive, or tried to be.  I’ll return 
to the accommodative and deconstructive use of disabling scenes 
momentarily, but want first to contrast that kind of reflexive writing with a 
more everyday discourse in which very similar scenes are employed 
“constructively,” often in the process of identity formation.  Bear in mind that 
identification enacts a categorical synthesis in which the individual is reduced 
to a set of qualities that characterize the group (the mathematical axiom is 
a=b).  What I have termed a “scene” is actually a very common explicit 
observational unit of experience within any conversation where the topic is a 
perdurant crisis of experience.  The scene functions as a quotidian version of 
the traumatic flashback, relived until it can be reworked into an 
understandable, productive, instructive resource for both remembering and 
 
59 The necessary groundwork for explicating my use of the word “ethos” is finally now 
on the page.  The linkage between language and economy corresponds with Bourdieu’s 
identification of economic, social, and cultural forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986), a formulation 
that derives directly from Levi-Strauss’ understanding of what I am calling “ethos” as an 
ordering of values for the negotiable exchange of goods, people, and ideas (Levi-Strauss 
1969).  Within this perspective, value can be described as anything that stands at the end of a 
discriminating gaze.  For example, the optical identification of a figure relies at the outset on  
distinctions among color values.  Operating as a comparative logic, ethos renders intelligible a 
sentence like “John is taller than the grass is green.”  Every possible circuit functions as a 
system of differences.  This idea builds a bridge between Wittgenstein’s “the meaning is the 
use,” which has had an almost mystical power to spark anthropological disputes; and a 
Marxian first principle, “the value is the use.” 
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for future action.  As we would expect, then, scenes of the sort discussed 
below are not uncommon when blind people talk to each other about 
blindness, as well as on e-mail lists in which blind people share their 
strategies (de Certeau would call them tactics) or, just as commonly, ask 
others for help formulating a strategy they can apply to a disabling scene.  
Scenes of disability circulate socially, then, painting the theatrical production 
described above as something like a revolutionary return of the repressed.  
Its force is that of a counter-public (Warner 2002). 
We the blind and we the practice theorists are in agreement about the 
word “strategy”, except that disability means one has to be aware of 
strategies like a theorist.  The modulation from practice to theory is sparked 
by intense personal interest, and the meta-level strategizing awareness 
constitutes a doubled consciousness (Bourdieu would still distinguish this 
categorically from the objective perspective on the basis of our being 
immediately interested parties).  What one does with the knowledge thus 
generated can follow several courses.  Without question, the most common 
product of communication of this kind, which constructs a self-identified blind 
community, collects the common elements of the strategies together at the 
endpoint of a gaze often characterized as “sighted attitudes about the blind.”  
I include the entire text of an e-mail posted to a blindness-related discussion 
list.  The author first reports on a scene from personal experience, and then 
links it to a similar scene reported by someone else:   
 
[1] >I've been on a plane, waiting to be guided out, and the flight 
attendant did say something about the airline policy, suggesting I'd 
have to wait for assistance. I didn't want to make a scene, but  
[2] >when assistance came, it guided me off the plane, and on to a seat 
by the gate. At that point I was asked to wait, and some more 
assistance would eventually show up. 
 > 
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[3] >Eventually never came, and I had a plane to catch, so I assisted 
myself to the next scheduled flight. 
 > 
[4] >At that point I remembered a writing of Dr. Maurer's in witch he 
described traveling in the airport. 
 > 
 >Here was the strategy used: 
 >Sir, would you tell me witch way to gate 15? 
 >Well, if you just wait a moment, I'll have someone show you to it. 
 >No, that's fine, sir, if you just tell me witch wan [one?] and... 
 >Just a moment, and... 
[5] >At this point, blind traveler starts walking one way. 
 >Sighted employee of airline says: No, no, sir you are going the wrong 
way! 
 >Blind traveler turns around and goes the right way, now that he has 
the information he was looking for. 
 > 
 >Pretty clever. 
 
Worth noting is the fact that the entire thread comprises a discussion 
about how to best navigate airports, with the universal consensus among the 
half dozen or so authors being that airline assistance was more trouble than 
it is worth.    Blank-line separations aren’t sentence-level or paragraph-level 
divisions, but seem instead to demarcate fields of narrative action, 
emphasizing that this assemblage has an analytical structure.  The author 
begins (1) by giving the impression of a past event that might belong to a 
slew of such occasions (“I’ve been…”) but switches in the next clause to the 
simple past of conventional experience narrative, where it remains until (4), 
the most incisive temporal event (“at that point”).  The author is told to “wait 
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for assistance” at the end of (1), and the narrative begins to play with 
personhood by implicitly but intentionally misinterpreting Assistance as a 
person’s name.  In (2), Assistance (which has a neuter gender) arrives, does 
little, and promises in effect that its clone will do the rest “eventually.”  In 
(3), “eventually” is again read as a proper designation of time (even though 
it was already given as indirect reported speech and so probably was the 
author’s own word choice), following which assistance becomes once more a 
kind of action as the author assists him- or herself.  “Assistance” is therefore 
a pivotal character, one whose function and embodiment are at odds until 
they are both embodied by the author.  The recounted story (4) floats within 
face-to-face dialogue, sticking to what amounts to a transcript, until (5) 
bodies begin to move.  At that point, present-tense action marks the scene 
as an event suspended out of the specificity of someone’s narrated past.  
This move is echoed in the way either “I” or “Dr. Moorer” (we can’t tell if the 
author is quoting or reporting) becomes “Blind Traveler,” opposed to “Airline 
Employee,” fashioning the scene into a parable for daily life.  The last line of 
the passage (and of the message) imparts the air of a sort of trickster tale, 
providing an evaluative component as to how such scenes are played. 
A second example comes from Sight Unseen (Kleege 1999), a
monograph exploring the author’s experience of partial sightedness while at 
the same time often seeming to be addressed as a reproach to the sighted.  
Her rhetorical tropes implicitly suggest that (oppositional) identity formation 
remains much the same process for any socially marked population.  “I know 
what it means to be sighted,” she writes (p. 3), “because I live in a sighted 
world. The language I speak, the literature I read, the art I value, the history 
I learned in school, the architecture I inhabit, the appliances and 
conveyances I employ were all created by and for sighted people. I find it 
easy to imagine what it's like to be sighted. I had to write this book to learn 
what it means to be blind.”  She continues by noting that the book she is 
writing about her blindness “spirals around its subject in ever-smaller circles, 
because, while blindness is always before my eyes, it is hard to confront 
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head-on. The book as a whole can be taken as a sort of ‘coming out’ 
narrative, though one without fanfare or a specific time line.”   
She argues (and I agree) that disability autobiographies, because they 
are written as narratives, provide too much potential to be read as a 
spectacle of blindness as an object—an individually-owned quality—that the 
author overcomes by narrative’s end.  Her alternative is to write more 
abstractly about blindness rather than her life, as she puts it, and in doing so 
she fashions scenes of blindness that serve the purpose of forging an 
identity.  For my part, I am far less interested in constructing a blind identity 
than in understanding where the need for such a thing arises and to what 
purpose one would put it, but the book as an object doesn’t provide insight 
into that circuit.  The parallels to my own work are obvious, and I find it 
instructive to dwell on Kleege’s text for a bit to note some contrasts.     
The net effect for Kleege’s scenes is to record blindness as a set of 
rationally-adapted strategies that, through a sort of et cetera condition of a 
presented sequence, make up a normative way of life: “I turn the soft-shell 
crabs when they start to pop. I add flour to the pie dough when it feels too 
sticky. My mother, who was sighted, taught me to time vegetables by smell. 
When the broccoli begins to smell like broccoli, it's done. When it smells like 
cabbage, it has gone too long” (p. 27).  The following serves to contrast her 
constructive use of scenes with my deconstructive usage.  Again, the et 
cetera condition does the work of permanently qualifying her as a completed, 
well and adequately functional adapted being, though I would point out that 
we can also read into this series of scenes either a statement about the 
boundedness of her life or else the ideology behind the presentation of this 
finished actor: 
Expectation plays a large role in what I perceive. I know what's 
on my desk because I put it there. If someone leaves me a 
surprise gift, it may take a few seconds to identify it, but how 
often does that happen? At home, at work, on the street, and in 
stores, museums, theaters, parking garages, airports, train 
stations, even unfamiliar cities, there is a finite number of 
objects that I am likely to encounter. I can recognize most 
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things through a quick process of elimination. And that process 
is only truly conscious on the rare occasions when the 
unexpected occurs, as when my cats carry objects out of 
context. A steel wool soap pad appears in the bath tub. I see it 
as a rusty, grayish blob. Though touch would probably tell me 
something, it can be risky to touch something you cannot 
identify some other way. I wait for it to move. When it doesn't, I 
sniff. It smells faintly metallic and vaguely soapy. Is it a massive 
hair clog the mind's eye  regurgitated by the drain? This seems 
implausible. I think, "What is that?" and then, almost in the 
same moment, I come up with a better question, "What's it 
doing there?" and know the answer. // I once encountered a 
rabid raccoon on a sidewalk near my house. I learned what it 
was from a neighbor watching it from his screened porch. What 
I saw was an indistinct, grayish mass, low to the ground and 
rather round. It was too big to be a cat and the wrong shape to 
be a dog. Its gait was not only unfamiliar but unsteady. It 
zigzagged up the pavement. I moved my gaze around it as my 
brain formed a picture of a raccoon. The raccoon in my mind 
had the characteristic mask across its face, a sharply pointed 
nose, striped tail, brindled fur. Nothing in the hazy blob at my 
feet, no variations in color or refinements in form, corresponded 
with that image. Its position was wrong. The raccoon in my 
mind was standing up on its haunches, holding something in its 
front paws. And what does a rabid raccoon look like? Was it 
foaming at the mouth? // Without my neighbor's information I 
wouldn't have gone through this mental process. I could tell that 
it was an animal, and probably not a pet. That's all I needed to 
know to proceed with caution. But I still might have guessed it 
was a raccoon. In this part of the world there are only so many 
animals it could have been. Groundhog, woodchuck, raccoon, 
my brain would have proposed, but not sloth or koala. // But 
such unexpected encounters happen so rarely that they become 
anecdotes. In the normal course of events I encounter only 
those objects, animals, and people that I can predict I will. If I 
see them as wobbly shadows, or semi-translucent blobs, it 
hardly ever startles me. And the fact that I can distinguish one 
shadow from another is no miracle. I cannot see people's faces 
well enough to recognize them, but often I know them from 
their posture or gait. At the supermarket I distinguish the 
Cheerios from the Wheaties because one hazy blur is yellow and 
the other is orange. But in a way, you do this too (pp. 106-7).  
This section of her book presents what Kleege calls a phenomenology 
of her vision, by which she means its immediate experience stripped of 
presuppositions.  The result is something like a series of still lifes.  Her 
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scenes of blind functionality almost always depict Kleege in solitary relation 
with a stable environment, rather than in a public.  Mine would do the same, 
and would read very similarly.  They are also quite often dehistoricized and 
present a general case of functionality rather than a particular instance.  
Even though her scenes and mine both use present tense, the stylized 
quality of these functional scenes can’t be placed in time, and none but the 
raccoon scene incorporate interactions by which we can infer duration.  
Moreover, this particularistic encounter with the rabid raccoon is on the verge 
of dissolving, because the neighbor has interpreted the object for her; but 
she continues the scene in the subjunctive, what “would have” happened 
otherwise.  The constructive use of scenes has collected and selected 
instances that then are represented as a unified icon of the system in its 
functional state.  This becomes the story of her life, and certainly this ability 
to represent an experience of blindness serves a purpose, especially for self 
esteem, self defense, or other political arenas. 
Her portrayals of sighted publics and the media, on the other hand, 
are not very forgiving, not very nuanced, and do indeed evidence a 
conviction that she knows what the sighted “are like.”  The following 
paragraph is indicative, not just of an essentialization, but of the painful 
history that prompts it: 
When the sighted label the accomplishments of a blind person 
as "exceptional" or "overcompensating" they reveal their 
diminished expectations for life without sight, and a 
superstitious belief that should belong to another era. They 
seem to secretly suspect an unseen force prompting our 
responses, guiding our hands. Since they can see with their own 
eyes that there are no strings or mirrors, they are compelled to 
reinvent the ancient myths about compensatory powers, 
supersensory perception. The sixth sense, second sight, third 
eye. We are supposed to have both extra-accurate hearing and 
perfect pitch, more numerous and more acute tastebuds, a finer 
touch, a bloodhound's sense of smell. We allegedly possess an 
unfair advantage that we could use against the sighted, hearing 
the secrets in their sighs, smelling their fear. . . . The blind are 
either supernatural or subhuman, alien or animal. We are not 
only different but dangerous. But when we express any of this, 
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the sighted scoff: "Don't be silly. I can see you as you really 
are. You don't scare me. You're just being oversensitive." 
Kleege and the author of the quoted e-mail both present outlooks on 
the sighted public based on a particular standpoint epistemology that is in 
keeping with a common discourse of “ablism” within disability studies as well 
as disability memoir.  I can personally relate to both the emotional force of 
“you don’t understand” and to the memory of many equivalent scenes that 
urge this interpretation.  There are problems, however.  First, the passage 
just quoted demonstrates amply how far an author can take sociological 
characterization in the direction of implicatures experienced as directly 
observable phenomena, to the point of putting words in the mouth of “the 
sighted” as a categorical subject, blurring the line between experience and 
hypothesis  (compare the discussion of Behar in Chapter 2), while at the 
same time blurring the distinction between stereotyping and induction.  The 
pragmatics of speaking-for-the-other vary, from occasions where a present 
other can repair misunderstandings within a dialogue to the rhetorical 
figuring of a group without present representatives, often for the purposes of 
enlisting an individual addressee’s sympathies against this collective third 
party.   
Kleege’s trope of “sighted people” raises the unanswerable question of 
whether she is, by publishing the book, addressing the public or herself.  In 
much the same procedure, Kleege and others frequently read mass-mediated 
stereotypes of the disabled as products and sources of popular stereotyped 
perceptions or beliefs about the disabled.   Certainly, there is a semantics of 
disability present both in ordinary language and art.  We are generally aware, 
however, of a space between Hollywood iconography and everyday life, and 
we have very few means, aside from highly localized probabilistic research, 
to draw any causal line between media and on-the-ground behaviors.  
Finally, experiential scenes of disablement are memorable because they 
stand out, not because they can be shown to be typical of any randomly 
chosen stretch of time, nor do we have any means to reliably say what 
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percentage of the population possesses the attitude of not-understanding, 
although something answering to this description is by no means rare.   
The only coherent way to read “the sighted,” then—and, I think, to 
read Kleege herself—becomes to deconstruct her text as a document of 
experience rather than, as it purports to be, a “phenomenological” and 
“critical” presentation of both Kleege’s vision and sighted attitudes.  The 
document came from someplace real, but the text is complexly performative.  
Kleege’s practical competence has been inferred from the affirmative side of 
generalized scenes and assigned to Kleege as a cross-contextual quality, 
while not-understanding has been abstracted from scenes to become 
negative attitudes of a public.  It is a double displacement.  In any particular 
encounter, both sides are understood as constative representatives of their 
respective categories, while the categories have been constituted on the 
basis of the same signs by which the scene has been identified.  Public 
misunderstanding becomes an expression of the psychological attitude of a 
refusal, although what the public is refusing to understand apparently can 
only be expressed in the repetition of particular disabling scenes, which to 
me is telling.  The catch here is not that the circuit is automatically fallacious, 
but that we have no basis, from within the circuit, for knowing whether it is 
structurally fallacious or contextually misapplied.  If Kleege’s competence 
fails, or if the public momentarily understands, these anomalies generally 
lack the force to break in.  A more powerful force for self determination 
would be a dialectical relation between Identity and non-identity. 
We tend to take understanding to be a noun or else a transitive verb, 
although it is an active verb.  The public hasn’t failed to be in possession of 
specific information, they (and often we the disabled) have failed to engage 
in understanding as a reflexive process that encounters truths in an 
interrogative mood.  Standards become more disabling still when one applies 
them to oneself, as if there is a set of skills and technologies that one can 
practice in order to obliterate disability.  The most disabling aspect of 
blindness for me has been the attempt to relate to a person who awaits some 
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set of strategies (hers or mine), technology, or knowledge that will overcome 
blindness once and for all, precisely in the manner one would fix a car so that 
one can just rely on it and forget about it.  A system that occasionally breaks 
isn’t treated as a working system.  That is not a healthy ideology to apply, 
either to oneself or to a public.  I know all the mobility skills.  Yet I will 
always still stand on the street corner, trying to decide if the light has 
changed, rehearsing all the skills, listening to every shred of evidence and 
feeling for the rest, and still there are times when the data underdetermine 
my decision.  There is noise from every side.  Do I step into the street, or will 
it kill me? 
The remainder of this chapter provides a rhetorical analysis of a single 
text which exemplifies uncommonly well the critical processes of self-
knowledge production I have found regularly in critical memoirs by the 
disabled.  Memoir demands attention to the dynamics of circulation and 
production of selfhood, because it is not only self-addressed by way of 
communicable discourse, but also addressed to a public it wants to teach.  
The reflexive potentials of writing helps foster an awareness of discourse as 
such in the process of wrestling with it to communicate individualistic 
experience.  The written experience does not pre-exist the writing as a 
mental nugget; and so, if one can begin to direct the passage of oneself as 
subject through its predications (literally), a space of play opens up in which 
new self knowledge can be produced.  This happens in the local exchange 
between oneself as writer and reader, by way of everything else one knows.  
Adding to the richness and relevance of the text at hand is the fact that its 
author was one of the architects of our current understanding of media 
reception.  Hired to study the introduction of television within an Aboriginal 
community, Michaels (1990 [1987]) watched the Warlpiri watching Australian 
TV, and watched them watching each other with video cameras.  He 
concluded that television, so often conceived in terms of a text being 
transmitted, was more profoundly the “invention” of the Warlpiri who were 
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interpreting it.  He watched a lot of TV himself with this idea in mind while he 
was dying. 
 
WILD REFLEXIVITY: THE AIDS DIARY OF ANTHROPOLOGIST 
ERIC MICHAELS60 
By the time Eric Michaels received his Ph.D. in 1982, he’d already been 
part of the Gay Movement in New York in the early seventies and lived in a 
Taos commune in the late 60s.  When he was diagnosed with AIDS and upon 
the onset of symptoms, he began writing a diary.  It does belong to a genre 
call the aids diary, but he is also exploring his dying as an anthropologist. 
Ross Chambers (1998) provides a reader-response criticism approach 
to Unbecoming in company with other AIDS diaries.  He is concerned with 
what the text means; that is, what a valid and skilled reading of the text 
might be, pointedly after the “death of the author.”  He reads it according to 
the image on the book’s cover: Michaels, covered in KS lesions, sticking his 
lesioned tongue out at the camera.  The diary as published literature, as 
Chambers views it, infects the reader with the task of being witness to AIDS 
as a process of unbecoming, and more deeply as a process by which 
“Straight” social institutions seek to extinguish all things that they find 
unbecoming, like Gay people with AIDS.  This is a valid and sound reading of 
the text as a circulating discursive product addressed to a public, although by 
the same token it isn’t a reading that adds much to what any of us are likely 
to get from Michaels’ own plain-spoken and incisive critiques.  I’m much 
more interested in a very different kind of reading centered on the diary as a 
process of writing addressed to the author himself.  “What I've been writing 
now is in some more indulgent sense just for me, and because if I weren't 
writing, what would I be doing?” (Nov. 22, 1987).  The AIDS diary is a 
complex genre, partaking both of the private discourse of a diary and the 
 
60 This material was originally presented in November 2006 at the American 
Anthropological Association meetings in San Jose, California.  Thanks go to discussant Doug 
Foley, who knew Eric well while Eric was completing his doctorate at the University of Texas. 
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intent to say something coherent and cohesive to some public or other. 
Whether that public is conceived as a congenial or antagonistic one can often 
be a confusing issue.  If Michaels wrote in order to indict or infect a too-
Straight audience, then he would be addressing those least likely to open the 
book, and so his actual likely readership is placed in the position of 
overhearing his text.  The text evidences an alternative set of circulatory 
dynamics, however.  Michaels did edit his diary and wrote from a sense of 
public address, but not solely from that standpoint.  I don’t want to take the 
text as a finished structure in which different motifs, symbols, and themes all 
index one another as a system.  Writing is more intriguing than that, in 
precisely the same way that Bourdieu talks about the practice of marriage as 
something much more suspenseful than filling in the structural blanks within 
a kinship system.  Obviously, one can’t read a text without reference to 
semantics.  In a rhetorical or discourse-pragmatics reading, however, the 
horizon of possible meanings is at stake only as a means to understand the 
processes of production required to produce that horizon.   
Literary texts don’t have a conventional mechanism for time/date 
stamping their production, and so the telling appears instantaneous—so 
much so that even our reading loses track of time.  Still, we aren’t entirely 
without means to read the text pragmatically as a gradual process of self-
constitution through discourse.  Because the diary is (1) for the most part 
sequentially written as well as sequentially organized, (2) is generically 
constrained to in some sense report facts about experience, and (3) is a 
reflexive genre wherein the author is compelled to present himself—he being 
the focus of the only fixed field of observation constructed by the text—there 
is a certain amount of analytical space between the diary as a process of 
self-address versus a text object read by whatever public for what it 
“means.”  Like a memoir, Unbecoming tends to report on the past according 
to the relevance it attains in the present.  Generally, this means that the 
autobiography of a statesman, for example, will characterize the child as a 
statesman-to-be or in some other way embed the self within a discourse 
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appropriate and comprehensible to an intended readership.  I’ve read 
Michaels’ book numerous times cover to cover now, and strange to say I’ve 
never managed to think of it as an AIDS diary, nor has my understanding of 
his explorations hinged specifically on his being gay, except as part of the 
montage of his life or in passages where he critiques ideas of gay sexuality 
and identity.  His role as critic remains much more up front.  Despite the 
ability of a critic like Chambers to identify a text-system formed around an 
anti-oppressive raspberry by Michaels’ gay tongue-wagging self, my 
assessment is that there are no stable discourses in this book, and any 
stability of the self obtains only as the product of the work of writing.  The 
constitution of the text and of Michaels himself comes down to an irreducible 
set of inferential processes, each of which is trying to formulate a different 
kind of experience.  The labels I’ve given to these processes are very 
exploratory and contingent.  I’ve ordered them loosely according to how 
much of the interpretive work can potentially be done by ideology, versus the 
work Michaels and his readers are required to do against the grain of 
ordinary language and experience.  Categorical synthesis, mimesis, 
abduction, and second-stories are very closely related, but distinct 
operations.61 My goal, then, is to replace a notion of diary-writing as a 
representation of private and interior “personal” experience with a processual 
understanding of the same scene of writing, in which efficacious self-
understanding is constituted through its playful, experimental, subjunctive 
passages through another’s discourse or the address of an other.   
 
Categorical Synthesis 
The term comes from Kant, and denotes the single-place predication of 
a subject as the token of a type; in other words, to “identify as” something 
(from a structural perspective, the operation can be glossed as metonymy, 
 
61 This set of operations, two of which are mimetic (iconic) and two metonymic 
(indexical), represent, like Deleuze and Guattari’s syntheses, a reconstruction of Kant’s trio of 
syntheses but keyed to a contemporary world that is creative and pragmatic beyond reason.  
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but “synthesis” gets at the pragmatics of what it is doing in this case).  
Michaels is Gay, he is an anthropologist, an ex-hippy, White, an American in 
Australia, and he is dying, most immediately of cancer.  He could take up any 
of these subject positions to launch an oppositional politics, but he does so 
only with the last, the role of victim of the hospital.  All the other pre-fab 
identities will become grist for other forms of reflexivity.  Put another way, 
State-level institutions, including the hospital and the immigration 
department, are forces of which he can be entirely critical without reserving a 
space in which to be critical of his own complicity. 
The first entry (September 7, 1987) establishes the diary as a 
counternarrative: “I imagine that diary-keeping might serve to keep another 
set of definitions going against the quite barbaric ones that were inflicted in 
these last few days, through the rubber gloves, face masks, goggles, and an 
inventory of tropes assumed lately by medical practice to deal not so much 
with disease. . . but more evidently, no less, with sin and retribution.”   
In November (entry dated Nov. 5-20), he finds the metaphor for his 
institutional nemesis and delivers the most brilliant extended mini-essay in 
the diary.  It concerns the word “tidy,” which he always associated with 
child-speak but which is a “key term” in the Australian “cultural 
configuration, operating like the word ‘fitness.’”: “Tidiness is a process which, 
while avowedly in the service of cleanliness and health, in fact is only 
interested in obscuring all traces of history, of process, of past users, of the 
conditions of manufacture (the high high gloss).”  I’ll return to this diatribe, 
but suffice to say now that he has established one of the fundamental tasks 
of his work by constituting himself as the subject of institutional discourses 
that manage to be “tidy” in a profoundly sinister way.   
I’ll briefly note a few other sites of categorical synthesis, but these 
operate ideologically rather than critically.  Identity often occupies discourse 
as the collapsed product of abductive reasoning.  That is, the categorization 
is presupposed, the conditions of the identification being no longer available 
for scrutiny (Biddle 2002: 104ff).  Categorization is also a matter of language 
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ideologies that frame X as a token of Y. The text indexes various registers or 
discourses in a very off-handed way, but of course what discourses do, 
precisely, is to fix the parameters for conjoining subjects and objects, which 
here means fixing selves and experiences in a cultural-explanatory 
framework, as Jane Hill (1995) and Kathryn Ewing (1990) have 
demonstrated.   
On Feb. 16, prior to most such references, he reports that he is no 
longer able to “jerk off” and then launches into a critical review of his 
sexuality in which he argues that Gay promiscuity is a practice of identity 
reinforcement in which the sex act is “largely symbolic in its transfer of 
natural to cultural purposes.”  “If I don’t now do any of these things, if I can’t 
even jerk off, to what extent can I be said to be gay?”  Although the idea of 
Gay identity will constantly be under scrutiny, Michaels occasionally indexes 
himself in the feminine gender, either as “her” or in a feminine register, such 
as “getting dolled up,” “playing hostess,” or referring to himself as “forever 
female” when relating that he’d been watching a lot of Ginger Rogers movies.  
These indexes are out of the ordinary in his text, and so it may be telling that 
they track with entries in which he describes the gradual loss of any practice 
of sexual identity.  His discourse asserts a feminine gendering with increasing 
frequency, even as his reflexivity questions his identity. 
When Michaels writes forward—i.e., simply tries to describe 
experiences within a factual register rather than a self-interrogating one—
recognizable ideologies tend to replace critique in providing the explanatory 
framework.  One of the first things we learn about his past is that he had a 
“gutful of psychologizing” and that he claims to have been drawn to 
anthropology by its anti-psychologism (September 17).  Even so, he 
continues to monitor his behaviors in terms of “pathology,” recalling a 
discourse from the height of ‘60s Freudianism.  After a mundane bit of traffic 
rudeness during which his cousin was the passenger in his car, he “wondered 
whether I should try and conceal my growing pathological bitterness, 
realizing it was already too late. I wondered how much I would look like my 
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monster mother at her horrible worst in that last decade of her spoiled, 
indulgent life” (December 29).  At the very beginning of the diary, before the 
tidiness entry, and again at the end, psychologistic discourse asserts itself as 
the explanation of his past.  Whenever he attempts to give an account of his 
past, causality creeps in, relying in his case often on psychologizing in terms 
of “pathologies,” desires, and family—just the sorts of things he would have 
had ingrained as a (probably involuntary) client.   
Finally, the text occasionally relies on stock religious allusions—e.g., 
“sin and retribution” in the previous quotation.  He worries at one point about 
his brother Bible-bashing him (June 28), so this is a discourse from his 
family.  Sometimes the religious discourse is a critical device, as when he 
decides, very late in the game, to shoot the cover photo, title the book 
Unbecoming, become a celebrity in a very small circuit of an AIDS diary’s 
likely readership, let it be aggressive, and “throw the whole bucket of blood 
up, my anger transubstantiated” (June 26).  All the other instances of 
Christian imagery, however, figure in dreams about his mother, as when he 
sees himself directing her and his sister to build a chapel while he lies on its 
alter.  These come very late in the diary.  At that point, his self-indexing as 
female becomes more frequent, and keeps company with ever-more 
juxtapositions of himself with his mother, as well as invocations of Freud.  
But by that point, his strength is almost gone and the text has changed, a 
point I’ll return to.  These revelations might mark the “ah ha!” moment of a 
too-typical psychoanalytic reading, but I find these aspects of the text rote 
(they return to the analyst exactly what the analytic instruments were 
designed to see) and to be at odds with the critical tension he creates when 
he is in possession of his writerly powers. 
The categorical synthesis that positions pre-constituted identities, 
launches an oppositional politics, and expresses the subject ideologically is 
the least interesting form of reasoning in the diary.  Identity politics enacts 
what Hegelianism identifies as determinate negation (e.g., negation of the 
hospital’s subjugation, in spirit if not in fact).  The other three mechanisms 
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I’ll discuss enact a more complex and indeterminate kind of play in which 
meanings are deconstructed rather than diametrically opposed.  Michaels 
thereby constitutes the self and society from a critical distance. 
 
Mimesis 
Mimetic relationships are achieved culturally, but are generally taken 
to be naturally-observable mirrorings of qualities, usually between particular 
people or objects.  What passes from one object to the other is not just 
appearance, however; the power of the other passes into the hands of the 
signifier.  The concept has been explored at length by Michael Taussig 
(1993), who follows close on the heels of Walter Benjamin.  Among the 
examples Taussig provides are Kuna magical figurines carved in the form of 
European personages.  Where categorical synthesis identifies X as a Y, 
mimesis is to “identify with” something or someone, which usually requires 
the perceiver to have specific and often poetically apprehended values in 
mind.   
Mimesis is Michaels’ mainstay of self-conception.  He sees himself 
everywhere on television and in print.  “I can’t believe everybody doesn’t 
have AIDS,” he writes very early on (Sept. 17), and he scans people on TV 
for signs of AIDS.  He fixes on flawed skin, at first suspiciously as he 
scrutinizes his pornography collection, while later he can only fantasize about 
flawed skin while “porcelain blondes” nauseate him.  Describing his youth, he 
writes, “I lived my life on those covers of Life magazine which identified and 
named trendy locales, the ‘in places,’ those ephemeral sites created by the 
contradictory explosions and implosions of the birth and death of the global 
village.”  He speculates that his autobiography (which in some sense he is 
writing) would read like something from a fan magazine. Television, his 
professional critics (Warlpiri as well as academic), and anything else he 
scrutinizes very quickly leads to autobiographical reflections throughout the 
diary. 
204 
On December 27, he reports watching a lot of Ginger Rogers movies 
and thereupon indexes that activity by saying what a female he is, only to 
use the next sentence to begin reading himself into The Singing Detective—a
good choice: it is the story of a bed-ridden, terminally ill, hallucinating 
mystery writer dreaming his way through his detective stories.  “How, then, 
could it claim any audience at all? Who, and how many viewers would subject 
themselves to this? (How many fellow sufferers are out there?, I beg to ask 
as a viewer; which is the same question, I think, that the main character 
asks all the way through, in a manner so reflexive that this may prove the 
clue to the whole transgeneric mystery.)”  Immediately thereafter, he ends 
the entry reporting that he is frustrated with the diary’s failure to succeed in 
the same reflexivity he perceives in The Singing Detective.
He is clearly aware and critical of his tendency to read himself from 
mass media, but never stops doing it; although he does not maintain this 
critical distance from the same procedure as he predicates himself upon the 
Warlpiri (A certain aboriginalism has in fact been noted in his academic work 
[Hodge 1990]).  In November, he began assembling his will.  The diary 
interprets his death and relationship to material goods by way of a 
comparison to Warlpiri death customs, in which the name and images of the 
deceased are “forbidden to the common lexicon, and proscribed in 
discourse”: 
Not only did I feel required to take these prohibitions into 
account with respect to my writing and publishing, as well as 
the very interesting implications of literacy here, I discovered 
that the idea became very sensible to me. For some time I 
refused to look at pictures of Rick, or of my mother, after they 
died, except surreptitiously. And of course, this poses a 
particular problem for my own work, and my relationship to the 
community which is the subject of so much of my writing. This, 
along with the disclosures [of his AIDS], is one of those things I 
will have to muddle out, to produce in fact an analytic 
assessment of. My will, it seems, will be a position paper. 
The images of his own dead, the images of the Warlpiri dead in his files, the 
name of AIDS secreted from his public image, and the prospect of his own 
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posthumous name and image are all seeking a balance through mimetic 
operations.  The problematic will remain open for some time (although cf. the 
cover photo).  Only when he looks over a newspaper editorial he’s just 
written does he recognize that he has written from the standpoint of an 
Australian; in other words, seeing himself from the audience’s perspective 
generates a reflexivity in which he recognizes the identification within his 
discourse.  But he does not relinquish the mechanism.  His response takes 
the form of his writing down what he imagined himself replying to a radio 
interviewer raising the question to him.  And within that imagined response, 
he continues to identify with the Warlpiri: “As is true of so many here, I was 
not born in Australia; one has little choice in these matters. But it appears I 
will die here. My first teachers of Australianism, the old Warlpiri men of 
Yuendumu, believe that fact gives me certain rights here, which I am entitled 
to invoke.” 
Primates seem to be hard-wired to use one another as mirrors in 
which we see ourselves, and Michaels has his finger on the pulse of this 
process (to invoke a medical metaphor).  It’s worth drawing attention to the 
dialogism that has by now seeped onto the surface of the text.  His discourse 
is “about” himself as an other, while at the same time marking the difference 
between the two.  He formulates novel experiences of self through this 
radical recontextualization, and there is clearly more at stake in this 
procedure for him than artistic effect.  Meanwhile, what written discourse 
provides that introspection can’t is the inherent address of a public—
language is never private.  And so, to read oneself on the page is to figure 
oneself from the perspective of an other, which is simply to say that writing 
can become reflexive if the author creates a play of different discourses 
around the subject, which Michaels does.  There are multiple layers of 




Charles Peirce identified abduction as a third form of syllogistic 
reasoning distinct from deduction and deduction.  This is the logic of the 
detective at the crime scene or the unsettled ethnographer, both of whom 
are confronted with a baffling scene that compels them to borrow or abduct a 
theory from elsewhere capable of explaining what is going on.  The process is 
much-mystified; but, after all, the facility with theoretical frameworks is what 
repetition in education provides.  The diary displays how creativity emerges 
from this procedure in conjunction with other mechanisms available to the 
writer.  I would first mention his tidiness diatribe, which fixes the hospital as 
“one of those superbly rich sites of contradiction, sort of a Foucauldian holy 
ground on which multiple lines of discourse converge, like ley lines converge 
at Stonehenge.”  In the more concise passage below, Michaels deconstructs 
the life he led as part of a Taos commune in 1968.  This self-critique, within 
the same entry as the Warlpiri passage quoted above, is sparked by the sight 
of the sparseness of his material goods as he sits in his apartment thinking 
about his will. 
public articulations of collective hippy economics in the end 
totally obscured the actual material bases of the communes, the 
surplus economy on which they depended—inheritances by the 
children of Pittsburgh banking and steel families, generous 
allowances from families in Scarsdale and Great Neck, easily 
available welfare, and toward the end, fairly shocking mega-
drug deals, media sellouts, and other tawdry dealings as the 
1960s surplus economy dwindled and daddy took the T -Bird 
away. Second only to the failure to deal in any intelligent, 
appreciative way with feminism, this was the great 
disappointment to many of us as the radical movement of the 
1960s turned belly-up and we saw exposed the economic bones 
which had underwritten all that rhetoric. . . I sleep up off the 
floor now, but on a futon (how that makes it all right has to do, 
I'm afraid, with a 1980s marketing strategy figured out by 
entrepreneurial ex-hippies and cleverly aimed at an ex-hippy 
market, and is designed to resist any closer analysis). . . I 
maintain here that the point of intersection which generates 
these similarities between my vaguely Marxist/Zen/hippy 
economic idiolect and a hunter-gatherer ideology is this 
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resistance to fixed notions of property ownership which is 
superseded by ideas of custodianship, utility, of "looking after": 
a processual model.   
His ongoing dyadic identification with the Warlpiri seems to need some 
reinforcement, and here he employs explicit theorization to tie the story of 
his hippidom to the second story, his Warlpiri death.  We go from the 
economics of the hippy movement, complete with an indexing of a 60s pop 
icon now reread for its Marxist implications (the t-bird), to a historicized 
1980s mass marketing strategy in which he is complicit, to the sparseness of 
Warlpiri material life, with another, only semi-satirical index of 60s cultural 
exoticism (Zen) thrown in.  Note the construction of a self-understanding 
that takes the map of Michaels’ physical travels from Taos 1968 to Australia 
1987 and transposes it to a value plane, yielding an ideological 
understanding of his literal and immediate context—his stuff.  Henry Miller 
invented a very similar blurred genre (both were at some point sex-crazed, 
whatever that says), and I’m struck by the thought that there’s no reason to 
suppose Michaels would have found this extremely powerful and productive 
register if he’d remained alive and writing at the behest of the Academy. 
 
Second Stories 
Harvey Sacks (1992b [1968]) coined this term to describe a particular 
relationship between the utterances of two conversational partners.  Speaker 
A might report on seeing a wreck, and Speaker B replies by talking about 
being in an accident or, perhaps, about how news media fixates on accidents.  
Speaker B has undertaken an implicit procedure that drew out a set of 
significant qualities from A’s story and then recalled a story that mirrors 
speaker A’s experience within some particular framework.  Telling the second 
story, moreover, asks Speaker A to recognize Speaker B’s implicit procedure 
and, in doing so, hear the second story as a sequel to the first.  The First 
speaker must listen for the logic by which the second speaker’s story mirrors 
the first.  So this generally automatic conversational response in which one 
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story leads to another one turns out to put the two partners in a fairly 
complex relationship in which each must be on the other’s mind in order to 
verbally formulate one’s own experience.  Second stories are a dilation of 
mimesis, then, and work to negotiate contextually-contingent iconicities, as 
Peirce would call them.   
The writer alone at his laptop tells both the first and the second story, 
and yet the role of the absent addressee remains constitutive according to 
much the same logic.  As a composite structure, the second-story 
relationship gives up any pretense of being a simple reflection of a natural, 
extra-linguistic sequence of events, because the inferential work is 
constitutive of the text.  In the diary, the iconicity is generally a matter of 
constituting a cross-contextual self and, often, a matter of generating a 
critical distance from which the affect of one story can be cast onto another.  
Insofar as Michaels assesses his text to be readable, it is on the basis of 
formulating the text under the constraint of addressing a generalized other; 
hence, Michaels’ experience of himself within this operation—which in effect 
takes place on the page, and not pre-discursively in his head—returns to him 
in the perception of himself from an other’s perspective (shades of Lacan 
waft silently by). Certainly, there are entries here that simply change topic 
without any legible productive dialectic between the two, but Michaels is too 
wily an anthropologist not to recognize and generally make use of the 
potentials for sympathetic magic afforded by such shifts.  In the thirty or so 
memoirs I’ve studied, second story formations mark, without exception, the 
pivotal moment in which a critical experience of disability is first formulated.   
The “tidy” disquisition moves through the following series of scenes: 
(1) sterile or contaminated wrapped hospital utensils, (2) a municipal tidiness 
contest in which one town bulldozed all its trees to tidy itself up, (3) utterly 
characterless “tidy” apartments shown by a Brisbane realtor, (4) antiques 
dealers who “tidy” up old furniture by removing all traces of use, and (5) the 
hospital, in which all dorsal surfaces are polished while those only visible to a 
prone patient include “the ceiling, paint cracked, peeling and falling into the 
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water jar,” and the underside of his bed table, “which hasn’t been swabbed 
since 1942.”  The abductive theoretical construct of tidiness generates one 
story out of the next, interpreting them as unique repetitions, with the world 
of his observations as resource and his prone subjugation to the institution 
providing the occasion.  The iconicity built up in each successive story 
ultimately delivers a force to the story of Michaels himself, suffering from the 
health care system.   
Here is a more subtle example of second-stories: 
December 24: [1] Hyperhumbug. [2] Terrible Monday came and 
went. The electricians put in the ceiling fan: estimate $30; bill 
$158. [3] A small gland in the pit of my stomach releases a 
previously unknown but now familiar hormone into my system. 
My hemoglobin drops another quarter point. T-cells face the 
firing squad. All my lesions buzz, hum, light up, and claim an 
other millimeter of flesh. [4] I try desperately to understand 
everything, in relation to me and everything else, to gauge my 
own paranoia, which, of course, is that paranoia's favorite 
holiday delicacy. [5] Dr. K. says my brain isn't shrinking at all, 
no sign of anything. [6] The newspaper reports that 65 percent 
Of HIV carriers (symptomatic or not) exhibit signs of dementia. 
Following Sacks, I’m defining “a story” in terms not of plot, etc., but the 
interpretive work required for the audience to formulate an embodied 
experience—to “make sense” of reported events.  The crux is between #2 
and #3, marked by a shift in tense which, in context, signals the transition 
from #2’s diary-like report of his social life to his body’s internal  life, 
metaphorized here as a social conflict parallel to, of all things, the ceiling fan 
people.  #3 makes sense, I think, only on the basis that the present tense 
indexes #2 as just one instance of a repetitious scene whose outcome is #3 
(on January 16, he will report that KS is “known to be stress-triggered”).  
The secondness rests in this side-slip, indexing something that isn’t a simple 
cause-effect relationship.   
Despite its ironic stance toward medical discourse, #3 nevertheless 
inexorably comprehends the self through the discourse of the hospital, as I 
have found throughout cancer writing, while the Christmas allusion of #1 
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(the Christmas ghost of Baudrillard) seems to defend against the 
psychologistic discourse of #4 by indexing a setting in which he can gloss his 
fears ironically as a “holiday delicacy.”  The two dry reports, #5 returning 
medical results mentioned in a prior entry and #6 simply reading the 
newspaper, are legible by virtue of the self constructed by the preceding 
play, and it’s a more “affective” scene for it.  #6 implies that Michaels is once 
again reading himself into his reading of mass media.  This string of jumps 
from one plane to another, then, sequentially navigates a very complex array 
of discourses, achieving a similarity among them in which the diary can 
present Michaels’ self, to himself as much as to the reader, perhaps even 
conveying a level of terror that he can’t or won’t otherwise articulate.  One 
thing that we know happens in the writing process generally is that 
juxtapositions will “feel right” before they make rational sense, following 
which the author massages the language until meaning emerges.  It is the 
affect generated by a juxtaposition that potentiates any reading at all of the 
second-story formation.  
The passage marks the end of a long raft of entries in which he reports 
scenes of helplessness against botched and antagonistic relations with carpet 
cleaners, his departmental faculty, the immigration service (which works to 
cancel his visa throughout the diary, and has done so by the final entry 
shortly before his death), and others.  These very diary-like reports are 
paired with equally prosaic descriptions of his symptoms, and it is easy to 
miss the fact that the two classes of story gravitate toward one another in a 
significant way, accomplishing something unique through the repetition of 
their adjacency—a compulsive repetition, in fact, one entry after another.  
For example, the entry in which he questions the status of his gay identity 
actually begins with a report of his powerlessness against a neighbor blasting 
Rod Stuart at 11p.m. followed by ongoing threats to his faculty position: “I 
simply can't believe that they couldn't resolve everything and take good care 
of me if they were motivated, or simply competent.”  His already-noted 
inability to masturbate forms the second story to this dependency and social 
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lack of agency.  Subsequently, he launches into a psychologistic reading of 
his childhood, followed by an abstract position statement on erotic desire as 
such, then gay identity as noted earlier, and finally yet another attempt to 
locate himself within his Warlpiri fieldwork, during which his sexual behaviors 
were curtailed: 
I developed quite elaborate relationships with my video images. 
But over time, even this novelty wore off: Something curious 
happened also to my appearance; I stopped posing in mirrors or 
considering my cosmetology. I felt quite liberated in some 
sense, acknowledged that what mirrors were available was the 
community itself, and yet I was limited in my ability to read 
those mirrors. By the end of the fieldwork, my gay identity was 
problematized and backgrounded in ways I never could have 
imagined, let alone tolerated, five years before. It has made the 
transition to enforced celibacy easier. But if psychologists are 
right about the centrality and fixation of identity for the human 
self, what terrible psychic violence something like AIDS must 
wreak on most gays-and has perhaps done to me, although my 
analysis seems to offer a particular exemption for my case on 
this count, if only to rationalize and distance myself from the 
sad fact that I expect never again to engage in those caresses 
of the body which sustained and defined me for most of my 
adult life. 
Had my first radium treatment today. Another few hours of 
medical bizarrerie. In this case, the therapy room had the same 
bucolic wall mural I had used to kitsch up my last flat. 
Fortunately, they asked me to close my eyes during treatment. 
His critical stance falters as he tries unconvincingly to give himself an 
“exemption” from the deepest “havoc” of AIDS he has thus far disclosed.  
Even though we’ve returned to the site of tidiness, the secondness of the 
final story this time needn’t even mention subjugation.  But it’s interesting 
that Michaels forges an irony—which is always an agency, a negation of 
structure—out of finding a piece of himself already there in the room before 
him. 
The mirror in which he had been accustomed to seeing his reflection in 
others (and the sharedness of social practice always performs this function) 
has broken, exposing the dynamics of how agency is produced.  From all the 
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mundane reports of symptoms and social hassles, a stable calculus ultimately 
emerges.  His agency is directly proportionate to the ability of others to 
reason through a situation (bureaucracy being the opposite of reason) and 
inversely proportional to the amount of mobility demanded in a social field—
although this is my formulation, not his.  The idea of disability as such 
appears for the first time on February 28, and it is from a distance rather 
than in the midst of one of those scenes of dependency.  After a dinner 
party, he describes each of the people he met and, reflexive as ever, notices 
how unusually “normal” it is.  Disability enters almost as an aside: “Martyn, 
the book reviewer, was likewise engaging, and I’m astonished how quickly 
my condition and disabilities are forgotten in these lovely chatty encounters.”  
Two further second stories within the entry describe coffee with an ex-
boyfriend with AIDS, where he comes away afraid of having depressed the 
other with his need to swap symptoms; and then a description of gay Marti 
Gras as an overwhelming display of the carnivalesque, although he didn’t 
have the energy to be part of it.  “The crippled boy who couldn't follow the 
piper. I'm sorry I couldn't go to the ball. I'm sorry I turned into a pumpkin so 
soon. I'm sorry I don't have a boyfriend, can't even cruise, etc., etc. I'm not 
sure these sorrows are as unproductive as they seem, though.”  As always, 
his self-presentation alights only after passing through a series of other 
stories, so many Bakhtinian loopty-loops, which indeed render even this rare 
moment of grief productive. In the next entry, he is so weak that he’s had to 
drag himself to the study to write; “But it's not entirely unpleasant. Rather, 
it's most curious to watch everything slow down, to become oddly dissociated 
from events, or their pace.”  There are no subsequent second-story 
juxtapositions between symptoms and interpersonal conflict after this entry.  
That work is complete, and his condition is thereafter tracked in terms of his 
agency, as in this passage reporting on a trip to Sydney for the launch of his 
book:  
The whole trip was really an awful effort. There were some fine 
occasions I couldn't quite rise to, and opportunities for 
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socializing I didn't quite connect to. One of those efforts whose 
pleasures are delayed—perhaps like tourism? Surely a day spent 
at the new, and inhuman, Brisbane airport due to strikes in 
Sydney, getting misinformed, misdirected, and shuttled on and 
off planes like baggage didn't help. Then to return home (my 




June 6: In his office I said, "It's getting nasty now. Can you get 
me out of this?" We both cried a bit, and he arranged to check 
me into hospital. I drove my car home, waited for the QuAC 
cleaner, told her what was happening. She straightened up, 
cleaned out the fridge, and so forth. I packed and grabbed a 
taxi to Wattlebrae. I reckoned I had a few days left, at best (or 
worst), and wasn't displeased with the timing, felt reasonably 
resolved, even satisfied. I would try to get Athol to print out the 
journal and get it to Paul. The letter to Gavin would be a good 
place to duck out, even. 
The developing subjunctive mood in this entry is odd, seeming to 
indicate that he is already not just beyond but existentially outside the day 
being reported. He describes an end to the diary that was to be but now 
won’t be.  The writer has become the character’s ghost—this is the feeling I 
get from the subsequent entries.  I agree with Michaels that the diary’s work 
ends here.  What remains is an anticlimax.  Reports on his activities soon 
lack the dynamics described above and become more matter-of-fact, and 
Michaels complains several times that the diary is properly over while his life 
drags on.  Signs of this transduction of Michaels into his text begin to stand 
out a month earlier (May 1), when a confrontation in the hospital, now 
understood through the agency dynamics worked out earlier, ends: “My 
sarcasm, largely restrained until then, flooded the room and swept the entire 
nursing staff into the hall.”  The language is not just figurative, but 
performative; only in the world of the diary can the “sweeping” have the 
referent connoted here, an instrument for exercising real power over the 
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staff.  No similar figure appears in earlier disease-related scenes, which 
instead concern helplessness.  This isn’t reflexive work, but a self in action 
and a fictive constitution of the world.  Several excellent sociological critiques 
populate the final entries, but also the drive to “explain” his past 
psychologistically and link his sexuality to his relationship with his mother—
all the stuff of childhood analysis, I suspect—occupy the text for the first time 
since the initial exploratory entries.   
By June 16, the writing has changed.  The entry contains another 
reprise of the tidy hospital motif, but now the institution and the subject no 
longer have a relationship where anything is at stake, and so irony becomes 
Michaels’ final podium.  The hospital is now described off-handedly as “a 
Mexican prison, actually,” and the idea of letting himself die, simply from lack 
of interest in this dénouement, he shrugs off as “unsporting.”  Five days 
later, he would joke to a friend that this final chapter would be called “As I 
Lay Dying…Again.” By July 7, his brother, described as a “flawed mirror” of 
himself, has been asking all sorts of questions to understand their family, but 
Michaels just responds to what he’s asked, no longer really interested.   
 
"to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the 
way it really was',” writes Benjamin (qtd. In Taussig 1993: 39). “It means to 
seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger."  Michaels’ 
process of unbecoming never releases him from the obligation to 
conceptualize a self; or, at least, this is the tenacity Michaels as a theorist, 
an activist, and ultimately a writer never surrenders.  He is a native-
ethnographer caught in a situation of such radical displacement from society, 
his playing deck of identities, and his body that all the culturally-fabricated 
narrative conventions for formulating experience have to a great extent 
lapsed.  Although I’ve only related the barest fraction of this text, I have 
identified four mechanisms of critical reasoning that simultaneously 
contextualize and entextualize the self. These are dialectical operations that, 
like the irony Michaels ladles over everything, negate the ostensible free-
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standing solidity of structures, both discursive and institutional, in order to 
recover the process of production (or differentiation) within any established 
system of differences.  This is what experience and selfhood must come 
down to when the fabric of culture itself precludes more conventional 
formulation of one’s profoundly unshared experience.   
As a thoroughly competent poststructural theorist himself, Michaels 
had little patience for the critic’s tendency to deconstruct the world only to 
then leave the field without saving lives or ameliorating the human subject’s 
material conditions.  Similarly, we need to face the question of what all this 
self-work accomplished, since it in a sense only went along for the ride of his 
slow death.  The writing could be accounted for as “palliative,” as his 
physicians might say.  First, however, his critical process disclosed the 
socially unincorporated knowledge of his own changing relationship to the 
world and, within that, himself.  He didn’t occupy a marked category, but 
was instead dissociated, and reflexivity at such times produces agency.  The 
diary provides good evidence that he navigated the end of his life much more 
intentionally than might have been the case under a simple discourse of 
victimization, etc.  Then there is the diary itself.  The four poetic mechanisms 
of reflexivity have an almost magical quality, in retrospect, for the way 
Michaels used them to create a sort of spirit child.  To say that he lives on in 
his diary is no cop-out: writers write, and through the production of the text 
he ultimately conducted the work of his life.   
What brought me to the kind of reflexive literature represented by 
Unbecoming was my own mimetic attempt to read from these texts 
something that would help me formulate my own experience of blindness.  
That’s the drama I’m reading into Unbecoming. What I read is a heuristic 
process of critical thinking “on the ground,” outside Academe and beyond the 
exercise of research methods.  Michaels is a thoroughly unsentimental writer 
for whom AIDS ultimately became a critical pedagogy for his own life and 
death.  Finally, it is the refusal of the text to be contained within the 
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representational work as artifact that makes the reflexivity a practice we can 
observe in the wild.   
The text is not valuable in itself.  It has no powers of its own.  The text 
is the residue.  The object of observation here has been the birth of 
consciousness.  Perhaps this acknowledgment differentiates between a purely 
rhetorical analysis and an anthropological one, although contemporary 
anthropology is apt to fasten on the text and find ways not to talk about 
individual consciousness.  To trace one story line: theory inscribes memory, 
memory constitutes a self, the self projects action, and action constitutes the 
social field.  Any material consequences that accrue to the man or his 
memory by way of the artifact’s circulation, including the author’s originary 
intent to publish, takes place in another sociological circuit.    There is 
nothing more useless, more colonialist, repugnant, unethical, or moribund 
than an anthropological portrayal that finds oppressed natives muttering 
truth to power under their breaths, takes this as a sign of agency—in effect 
taking the sign for the thing itself—and then exits the field.  But there is 
nothing more critical to human life than consciousness.  A writer will exercise 
its productive power until the hour of death. 
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Chapter 6.  Clinical Inferences: Some Reading Notes 
on Cognitive Science 
 
Science can be distinguished from scientism by the latter’s mistaking 
correlation for causation.  When a statistical technique successfully accounts 
for observed variability, for example, the explaining variable might be taken 
to be the effective cause, whereupon several important aspects of context 
and interaction collapse.  The causal principle, not being tied to these 
collapsed pragmatic factors, is transportable across contexts.  The situations 
in which the correlation was observed become incidental, and the model 
becomes a free-standing truth factory.  Sometimes an effect of the analytical 
machinery is mistaken for the cause of what the machinery produces, which 
is, for example, apparently what happened when Freud’s structural model, 
derived from texts generated within a specific clinical interaction, was 
asserted to be the cause of all subsequent and prior texts emerging in and 
outside the clinical dialogue (Habermas 1972 [1968]: 245).   
Because the behavioral sciences always implicate unobservable mental 
processes, they remain a site where scientism takes hold very readily.  The 
mind becomes an object of the gaze (i.e., mind reading).  Clinical psychology 
is especially at risk for the scientistic mistake because the clinic structurally 
isolates the individual from the interactional contexts in which self-
knowledge, self-care, and the patient’s discourses take shape.  The clinic 
contracts the field of potential variables to something manageable, 
something recognizable within the literature, something reflected in the 
organism who stands before the clinician.  Whether the clinic is deemed a 
necessary evil or a methodological virtue, it dissociates the individual from 
history and society except through mediations such as the analyst or the 
patient’s way of playing the clinical language game.   
The clinic can serve as just one exemplary expression of any kind of 
knowledge structure that functions to close the circuit in this way.  Whereas 
218 
descriptions produced in terms of significant correlation continue to embody 
the conditions for remediating the machinery that gave rise to the scientific 
postulate, a causal model has instead to be “disproved.”  Again, this 
procedure is made very difficult by the ineffability of behavioral phenomena, 
which cannot be reproduced under controlled conditions. 
Geertz (1973: 26) notes that “clinical inference” is a documentary 
method of interpretation to which the ethnographer likewise appeals.  A 
surface of signifiers is read symptomatically—for signs of peculiarity—and 
theory is used “to ferret out the unapparent import of things” (more on 
ferrets below).  Although Geertz in effect uses clinical inference as a 
synonym for Charles Peirce’s concept of abduction and restricts its use to 
explanation, the scientistic “observation” of mental activities will use a similar 
process to construct a predictive model, because the evident range of effects 
must always follow from the cause until the whole machinery is brought to a 
halt by some outside force, either in nature or in the clinic.  Geertz wrote as 
if this “cognitivist fallacy” were something everyone with any sense already 
knew to avoid.  However, dismissal has not proven to be an effective way to 
deal with the basic human tendency to turn one’s own value horizon into a 
state of nature.  From within the circuit, no one understands themselves to 
be committing a fallacy, and so we’re faced with three ways to deal with such 
cultural assumptions.  First is interruption by another discourse, which can 
either take the form of ethnography, supposed to change the understanding 
of the ethnographizing group; or Bourdieu’s sense of sociology as a “combat 
sport,” which seeks change in the ethnographized group.  Second is 
dismissal, which tends to be what happens within professional communities 
who have to get on with each other in the close quarters of an academic 
department or even the comparatively small society of an anthropological 
subdiscipline.  In other words, turn away into one’s own camp and attempt to 
maintain some basic level of discourse that communicates between groups 
“for the sake of the kids.”  Third is an immanent critique practiced as a 
reflexive, phenomenological interrogation of one’s own assumptions, even 
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where this activity doesn’t obviously move the research project along in the 
short term.   
Below, I study three very different scientific observations of mental 
structures where the structures are taken to be at the root of the individual’s 
interaction with the world.  I am not critiquing the arguments on scientific 
grounds, nor am I convinced that all the examples mistake correlation for 
causality.  I want to instead focus on what makes this mistake very possible 
in practice wherever scientists insist on leaving the philosophy of science to 
philosophers, history to the historians, or culture to the anthropologists—or 
when anthropologists leave individual minds to the psychologists.  I am 
bothered by scientists who feel settled in their field and sure of what they 
know.  Scientific knowledge production, valid or fallacious, displays the basic 
dissociative force of what goes without saying, which is a constituent of all 
knowledge production. 
 
FROM EYE TO MIND 
My first reading comes from Claudia Strauss’ and Naomi Quinn’s A 
Cognitive Model of Cultural Meaning (1997), which belongs to the tradition 
and close-knit professional community (D’Andrade 1995: xiv) of cognitive 
anthropology.  They rely heavily on a connectionist variant of schema theory 
in which mental processing, roughly speaking, combines two related 
cognitive processes reminiscent of Jakobsonian linguistics: a very rapid, 
habit-like process of pattern-matching that draws inputs from parallel 
domains forms the basis for ordinary interpretation of scenes, while a 
serialogical problem-solving process tackles more abstract situations 
(D’Andrade 1995: 138ff.).  Behavior results from an array of distributed 
networks of schemas.  Contrary to most linguistic-anthropological models, 
cognitivism asserts that these functions operate in the brain as a “model for” 
action rather than constituting observed patterns belonging to an analytical 
“model of” social practice.  Whereas mainstream anthropology has sought to 
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understand culture and society on the basis of what can be observed more or 
less directly, Strauss and Quinn reground anthropology on the basis of 
inferences that use observations (of speech, in this case) to, as Quinn writes, 
“glean what people must have in mind in order to say the things they do” 
(Strauss and Quinn 1997: p. 140).  The connectionist model adequately 
explains the behavioral data they examine.  Although it is necessary to track 
the cognitivist model’s details, my goal is to describe a very particular faith in 
representation evidenced equally in the protocol by which they read 
theoretical texts an write them, as well as the methods by which they intuit 
the contents of minds and report them.  My interest was sparked by how 
difficult it was for me to attend their arguments in detail in the face of an 
urge to dismiss them because of a conviction that, despite my initial 
optimism over discovering an anthropological literature about individual 
consciousness, something felt deeply wrong to me about the book’s 
presuppositions and its preoccupation with defending their position as true 
and others as false (most theorists don’t understand their activity this way). 
The word “schema” refers to a mental structure such as marriage or 
door-opening as an action sequence.62 D’Andrade (1995: 132) notes in 
passing that there are “as many kinds of schemas as there are kinds of 
things”; which is a very important point, because we can either think of the 
identification of schemas as positing them analytically or, otherwise, to be 
labeling extant observable structures.  Strauss and Quinn insist on the latter, 
so that the brain must be really very full of these different “things.”63 Their 
argument makes use of a purely referential ideology of language in which 
 
62 The word  “schema” can be traced to Kant.  Its introduction to psychology is owed 
to Bartlet (1932), who argued for the social grounding of individual memory.  It is a concept 
that can be developed either as a theory of mental structures or of practice (cf. Chapter 2, 
scene ix).  
63 In Gulliver’s third journey—the one to the floating island of La Puta, populated by 
scientists—Jonathan Swift seems to suggest what a world would look like in which everyone 
communicated based on a stock of representations they have to carry around as their personal 
luggage.  Meanwhile, interpretivists (whoever they/we are, really) would not deny that we 
have mental schemas, but would suppose them to exist as a set of learned relationships 
instead of an assortment of objects, beliefs, etc.  “Thinking” and “interpreting,” under 
interpretivism, might be more a matter of living through qualitatively new situations in a way 
that reconstitutes the past rather than recalling the past and them adapting it to the present. 
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words index and therefore provide evidence of a priori things—a paradigm 
entirely implicit in their work, since they explicitly defer consideration of 
public interactional aspects of culture.  Meanings are “retrieved” (p. 156).  So 
long as people observably say what they mean to say, they must always 
mean what they say they mean.   
They define meaning as “the interpretation evoked in a person by an 
object or event at a given time,” (p. 6).  The definition in itself in no way 
elides interaction; but, in the context of their model, interpretation is 
decidedly no longer the metasemiotic process attended to by hermeneutic 
philosophy, in which meaning is “a function of the sign and is therefore 
inconceivable (since meaning is pure relation, or function) outside the sign as 
some particular, independently existing thing” (Volosinov 1973 [1930]: 28).  
Cognitivist meaning is instead a sort of hidden nexus that generates 
behavioral outputs from a set of cognitive-affective inputs.64 Meanings and 
interpretations are “the thoughts, feelings, and less conscious associations 
evoked when people's schemas meet the world at a given moment” (p. 52).  
They “are the product of current events in the public world interacting with 
mental structures, which are in turn the product of previous such interactions 
with the public world” (p. 7).  Meanings are momentary states, then, that 
occupy space in the brain (they possess mass); but “The relative stability of 
the world and our schemas has the effect that both in a given person and in 
a group of people who share a way of life, more or less the same meanings 
arise over and over” (p. 7).  They define culture, accordingly, as “the shared 
cognitive-emotional state that results when the mental structures of a group 
of people respond to typical objects and events in their world” (p. 15).  Quinn 
writes, “We may imagine that cultural models incorporate just those cultural 
exemplars that prove natural and helpful to many people in thinking 
analogically about a given domain of experience” (p. 155).   
 
64 In the interpretivist tradition, incidentally, affect is not in itself meaningful, but only 
becomes meaningful as emotion on the heels of affect’s semiotic incorporation. 
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Most fundamentally, they argue that the decisions, interpretations, 
and actions of individuals cannot be adequately derived from studies of public 
culture (this argument will be examined below).  Therefore, individual 
cognitive processes exist as an order of dynamics different from the 
dynamics of “messages and practices.”  Insofar as embodiment and 
interpretation require bodies and minds, this claim stands behind 
interpretivist assumptions as well, although they will take it a bit further after 
positing a permeable boundary between the two (p. 8).  They conclude that 
“both intrapersonal and extrapersonal processes are needed to make a whole 
theory of culture.  Our account is a necessary part of any such theory” (p. 
253).  Finally, they quote a passage from Geertz which, in quintessential 
fashion, almost but not quite off-handedly dismisses cognitive anthropology.  
Writing before the advent of the connectionist model, his target is the idea 
that psychic structures in themselves account for culture, which he attacks 
through citation of Goodenough’s classic definition of culture as that which 
"consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a 
manner acceptable to its members."  Strauss and Quinn take him to be 
attacking the idea of internalization, but this concept appears neither in the 
quoted passage nor the Goodenough quote quoted in the Geertz passage 
they quote.  The point that Geertz does make quite strongly, but on which 
they do not comment anywhere in the book, is the question of “whether 
particular analyses . . . reflect what the natives ‘really’ think or are merely 
clever simulations, logically equivalent but substantively different, of what 
they think” (Geertz 1973:11). 
One of the constitutive characteristics of a community, much less a 
close knit one, is the sharing of certain forms of knowledge and approaches 
to knowledge over and against those of an identifiable out-group.  Another 
characteristic is that these shared schemas don’t have occasion to retain the 
status of proper objects of critical inquiry.  For some members of the group, 
an attempt to communicate peaceably to the Other will tend to sharpen 
commitment to one’s own knowledge by way of a communicative style 
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focused on refuting the Other’s perspective (“let me prove to you why you’re 
wrong.”).  There will be an underlying warrant, which seldom itself appears 
in the argument and which may even have long since ceased to be explicitly 
shared within the in-group—it may even not be so widely shared, but only 
becomes a likely product of the socialization process once the community’s 
discourse is well settled.  These are dynamics of every community, so far as I 
know.  In the argument levied by Strauss and Quinn […a Freudian slip in my 
word choice there], there comes a tipping point where the widely-acceptable 
and useful model of schema theory begins to close off avenues of thought 
leading in other directions, narrowing the field of potential objects of 
analytical observation.  That point arrives when the confirmation of theory 
through research is used to make a positive inductive assertion about 
reality—the assertion that meanings exist as psychic structures—whereupon 
the field of possible observations will henceforth be implicitly the product of 
that framework, tending to confirm it and becoming a ground against which 
other positions appear nonsensical.  I read their argument as an instance of 
this process, and the process itself is the phenomenon that I want to 
understand. 
The book’s organization is telling.  The first presented application of 
their cognitive model, on page 87, employs a fictional composite person, 
herself dealt with very sporadically.  Discussions of research begin on page 
137.  This arrangement underscores the nature of the anthropological project 
in their assessment: to build an accurate model (in the singular) of the 
human world (again singular, certainly) capable of reliably describing how 
individuals construct models for action and thereby generate culture.  
Although we can easily suppose that their prior research adequately supports 
their model, the book’s organization entirely subordinates the construction of 
the model to its prefatory presentation as a free-standing true 
representation.  Virtually none of the claims grounded in their presented case 
studies rely for their validity or soundness on either the rejection of other 
theories or the objective truth of the cognitive model, and yet they spend the 
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first forty-eight pages refuting various strictly outdoor psychologies.  The 
rightness of the abstract model emerges de facto against the negation of 
other positions.  Specifically, they are at pains to locate themselves in partial 
opposition to “Geertzian  and neo-Geertzian interpretivists, Foucauldian 
poststructuralists and other postmodernists, some contemporary historical 
materialists, and those cognitive and linguistic anthropologists who study 
cognition in practice (or discourse pragmatics)” (p. 12), all of whom they 
consider to be in significant aspects “inconsistent” (p. 19), “confused,” (p. 
20), or “not confused, just wrong” (p. 33).  They address recent theories of 
meaning, which they suppose most cultural anthropologists to hold, as 
follows: 
We reject all three of the current meaning-is-use, meaning-is-
place-in-a-system-of-signs,  and meanings-are-endlessly-
deferred approaches. . .  Meaning-as-use pretends that people 
act without having anything in mind. Meaning-as-emerging-
from-a-system-of-signs   assigns a reality to these abstract 
systems that they do not have. Finally,   meanings-as-endlessly-
deferred delights in the ceaseless play of signs, forgetting that 
in the meantime people need some meanings to get them 
through the day. Instead, our definition combines aspects of 
earlier behaviorist (meanings are defined by their stimuli and 
responses) and ideational (meanings are ideas in people's 
heads) approaches (p. 5). 
That their correctives to so many major trends in 20th Century social 
theory can be done adequately within forty-eight pages (which nevertheless 
seems like a lot while reading) relies on their ability to treat theories as 
standing independently from the domains in which they were derived, 
thereby taking them as universal objective propositions governing any 
individual’s relationship to society and culture.  Certainly, Foucault and 
Bourdieu and the gang do theorize on the grand scale.  They make 
statements about “culture” as such.  Because meanings pre-exist context 
according to the cognitivist model, the presence of a word, whether 
“marriage” in their data or “culture” in Academe, indexes the same referent.  
As a shared academic culture, we all can be assumed to be using the same 
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word “culture” to mean the same thing (like much structural scholarship, 
they track schemas according to the appearance of particular words in the 
data).  Within each critique, they follow a three-step procedure.  First, state 
the theory, which they assume can be done with a few characteristic 
statements.  Context is not a problem, because all theorists who say they’ve 
explained something about “culture” as such can be taken to either be right 
or wrong in any recontextualization of any accurate summary statement 
taken from their work.  Second, under the assumption that the theory 
purports to be an objective representation, find an instance (usually an 
ethnographic example) that contradicts and thereby falsifies it.  Third, pose 
the cognitive model as a corrective, a negative of the negative.   
The vast majority of their refutations, however, are carried out against 
positions that are frequently not on the page.  From within a positivist 
framework, theoretical position X, taken as a proposition, necessarily implies, 
first, that X is a universal generalization; and, second, that all not-X positions 
are false, even if the theory under scrutiny never actually comes out with this 
implication.  These implicatures are what they refute.  Regarding Foucault, 
for example, they react to the assertion that discourses create experiences of 
the self: “Implicit in this is that discourses do not represent realities: they 
create them” (p. 27); hence Foucaultians “do not see a person as something 
separate that is acted upon by social discourses” (p. 29).  The book contains 
far more answers than questions, straw dogs not withstanding.  The model is 
pre-imminent in the text and pre-scriptive of anthropological practice by 
virtue of its obeying a standard of correctness rather than utility.   
Geertz’s rhetoric gives them fits, as we would expect, because of his 
tendency to offer functional definitions of self, meaning, culture, 
interpretation, etc., that are nominally calibrated for the world of phenomena 
the anthropologist can observe without resorting to causal inferences.65 They 
 
65 Certainly, many valid critiques of Geertz exist, but to read Geertz as denying the 
salience of individuals in the production of culture is not one of them.  Few cultural 
anthropologists since have been as concerned with the idea of mind.  On the other hand, I 
agree with the observation Strauss and Quinn make as to the way anthropology’s post-1960s 
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mistakenly believe they are standing with Geertz in opposition to 
Wittgenstein when they conclude that, because Geertz acknowledges that 
action transpires in terms of meaningful precedents, it follows necessarily 
that “meaning is something added to bare actions; it is not simply use” (p. 
18).  Whereupon they chide Geertz for not remaining consistent with what 
they take to be this point of agreement.  Reacting to several classic 
Geertzian formulations, they can be heard to grow ever more frustrated with 
his obdurate refusal to face the to-them obvious fact that meanings have to 
have a material existence apart from the transaction  of meaning (the 
following quotes proceed from pp. 18-20).  “If meanings influence action, 
they have to be someplace,” they reason: “Where are they?”  And, “if 
meanings do not literally rest in symbols and are not identical with symbolic 
actions, where are they?” And, “if they are nowhere in particular, how can 
they ever come to motivate action?”  They offer an avowedly sarcastic reply 
from a colleague: maybe the meaning is “in a cloud hovering over 
Cincinnati.”  “If culture (a pattern of meaning) is ‘unphysical,’ how can it 
have the same ontological status as a rock or a mock sheep raid?”  Coming 
to a landing, they state the warrant of their argument by asserting that 
Meanings “have to be concrete if they make a difference in the world.”  They 
somehow read Geertz as having denied the participation of the brain in 
symbolic interaction, although a conventional reading has Geertz more 
conservatively stipulating that cultural anthropology can only practically 
attend to the observable products of meaning in interaction—an “outdoor 
psychology,” and in fact a field that reclaims the study of mind from the 
institution of psychology, the fallacious objectivism of which was already 
being attacked by Marx and Husserl long before. 
As Strauss and Quinn note, much of cognitive anthropology’s 
foundation echoes Bourdieu’s articulation of habitus and (not just for that 
reason) harmonizes with many other independently-derived streams of 
 
“psychophobia” latched onto Geertz’s zealous attack on cognitive structuralism, with the result 
that a wink from Geertz made all the natives lose their minds. 
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thought about habitual action; Although in their case studies I would prefer 
to divide what Strauss and Quinn call “meaning” into two regions of 
(hermeneutically-constituted) meaning and (schematically-reproductive) 
behavior, where the latter is entrenched while the former is continually 
refashioned contextually within communicative practices, including 
introspection.  But the cognitivist imperative is to look for sufficient cause 
within a psychic structure, not within an abstraction whose only reality is 
interactional.  Cognitivists really, really want to know if a particular eyelid 
was winking or blinking, as well as why; not just what the world of potential 
local interpretations might plausibly be.  “To understand why someone acts 
the way they do it is not enough to know the discourses, objects, and events 
to which they have been exposed,” writes Strauss (1992: 8), again in 
frustration with Geertz’s wink; “we need to know the psychic structures that 
assimilate those things and render them a basis for meaningful action.”   
I hate to sound like a broken record, but “not enough” for what?  A 
significant difference stands between Strauss’ “what makes them do that?” 
and the ethnographic “what is going on here,” in which it is indeed enough to 
know what is circulating publicly—not only because that’s what is taken to be 
methodologically available, but also because the ultimate object of interest is 
often the aggregate patterned dynamics of the Ethnos, regardless of 
individual rationales, motivations, etc.   
I’ve identified the ideological force of referential language in their 
argumentation and in the basic goals of their knowledge production.  Their 
methodology remains consistent with this positivist epistemology, which in a 
sense is laudable.  The primary methodological shortcoming is that poetics 
becomes an anomaly requiring subsequent ad-hock appendages to the 
model.  One might suppose that a psychologistic model would be capable of 
apprehending individualistic acts of meaning-making that escape circulation 
in public discourses.  But there is no mechanism for recognizing schemas as 
significant except insofar as they are spoken repeatedly in the analyst’s 
vicinity or otherwise emphasized so that they gain the analyst’s attention, 
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and can thereafter be glossed metapragmatically either by the speaker or the 
content-analyst.  So the world of schema theory is bound within 
communicative practice and more narrowly within either emic or etic 
metapragmatics.  Furthermore, the discourse that comprises the data 
originates roughly within a discourse the informant shares with the analyst, 
because Strauss and Quinn base their research on a content-analytic 
approach to interview-like elicitations of monologue instead of on speech 
collected in “natural” contexts.  The content analyst then identifies 
psychological structures on the basis of perceived regularities within the 
data.    The schemas are guaranteed to appear on the surface of 
communicative practice, insofar as humans learn about our own capacities 
and possible dispositions from watching and participating with others—this is 
basic socialization, in and beyond language.  There’s no room in the model 
for meaningful discourse that doesn’t index schemas, and it is unclear what 
the status of something like glossalalia or schizophrenic discourse would be.  
Because all thought is based on schemas, however, individuals can fail to find 
the right words to represent what they mean—Quinn uses such struggles to 
prove the existence of underlying schemas.  The model does not deal with 
the power of public culture to dictate the terms in which individuals will 
attend to or express “internal” phenomena, nor the potential inadequacy of 
available discourse to express everything the individual cognitively-affectively 
means: the right words are out there, somewhere.  Discourse ultimately 
serves as a guarantor that the analyst will find evidence of brain structures 
at work, if one goes into it seeking to corroborate that idea.   
We have now come up against the same theoretical limit encountered 
by the proof procedure noted in Chapter 3: of that which the subject can’t 
communicate, the content-analyst must remain silent.  Only now, we’re not 
talking about theories of culture, but positive statements about what is in 
people’s heads.  The default assumption is that the limits of discourse, as a 
socially adapted way of speaking, are adequate to the needs of the people 
who are socialized to those communicative practices.  Because cognitivism 
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also makes a hard-science claim to identify the psychological structures 
comprising neural pathways, the analyst is likely to have great confidence 
that nothing else exists, even though the model already guaranteed from the 
start that nothing else could.   
 “Discourses about desire (emotions, thoughts, the body, etc.) are not 
the same as desire (emotions, thoughts, the body, etc.). Anyone who has not 
read too much postmodern philosophy recognizes this from their own 
experience” (p. 33).  The irony in this quip is that, for anyone with too 
shallow an understanding of postmodern philosophy (and certainly far too 
many of its proponents have indulged in postmodernism as a recreational 
drug), it is too easy to write such things while neglecting the ramifications of 
the fact that both elements of the contrastive pair have just been written on 
the same surface using very similar symbols.  Her sentiment cannot be 
written or even introspected except by way of a set of audience-directed 
discourses, which implies that the pre-discursive referent in itself is what we 
don’t seem to have directly before us, technically.  Of all things, “desire” is 
the one that makes this fact felt most immediately.  Empirical science 
presupposes the existence of the objective world, which is a very useful 
assumption; but not all empiricists claim to have made it all the way to 
objective reality through their methods.  A conservative and serviceable form 
of empiricism acknowledges that reality is obdurate and resists our claims, 
and this resistance is itself sometimes a sign that there is indeed an objective 
reality out there, instrumentally detectable.  There is always the other 
possibility, though, that resistance of the data is a sign that there are still 
undetected explicable layers of discourse working on us.  We’ll never know 
the end of it, a position that prompts the “post-objectivist” orientation to 
critique in place of investigation when truth rather than utility is at stake.  
Post-objective critique relies on the idea that reason is “out there” 
instrumentally; but, in contrast to model-building, reason and a question are 
all one needs to authorize a critique of anything at all, including a critique of 
reason. 
230 
I’m not concerned with the “right” answer in this clash of faiths. 
Instead, the questions that interest me are those that always seem to come 
and go without saying in such disputes: what can you do with it?  What’s at 
stake and for whom whenever we apply a model as a model of versus for 
reality?  These pragmatic concerns are agnostic and neutral with respect to 
truth claims, postmodern or positivist, and needn’t ever be the only 
questions one asks.  They constitute the reflexive monitoring function of any 
knowledge-producing instrumentality, whereas all the additional questions 
are what will locate the asker on Science’s political map.  The cognitivist 
insistence on attacking interpretivism so vehemently seems to indicate some 
illegible force at work in the institutional context of anthropology, since the 
practical question of what changes in the world based on whether one 
examines meaning in interaction or meaning in still life snapshots is unclear 
from this text.  Given that we do have active brains, I doubt anyone would 
deny that they are busy matching patterns, learning new ones, and 
sometimes relying on serial processing to solve problems: these things do 
occupy the mind.  The basic cognitive anthropological model has considerable 
explanatory force.  Yet, the insistence that the observer can read minds, and 
that this reading is in fact a final reading, remains an article of faith in 
cognitivist accounts, one divorced from their functionality and products.  
Strauss’ and Quinn’s book illustrates the functionality of a cognitive model, 
its assumptions, and the separability of the method from its assumptions, as 
well as their refusal to acknowledge the status of those assumptions and the 
consequent irremediable cast of their methodology.  What kinds of projects 
demand a methodology that (a) claims objective knowledge and (b) locates 
meaning within the individual brain?  I write the answer into two neurological 
examples where perhaps more is immediately at stake than the “right” way 
to write about people. 
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READING THE NEUROIMAGE 
Blind people are demonstrably more dependent than their sighted 
counterparts on memory in everyday life, and especially on verbal memory.  
They also seem often to develop conspicuous mnemonic abilities.  Amedi et 
al (2003) employ neuroimaging to ascertain how the blind do it.  The Israeli 
scientists cite Talmudic scripture as anecdotal evidence of the blind being 
given the role of a “living database” of tradition.  Such anecdotal evidence 
inspired a perfectly valid scientific study designed in such a way that it could 
potentially falsify that initial bit of common knowledge.  The cognitivist model 
of the brain’s geographic specialization they brought to their understanding 
of the ensuing FMRI scans is not tested, however.  Their tests first 
corroborate the observation that the blind have superior verbal memory, 
then use knowledge of the brain’s plasticity to explain it.66 They conclude 
that blind brains have refunctionalized the otherwise-unemployed primary 
visual cortex, abbreviated as “V1” and sometimes also known as Brodman 
Area 17, so that it now provides extra cortical mass to the task of verbal 
memory. 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) provides something 
close to a real-time map of brain activity based on evidence of how much 
blood oxygen different neural regions are consuming.  FMRI is not a tool 
suited for studying the kind of parallel distributed networks noted by Strauss 
and Quinn; but, unlike content analysis, it yields “direct” access to the 
structural-functional map of the brain, without slicing up or irradiating the 
subject (although don’t let them strap you in if you have metal fillings).  
Interpretations can vary, but what one sees in the blue glow of the output 
screen is perfectly transposable within the global community of scientists 
 
66 We have good evidence that the brain can strengthen or generate new pathways in 
response to the need to learn new schemas.  This learning process is referred to as plasticity 
and has become a motivating force in the conception of new avenues of research.  Situations 
might range from traumatic brain injury to learning morse code.  Understood as a composite 
of pathways built or dismantled as a learning process, plus locales that can be 
refunctionalized, the brain can be said to be socially constructed without one’s having to 
depart from the emerging discourse of cognitive science. 
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trained to read it—not a topological theory, but a vista surveying the territory 
of the brain.  No mereological problem as to what level of linguistic fragment 
properly identifies a truly basic schema: displayed is the electrical origin and 
endpoint of human experience.  The technology inspires awe.  The cognitivist 
paradigm mandates the search for ultimate behavioral explanations in 
anatomical structures, and the structures, plainly visible, serve as the 
foundation for the discourses in which experiments are conceived, results 
communicated, and variables identified.  FMRI and other neuroimaging 
technologies imbue the discourse of cognitive science with an immediacy and 
objectivity so concrete that convoluted, abstract ideas about discursive and 
social productions of experience are very readily dismissed in its light as 
either epiphenomenal or arcane.   
Vision science takes V1 to be the receptacle for the impulse driven by 
the optic nerve.  FMRI scans show that this region displays a pattern 
organized according to the retinal image, which in turn has constructed a 
neural reformatting of the visual field, and so it is treated as part of what 
makes up vision.  Scientists show the eye a square and a square-shaped 
imprint forms in V1.  Scientists show twelve psychosurgically-monitored 
ferrets The Matrix, and something very much like Keyano Reeves’ hand 
moves across the V1s of twelve goggle-eyed ferrets in a darkened room 
(Fiser et. al. 2004).  Diagram as follows: ferret wearing little helmet with 
squiggles of wire coming off it, a tiny movie screen at the back of its head 
labeled V1; giant movie screen in front of the ferret, labeled, say, VH1.  A 
human hand traces an arrow from the giant screen to V1, and then draws a 
few other arrows pointing forward from V1 to other brain regions that 
conduct higher-level processing (the dorsal and ventral streams, plus the 
infero-temporal cortex).  Research has also demonstrated that V1 is 
sometimes activated by just imagining a visual image, too, but this V1 
activity is considered a problem that has yet to be understood.  Imagination 
isn’t vision, and studies of this phenomenon haven’t been common.  No 
activity in V1 other than representation of a seen object has been taken as 
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part of the same underlying function of V1 (i.e., equally-indelible arrows 
haven’t been drawn pointing to V1 from other brain regions), perhaps 
because a sighted brain cannot be actively seeing anything while 
simultaneously visualizing something else and because V1 activity drops 
when the eyes are closed.  It could have been said that vision interferes with 
imagination in V1, but visuo-centrism has made that formulation unlikely.  
Even where mental imagery is acknowledged, it is taken to be an assemblage 
of things seen, displaced in time.  Therefore, in conclusion, V1 must remain 
vacant for the congenitally blind.   
Except, it doesn’t always. Amedi’s is one among several studies 
showing V1 to be activated during linguistic, tactile, and auditory tasks.  
Naturally, the contents of V1 are not retinally organized in the congenitally 
blind—the patterns analogous to the shapes of presented objects don’t 
appear on the scan, but something is going on in response to other stimuli.  
“These findings give rise to at least two alternatives: (i) that the occipital 
cortex of the blind has a general-purpose function, activated by all these 
different tasks and sensory modalities or (ii) that different anatomical regions 
within the occipital cortex of the blind may acquire new specialized functional 
characteristics (much like the `division of labor' in the sighted brain).”  Test 
results lead them to adopt the second possibility to the exclusion of the first.  
Under the assumption that the brains of the blind in the Amedi study have 
been reorganized, the distinction between blind brains and sighted brains is 
inevitable.  The blind brains “seem to have an additional memory-related 
region, located in the occipital cortex.  How this reorganization is 
accomplished is still a mystery.”  After providing a simplified overview of 
their evidence and reasoning, I will revisit the discarded alternative in order 
to wonder if the evidence from blindness might be trying to tell us that not 
only blind brains but all brains use the occipital cortex in a more general 
manner than has been supposed. 
The scientists are aware that the visual cortex can be activated in 
sighted brains by auditory or tactile input, and that this “noise” is normally 
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“inhibited”; but they assess that the results make “less effective inhibition” of 
this behavior in blind brains an inadequate explanation.67 Moreover, the 
study’s verb-generation and matching tasks utilized abstract words in order 
to minimize the manifestation of images associated with the words being 
presented.  In six out of ten of the Amedi study’s blind subjects, V1 was not 
only activated but also evidenced internal specialization.  Braille-reading 
Tasks designed to access long-term memory regions associated with 
language lit up a different area of the brain in blind subjects than similar 
tasks with a verbal input (in neurological discourse, parts of the brain are 
often said to “prefer” a certain kind of input).  This neural activity is tied to 
language, because non-semantic sounds and dots did not sort themselves in 
this way.  At one point, the authors speculate that a particular region might 
be activated during Braille activities because it has become a “tactile anchor 
for the development of Braille responses in the retinotopic region of the 
blind,” either by itself or as an expansion from the parieto-occipital cortex 
(which does some tactile processing in sighted brains).  In sighted brains, 
tactility is anterior while more abstract objectifications (size, viewpoint, 
coordination of sense modalities, etc.) are posterior, but this so-called 
“hierarchy” is “reversed” in blind brains.  Finally, when subjects  were asked 
six months later to identify the words that had been part of the original 
study, V1 activation was significant for most blind subjects and not for 
sighted.  A previous study had shown that sighted subjects, too, who 
exhibited superior verbal memory likewise enlisted additional cortical mass 
when they were remembering. These brains were never said to be 
“refunctionalized,” however. 
The null hypothesis for the Amedi study would be that the blind have 
not reorganized their brains, and are instead visualizing mental images based 
 
67 Fiser’s ferrets (Fiser et. al. 2004) would subsequently demonstrate that what had 
been called “noise” in V1 actually “has a highly coherent spatio-temporal structure” and is 
present even when the ferrets are in complete dark.  V1 seems to be thinking about 
something else, this activity accounting for up to 80% of neural activity.  Scientific discovery 
often hinges on expectation and where one directs instrumental attention. 
235 
on tactile or verbal inputs, even though the image doesn’t act like a visual 
image on the FMRI.  The authors of the Amedi study dismiss this idea in a 
single sentence as “highly unlikely.”  I began backtracking their bibliography 
to determine the history of this assumption.  An earlier study (Sadato 1996) 
entertains and immediately dismisses the same thought: “’Visual imagery’ is 
an unlikely explanation of our findings because subjects blinded early in life 
have little or no ‘visual' memory to aid their Braille reading, which was 
usually learned after the loss of sight.”  The authors’ quotation marks around 
“visual” are perhaps an acknowledgment that the neurological home ground 
of vision has only a genealogical relation to the experience of sight—that is, 
the retinal image is a neural reformatting of light, and from that point 
onward we are no longer talking about arrangements of light waves (in fact, 
what we experience as vision is neural, so that we have no idea what light 
objectively looks like).  Like the Amedi study, however, they maintain a total 
commitment to the assumption that V1 must be fed by a sense modality and 
not by a “higher-order” analytical-imaginative process, and that an “image” 
is not the same thing at all as a spatial scene of the sort that are fed by 
tactile and haptic inputs in the blind.  Cohen et al (1997) in turn disrupted 
various areas of blind brains as they identified both Braille and embossed 
Roman characters (again working from the assumption that V1 must be fed 
only from a primary sense modality and therefore the tactile area has seeped 
into it): “Transient stimulation of the occipital (visual) cortex induced errors 
in both tasks and distorted the tactile perceptions of blind subjects. In 
contrast, occipital stimulation had no effect on tactile performance in normal-
sighted subjects, whereas similar stimulation is known to disrupt their visual 
performance.”  Arno et al (2001) use sensory substitution gear to observe 
visual cortex stimulation as blind and blindfolded subjects alternately heard 
meaningless, familiar, and patterned sounds.  It lit up in the blind, and so, 
once again, plasticity allows the authors to conclude that the blind brain has 
been refunctionalized to accommodate cross-modal primary input.  Again and 
again, the same story emerges. The images on PET and FMRI scans provide 
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evidence that the blind have unusual senses of hearing and touch.  The 
Amedi study did not need to take reorganization as the point at issue, but 
could instead move forward to propose an explanation of superior memory 
performance based on the evidence of refunctionalization. 
Sighted scientists predisposed to look elsewhere in the brain for verbal 
comprehension and to focus on the V1 image that corresponds to the 
laboratory object assume that any extraneous V1 activity is either noise or 
else a sign of refunctionalization.  At the same time, the idea of a 
refunctionalized brain could only have arisen after the advent of FMRI, 
because the outward human being is functional in the same pragmatic terms 
as the sighted individual.  We know that whatever is going on, the functions 
of speech, remembering, recognition, scene description, and moving through 
space are all getting done by blind brains.  Drawing on the data of the afore-
mentioned studies, one alternate possibility is that blind people might simply 
have developed conspicuous strategies for imagining abstract words.  The 
Amedi test utilized verbs, for example, which might especially need to be 
imagined in a context of action, even if the verb is abstract.  Nouns and 
verbs might not even be speakable without an attempt to contextualize 
them, and we might not always be aware this visualizing activity is taking 
place.  Maybe we attend to it very poorly, or it might have become 
comparatively less effective from an evolutionary standpoint than other 
mechanisms for understanding verbs and so remained underdeveloped.  The 
blind would in this case be developing a human capacity under the rubric of 
plasticity, but not as a refunctionalization.  As a more profoundly divergent 
alternate story, the disparity between blind and sighted brains might be 
understood as an indication that the visual form itself is inessential to the 
general function of V1.  Entertaining this line of thought challenges some 
basic presuppositions. 
Oliver Sacks (2003) reviews descriptions of mental imagery in a 
number of memoirs by the blind and finds that some of us rely heavily on 
visualization and others not at all.  Neither does there seem to be any 
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correlation between outward functionality and whether or not people claim to 
navigate according to a mental image.  One can wonder what happens in V1 
among those who claim not to visualize.  Vision science would have to expect 
that it will light up with sound and touch processing, if the subjects have 
nimble fingers, good verbal memory, etc.; or else not at all.  If, on the other 
hand, they are using this center in the same way as people who claim to 
visualize, sighted or blind, how would either the subject or the FMRI-gazing 
scientist ever be able to identify it as mental “visual” imagery?  If they’ve 
never seen, after all, they would have no way to know their brains were busy 
concocting the analogs of vision, unnoticed because they make no sense and 
are always there as a disregarded but potentially organized noise.  From the 
scientist’s perspective, this activity doesn’t respond to the retina and so 
doesn’t key in to what the scientist sees in front of the subject, which would 
be the only basis on which she would ever declare it a normally functioning 
V1.  Finally, if V1 doesn’t light up, then we no nothing in particular about that 
blind brain, except the obvious fact that it belongs to someone who can’t see.  
These are the sorts of interpretive problematics that make cognitive 
structural-functionalism so seductive.   
But what if, finally, V1 is not a little movie screen at all, but a region 
associated with spatial processing?  What if the word “visualization” has 
gotten in the way?  We have to get beyond the idea that a mental “image,” 
or one depicted in blood-oxygen levels, means what sighted people familiarly 
experience as sight.  We’ve traditionally oriented the brain along the axis of 
the sense organs: anterior is where the eyes, nose, and mouth are, 
transversed by the axis of the left and right ear.  Impulses travel from the 
retinas to the visual cortices, then forward as they are processed.  In this so-
called “feed-forward” model of the brain, scientists conceptually identify the 
neural pattern in V1 with the familiar experience of sight, and so the 
retinally-organized pattern in the brain is inscribed, somewhat reductively, 
with the label “visual cortex.”  Let me offer a highly simplistic pedagogy for 
questioning this.  Turn the brain so that the left inferotemperal cortex is in 
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front of you and V1 will be off to the right.  It is still accepting input from the 
optic nerves, but maybe from this perspective it will be easier to keep vision 
in perspective and scrutinize V1’s troublesome two-way relationship (now 
flowing left-and-right) with the ventral stream and infero-temporal cortex, 
which are regions involved with the processing of objects, spatial relations, 
and the meaningful organization of objects like facial features into what 
neurologists sometimes call “scenes”. V1 becomes more easily conceived 
functionally as a space-processing center with neurological connections to the 
optic nerve; as well as to the non-retinotopically organized inferotemporal 
cortex, to the dorsal stream (associated with processing in variances in the 
image), and to the prefrontal lobes (associated with calculation of 
consequences both for object manipulation and social behaviors).  V1 can be 
retinatopically organized, but V1 is encoded in an intermediate format 
somewhere between patterns of light and an abstract geometry of spatial 
relationships.  If images of objects, space, and scenes can be processed at all 
by the congenitally blind, of which we have evidence, then suddenly the 
problem of refunctionalization disappears.  It’s a spatial cortex. 
Certainly, the idea of a blind brain is no more strange than the 
indisputable fact of a blind eye or a brain adapted to left-handedness, thanks 
to plasticity.  In all three cases, the point at issue is instead what the 
neuroimage means.  Cognitive structuralism treats blindness as a unitary 
condition of the organism, rather than as, say, a biological resource or 
capacity significantly shaped by a social career.  In other words, draw a line 
from the word “congenital blindness,” through all possible causes and effects 
of congenital blindness, to the refunctionalized V1.  The narrow context of 
the clinic, along with the research instruments that have evolved within it, 
are unable to draw on the kind of longitudinal heuristic study from which 
classic ethnography derives its sense of contingencies.  As a consequence, 
the reorganization of the study’s ten blind brains observed in the clinical 
setting is fused with the quality of congenital blindness and thereafter will 
tend to be assumed to be normally distributed across the congenitally blind 
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population.  An authoritative fact about the blind has just been born.  The 
circuit that runs between cognitivism, which explains brain behaviors and 
outward behaviors alike in terms of “mechanisms,” and the neuroimaging 
mechanisms designed to make behavioral mechanisms visible confirms itself.  
However, all that is required to re-open this circuit has been a reflexive 
question that drives the first wedge: what is the relationship between the 
electrical pattern that lights up the FMRI and the referent of the word 
“vision”? 
By way of analogy, we’re prone to think of a few bits of computer 
video memory as holding a bright blue letter W or a hard drive as imprinting 
little “folders” and “files” that in fact are not even stored as contiguous 
strings of ions in the machine itself.  From one kind of laboratory to another, 
scientists have ingrained metaphors into their/our experience of alien 
structures, as when computer engineers began to imagine the “brain” of the 
computer.  Specifically, the computer was imagined according to the 
engineer’s idea of his brain.  The next generation of psychologists Then 
began using the computers in which they’d become enmeshed as a 
generative metaphor to direct brain research.  Computer memory was an 
analog of human memory, but now memory science falls back on the image 
of a computer to describe inputs, outputs, various forms of storage, etc., and 
memory systems are in company with any number of other systems, 
subsystems, and routines.  Can we even begin to comprehend the extent of 
knowledge and power that circulates within today’s world bound by this 
feedback loop between gleaming machines and the clinical rooms that house 
them?  But there really is one sense in which we’ve managed to build 
computers that mirror the mind’s structure: they operate electrically, which 
is a format we can’t comprehend or interact with except under the auspices 
of a more familiar layer of symbols, either mathematical or metaphorical.  
Vision science is thus already emplotted within a certain scope of possible 
action that hinges on some set of ideas about localized structure, invariant 
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functions, and information, all in place when the brain pops up on the 
monitor.   
Twelve head constrained ferrets and a blind man wearing headphones 
are placed in flickering darkness.  What mental image is invoked by an 
auditory substitution for a Keyano Reeves action sequence?  Not a 
retinotopically-organized one.  The blind brain doesn’t light up at all 
commensurately with the ferret brains.  But though it fails to correspond to 
what the sighted analyst sees, let’s say it pulses rhythmically to the action 
and some other geometry appears.  Lets say the blind man tries to keep up 
with the action by sound, which requires a mental projection of space.  The 
spatial field of blindness with which his V1 is all abuzz comprises a working 
theory of spatial relations and other aspects that reside as variables that 
might be present but for the moment useless, or question marks that need to 
be filled in either by manipulating other assumptions or simply waiting and 
staying attuned.  The variables that need to be built into this model are 
legion, and include things like a theory of what the sighted participants would 
be able to see, how their dispositions and discourses refract what they see 
into what they report, what objects would be visually obscured by others, 
where everything in the field is and was and can be and mustn’t ever be, 
boundaries, locations of objects by sound (including walls), kinesthetics, how 
far objects extend into space (especially when they are moving around other 
objects), the space one has moved through, and on and on.  Vision is a 
spatial cheat sheet that largely alleviates the need for any significant 
command over memory.  The blind man is set a task calibrated for a sighted 
person, but with a sensory deficit, relative to the ferrets.  Naturally, a 
constructed model—a mental image—is a vital tool.  It may not and might 
ought not, for peak efficiency, bear much resemblance to a visual field that 
could be transposed with a sighted person occupying the same perspective, 
since the pertinent variables shift in multiple dimensions within time and 
against it.  Imagination of a three-dimensional optical field isn’t necessarily 
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the best representation of space.68 Of course, if the blind brain is using V1 to 
construct a dynamic theoretical model of space, then the hierarchy of 
abstraction in V1 would be the reverse of the sighted brain, since a lot of 
abstract processing goes into constructing a (posterior) functional image 
based on supposition as compared to the more direct (anterior) inputs from 
language.   
In this discussion, I’ve slipped happily into science-fiction through that 
aperture in the cognitivist studies concerned with meaningless noise in V1 for 
the sighted and non-visual but organized activity in V1 for the blind.  I’ve 
always found sci-fi a good critical tool, so long as the author uses the genre’s 
hyphenation as a dialectical tension.  The problem isn’t that visual scientists 
don’t know what is going on in the brain: they know—they can see it.  But 
the “visual” cortex already limits the scientific imagination unnecessarily as 
to what they might be looking at.  More fundamentally, one cannot read the 
display of functional magnetic resonance imaging as a display of functions 
without first encountering the image already as a map of cognitive 
structures.  The statement “V1 has been refunctionalized” embodies a 
structural model as the unfalsifiable foundation beneath the functionalist 
paradigm.  Plasticity may well one day force apart these ideas of function and 
structure, a prospect reminiscent of something similar that happened to 
anthropology some time back.  My big idea about the blind brain is a 
rhetorically-derived hypothesis, not a neurological one.  I know extremely 
little about neurology or vision science, and I have taken my “facts” entirely 
from the by-now well superseded article at hand, plus a Wikipedia entry for 
 
68 By way of an accessible example, consider the difference between a Web page 
presented as a two-dimensional layout (left-right, top-bottom) versus a speech presentation 
that has only one native dimension (earlier-later).  Based on several years’ professional 
experience, I’ve noticed that authors who feel like they have an awareness of accessibility 
issues will devote much of their energy to translating the visual layout into words—where the 
left-hand navigation pane is, what is blue, where spacer elements are, etc., all of which 
translates into time-consuming verbiage that increases the user’s cognitive load.  An efficient 
auditory interface has to be conceived in terms of equivalent functionality, not an equivalent 
experience.  My schematization of the page, based on a temporal model, yields an experience 
of the page that is incommensurable to a visual experience, even though I visualize the page 
constantly, after a fashion, as I navigate it. 
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“human brain.”69 The brain exists for me as a lattice work of discourses, and 
I have simply employed rhetorical analysis to identify the warrants that 
establish the parameters for producing knowledge about blind brains.  The 
point is that the reading of FMRI scans can and at times ought to be red as a 
text about the readers, as much as they are about the brains they examine. 
The kind of “thinking outside the box” that occasionally yields a 
paradigm shift only seems mysterious from the standpoint of being trapped 
inside the box.  One can always improvise, infer, negate, bracket, 
deconstruct—in a word, “play.”  Thinking outside the box can be a procedural 
matter, which is vital for scientific practice; but at the same time cannot be 
seen to participate in or advance science.  This fact is responsible for the 
wide margins by which scientific discoveries tend to trail behind the wider 
subjunctive field of science-fiction. Of those few whose goal is to predict the 
future, six out of seven are nuts, of course, and only in hind-sight does the 
seventh prove to have been prophetic.  Most will have provided something 
good to think, though, and thereby delivered collateral benefits.  My purpose 
has been only to highlight the legible assumptions of cognitivism in a 
particular historically-situated research article.  Still, these hard-science 
assumptions have troubling consequences.  Once there are blind brains, 
history teaches that the next idea to pop into someone’s scientific brain will 
be a surgical procedure or chemical cure.  If these eventualities seem 
absurd, it is only because we don’t know what intervening chain of events 
will pick this concrete knowledge up and connect it with some other disorder 
machine.  The blind brain and the trans-orbital lobotomy, discussed below, 
are only two rather queasy representatives of what is at stake in the 
privatization of meaning. 
I come awake, lying in my bed, lying in darkness.  As two sides of the 
same thought, I wonder what time it is and try to remember the moment 
 
69 Thanks, however, go to cognitive psychologist Matt Bronstad for reading a draft of 
this essay and concurring with my identification of the limiting presuppositions of cognitivism 
and his admission that my alternative hypothesis is plausible.  He doesn’t yet believe a word 
of it, of course. 
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when I had fallen asleep.  I fell asleep reading a book on tape.  Had I turned 
out the light?  I couldn’t remember doing so, and suddenly the room is lit.  I 
hadn’t awakened in darkness at all.  I reach over and turn off the bedside 
lamp, then, when the room stays lit, I blink and remind myself to attend to 
what my eyes are reporting.  The room goes dark.  I push aside the white 
sheet and tan bedspread before climbing out of bed.  I see better in the dark 
these days—in fact, I see better with my eyes closed.  A pale yellow beam of 
light from a street light spills past the blinds to bring out the dark shapes of 
things in the room.  This contrast is real vision, I think.  The yellowness as 
such must be a supposition, though.  I would never in practice connect these 
dim visual cues to anything useful.  They are inert, disconnected qualia, 
although they retain a certain small aesthetic appeal.  Testing the light, the 
sound of the night, and the lack of interest Adler shows in what I’m doing, I 
conclude it’s no later than four.  There’s a brown wooden table I walk up to—
never mind that there is no light to make it brown, since the point is that 
brown is an experience of the object and so it comes to me as I locate the in-
fact colorless object, black as any cat at night, toward which I am moving.  I 
never can remember exactly where on the table I put my water glass, and so 
my hand scans for it, too quickly, knocking it to the floor where it rolls.  I put 
my hand down at the point where I marked the sound of it hitting the carpet 
and spend another minute searching for it.  Adler licks his chops, signaling 
that a black-and-tan German Shepherd on his blue-green pad is looking back 
at me.  No one has told me it isn’t blue-green, at least.  The doorway to the 
bathroom is open (if it isn’t, I’ll get a bruised nose on the strength of my 
assumption), and of course I see this clearly, too, as I walk around the table 
and get my water from the tap without having to touch anything but the 
knob.  This is not a scene described by “moving through blackness, 
discovering objects.”  In my immediate experience of the room, everything is 
already in its place the moment I think of it.  These are not matters of 
calculation or hearing or even conscious acts of memory.  They’re not 
reliable, either.  Any of the habituated conditions can fail to hold true.  A 
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series of schematic conditions is presented to me visually.  Only vision has 
this quality of immediacy, which is perhaps why I’ve adapted this format for 
imagining my embodied context.  It presents space to me as a fact, and all 
the procedures enacted to bring it to me are imperceptible unless and until 
something goes wrong.  I can never quite get my mind around the way a 
sight-dependent person moves through a dark but utterly familiar room, a 
room lived in for thirty years, say.  The blackness they move through, in 
which objects are really not there until they can be groped, must be the way 
they imagine blindness—as a blackness of not seeing.  But of course that’s 
already a view from within the perspective of seeing, since one has to see 
black.  A blind spot is what lies just beyond the edge of a sighted person’s 
field of vision: things are there, but confused and uncommunicative.  Things 
come and go, and what goes is a scotoma, fuzzy with the dream-like sense 
of being “there,” just where I know it is, just where I can focus on it if need 
be, just like language when it isn’t being spoken.   
 
HOWARD DULLY’S LOBOTOMY 
Walter Freeman’s mission in life was to develop a method of 
psychosurgery that would make radical and presumably ameliorative 
behavior modification a cheap, five-minute operation that could be done 
anywhere.  His method was the trans-orbital lobotomy (i.e., over the eyes), 
although he generally called it his “ice pick lobotomy” because his instrument 
was a modified ice pick.  The operation didn’t even open the skull; Freeman 
navigated by intuition, feel, and prior generalized anatomical knowledge.  At 
least since the publication of One Flew Over the Coo-Coo’s Nest, the 
lobotomy has represented Medicine’s barbaric yesterday, much as twentieth-
century medicine views leaching.  Did the biomedical sphere become wiser, 
coincident with the shift from psychosurgery to psychopharmacology?  In 
terms of medical history, the trans-orbital lobotomy was an advancement 
over the absolute absence of treatment that came before it, and a procedure 
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subsequently rendered obsolete by Thorazine and other drugs that 
characterize the (brave) new world of  today.  “The medical treatments were 
not effective,” Freeman’s assistant Robert Lichtenstein has recently said, 
“and it was an advanced step over what was previously available” (Gajalin 
2005).  In terms of the history of social control, we can likewise locate the 
lobotomy as post-asylum (Foucault 1988 [1965]).  Lichtenstein also noted, 
“trying to render some of these people more cooperative was one of the 
major goals of management. Otherwise they would have to be put in a room 
with sometimes just a mattress on the floor, and sometimes they would 
destroy the mattress” (Chui 2005).   
These quotes come from newspaper coverage of the first audition of 
“My Lobotomy,” a 22-minute audio documentary representing Howard Dully’s 
attempt to track down and come to grips with the context of the trans-orbital 
lobotomy performed on him in 1960, when he was twelve.70 He reads the 
medical reports aloud: 
Mrs. Dully called up to say that Howard has been unbelievably 
defiant with a savage look on his face and at times she is almost 
afraid. He doesn’t react either to love or to punishment.  He 
objects to going to bed but then sleeps well.  He does a good 
deal of daydreaming and when asked about it he says, ‘I don’t 
know.’ He turns the room’s lights on when there is broad 
sunlight outside. He hates to wash… 
Freeman’s notes record that Dully is of “a rather withdrawn type” who 
is “rather evasive about talking about things that go on in the home…”  Dully 
continues to read from his medical records. 
November 30 (Dully notes that this was his birthday). Mrs. Dully 
came in for a talk about Howard. Things have gotten much 
worse and she can barely endure it. I explained to Mrs. Dully, 
that the family should consider the possibility of changing 
Howard’s personality by means of transorbital lobotomy. Mrs. 
 
70 Produced by Sound Portraits, Inc. See www.soundportraits.org/on-
air/my_lobotomy.  First broadcast November 16, 2005 on “All Things Considered” 
(www.npr.org). 
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Dully said it was up to her husband, that I would have to talk 
with him and make it stick. 
December 3. Mr. and Mrs. Dully have apparently decided to 
have Howard operated on.  I suggested them not tell Howard 
anything about it. 
December 17. I performed transorbital lobotomy. 
Physician’s Service Report. Transorbital lobotomy: a sharp 
instrument was thrust through the orbital roof, and moved so as 
to sever brain pathways in the frontal lobes.  200 dollars for 
surgery. 
January 4, 1961. I told Howard what I’d done to him today and 
he took it without a quiver. He sits quietly, grinning most of the 
time and offering nothing. 
“Twelve years old.  And I was supposed to fight all that?  No way.”  My 
presentation of the transcript above has removed a key element: Dully’s 
interjections as he looks up from what he is reading and provides context for 
the benefit of the microphone.  After the first passage, Dully says that his 
mother died when he was five and his step mother hated him.  “She would 
do anything to get rid of me.”  He also muses that she began to be afraid of 
him when he became so much larger than her (Dully is now 6’7”).  Although 
Thorazine had gone onto the market six years previously, Freeman’s small 
office was conveniently located a few miles from the Dully home. 
Dr. Robert Lichtenstein, the assisting physician for Dully’s operation in 
1960, shook Dully’s hand at the “My Lobotomy” audition and said he was 
glad the procedure had such a “positive outcome” (McGrath 2005).  
Journalist Glenda Chui constructs a different history: “Dully, now 56, never 
went back to school, never graduated. At the insistence of his stepmother, he 
was made a ward of the state, drifting from juvenile hall to halfway houses to 
Agnews State Hospital. He committed petty crimes, drank too much and lived 
on disability payments. He no longer felt welcome at his parents' Los Altos 
home.”  The same article quotes Dully’s own retrospection: “I felt I was not 
who I was supposed to be anymore. You can't put your finger on it, but 
something's been taken away. Something's been altered or changed. It's 
very frustrating.”  Naturally, the narrative frameworks of Lichtenstein, the 
journalist, and Dully are all equally speculative and emerge within different 
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pragmatic circuits.  Each in one sense will claim a higher authority over truth 
on differing grounds, but none automatically have it and we can’t count on 
excavating it. 
Thickening this story even further is the photo of the surgery.  Walter 
Freeman customarily took a photo during each operation he performed, each 
at the moment when the ice picks were in place.  The need for an assistant 
came at this juncture, when Freeman had to take the picture and, statedly, 
check the position of the instruments.  Some observers have been reminded 
of mementos taken by serial killers.  If the photo-taking behavior was not a 
compulsion on Freeman’s part, then the absence of any medical use being 
made of the pictures poses a puzzle.  I imagine his files—3,439 manila 
folders, and from each spills the photo of someone with ice picks in their 
eyes.  Is that normal, Doctor?  Lichtenstein’s hand is visible holding the ice 
picks in Howard Dully’s eyes.  This photo itself is, in turn, compulsively 
reproduced everywhere Dully’s story is told, appearing alongside a graphic 
description of the procedure.  The term “ice pick” is always used in place of 
the pleasantly Nietzschean-sounding “orbitoclast,” as Freeman named his 
slightly-revised ice pick.  The verbal spectacle of the surgery only 
reproduces, lingeringly, the nightmare image of a medical science out to get 
us that can get us where we live.  “Surgery Used on the Soul Sick” was the 
1936 New York Times essay that introduced pre-frontal lobotomy.  Freeman 
jacks open the windows to the soul in black and white.  No more resistance. 
The biomedical story here has been that lobotomy is Medieval by 
today’s  standards but represented progress over simple incarceration.  The 
media’s story is that Freeman was a monster and/or that lobotomy was evil, 
a sensibility that fits well with the ethical awakening toward human research 
subjects that led to the National Research Act of1974.  Both stories can be 
reduced to the photograph, although the shocking image and queasiness 
have absolutely no bearing on the merits of the procedure.  The fact that 
even observing physicians would turn and wretch after watching Freeman 
perform, say, eleven lobotomies in a row may point to something about 
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Freeman’s affective presence during the procedure, a layer of data not legible 
in the photograph; but even Freeman’s own motivations have no bearing on 
the merits of the lobotomy for its day.  Yet, I’m attracted to the obvious 
dichotomy between the reductive stories that fasten on the photograph, 
versus Dully’s choice to talk it through.  The narrative re-presents the past, 
and this vivification brings to light the human factors that subtend our 
present.  “The lobotomy” gives way to local details in a spoken story that 
dramatically displays the interests at stake in that initial diagnosis (which in 
any event never put itself forward as the diagnosis of anything in particular).    
The photograph is about a procedure and a human organism, both given 
context by a medical discourse that describes the human being through the 
lens of a bounded functionalism.  In the narrative, by contrast, Dully views 
himself as a history and set of social relationships.  That story compels a 
human engagement.  It also tells us about the clinic as such. 
The “bad operation” issue is a dead one, but the ideological apparatus 
of the clinic remains alive and well or unwell.  Functionalism methodically 
fishes for data within a paradigm itself steered by contextual motivations.  
Only knowing the truth of the data, the paradigm, and the motivations all 
three shall set you free, even in your own mind.  The problem is that neither 
Lichtenstein’s or the media’s story is very dangerous or has much at stake, 
since both are stories about a past and a man that are dead to everyone but 
Howard Dully.  That means the monster is still out there, living within the 
walls that enclose clinics of every sort.  It will all happen again.  It is 
probably happening under our feet, here, in the present moment. 
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Chapter 7.  Argonauts of the Western Tradition 
 
Chicago: the downtown hotel across from Grant Park, where I take 
Adler to pee, is a juggernaut held up by the swarming bodies of thousands 
upon thousands of anthropologists.  Gaston Bachelard aptly identified a 
structural principle behind the human tendency to distribute labors of the 
body and mind up and down a vertical axis, at least in our homes.  As 
adolescents, we climb out onto the roof to aspire, and later we place our 
studies on the top floor as the best place for lofty thoughts.  Bodies and 
private things are buried in the dark, humid cellar, just below the kitchen, 
along with the stackable Whirlpool washer and dryer.  An analogous principle 
divides spaces at the conference hotel, but the structure is inverted.  In a 
reflection of the utilitarian structure of an urban multi-use building, Private 
spaces are on high while public business goes on near or below ground level: 
beds above and brains below.  A circulatory system communicates the flow of 
people from one to the other, centered on the thick bank of elevators 
continually jammed with people who can, in most other areas of the hotel, be 
observed to navigate according to an index of the social and physical 
proximity of different people (this index is calculated very differently, 
approaching an inverse, “in the field,” where listening replaces speaking as 
the basic operating mode).   
The flow of humanity spit out from the elevator onto any given level 
surges forward into a myriad arteriole hallways, all lined with chambers that 
gradually absorb them.  They check the number of the door against a 
schedule held in their hands and choose the door that corresponds to their 
interests, the one that will advance their knowledge.  Within each of these 
terminal cells, one figure, the speaker, stands with his body concealed behind 
the chest-high lectern so that his voice can be projected with unnatural force 
by the P.A. system toward three hundred or thirty or three people in the 
audience, while four others sit in a row in front, their nether body parts 
250 
hidden by the folds of a white skirt draped over the table: five talking heads 
positioned opposite their audience.  The audience cannot talk back until the 
end, if there is time and if they have time. I’ve just come from there back 
into the hallway, occupied by the faint sound of closed-off applause, the 
swish of so-called “sports coats” (who plays what in these?), the clink of 
water glasses: no human smells at all, by design.   
I direct my dog into a side passage and am engulfed in a milling 
crowd.  I urge him forward.  The cold black nose of a German Shepherd has 
a particular knack for dividing the waters.  But amidst the noise and perfume 
and all-absorbing walls of one corridor after another, we’re lost.  “Adler.” We 
stop and he cocks his head up at me attentively.  “Where is the elevator?”  
He wheels us around, diving back through the crowd, but it’s no use: he 
returns to the conference room from which we’ve just come.  I locate 
someone from the hotel staff by the sound of a walkie talkie, and they take 
me halfway to my next destination before being called away, leaving behind 
the promise that someone else would come.  I sit down, opting to give it a 
few minutes before setting out again on my own.  I begin planning how I will 
navigate and imagine myself locating the bell of an arriving elevator.  Point 
of trivia: elevator bells were originally intended to allow the disabled time to 
position themselves in front of the proper door. 
I’m not alone.  For a full minute, I monitor the sounds of under-breath 
mutterings of a cigarette smoker, combined with the activities of a man 
intent on combat with some personal article.  What I should do is turn my 
head slightly in that direction as if to say “I’m present and am aware that 
this, whatever it is, is going on, and am not ignoring it, but am not 
demanding an explanation either.  I am turning my head slightly, just as 
would a sighted person to gaze upon this scene, but obviously I am only 
acknowledging that gazing in such a manner is what I would be doing if I 
could see, and you can react to that however you like, now that it’s 
established that I am aware and not forcibly ignoring what I obviously know 
is happening.”  I would turn my head a few degrees in that direction, then 
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back.  Instead, I continue to stare straight ahead, thinking about the 
mounting tension embodied in my obvious act of not turning my head, and 
monitoring the odd sound in case it turns out to be something I would rather 
not have acknowledged.  It probably isn’t a threat to me, but long habit 
keeps me attuned to the fact that it might be.   
The rustling stops and he says, “My briefcase broke.” 
“Oh, no.”  One still can’t say “that sucks” to a stranger over fifty at a 
professional conference, which poses a limitation to the display of routine 
empathy.  In front of us, the crowd surges in both directions.  Most wear 
name tags.  Many diligently scan the names they pass.  Under certain 
conditions, the scanning eyes and face light up with a respectful, “notice me” 
gaze at the other’s face.  Or, the scanning eyes slide off the name tag and 
onto the next one without raising to se the face at all.  This seems to go on 
throughout the circulatory system as one of its primary functions.   
The leather of his briefcase rattles again.  “Look at that.”  The end of a 
leather strap nudges insistently against my hand.  It is a broken strap.  “It 
just snapped,” he says, with the tone he would use if telling me about a 
distant relation convicted for dealing drugs. 
“Yes.”  Ten feet away, a man is intent on pumping an older woman’s 
hand and expressing admiration for so-and-so’s work.  He isn’t aware of the 
repeated slight bow he makes in concert with every other down-up 
movement of his arm.  Somewhere, there is a zone within all this where 
peers comfortable with their status and position maintain personal networks, 
reinforce old friendships, and, often in the rooms above or out on the street, 
refuel their scholarly passions.  I’ve seen some evidence of it. 
The rattle of steel against stiff leather goes on for a few more minutes 
then stops, either because he has jury-rigged the shoulder strap or his body 
has caught up with his intellectual realization of the break and he’s decided 
to pick up the handle instead.  He is gone, taken up by the flow of scanning 
eyes.  My sighted guide arrives a minute later and I am gone, too, back to 
the gleaming, chiming, democratic elevator. 
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This elevator is in fact the site of a small social drama, although I think 
I am alone in theorizing it.  About this time, every television screen in the 
United States is fixed, in compulsive fascination or else its assumption of 
America’s compulsive fascinatedness, on the scene of Michael Jackson 
(author of Bad, not that of Paths Toward a Clearing or of Beerhunter.com) on 
trial for pedophilia.  Since every room in the hotel and most reasonably-
priced eateries have television screens, the experience is like discovering that 
we are all enclosed in “Biosphere III: Planet Academe,” which I tend to 
experience at the best of times but now one opens any window onto the 
world outside and the same sad little extra-terrestrial face looks back, 
waving the same gloved hand.  Many anthropologists have, in private or as a 
ritual of identity, killed our televisions.  And so, turning to drink or evening 
keynote addresses as an alternative drug comes easily.  But in this hotel, as 
it happens, the elevators all have television screens, and all of them are 
showing Michael Jackson.  In one elevator car, however, the screen has been 
covered by a bumper sticker for Amnesty International. 
I don’t know who did it, but I can offer an assessment that the act 
would have been committed by someone at the bottom of the social 
hierarchy, not someone with an established name and presence.  When the 
doors close behind the eminent Dr. Jeckel, he exercises a special ability to 
not notice the icon of 1980s popular culture (strike 1) on the television 
(strike 2) intruding in the field of the academic conference.  The television 
does not belong on his route or in his interactions upon this securely 
intellectual field of relations, while Michael Jackson does not constitute a 
proper interlocutor at all, unless and until he becomes the object of study in 
one of the cellular rooms fed by the circulatory system.  It is likewise 
important not to overtly turn one’s back on the monitor, however, because 
that is likewise an acknowledgement of the television’s power to dictate his 
action.  To his credit, he makes this calculation entirely without his own 
knowledge of it and without respect to whether or not there are others 
present in the elevator—which, he now notices, there are.  He quickly scans 
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their faces looking for a peer he can address.  It is because the senior 
academic cannot with certainty maintain his preeminence in the act of being 
forced into a subject-object relation with either the television or Michael 
Jackson that the television is required to depart entirely from Dr. Jeckel’s 
plane.  It will not be noticed, it will not be spoken of, it will not be defaced. 
Graduate students inhabit a very different world within the same 
enclosed space.  Quite apart from that, they’ve also just come from crashing 
a party on the twelfth floor.  She’d grabbed a handful of politically correct, 
human-rights-oriented, vaguely anti-capitalist bumperstickers at the 
registration desk.  Three people attended her talk, and the trip has cost her 
close to a month’s salary as a teaching assistant.  She has no name when 
she comes to the lower floors.  Everyone she knows here is crammed noisily 
into the elevator with her, except for the graying, important-looking man 
who seems not to notice any of them, and so Amnesty International plasters 
over Jackson’s wrinkled nose and whiter shade of pale.  The bumper sticker, 
weapon of the weak.   
Speaking now as ethnographer, I want to celebrate this act of 
everyday resistance because it is concrete.  It accomplishes exactly what it 
wants to and without discussion, without displacing the site of resistance to 
another space of discussions about someone else’s resistance.  This act is 
aware and attentive to the structure we have all strained so hard to let 
swallow us whole.  Up and down the elevator goes, pumping intellectuals 
between the dark grottos above and the charged scholarly mosh pit below, 
and for a few hours, those who would notice the screens at all were asked to 
write letters in support of basic human rights instead.  But I don’t yet know 
about this episode as the doors open onto the cacophony of scholars who can 
smell the boundary line of the conference space over which floats the tinny 
echo of Muzak.  It smells of steak and idling taxi cabs and  the tingling 
sensation of the faint detection of “outside.”  A small man in a double-
buttoned uniform shouts “Going up!”  The floor quakes and those inside 
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brace themselves against the walls as a jet of flame ignites below the car, 
sending it skywards again in a cloud of smoke. 
 “Yes sir.  I’ve called them in and they’re going to meet me at the 
elevator with the cleaning supplies right now.  Yes sir, I understand.”  The 
phone clicks into place and the tall man straightens his tailored jacket before 
taking up a walkie talkie on his way out the door.  I raise one eyebrow as he 
passes.  I’m holding an icepack over my other eye.  He offers a wry smile.  
“We’ve got beer bottles piled all up and down the hallways on the twelfth 
floor, but the Man says the big emergency is a bumper sticker in the 
elevator.”  When he is gone, I check to see if the cut over my eye is still 
bleeding.  Probably so, but it’s indeterminate enough for me to stand, thank 
the solicitous woman behind the desk, and head with Adler out of the 
security station.  As I make my way back to the roar of the lobby, I’m aware 
of how quiet and efficient this employees-only behind-the-screen area of the 
hotel is.  It is another filigree of passageways, ducts, locked panels, and 
closets traveling up the hotel’s skeletal structure unseen by the 
anthropologists.  Everyone in this space is Black. 
Largely inadvertently, I’ve trained Adler in an unusual way.  Ignoring 
the first rule of dog training, which is to be consistent, I have always told him 
what I wanted—or, just as often, asked his advice—using whatever words 
occur to me.  I have counted ten different phrases to which he appropriately 
responds by relieving himself, for example, while he will snap into 
professional high gear and perform flawlessly when I say “isn’t it the other 
way?” or “do you remember where the barber shop is?” or “I don’t think it’s 
up there.”  Our communication is based entirely on the assessment I’ve 
forced him to make regarding my referentially ambiguous intentions within 
the present context.  He knows what I mean based entirely on where we are, 
and this system works terrifically well for our mutual understanding as long 
as I remain attentive to what he, as a dog, is likely to be aware of in the 
present.  He always watches me, especially when he utilizes mute passive 
resistance, going completely still and inaudible when I give those mundane, 
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doggie-speak, context-independent commands like “come” or “do you want 
to go for a walk?”  I can say anything, so long as the context accurately fixes 
the meaning he apprehends.  But I can’t make him be aware of obstacles in 
our environment that he isn’t aware of.  Adler is an animal, not a robot, and 
hadn’t noticed the concrete arch that curved overhead as I had exited the 
hotel and pointed, giving him the standard command to go right.  The one 
shortcoming of his work is that he can’t programmatically remember to look 
up.   
Leaving the hotel for once and all comes with a sigh of relief known 
only to the lobster who somehow manages to climb out of the boiling pot 
unnoticed, despite the fact that I am now at the airport, the second-most 
disabling environment I know.  Adler is heeling at my side rather than 
working, because hanging onto one more arm is easier than training my 
Caribbean skycap how to reliably verbalize the right kind of navigation 
directions that would let me go alongside him without passing him by.  He 
keeps saying “excuse me” in a honking, bored and somewhat rude monotone 
to the oblivious slow-moving travelers, wheeled luggage heeling at their 
sides.  On we go in this manner for a quarter mile.  I catch onto the upset 
voice of a man who is trying to explain that what he needs is an elevator 
because his wheelchair can’t go up the escalator.  The attendants ignore him 
and hurriedly speak to one another over his head in a sub-Saharan African 
language.  One of them does, at any rate.  The other might be speaking 
something entirely different.  The man raises his voice and speaks more 
slowly, emphatically, but what the attendants do is call two more employees 
over.  Yelling fiercely now, the man, head thrashing, limbs limp as a doll’s, is 
lifted bodily from the chair and held by three men.  As we pass the scene, 
the remaining lanky teenager, eyes large and frightened, awkwardly hauls 
the wheelchair onto the escalator, which ascends toward a light visible within 
a sort of Plexiglas tube, at the top end of which the man’s impotent sob of 
rage can be heard before we pass into another area of the terminal. 
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Someplace out there, as potential readers, are a disability studies 
scholar who remembers being abducted up an escalator, an anthropologist 
who showed a young blind man a broken briefcase, an anti-mass-media 
vigilante, and various participants who might recognize themselves.  Others 
won’t. 
 
OUT-OF-THE-ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY 
The following passages, begun in January 2006, comprises a self-
addressed exploration through which I began to articulate a vocabulary and 
set of concepts that would then repeat themselves as a trope and a rhetorical 
structure throughout the previous essays.  When I say “I am writing just at 
the moment when…” this should be taken literally, as the scene of a man 
confronting an as-yet empty document while the radio is tuned to the news. 
 
I am writing just at the moment when the status of memoir as a genre 
has come into question within popular media, thanks to the revelation that 
James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces has been shown to incorporate several 
demonstrably untrue statements by the author about his life (“A Million Little 
Lies,” Jan. 8, 2006).  The problem, apparently, is that it remains a “real” and 
productive experience, even though the events are imaginary.  So, Opra 
Winfrey and others have had to ask themselves what is at stake in whether 
or not memories are knowingly misreported, and if that situation is different 
from misremembering one’s life.  Anthropology likewise has its Carlos 
Castaneda, the “flying nun of anthropology” (van Maanen 1988: 77), whose 
spiritual journeys, likely into the UCLA library (De Mille 1976), became a 
series of trickster tales that have been held up by Mexicans I’ve known as a 
sort of Bible for their cultural identity—noting, too, that those who take Don 
Juan as fact instead of allegory remain in the overwhelming majority today, 
according to a quick surf around the Web.  Distinctions between veracity and 
verisimilitude can be important, depending on why one is digging into the 
257 
matter, but an insoluble truth resides in these texts at the point where the 
reader has an experience that cannot thereafter be unhad.   
Henry Miller was, for whatever reason, spurred to assert himself on 
this point (Miller 1962 [1939]): 
If the self were not imperishable, the “I” I write about would 
have been destroyed long ago.  To some, this may seem like an 
invention.  But whatever I imagine to have happened, actually 
happened, at least to me.  History may deny it, since I have 
played no part in the history of my people, but even if 
everything I say is wrong, is prejudiced, spiteful, malevolent, 
even if I am a liar and a poisoner, it is nevertheless the truth, 
and it will have to be swallowed. 
This passage reflects the structure of the novelistic form Miller invented for 
himself, which was part autobiography, part fiction, and part social critique in 
a way that insisted on not marking these as discrete discourses.  I’ll dwell on 
it, because Miller turns out to have been, to coin a phrase, a poststructuralist 
before there was a proper structuralism to be post about.  The passage 
places the reader in the position of what Bateson (1972 [Bateson et. Al 
1956]: 206ff.) would later call a double bind.   
The double-bind relationship has sometimes been illustrated by a box labeled 
“everything inside this box is true” nested inside a larger box labeled 
“everything inside this box is false.”  The inner-most proposition of Miller’s 
text states, (P or not P) implies Q, where Q is nothing less than the truth of 
his text and P, the status of which doesn’t seem to matter, is whether or not 
he’s lying.  The outer proposition reads, not P implies not Q; or, “if the self is 
a construct (“not imperishable”), then I couldn’t be reporting on my past life 
right now as I’m doing.”  The two propositions are mutually incoherent.  
Note, however, that he introduces the passage with “if,” which is already 
imagining the negative of its proposition; and, indeed, he implies that 
(objective) history might (doesn’t?) have a record of these events.  But he’s 
never been immanent in history—which, I’d say, might actually be the only 
way one can be imperishable: to be, for example, a self only on the page of a 
book circulating somewhere within a public.  So the memories are true even 
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if the self is false, from an objective viewpoint?  A certain kind of objectivist 
would dismiss the book at this point (or would, if not for the graphic sex 
scenes to follow).  Now, back to the “whether or not I’m a liar” term: here, 
too, the thing is already imagining its opposite and accounting for it 
(“whether or not”).   
The nested-box model depicts structure, but the double bind is actually a 
theory of practice, not a structure.  As an anthropologist-become-
psychiatrist, Bateson was already frustrated with cognitivist models that 
place objects or images of objects in the mind rather than in symbolic 
interaction.  The problem was reification, and the answer was what linguists 
today call performativity, the fact that signs take their meaning from usage 
and, in their usage, come to have stable meanings that can help create social 
realities by pointing to what people take to be going on: “This weaving of 
contexts and of messages which propose context—but which, like all 
messages whatsoever, have ‘meaning’ only by virtue of context—is the 
subject matter of the so-called double bind theory” (1972 [1969]: 275-6).   
He calls the relationship of what I’ve drawn as the inner to outer box 
“transcontextual.”  In context A, we learn to use signs in ways that bring 
about reliable rewards from our interlocutors; or, following Bateson’s specific 
case, the schizo-to-be learns to follow the injunctions of his mother in order 
to avoid punishment.  Next, we learn to recognize key characteristics that 
make up repetitions of such a context, and the sign-behavior becomes a 
habit.  But then one time in Context X, the reward doesn’t come or Mother 
wallops the schizo-in-training—the sign is true and not true.  Now all the 
contexts have to be subsumed into a broader context, the habit brought back 
to the surface where it can undergo modification to accommodate the 
rupture.  What would account for both getting walloped and not-walloped in 
this ostensible repetition of the same context?  For every such synthesis, 
Mother relentlessly wallops the schizo until the only sustainable strategy is a 
retreat into literalness with no contextualization at all, like a string of 
morphemes with no idea of semantics.  The policeman says “You can’t stand 
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here” and the loiterer obligingly sits down.  This dynamic, once it becomes a 
technique instead of a syndrome, even if by a narrow margin, enables Miller’s 
inner proposition to assert itself with an undeniable Walt Whitmanesque 
barbaric yaup.  The text is split from objective history, and the “I” has 
absented itself from history in favor of a plane of intensities recorded on the 
surface of the page, a schizo in the Deleuzian sense and so not subjugated 
by any regime such as symbolic logic.  The “truth” of his stories “have to be 
swallowed” just because this surface is what we the readers are forced to 
traverse.71
Bully for him, I suppose, but my interest is more narrowly invested in 
the logical structure, “if it is fiction, it is true,” which gathers up Henry Miller, 
Don Juan, and Opra Winfrey into a surprising bouquet.  In a shallow literary 
sense, marking fiction as somehow experientially real is the end of it, and 
consequently a cliché (not only that; the correlated reduction of cultures-as-
texts to equal and uncritical ontologies turns cultural relativism into moral 
relativism).  In that camp, I also place the view that an ethnographic allegory 
based on indeterminate sources “evokes” experience in us and so is its own 
justification.  The force of such texts is stored in images and realized in their 
ability to contract our attention and compel our belief.  A text that is simply 
forceful as a function of rhetorical or institutional power rather than 
argument either has its way or goes its way: the reader corresponds with it, 
desires to connect with it, or not.  Miller’s text and much of poststructural 
theory outside philosophy, along with ethnographies addressed primarily to 
the Academy, exert this kind of force.   
Rhetoricians, conversely, measure the force of an argument in terms 
of what consequences hinge on whether a proposition is true, including 
whether or not its course of action is followed.  In an argument, something is 
 
71 As it happens, Deleuze and Guattari cite another work by Henry Miller in affinity to 
their celebration of the schizo at the opening of Anti-Oedipus, and this citation is reinforced by 
Foucault in his introduction to the book.  Bateson’s double-bind becomes central to their 
formulation of schizophrenia on p. 79, and Bateson’s professional development is read 
imaginatively in schizoanalytic terms on p. 236. 
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at stake for the reader, and something from the reader is at stake for the 
author, and it is this fact that has compelled the published text, even if the 
writer is using the page in a largely private way as a surface to think with.  
This risk, introduced when the consequences of P are profoundly different 
from not-P, is the search for either a habit that reliably succeeds cross-
contextually or else the tactical contextual awareness (a meta-level 
awareness) that will allow the self to better navigate the encounter with 
rupture.  The rhetorical force of an ethnography, from the native point of 
view, is expressed by a consequential change in practice; while its rhetorical 
force for the reader is realized by a consequential change in the reader’s 
practice.  These are pedagogical and pragmatic rather than representational 
concerns, and locate the sociological study of the circulation and use of texts 
apart from the unidirectional study of their production.  A messy text like 
Miller’s or Castaneda’s demands that its impacts should be watched and its 
histories excavated.  The object in this case is not to know if the reports are 
true in themselves, but what the experience means, which cannot ever be 
divorced from the question of for whom it matters.72 On these terms, we can 
begin to think about constructing a text able to produce an experience of 
individual difference despite the limitations of shared communicative 
practice.  As an ethical pursuit, this encounter cannot rely on simply offering 
a product one chooses to accept or not.  Too much is at stake, and the 
encounter will be conceptually difficult. 
My rereading of Bateson ran across his definition of an idea as “a 
difference that makes a difference” (p. 272), which I had somehow 
 
72 Geertz, committed as he was to the maintenance of ethnography as interpretive 
“science,” would likely disagree, as would many ethnographers today.  Writing in 1973, he 
casually refers to  “the little stories Oxford philosophers like to make up for themselves,” 
admitting that they “may seem artificial” (1973: 7).  We might today instead say “denatured” 
in contradistinction with natural language collected off the ground somewhere.  Even so, the 
key mechanism by which Geertz moves the concept of thick description from philosophy into 
social science is merely to use the episode of a sheep raid from his field journal to exemplify 
precisely the same winking/blinking story Ryle concocted introspectively (Ryle 1971 [1967]).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the consequential difference between a scientific project and a 
deconstructive one cannot be discussed rationally in the absence of an accompanying reflexive 
critical perspective on the pragmatics of the text in question. 
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mistakenly come to associate with Derrida.  Googling the phrase finds it in 
use as a definition within information science and emblazoned as a slogan 
within business, social work, consulting firms, golf, and in general by anyone 
wanting to proclaim the value of making an impact on society—because, of 
course, a difference that makes no difference (if P or not-P then Q) is in 
effect dissociated from the system.  The Google result seems to map the 
world as a sprawling semiotic network of quantum differences, making up the 
Information Age.  These are the residual and perhaps momentary products of 
differentiation.  Bateson was instead writing about the process.   
He ultimately provides the example of a porpoise, trained through 
double bind to anticipate the need to exhibit some kind of strange new trick 
for the humans because she knew that repeating the expected would be 
futile.  The animal had to synthesize a long, inconsistent series of rewards 
and punishments doled out for the same behavior until she realized that it 
was not the trick but the new trick that gained praise.  This realization 
involved getting walloped to the brink of utterly destroying the animal’s 
ability to trust any gesture the trainer made.  On the bright side, the 
transcontextual syndrome puts present particularity at center field as the 
only means of escape from the nonsensical game.  By the experiment’s end, 
the porpoise had the game fully mastered and spontaneously exhibited “eight 
conspicuous pieces of behavior of which four were entirely new—never before 
observed in this species of animal” (p. 278).  The moral he gives this story is 
very pointedly about more than how one gets at cross porpoises: “First, that 
severe pain and maladjustment can be induced by putting a mammal in the 
wrong regarding its rules for making sense of an important relationship with 
another mammal. And second, that if this pathology can be warded off or 
resisted, the total experience may promote creativity” (p. 278). 
Bateson’s thinking was revolutionary for the manner in which he 
conceived the psyche as a communicative product, far above and beyond 
whatever potentials and propensities genetics provide.  It was a failed 
revolution in psychiatry and psychology, however, as we know.  When I 
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asked a psychologist about how Bateson’s interpersonal theory of 
schizophrenia was viewed by psychology, he had no idea who I was talking 
about until I tried to explain the double bind, at which point a light bulb 
ignited with a flash: “Oh, you mean the refrigerator mother guy?”  A pair of 
presumptive inferences has apparently positioned Bateson as a laughing 
stock: if we can point to genetic or physiological origins of schizophrenia, 
which in turn usually means that we can effectively control it with drugs, 
then the mother’s mixed messages can’t be the cause; and (although this is 
now superfluous) if it’s not the mother, then it’s not interpersonal.  From that 
point forward, schizophrenia developed very different careers within 
psychiatry and psychological anthropology.   
This schism is constitutive of the larger schism over the nature of the 
human mind, modeled structurally by cognitivism and hermeneutically by 
traditions that approach the mind as a function of discourse.73 Potter (1999) 
depicts these competing (or mutually indisposed) paradigms as historical 
progressions from Chomsky on the one hand (and we would want to add 
Jakobson and Levi-Strauss) versus Wittgenstein and Harvey Sacks on the 
other.  Although Potter identifies ethnography as the archetype of the study 
of practice, I have argued that both grounded theory and Sacks’ proof 
procedure stem from a core “seeing is believing” structural rigidity that can 
ultimately occupy ethnography at any level between sense data and the 
theoretical paradigm.  Empirical observation can’t cope with difference.  It 
has to recognize it as something.  The only way out is to jump through the 
hoop of negativity.  The way I know to accomplish this is through a kind of 
writing steeped in what Wittgenstein called a grammatical fiction, which in a 
sense comprises an indeterminate and heuristic negation of the world as it 
represents itself.  Potter also notes that the word “cognitivism” is a very 
 
73 The division is not made along disciplinary lines.  Psychological anthropologists 
might be of either persuasion, while the field of psychology is divided between the eight-
hundred-pound gorilla of cognitivism and minority traditions, including narrative psychology 
(Sarbin 1986), discursive psychology (Edwards 1997), and post-Freudian psychoanalysis 
(Stern 1997). 
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recent contrivance, as opposed to “cognitive psychology,” which was simply a 
moniker for finally being able to do psychology the right way; and that this 
new ‘ism already embodies the dangerous conception of something beyond 
the cognitive-structural paradigm.  How ever that –ism became suspect, it’s 
the right track.  The remediation of such a deep paradigm continues to be an 
ideal goal for a radical critique bent on remediating very basic 
misrecognitions concerning human experience, knowledge, sense, selfhood, 
and abilities. 
One valid story about our brains has been that humans categorize and 
objectify as two sides of the same cognitive process.  Mary Douglas (2002 
[1966]) and Edmund Leach (1964) have demonstrated the utility of such a 
model to a degree we can dismiss only by ignoring the issue altogether.  But 
there’s a dialectical relationship between Adam’s naming of all the animals 
and the contrary movements of anomalies, of qualities from one category-
object to another, and of the rules dishonored in the breach.  A different and 
more inclusive story about the brain is told in Victor Turner’s last neglected 
essay, “Body, Brain, and Culture” (1987 [1983]).  He asked, what if the 
faculty hard-wired into humans is a biological imperative to play?  What if the 
contrasts we generate, as when an animal tilts its head to gain more visual 
images, is something we humans can generate imaginatively through ritual, 
fiction, games, and discourse?  And, what if this profoundly non-Cartesian 
pineal gland underwrites our ability to perceive objects in the first place?  
Nietzsche and Hegel could both belong to such a species.   
The word “standard” does an entertaining flip when its usage transits 
from jazz to all things that aren’t jazz; from a common repertory form to be 
appropriated as one’s own through playing it, to an often tacit set of criteria 
by which to assess someone’s position within the bounds of a radial category.  
The jazz standard follows an innovative set of operations to play with time, 
melody, and harmony in a way that transcends the world of the original 
piece.  This kind of play is deeply instructive as to how one can cope with 
other kinds of inherited standards.  Victor Turner always insisted on the 
264 
seriousness of play, and he wasn’t alone.  Geertz (1973: 11-2) saw fit to 
observe that one can’t play violin music without the score, without practice, 
or without a violin (though MIDI changed this last).  For Gadamer, meaning 
is a product of understanding, and understanding is a linguistic process of 
interpretation, and interpretation is an extra-methodical exploration of truth 
that operates through the to-and-fro jog dial of play.  For all the above, the 
object comes to life through one’s playing with it, one’s playing of it, entering 
into its life from the point at which it makes its claim upon us.  A standard in 
the unethical, unjazzed sense of the term restricts which claims are valid 
ones; whereas, in the jazz world, any noise can be valid, even a stream of 
consciousness (play it once it’s a mistake, play it twice, it’s jazz).   
I remember jazz pianist Marian McPartland once on her radio show 
“Piano Jazz” recounting the story of being asked to play something at a 
party.  In attendance was Thelonious Monk, so renown for both the notes he 
played and for the negative spaces where he refrained.  In the story, she 
walks over to the great man (I see him in a suit and pork pie hat…always).  
“Mr. Monk,” she begins, hands clasped in front of her, “I was thinking of 
playing ‘Round Midnight and wanted to know if you had any advice for how I 
should play it.”  He doesn’t even turn his head to face where she stands by 
the arm of his chair, but looks at her from the corner of his eye.  “Swing it,” 
he says.  “Thank you.”  She backs away, turns, pauses, and then turns 
toward him again.  “Mr. Monk, after I’ve gotten through swinging it, then 
what should I do?”  One corner of his mouth turns upwards.  “Swing it some 
more.” 
 
ONE LAST DISAVOWED CATEGORY, OR, “UP HE WENT AND 
DOWN HE CAME WITHOUT HIS EYES”74 
Anyone attending these essays with a tin ear will classify me as a 
Gallocentric poststructuralist and read (or not read) the text knowing it 
 
74 Plato, The Republic, Book VII. 
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proceeded from a set of deconstructive assumptions (although this ought to 
be a contradiction).  Significantly, that is precisely the same procedure by 
which someone would read or discard the text as being “about” disability as a 
specialized topic that either corresponds to their intellectual interests or fails 
to.   
When, during the first half of the 20th Century, the voices of 
Wittgenstein and several others among whom Derrida would soon count 
himself emerged within philosophy to question the fundamental character of 
philosophical understanding, their aggregate discourse became known within 
philosophy as the Linguistic Turn (as a methodological marker) and as the 
“radical critique of objectivism” (marking philosophy’s problematic 
relationship to science). Critique it remained as Geertz played his part in 
transposing it to anthropology.  By 1973, Geertz was already able to write as 
if the whole discussion were old hat for anthropology, while that hat would be 
remarkably no more or les worn, but much more beaten, twenty years later 
when the same basic talking points were still at issue.  By the early 1990s, 
the dialogue had been replaced by two discourses talking past one another 
about the method, the text, and the ethnographer caught in the middle.  It 
was never supposed to be a winnable debate, once it departed from the 
subject of whether philosophy’s proper object was language or objective 
reality, although writers too often urged it into that trap by framing the 
discussion as a fight over the nature of something called “ethnography,” 
science or art.  It was initially supposed to be a performance of the dialectic 
of understanding which, like a conversation, would keep alive the contextual 
awareness of differing perspectives—anthropology as a multidisciplinary field.  
That dialectical tension, I believe, has devolved into something unhealthy.  
Science remains predictably scientistic, but the radical critique has morphed.   
Some of the most-criticized aspects of poststructural writing are in fact 
productive and necessary.  First, the brevity and simplicity of conventional 
writing—what makes it conventional—is a common ground of presuppositions 
that deconstructive writing can’t utilize, and so the text will always demand 
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concentration.  Second, it is also an in-vivo thought process, not a report—
not a “write-up”—and so the abstract object of a poststructural text generally 
requires metaphor for the sake of the writer as much as the reader, or 
perhaps more so.  Third, although the object might be unitary, its 
elaborations will be irreducibly complex.  The inductive strand of a mobile, 
creative abduction is, to the very last page, in the process of building a figure 
out of the very scenes in which that figure begins to be discerned.  Any 
glance into a formative ethnographic text will display some evidence of this 
abductive process.  Take away the concreteness of ethnographic reality, 
however, and the text becomes highly abstract.  Fourth, and as a corollary to 
the preceding, the intertextuality of poststructural theory is seldom a matter 
of citing authoritative sources.  Poststructuralism grasps that the concept of 
“applied theory” is impossible.  For example, to claim that one is applying 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice by appropriating the idea of habitus without the 
concepts of reflexive sociology or objectivity is an incoherent reading of 
Bourdieu, although it might still produce useful knowledge, precisely because 
one hasn’t “applied” a theory but learned from a fragment of it and learned 
to synthesize something that has become one’s own, which is what scholars 
like Bourdieu and Deleuze and all ethnographers have done.  Finally, it goes 
without saying that all sentences that attempt to firmly predicate 
poststructuralism, as I’ve been doing, are self defeating.  A valid 
deconstructive project seeks to question the foundations of knowledge, 
including its own.75 We have technologies of inscription and information, but 
there are no technologies of Socratic dialogue, which is technology’s 
 
75 This fact made of Derrida something of a performance philosopher, since to write 
centrally about deconstructive decentering is always to write about how the writing hasn’t yet 
captured the subject.  Some have adopted his style without adopting his object, which is 
strictly philosophical; while some critics have dismissed deconstruction on the basis of the 
oblique style without understanding the relationship in Derrida’s work between style and 
intent.  Neither course is valid.  Neither is the claim that literary criticism or anthropology has 
“gotten past” Derrida, since deconstruction is not located in a linear dialectic in which the 
notion of progress makes any sense.  Neither, finally, need we confuse deconstruction with 
derrida, since to do so, as Scholes (1989: 50-78) demonstrates, discovers many 
inconsistencies of argument based on the assumption that a unitary Derrida exists; and, 
surely, such a “literal” reading of Derrida can’t be the only useful one. 
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dialectical other.  To carry out a deconstruction drives a wedge into the 
smooth surfaces of things like ideologies, institutions, habits, and discourses, 
none of which present themselves as rational arguments that can be 
addressed by classical forms of reason or rhetoric.   
The literary conventions that emerged among French and Gallo-centric 
theorists made a point of performing the fact that one can only learn a 
discourse by inhabiting it (a la Foucault, but also Bakhtin 1986 [1953]).  
Escape from the linear dialectic of Hegel was often a central concern.  
Rhetorically, the effect is a discourse closed upon itself that makes no 
apologies to skeptics.  In this regard, many critics have noted that post-
scientific discourse has a way of swallowing its subjects so that they either 
cannot or never wish to resurface to tell outsiders what they’ve found that’s 
so amazing, except to say it in its own abstruse terms.  Not withstanding the 
stipulations already mentioned, these critiques are valid.  The label Social 
Constructionism came from the direction of scientism, but it has become a 
proper designation for a discourse that operates in large part as a system of 
internally-referential contentions about the world.  What should go without 
saying is that a critique of objectivism is more effective when addressed to a 
public inhabiting objectivist discourse.  One can take up or opt out of an “-
ism,” whereas a critique makes a claim on us.   
From the processual, exploratory, self-addressed character of the text 
(what Philistines call “navel-gazing,” and not all Philistines are wrong), it 
follows that the text accords with the in-group’s standards of aesthetic value 
rather than its rhetorical effectiveness for addressing the framework of the 
out-group.  Poetic language serves the poststructural aim of interrogating 
ordinary language relationships and referents, but when those figures are 
thereafter reproduced and applied by others as an implicit mode of citation, a 
public is formed.  The danger of learning poststructural ideas through 
socialization to poststructural discourse, thereby joining it as a public, is the 
strong possibility that the discourse will become, within its readership, an 
ordinary language instead of a critical one.  A poststructural critic cannot 
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take for granted that he has learned to be a deconstructionist and will 
therefore apply those tools to every task.  Above all, however, the trouble 
with poststructural theory is that the discourse presents a sheer surface, the 
author a finished product who is already writing from the far side of 
revelation.  Much poststructural writing thereby violates a first principle of 
anti-objectivist critique, in that texts about the constructedness of our most 
closely-held ideas are in themselves presented as the miraculous products of 
theorists whose works display no traces of their own production. 
If one combines “read culture like a text”—which for most students is 
the only received residue of Geertz’s synthesis of Ricoeur and Ryle—with 
Barthes’ concept of the text as methodological field, the result is a wonderful 
hermeneutic circularity, which can be restated as the confrontation between 
ideas of data as methodically-collected objects versus data as a discursive 
product of avowedly overdetermined methodical perception; which in turn 
resolves into any number of philosophical or anthropological approaches that 
concede that we always begin any inquiry already standing in the interpretive 
thick of things.  Such is the standpoint of what Americans choose to call 
poststructuralism, which may be an unfortunate label because it can permit 
the casual student to dismiss structuralism as altogether passé instead of 
regarding what happened in France during the 1960s as a mature or 
advanced structuralist train of thought that left a scowling Levi-Strauss 
standing on the station platform.  Because whether culture is a system of 
discourses, an assemblage of texts, or the Saussurian system of differences; 
and whether the systematicity itself resides in the brain or in the reading, we 
are still either dealing with social structure or else with a glob of jelly without 
any way to plug a verb onto the back of a noun or a means to discern figure 
from ground.  Texts do have structure, both apparently and intentionally.  
And texts have structure because practice emerges from and reproduces 
structures.  Structures only exist in practice, and have the same ontological 
status as language (which is the tricky part).  The task is to study how 
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practice generates and circulates structures, which is not a particularly flighty 
job to take on. 
 
March 2006: After writing much of the above, I fell asleep and had a 
thoroughly private experience.  I am standing in front of a chalk board 
drawing a line (this is an actual dream, whatever that is worth), and I affix 
an arrow to the end, knowing that the figure standing next to me—his/her 
face keeps shifting indefinitely—will not like it.  It is time’s arrow, or else an 
illustration of an argument’s valence.  At the other end of the board, he/she 
writes “Belongs to phylum Analida” at the top and then “lumbercus 
terrestrius” at the bottom (never mind why in high school I made a point of 
memorizing the Latin nomenclature of the earthworm).  Next, he/she 
smudges out the arrow at my end of the board and begins carefully 
constructing a dotted line downward between the two terms, the dots 
meticulously close together and marked with such care that drawing this 
ellipsis promises to take forever.   
I remember wondering if it’s supposed to represent a parable told by 
Lewis Carroll (1895), in which Tortoise tricked Achilles into a paper chase 
where each step took Achilles further from the finish line.  The race 
comprised the set of steps required to prove the Pythagorean theorem.  
Within a single logical inference, the Tortoise demonstrates, there are an 
infinite number of points where one can refuse to accept the logical 
connection itself.  One can accept all the relationships within a right triangle, 
but reaching the Pythagorean theorem requires the intervening step of first 
imagining and then accepting the idea of the relationship; and, in fact, even 
if one accepts that idea, one can still refuse to accept the connection 
between that idea and the conclusion.  It is an infinite race, so that each step 
takes one further from the finish line.  My interpretation is that inferences 
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have the materiality of social facts and are thus always revocable in 
practice.76 
“What is missing from this?” he/she asks, indicating the top of the 
board.   
“You’re doing Wittgenstein.77 The complete sentence is ‘These are 
objects which stand in relation to me as belonging to a category identified on 
the basis of certain selective qualities as phylum Analida.” I begin making 
close-set dots next to the ones already there, beginning at the bottom and 
moving toward the top.   
Now, I suppose that Freud would have found this dream to be a 
shockingly displaced meditation upon the worm, because dreams come from 
the irrational Unconscious.  Without a foundation text against which to read 
the dream, on the other hand, it is simply here to be dealt with on the 
evidence of its organization and dialogicality.  Even as I presented it, the text 
is already steeped in indexical relations to other texts that may or may not 
have been “on my mind” in the dream.  But what prompted me to think 
about meaning when I awoke began with the question “do I need to know 
 
76 I am also struck by a provocative connection between Carroll’s use of the 
Pythagorean Theorem and “The Phaedrus,” that most pesky of all Platonic dialogues, in which 
Socrates purports to demonstrate that a slave boy already knew, but only had to know that he 
knew, the Pythagorean Theorem.  The implication is that all learning is a remembering, not a 
penetration of something alien into one’s mind.  On the one hand, the scene isn’t much of a 
dialogue, seeing as how the very young SLAVE is bound to affirm everything Socrates says, 
making it a scene of control only pretending to be dialogue.  On the other hand, perhaps Plato 
was very much aware of dialogue after all.  Argumentation exists because the “internalization” 
of new knowledge cannot be coerced.  The argumentative quest to find common ground and 
build an agreement works through the communication of a set of experiences and 
understandings until the one nominally taking the role of student comes to the very conclusion 
that constituted the point of contention.  At that point, the student hears the initial strange 
idea again as the echo of something already known, making all learning a process of 
circulation and return (while non-learning is an infinite race).  In less rosy light, hegemony 
and the Stockholm Syndrome can also be seen as signs of this. 
77 Compare, possibly, the following (Wittgenstein 1958 [1936-1951]: ¶232): “Let us 
imagine a rule intimating to me which way I am to obey it; that is, as my eye travels along 
the line, a voice within me says: "This way!"—What is the difference between this process of 
obeying a kind of inspiration and that of obeying a rule? For they are surely not the same. In 
the case of inspiration I await direction. I shall not be able to teach anyone else my 'technique' 
of following the line. Unless, indeed, I teach him some way of hearkening, some kind of 
receptivity. But then, of course, I cannot require him to follow the line in the same way as I 
do.  These are not my experiences of acting from inspiration and according to a rule; they are 
grammatical notes.”  
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what this means?” I decided I did.  The simplest reading of the dream 
unpacks the deceptively-objective sentence “Lumbercus terrestrius belongs 
to phylum analida” to reveal the umpteen historical contingencies and 
possible contextualizations that render an object open to recontextualization.  
The elements that made the dream nag at me, however, have more to do 
with recalling the dusty classroom with its flickering dim florescent lights, the 
rubbing out of a trajectory, and the way the two-dimensional writing surface 
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